{"id":1061563,"date":"2026-06-08T06:15:12","date_gmt":"2026-06-08T04:15:12","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/jurisprudences\/supreme-court-of-mauritius-17-janvier-2020-2020-int-12-police-v-m-c-i-bibi\/"},"modified":"2026-06-08T06:15:12","modified_gmt":"2026-06-08T04:15:12","slug":"supreme-court-of-mauritius-17-janvier-2020-2020-int-12-police-v-m-c-i-bibi","status":"publish","type":"kji_decision","link":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/en\/jurisprudences\/supreme-court-of-mauritius-17-janvier-2020-2020-int-12-police-v-m-c-i-bibi\/","title":{"rendered":"Supreme Court of Mauritius, 17 janvier 2020, 2020 INT 12 – Police v M C I Bibi"},"content":{"rendered":"
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POLICE V Marie Christelle Isabelle BIBI 1 | P a g e<\/p>\n

Police v M C I Bibi<\/p>\n

2020 INT 12<\/p>\n

Cause Number: 16\/2019 IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF MAURITIUS (Criminal Side) In the matter of:- POLICE v\/s Marie Christelle Isabelle BIBI Judgment<\/p>\n

1] The Accused stands charged under three counts of the Information for the offence of \u2018Money Laundering\u2019 in breach of sections 3(1) (b) and 8 of the Financial Intelligence and Anti-Money Laundering Act (FIAMLA). She pleaded not guilty to counts 1, 2 and 3 and was represented by Mr A Juwaheer, of counsel at the trial thereat.<\/p>\n

2] The prosecution was represented by Mr A. Neerooa, Assistant Director of Public Prosecutions together with Ms Gya, State Counsel assisted by Police Prosecutor, Inspector Nundloll.<\/p>\n

Prosecution Evidence<\/p>\n

3] The evidence led by the prosecution rested on the production of a booklet of photographs, document A, a statement explaining the photographs, document B, an information against one Fabio Tony RIACCA, document C, the out of court statement of the accused, document D, the depositions of various police witnesses and one Fabio Tony RIACCA, witness no.14.<\/p>\n

4] Witness no.13, PC 4024 Rengasamy, deposed and produced a booklet of photographs, document A. He was not cross examined.<\/p>\n

POLICE V Marie Christelle Isabelle BIBI 2 | P a g e<\/p>\n

5] Witness no.1, Inspector Mohes, the main enquiring officer, deposed to the effect that witness no.13 took photographs under his instructions in presence of witness no.14, and he produced document B. He further contended that following a deposition made by witness no.14, in presence of his bar at law, at the ADSU Police on 26 th May 2017, accused was arrested in connection to a case of Money Laundering. He added that the accused was positively identified by the said Mr Riacca, who was prosecuted and convicted before the Intermediate Court vide case bearing cause number 660\/2018 and produced the said Information sheet in support, marked as document C. The relevant counts as per document C for which witness no.14 pleaded guilty concerning the present accused were counts 1, 2 and 3. Under cross examination, it transpired that accused denied knowing Mr Riacca at first but then stated in her out of court statement that she had met with the said Mr Riacca on two occasions and according to her version, she was remitted clothing each time. He maintained that as per the version of witness no.14, money was remitted to the accused on three occasions in the sums of Rs 40,000, Rs 70,000 and Rs 70,000.<\/p>\n

6] Witness no.10 deposed and confirmed that during the identification exercise carried out, accused was positively identified by witness no.14 and that accused denied knowing Mr Riacca. The witness stated under cross examination, that she was not aware what the accused had stated in her out of court statement in respect of the identification exercise.<\/p>\n

7] Witness no.5, deposed and produced the out of court statement of the accused, document D, which was recorded in presence of her bar at law. He was lengthily cross examined, and it transpired that the police did not verify the version of the accused as regards the parcels that were remitted to a detainee containing clothing allegedly. He maintained that the enquiry was conducted in a transparent manner.<\/p>\n

