{"id":933438,"date":"2026-05-21T02:09:18","date_gmt":"2026-05-21T00:09:18","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/jurisprudences\/keith-kennaugh-v-the-information-commissioner-3\/"},"modified":"2026-05-21T02:09:18","modified_gmt":"2026-05-21T00:09:18","slug":"keith-kennaugh-v-the-information-commissioner-3","status":"publish","type":"kji_decision","link":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/en\/jurisprudences\/keith-kennaugh-v-the-information-commissioner-3\/","title":{"rendered":"Keith Kennaugh v The Information Commissioner"},"content":{"rendered":"
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NCN: [2026] UKFTT 00648 (GRC) Case Reference: FT\/EA\/2024\/0349\/GDPR First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber) Information Rights Heard by Cloud Video Platform Heard on: 30 April 2026 Decision given on: 01 May 2026 Before JUDGE HARRIS Between KEITH KENNAUGH Applicant and THE INFORMATION COMMISSIONER Respondent Representation: For the Applicant: Mr Kennaugh, representing himself For the Respondent: Samuel Willis Decision: The Application is Dismissed. REASONS Background to the Application 1. These proceedings concern an application (the \u201cApplication\u201d) under section 166(2) of the Data Protection Act 2018 (\u201cDPA 2018\u201d) for an order to progress the Applicant\u2019s complaint against\u00a0West Yorkshire Combined Authority (\u201cWYCA\u201d)\u00a0regarding\u00a0the processing of his personal data. The complaint was\u00a0submitted\u00a0to the Information Commissioner (\u201cIC\u201d) on\u00a019 June 2023\u00a0and was dealt with under reference IC-239469-C4K7. 2. Following submission of the Applicant\u2019s complaint, on 14 August 2023, the IC\u2019s case officer wrote to the Applicant and requested that he provided evidence of his complaint, in order for the IC to consider the matter further. In particular, the case officer asked for copies of correspondence with WYCA and any final response. The Applicant responded on the same day and provided some correspondence with the WYCA. 3. On 15 August 2023, the case officer advised the Applicant to raise a formal complaint with WYCA before bringing the matter to the IC. 4. The Applicant and the case officer exchanged emails between 15 and 22 August 2023, clarifying the complaint made to WYCA and confirming that a final response had not been issued. 5. A telephone call between the case officer and the Data Protection Officer (DPO) at WYCA to discuss the complaint took place on 23 August 2023. An update was sent to the Applicant about this. 6. Also, on 23 August 2023 the DPO sent copies of the WYCA\u2019s response to the Applicant\u2019s complaint to the case officer. The case officer subsequently obtained permission from the DPO to share this with the Applicant. 7. On 5 December 2023, WYCA\u2019s response was shared with the Applicant. The Applicant responded on the same day and advised that he had requested a copy of the warrant authorising the interception of his emails and the Decision Notice made under the WYCA\u2019s Unreasonable Behaviour Policy, and that these documents were not provided in WYCA\u2019s response. 8. On the same day, the Applicant also made a Data Subject Access Request (\u201cDSAR\u201d) to the WYCA requesting a copy of a log of his emails received by the WYCA. WYCA provided a response to the Applicant on 19 December 2023 informing him that the requested information was not held by the WYCA. 9. On 21 December 2023, the Applicant contacted the IC\u2019s case officer and advised that the WYCA had not provided him with a record of his correspondence, nor a copy of the Decision Notice previously requested. 10. On 9 January 2024, the case officer emailed the Applicant to inform him that she hadcontacted the WYCA to discuss his outstanding concerns. She informed theApplicant that she would be in touch with him with an update as soon as she had spokento the WYCA. 11. On 11 January 2024, the case officer obtained permission from the Applicant to forward an email thread to the DPO which detailed his outstanding concerns. The correspondence was sent to the DPO on 12 January 2024. 12. On 26 January 2024, the DPO responded to the issues raised in the Applicant\u2019s email. 13. The Applicant exchanged emails with the case officer on 16 February 2024, who confirmed that they were still waiting on a response from the DPO. 14. On 22 February 2024 and 27 April 2024, the Applicant emailed WYCA, copying in the IC, and expressed further concerns regarding his complaint. 15. On 1 May 2024, the Applicant was informed that the complaint had been re-assigned to a different case officer and that an outcome would be provided upon review of the file. 16. The Applicant sent further emails to the case officer between 10 May 2024 and 7 June 2024 and reiterated his concerns about the WYCA\u2019s response to his SAR. 17. On 20 June 2024, having reviewed the information provided by the Applicant and WYCA, the IC\u2019s case officer wrote to the Applicant. The case officer was of the view that WYCA had considered the Applicant\u2019s request and provided an appropriate response, and as such there was nothing further that WYCA could be expected to do in relation to his request. The case officer was also satisfied with WYCA\u2019s response in relation to the Applicant\u2019s other concern about WYCA\u2019s processing of his personal data. Information on next steps and judicial remedies was provided to the Applicant. 