8] Witness no.14, one Fabio Tony Riacca, deposed under oath and stated that he was convicted with twelve counts of money laundering and was sentenced to three years penal servitude, out of which, there were three counts to which he pleaded guilty which involved the present accused. He added that the sums involved under these counts were Rs 40,000, Rs 70,000 and Rs 70,000 respectively. He explained that following a newspaper article, where he saw accused was arrested for a charge of money laundering following a big drug seizure case at the Port, he went to the police station with his bar at law. He identified accused to be the very person to whom he remitted these sums of money on the three different occasions. He further stated that it was one Ramesh, who called him and instructed him to go meet accused to hand over the money, which he had to collect behind a tree near London Way supermarket on two occasions and on another occasion, he collected the money at Vandeermesh Street, Rose Hill. Given that he had never met accused before, it was through phone and her voice that he recognised her at the meeting place. He explained that on the first occasion he met accused in March 2016 in Rose Hill at Gallery Evershine and remitted the sum of Rs 40,000 to her and then subsequently, he met her on a second occasion in March 2016, at Eau Coulee in a Lane where he remitted the sum of Rs 70,000 to her and on the third occasion, he remitted Rs 70,000 to her at Eau Coulee in May 2016. He confirmed that on each occasion he saw that there was money in<\/p>\n

POLICE V Marie Christelle Isabelle BIBI 3 | P a g e<\/p>\n

the bags but he did not count the money as he was told by the said Ramesh that the parcels contained the sums in question. He further stated that he was being paid each time for his participation.<\/p>\n

9] Under cross examination, he reiterated that when he saw in a newspaper article that accused was arrested for a case of money laundering, he went to seek the advice of a bar at law fearing that he might have been involved in unlawful transactions. He maintained his version throughout and denied that the parcels contained T-Shirt and jeans or a box of Adidas shoes. In respect of the question which arose under cross examination as regards the mobile phone he used, it was clarified under re-examination that in fact the witness did remit the mobile phone to the police for enquiry purposes.<\/p>\n

10] Prosecution closed its case.<\/p>\n

Defence case<\/p>\n

11] Accused exercised her constitutional right not to give evidence but called a defence witness, Mr Gianduth Seegoolam, Principal Prison Officer, who produced a certified copy of a list of items which accused remitted to Mr Peroumal Veeren, a detainee, from January 2016 to September 2016, document E. It transpired during cross examination that no item was remitted to Mr Veeren by the accused in the months of April, May and November 2016.<\/p>\n

12] Defence closed its case.<\/p>\n

Submission by Prosecution<\/p>\n

13] Mr A Neerooa, Assistant Director of Public Prosecutions, submitted that the elements of the offence under section 3 of the Financial Intelligence and Anti Money Laundering Act that the prosecution has to prove beyond reasonable doubt in the case at hand are threefold: (1) Received (the actus reus); (2) Property which in whole or in part directly or indirectly represent the proceeds of a crime; and (3) The accused had reasonable grounds to suspect that the property was derived in whole or in part, directly or indirectly from a crime (the mens rea). He submitted that on the evidence of witness no.14, the prosecution has been able to satisfy the first element of receiving as the accused did receive money on three different occasions from the said Mr Riacca, witness no.14. As regards the second element, that is property in whole or in part directly or indirectly represent the proceeds of a crime, he referred to section 6(3) of FIAMLA and the case of The Director of Public Prosecutions v A.A. Bholah [2011] UKPC 44 , to submit that the prosecution has discharged this burden as witness no.14, although a self-confessed accomplice has remained a truthful and credible witness and on the evidence of Insp Mohes, witness no.1, that following a big drug seizure at the Port, Mr Riacca had voluntarily surrendered himself to the police and confessed his involvement. He contended further that even though the defence tried to cast doubt on the sums of money that were allegedly transferred to the Accused by the said Riacca, the latter nonetheless maintained that he saw sums of money<\/p>\n

POLICE V Marie Christelle Isabelle BIBI 4 | P a g e<\/p>\n

in the plastic bag and in absence of any evidence to the contrary, there was no reason why his version ought not be believed. He submitted that the proceeds could only have been from drug transactions given the circumstances in which Mr Riacca surrendered to the police. As far as the third element is concerned, that is the accused had reasonable grounds to suspect that the property was derived in whole or in part, directly and indirectly from a crime, he submitted that given the facts and circumstances of the present case and the way the money was remitted by Riacca, a complete stranger to the accused on the three occasions, the Court can draw the appropriate inferences to establish that the element has been proven. He supported his contentions on the authorities of Audit v The State [2016 SCJ 282] and Coonjul v The State [2018 SCJ 97]. He submitted that the prosecution has been able to prove its case beyond reasonable against the accused under all three counts of the Information.<\/p>\n

Submision by Defence<\/p>\n

14] Mr Juwaheer, counsel for the accused submitted that the charges levelled against the accused should be dismissed in as much as the case for the prosecution was rigged with several shortcomings in the police enquiry breaching the right of the accused to benefit from a fair hearing, and that the version of the material prosecution witness contained inconsistencies and therefore cannot be relied upon. He referred to the authorities of Antoine v State 2009 SCJ 328; Mamode v The Queen 1991 MR 223; Rummun v The State [2013] UKPC 6; Excelerate Technology Limited v Cumberbach [2015] EWCH B1 (Mercantile) during his submissions.<\/p>\n

Analysis<\/p>\n

15] At the outset, having heard the testimonies of the police witnesses and having had the benefit of going through the documents produced by the prosecution including the out of court statements of the accused, this Court does not find that the police enquiry was conducted in an unfair manner such that the constitutional rights of the accused have been breached. On the contrary, this Court finds that the accused was afforded a fair enquiry and that at all times she was fully made aware of the charges levelled against her and the evidence available to the police.<\/p>\n

16] Court has carefully analysed all the evidence on record testimonial and documentary, assessed the demeanour of the witnesses, and duly considered the submissions of counsel for the prosecution and the defence.<\/p>\n

17] Court will first consider the law, and will thereafter proceed to analyse the evidence on record in line with the elements of the offence of money laundering as per section 3 (1) (b) of FIAMLA.<\/p>\n

The Law<\/p>\n

POLICE V Marie Christelle Isabelle BIBI 5 | P a g e<\/p>\n

18] Sections 3(1) (b), 6 and 8 of the Financial Intelligence and Anti-Money Laundering Act [FIAMLA] are reproduced below:<\/p>\n

Section 3(1)(b) of FIAMLA<\/p>\n

\u2018Any person who \u2013<\/p>\n

(b) receives, is in possession of, conceals, disguises, transfers, converts, disposes of, from or brings into Mauritius any property which is, or in whole or in part directly or indirectly represents, the proceeds of any crime,where he suspects or has reasonable grounds for suspecting that the property is derived or realized, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly from any crime, shall commit an offence.\u2019<\/p>\n

Section 6 of FIAMLA:<\/p>\n

\u2018(1) A person may be convicted of a money laundering offence notwithstanding the absence of a conviction in respect of a crime which generated the proceeds alleged to have been laundered.<\/p>\n

(2) Any person may, upon single information or upon separate information, be charged with and convicted of both the money laundering offence and of the offence which generated the proceeds alleged to have been laundered.<\/p>\n

(3) In any proceedings against a person for an offence under this Part, it shall be sufficient to aver in the information that the property is, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly the proceeds of a crime, without specifying any particular crime, and the Court, having regard to all the evidence, may reasonably infer that the proceeds were, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, the proceeds of a crime.\u2019[underlining mine]<\/p>\n

Section 8 of FIAMLA:<\/p>\n

(1)Any person who \u2013<\/p>\n

(a)Commits an offence under this Part; or (b)Disposes or otherwise deals with property subject to a forfeiture order under subsection (2)shall on conviction, be liable to a fine not exceeding 2 million rupees and to penalservitude for a term not exceeding 10 years.<\/p>\n

(2)Any property belonging to or in the possession or under the control of any person who is convicted of an offence under this Part shall be deemed, unless the contrary is proved, to be derived from a crime and the Court may, in addition to any penalty imposed, order that the property be forfeited.<\/p>\n