18. The Applicant responded on 24 June 2024 and expressed his dissatisfaction with the outcome and requested further information from the case officer. 19. On 10 July 2024, the case officer sent the Applicant a final response. It was reiterated that the IC did not intend to take the matter further but that his request for information had been passed to the IC\u2019s Information Access Team to respond separately. The Applicant was informed of his rights to request a case review, or bring a service complaint in the event he was dissatisfied with the outcome to his complaint, or the way in which his case was handled. The Application 20. The\u00a0Applicant\u00a0wrote to the Tribunal on 16 August 2024 applying for an order under section 166 DPA 2018. In his grounds for the Application, the Applicant\u00a0stated:\u00a0 \u201cI am writing to apply for an order under section 166 of the Data Protection Act 2018 as I do not believe the commissioner has taken appropriate steps to respond to the complaint. The complaint relates to a policy operated by West Yorkshire Combined Authority in which members of staff are entitled to deem an individual as "Unreasonable" and having so deemed, they are able to divert to themselves any and all email sent by that individual to the authority and thereby ensure that it is ignored. This includes mail addressed personally to the mayor or deputy mayor. This means that, for example, if a member of staff was anti semitic, and they identified a service user as Jewish, then they could deem them "Unreasonable" and thereby deny them any service or democratic representation. I have been deemed "Unreasonable" without fair warning, by unspecified staff for reasons which are unclear. The request sought a copy of the decision to impose that policy, the evidence supporting that decision or indeed any record whatsoever of due process. WYCA says that they do not have any. This is simply irrational. If all that there is is the settings on their mail server that cause all my mail to go to the unspecified individuals, then that is a record to which the request applies. Likewise if they have sent a note out asking people to forward it manually. If there is any semblance of proper process, then there should be a formal written decision, showing who made it and for what reasons. Apparently there is none of it. It is not clear what action the Commissioner has taken. They only say they are satisfied that the authority has considered the response and responded. They appear to have done nothing more than hold a few telephone conversations with the unspecified individual, and they've refused to divulge any of the correspondence or notes on the grounds it was given in confidence where there is no discernible reason why it should be confidential, unless the unspecified individuals actually are the crooks that they appear to be and the Commissioner is sympathetic to their cause. That seems extremely unlikely. Finally, they failed to inform me of my rights under Section 166, as required by s165(c).\u201d 21. The Application was not made in the prescribed form. I am aware that the Upper Tribunal (\u201cUT\u201d) is currently considering an appeal (reference UA-2025-000372-GIA) in relation to the use of forms in connection with earlier case management decisions in this Application. However, it appears to me that the outcome of the UT appeal is not determinative and, indeed, has no bearing on the substantive matters in issue in this Application, so I have proceeded to determine it without waiting for the appeal to the UT to be concluded. The IC\u2019s Response to the Application 22. The IC filed a response to the Application on 6 August 2025, opposing the Application. In, summary, it made the following points: 1. The relief available from the Tribunal on an application under section 166 DPA 2018 only applies where it is satisfied that the IC has failed in some procedural respect to comply with the requirements of section 166(1) DPA 2018, limited solely to those orders that are set out in section 166(2). 2. The IC has taken steps to investigate and respond to this complaint and has provided an outcome to the Applicant\u2019s complaint on 20 June 2024. Accordingly, the IC submits that he has taken steps to comply with the procedural requirements set out in section 166(1) of the DPA 2018, and there is therefore no basis for the Tribunal to make an order under section 166(2) DPA 2018. 