(3)Sections 150, 151 and Part X of the Criminal Procedure Act and the Probation of Offenders Act shall not apply to a conviction under this Part.<\/p>\n

POLICE V Marie Christelle Isabelle BIBI 6 | P a g e<\/p>\n

19] Under section 2 of FIAMLA \u2018crime\u2019 means \u2018an offence punishable by penal servitude; imprisonment for a term exceeding 10 days; and a fine exceeding 5,000 rupees\u2019 and \u2018property\u2019 means \u2018property of any kind, nature or description, whether moveable or immoveable, tangible or intangible and would include currency, bill, security bond, negotiable instrument or any instrument capable of being negotiated which is payable to bearer or endorsed payable to bearer, whether expressed in Mauritius currency or otherwise, as well as any balance held in a Mauritius currency or any other currency in accounts with any bank which carries on business in Mauritius or elsewhere.\u2019<\/p>\n

20] It remains a prerequisite, however, in line with the above definitions, that the crime must have derived in whole or in part, directly or indirectly property to satisfy the requirements of section 3(1) (b) of FIAMLA.<\/p>\n

21] Whereas, section 3(1)(b), creates the elements of the offence, section 6 sets out the procedural requirements to establish a prima facie case of money laundering. It can be read into section 6 that:(1) a person may be convicted of a money laundering offence irrespective of whether he is convicted in respect of a crime, which generated the proceeds alleged to have been laundered. Hence as in the case of Audit v The State [2016 SCJ 282], the appellant was convicted of money laundering, as she was the beneficiary of the proceeds of the crime committed by her husband; (2) a person may be charged of the money laundering offence and the offence which generated the proceeds alleged to have been laundered; and (3) it is sufficient to aver in the information that the property is, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly the proceeds of a crime, without specifying any particular crime, and the Court, having regard to all the evidence, may reasonably infer that the proceeds were, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, the proceeds of a crime. It stands to reason therefore, that the crime and\/or crimes and\/or criminal activities in question must have generated proceeds, whereby, \u2018proceeds\u2019 as per its ordinary dictionary meaning is \u2018money obtained from an event or activity\u2019. In fact, section 6(3) requires the prosecution to bring sufficient evidence from which the court may reasonably infer that the proceeds were, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, the proceeds of a crime. In other words, there must be a link between the crime and the proceeds.<\/p>\n

22] Thus, the elements that the prosecution has to prove to establish its case under section 3(1) (b) of FIAMLA are:<\/p>\n

(a) Receive any property; (b) in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, represents the proceeds of a crime; (c) the accused suspects or has reasonable grounds to suspect that the property is derived, in whole or in part directly or indirectly from a crime.<\/p>\n

23] It is an established principle that in criminal cases, the prosecution bears the burden of proof, since the accused as of right under section 10(2) of the Constitution and Article 6(2) of the European Convention of Human Rights, is presumed innocent until proven guilty. As per Viscount Sankey in Woolmington v DPP [1935 AC 462] (at pp481-482):<\/p>\n

POLICE V Marie Christelle Isabelle BIBI 7 | P a g e<\/p>\n

\u2018Throughout the web of English criminal law one golden thread is always to be seen, that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the prisoner\u2019s guilt\u2026No matter what the charge or where the trial, the principle that the prosecution must prove the guilt of the prisoner is part of the common law of England and no attempt to whittle it down can be entertained.\u2019<\/p>\n

24] Statutes, however, have departed from that rule in certain instances where certain facts are essentially or peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant. In those instances, the burden would then shift on the defence to prove on a balance of probabilities either the legal or the evidential burden.<\/p>\n

25] In this regard, I refer to the case of P v Moorbannoo [1972 MR 22], approved in Fakira AG v The State [2012 SCJ 466], where, it was held that:<\/p>\n

\u201cThe principle which section 10(11)(a) of the Constitution aims at expressing in a compendious and general form may be expounded thus: To say that an accused party is to be presumed innocent is really to say that the burden is on the prosecution to prove every ingredient of the charge against him. It has long ago been realised, however, that if that rule were strictly adhered to, many acts and omissions which the Legislature deems of the utmost importance to prohibit for the public good would have to be left unpunished, because the prohibition would be incapable of enforcement, and there has from early times been elaborated a qualification to the rule which is, that facts which bring a defendant within the ambit of a particular exception, if they are peculiarly or exclusively within his knowledge, should be regarded as matters which it is for him to establish.\u201d As in R v Johnstone [2003] 1 WLR 1736, Lord Nicholls held \u2018the extent to which the burden on the accused relates to facts which, if they exist, are readily provable by him as matters within his own knowledge or to which he has ready access.\u2019<\/p>\n

26] In view of the above, once the prosecution has discharged the necessary burdens of proof as per sections 3(1) (b) and 6 of FIAMLA,the reversal of the burden on the accused to prove certain facts, as per section 10(11)(a) of the Constitution, would not be inconsistent with section 10(2)(a) and section 10(7) of the Constitution.[Re: Abongo L.A. v The State [2009 SCJ 81], quoting Lobogun v State [2006 MR 63]]. Henceforth, in such an instance, the burden would shift on the defence once the prosecution has been able to establish the three elements of the offence under section 3 of FIAMLA.<\/p>\n

On the merits of the case<\/p>\n

Summary of the facts<\/p>\n

27] On the facts of the case, the accused was arrested in conjunction with three charges of money laundering following a declaration made by one Mr Riacca, witness no.14, who surrendered himself to the police having read an article in respect of a big drug seizure at the Port. Mr Riacca, witness no.14, implicated the accused in his deposition to the police and was prosecuted before the Intermediate Court for 12 counts of money laundering, out<\/p>\n

POLICE V Marie Christelle Isabelle BIBI 8 | P a g e<\/p>\n

of which three counts concerned the remittance of money to the accused in the case at hand. He had pleaded guilty, was convicted and is serving a custodial sentence.<\/p>\n

28] It was argued by the defence that the deposition of witness no.14, was rigged with inconsistencies and is therefore unreliable. The prosecution on the other hand, insisted that even though witness no.14\u2019s testimony must be treated with caution as he is a self- confessed accomplice, his testimony can only be found to be most reliable in that throughout his testimony he remained truthful and credible and his testimony has remained unshaken under cross examination.<\/p>\n

29] This Court has carefully perused the testimony of witness no.14 and has given itself the appropriate warning of the dangers of relying on the evidence of potential co-accused whether tried jointly or separately. Court also bears in mind that at common law, a confession in a criminal trial can only be evidence against the person who made it and also considers the universal rule which excludes out of court admissions being used to provide evidence against a co-accused, whether indicted jointly or separately. However, having regard to the case of R v Hayter [2005] 1 WLR 605, where the confession of a co- defendant in a murder case was admissible and relevant against another co-accused, this Court finds that it can use the confession and conviction of witness no.14, in deciding the guilt of the present accused, so long as the version of witness no.14, is found to be credible and reliable.<\/p>\n

30] The above being established this Court will now consider the evidence on record in line with the elements of the offence. After careful analysis of the version of the prosecution and the out of court statement of the accused, Court finds for the reasons that would unfold in the following paragraphs that Mr Riacca has remained a credible and reliable witness throughout his testimony in Court and so, in spite of the fact that his memory had to be refreshed during his testimony.<\/p>\n

Evidence on record and The elements of the offence<\/p>\n

a. Received (actus reus)<\/p>\n

31] On the evidence of Mr Riacca, whose testimony has remained unshaken under cross examination that he remitted the money to the accused on three different occasions, this Court finds that the accused did receive the money on three different occasions as per Counts 1, 2 and 3. In the circumstances, the voluntary act of receiving the money satisfies the actus reus of the offence, Court finds that the prosecution has been able to prove the first element of the offence against the accused.<\/p>\n

b. In whole or in part, directly or indirectly, represents the proceeds of a crime 32] This leads us to the predicate offence, which in criminal law terms, is a crime that provides resources for, or contains some of the elements of, a more serious crime. Although, it is a well established principle that the prosecution need not specify any<\/p>\n

POLICE V Marie Christelle Isabelle BIBI 9 | P a g e<\/p>\n

specific crime or criminal activity which generated the proceeds of crime for the purposes of FIAMLA, it is nonetheless, good practice, for same to be provided where the proceeds can be linked to a particular crime or criminal activity. In this regard, I refer to the Privy Council decision of The Director of Public Prosecutions v A.A. Bholah [2011] UKPC 44, where it was held that the prosecution does not have the burden of proving any particular crime, the relevant passage is quoted below:<\/p>\n

\u201c33. The Board has therefore concluded that proof of a specific offence was not required in order to establish guilt under section 17(1) of ECAMLA. It is sufficient for the purposes of that subsection that it be shown that the property possessed, concealed, disguised, or transferred etc represented the proceeds of any crime \u2013 in other words any criminal activity \u2013 and that it is not required of the prosecution to establish that it was the result of a particular crime or crimes. In light of this conclusion it follows that a failure to identify and prove a specific offence as the means by which the unlawful proceeds were produced is not a breach of section 10(2)(b) of the Constitution. In the Board\u2019s view, that section requires that the nature of the offence of which the accused person must be informed is that with which he is charged, in this case the offence of money laundering. Proof of a particular crime is not an essential \u201celement\u201d of the offence of money laundering.\u201d [underlining is mine]<\/p>\n

33] In this regard, Court refers to section 6(3) of FIAMLA discussed above. During the evidence of the police witnesses and that of Mr Riacca, it came to light that the present case was connected to a drug dealing case. Thus, on the evidence of witness no.14, it became apparent that the money which was collected by the latter and remitted to the accused could only have been proceeds of crime and\/or from illegal activity or activities, in the present case that of drug dealing. This is so as witness no.14 stated that on two occasions he collected the money contained in a plastic bag left under a tree behind London Way supermarket in Pointe aux Sables and on one occasion he collected a plastic bag containing money under a tree at Vandeermesh Street, Rose Hill; and each time he was contacted on his mobile phone by one Ramesh whom he had never met and who gave him instructions as to where to collect the money. The said Ramesh also gave him the contact details of the Accused and instructed him to remit the said sums of money to the Accused on every occasion. Moreover, the manner in which the sums of money were transferred to the accused, that is on one occasion near Gallery Evershine in Rose Hill and on two occasions, on a public road, in a residential area in Eau Coulee, clearly depict that there was something suspicious about the money transactions in question. In respect of the value transferred, witness no.14, did state that he did see sums of money wrapped in the plastic bags and was told by the said Ramesh of the amount contained in the bags on each occasion. In addition to that there is the evidence of Insp Mohes to the effect that the present case was connected to a big drug seizure case at the Port. All these evidences when considered as a whole strengthen the fact that the sums of money transferred to the accused by witness no.14 could only have been proceeds of crime.<\/p>\n

34] Therefore, Court finds for the above reasons that the prosecution has been able to prove the second element of the offence against the accused.<\/p>\n

POLICE V Marie Christelle Isabelle BIBI 10 | P a g e<\/p>\n

c. Reasonable grounds to suspect 35] The third and most important element is the mental element \u2018reasonable ground to suspect\u2019, which has been elaborated and explained in the Chambers case of Manraj and Others v ICAC 2003 SCJ 75. I find it apt to quote an extract of the Learned Judge\u2019s judgment, which I find appropriate and relevant. It reads as follows:- \u201c……..First, the suspicion should be reasonable: King v Gardner (1979) 71 Cr. App. R. 13; Prince [1981] Crim. L. R. 638. Second reasonability should be gauged not from the personal point of view……… It should be appreciated from the objective standard, the point of view of a dispassionate bystander: Inland Revenue Commissioners v Rossminster Ltd [1980] A.C. 952. Finally, and importantly, the suspicion should be based on facts: King v Gardner (supra); Prince (supra); Ware v Matthew February 11, 1981, 1978 W. No. 1780 (Lexis). The facts relied on should be such as are consistent with the implication of the suspect in the crime: Pedro v Diss [1981] 2 All ER 59, D.C.; [1981] Crim. L.R. 236.\u201d 36] Of equal relevance is the following extract from Antoine v The State [2009 SCJ 328]: \u201cSince suspicion has to be based on facts, it is the duty of the Court to analyse the whole of the evidence on record in order to determine whether or not it can be inferred, from the facts and circumstances of the case, that the accused reasonably suspected that the proceeds were proceeds of crime.\u201d 37] Having carefully analysed all the prosecution evidence on record, including the defence statement and the memo from prison produced, Court finds that on the evidence on record it can reasonably infer that the accused had reasonable grounds to suspect that the sums of money on each occasion were proceeds of crime. The record makes it clear that the said Mr Riacca was a complete stranger to the accused and yet this did not stop the accused from meeting the said Riacca on three different occasions after having merely been contacted through phone. The large sums of money contained in plastic bags were remitted to her in public places by Mr Riacca which she accepted and received on every occasion; the accused did not check the contents of the bag nor did she count the money that she was receiving from Mr Riacca on every occasion. Furthermore, it is not in dispute that the accused did meet Mr Riacca on more than one occasion in spite of Mr Riacca being a stranger to her as she herself mentioned in her statement given to the police dated 10 th<\/p>\n

September 2017 in presence of her bar at law. It can be gathered from the said statement that she lied when she was confronted with Mr Riacca during the identification exercise as she denied knowing Mr Riacca, but in her out of court statement, she mentioned that she met him on two occasions but did know his name. The accused went further to explain that she went to visit one Peroumal Veeren who told her that an unknown person would come to remit to her a parcel containing a pair of jeans and a t-shirt for him. Accused cannot claim ignorance, the more so since a close analysis of the prison records clearly gave the lie to her. The periods she mentioned that she received clothing and shoes to be remitted to Mr Veeren did not tally with the dates and items handed over to Mr Veeren during her prison visits. In fact, it is clear that her version as per her statement cannot be believed and is neither here nor there. The Accused for her part has failed to rebut any of the prosecution evidence. This Court finds that it can safely rely on the prosecution\u2019s evidence<\/p>\n

POLICE V Marie Christelle Isabelle BIBI 11 | P a g e<\/p>\n

to infer that the accused had reasonable grounds to suspect that the money was derived in whole or in part, directly or indirectly from a crime.<\/p>\n

38] Court, therefore, finds that the prosecution has been able to prove the third element of the offence against the accused. Conclusion 39] Having found that the prosecution has been able to satisfy all the elements of the offence against the accused, this Court in absence of any evidence from the Accused to the contrary, finds on the application of the well-established principle in Andoo M v The Queen [1989 SCJ 257], where it was held \u201cThis Court has repeatedly stressed that the unsworn statement of an accused is only evidence of what he told the Police. Where the evidence for the prosecution establishes a strong and unshaken prima facie case and the accused chooses not to swear to his statement and expose himself to cross examination, the trial court is perfectly entitled to conclude that the Prosecution evidence remains unrebutted. It is of course true that the burden of proving the guilt of an accused squarely lies on the Prosecution and that the accused is entitled to remain silent. His right to silence, however, is exercised at his risk and peril when, at the close of the case for the prosecution, a prima facie case has been clearly established since the burden then shifts on him to satisfy the Court that it should not act on the evidence adduced by the Prosecution. We need only repeat what was said by Sir A. He rchenroder CJ in Ramkalawon v R, [1914 MR 124], namely that the observation of Beccaria should never be forgotten \u2013 \u201cimperfect proofs, from which the accused might clear himself, and does not, become perfect\u201d, that the prosecution has been able to prove its case beyond reasonable under each of counts 1, 2 and 3 of the Information against the accused. 40] Court, accordingly, finds the Accused guilty as charged under each of Counts 1, 2 and 3 of the Information.<\/p>\n

Judgment delivered by Ms Navina Parsuramen Magistrate Intermediate Court (Criminal Side) Dated this 17 th January 2020<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Supreme Court of Mauritius – public domain<\/em><\/p>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

POLICE V Marie Christelle Isabelle BIBI 1 | P a g e Police v M C I Bibi 2020 INT 12 Cause Number: 16\/2019 IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF MAURITIUS (Criminal Side) In the matter of:- POLICE v\/s Marie Christelle Isabelle BIBI Judgment 1] The Accused stands charged under three counts of the Information for the offence of \u2018Money Laundering\u2019…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":0,"template":"","meta":[],"kji_country":[92666],"kji_court":[92667],"kji_chamber":[127763],"kji_year":[41198],"kji_subject":[7646],"kji_keyword":[8460,92684,15757,8066,15594],"kji_language":[7611],"class_list":["post-1061563","kji_decision","type-kji_decision","status-publish","hentry","kji_country-maurice","kji_court-supreme-court-of-mauritius","kji_chamber-mrs-n-parsuramen-magistrate-intermediate-court","kji_year-41198","kji_subject-divers","kji_keyword-janvier","kji_keyword-marie","kji_keyword-mauritius","kji_keyword-police","kji_keyword-supreme","kji_language-anglais"],"yoast_head":"\nSupreme Court of Mauritius, 17 janvier 2020, 2020 INT 12 - Police v M C I Bibi - Ma\u00eetre Hassan Kohen, avocat en droit p\u00e9nal \u00e0 Paris<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/en\/jurisprudences\/supreme-court-of-mauritius-17-janvier-2020-2020-int-12-police-v-m-c-i-bibi\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Supreme Court of Mauritius, 17 janvier 2020, 2020 INT 12 - Police v M C I Bibi\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"POLICE V Marie Christelle Isabelle BIBI 1 | P a g e Police v M C I Bibi 2020 INT 12 Cause Number: 16\/2019 IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF MAURITIUS (Criminal Side) In the matter of:- POLICE v\/s Marie Christelle Isabelle BIBI Judgment 1] The Accused stands charged under three counts of the Information for the offence of \u2018Money Laundering\u2019...\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/en\/jurisprudences\/supreme-court-of-mauritius-17-janvier-2020-2020-int-12-police-v-m-c-i-bibi\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Ma\u00eetre Hassan Kohen, avocat en droit p\u00e9nal \u00e0 Paris\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"26 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/en\\\/jurisprudences\\\/supreme-court-of-mauritius-17-janvier-2020-2020-int-12-police-v-m-c-i-bibi\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/en\\\/jurisprudences\\\/supreme-court-of-mauritius-17-janvier-2020-2020-int-12-police-v-m-c-i-bibi\\\/\",\"name\":\"Supreme Court of Mauritius, 17 janvier 2020, 2020 INT 12 - Police v M C I Bibi - Ma\u00eetre Hassan Kohen, avocat en droit p\u00e9nal \u00e0 Paris\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/en\\\/#website\"},\"datePublished\":\"2026-06-08T04:15:12+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/en\\\/jurisprudences\\\/supreme-court-of-mauritius-17-janvier-2020-2020-int-12-police-v-m-c-i-bibi\\\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/en\\\/jurisprudences\\\/supreme-court-of-mauritius-17-janvier-2020-2020-int-12-police-v-m-c-i-bibi\\\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/en\\\/jurisprudences\\\/supreme-court-of-mauritius-17-janvier-2020-2020-int-12-police-v-m-c-i-bibi\\\/#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/en\\\/criminal-law-attorneys-in-paris-counsel-and-strategic-defense\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Jurisprudences\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/en\\\/jurisprudences\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":3,\"name\":\"Supreme Court of Mauritius, 17 janvier 2020, 2020 INT 12 – Police v M C I Bibi\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/en\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/en\\\/\",\"name\":\"Kohen Avocats\",\"description\":\"Ma\u00eetre Hassan Kohen, avocat p\u00e9naliste \u00e0 Paris, intervient exclusivement en droit p\u00e9nal pour la d\u00e9fense des particuliers, notamment en mati\u00e8re d\u2019accusations de viol. 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