3. If the Applicant wishes to seek an order of compliance against the controller for breach of his data rights, the correct route for him to do so is by way of separate civil proceedings in the County Court or High Court under section 167 of the DPA18. The Applicant\u2019s Reply 23. The Applicant filed a response to the Response on 18 August 2025. In this he explained that that the case is about the operation of WYCA\u2019s Unreasonable Behaviour policy, under which correspondence from a complainant deemed \u2018unreasonable\u2019 is directed to a single point of contact within WYCA. He said that the principal purpose of the information request was to find the lawful authority for this and what he described as \u201cthe interception of these emails\u201d. 24. In summary, the Applicant made the following points: 1. The Applicant made a number of complaints to the Respondent about WYCA but the Respondent refers only to a specific complaint; he says that \u201cthe first question to be determined is of whether the Commissioner is entitled to disregard subsequent complaints about a data controller just because they have a case open on that data controller.\u201d 2. The IC has not shown any evidence of having engaged with any data controller, whether WYCA or not. He states \u201cthe repeated failures and ongoing delays suggest that the Commissioner was dealing with the Policing and Crime Office\u201d. 3. The IC has not included WYCA\u2019s response to the information request and has refused to do so relying on section 132 DPA 2018. He argues that the consent described in section 132(2)(a) is implicit in the request for the information. 4. WYCA\u2019s only known response to the IC\u2019s investigation was sent to the IC on 23 August 2023 and passed to the Applicant on 5 December 2023. The Applicant replied on the same day to explain why the response was inadequate. The IC\u2019s case officer said they had relayed those concerns to WYCA. 5. The IC\u2019s response to the Applicant\u2019s complaint dated 20 June 2024 referred only to the initial complaint \u201cnot the ongoing concerns raised in the course of proceedings\u201d. 6. There was nothing on the record to suggest there was no more that WYCA could do. The Applicant said \u201cWere there a written assurance from an identifiable data protection officer stating clearly what they understood the request was asking for and stating that they had no information within the scope of that request, or citing exemptions for why they should not disclose it, then that might give grounds to justify the commissioner\u2019s conclusion\u201d. He further argued that \u201cGiven that the Commissioner had accepted the appellant\u2019s ongoing concerns and relayed them to the authority, it is not an appropriate step to then walk away without a further response from the authority\u201d. 7. The Applicant states \u201cthe essence of the Respondent\u2019s argument appears to be that the \u201cBroad discretion\u201d they refer to entitles them to accept anything as a valid response to a data request; they might respond with a shopping list or a printer test page and the commissioner can accept it as valid. Broad discretion has to have limits: the response provided by the authority is one that no reasonable person, in view of the relevant facts, would accept as a valid response to the information required.\u201d 8. The Applicant asserts that in its response to his complaint the IC has \u201caccepted without question a dishonest account of events by West Yorkshire Police and as a consequence have judged the appellant to be utterly unreasonable on the basis of his expectation that the General Data Protection Regulations should apply. That assessment appears to form the basis of the Commissioner\u2019s decisions across multiple cases: the Commissioner knows that the appellant is unreasonable, therefore anything the authority might do is a reasonable response to the appellant\u2019s abject unreasonableness.\u201d Legal framework 25. Section 165 DPA 2018 sets out the right of data subjects to complain to the IC about infringement of their rights under the data protection legislation. Under section 166 DPA 2018 a data subject can make an application to this Tribunal for an order as follows: \u201cOrders to progress complaints (1) This section applies where, after a data subject makes a complaint under section 165 or Article 77 of the UK GDPR, the Commissioner – (a) fails to\u00a0take\u00a0appropriate steps\u00a0to respond to the complaint, (b) fails to\u00a0provide the complainant with information about progress on the complaint, or of the outcome of the complaint, before the end of the period of 3 months beginning when the Commissioner received the complaint, or (c) if the Commissioner's consideration of the complaint is not concluded during that period,\u00a0fails to\u00a0provide the complainant with such information during a\u00a0subsequent\u00a0period of 3 months. (2) The Tribunal may, on an application by the data subject, make an order requiring the Commissioner – (a) to take\u00a0appropriate steps\u00a0to respond to the complaint, or (b) to inform the complainant of progress on the complaint, or of the outcome of the complaint, within a period specified in the order.\u201d 26. The Tribunal can only make an order under section 166(2) if one of the conditions at section 166(1)(a), (b) or (c) is met. There have been\u00a0a number of\u00a0appeal decisions which have considered the scope of section 166. It is clearly\u00a0established\u00a0that the Tribunal\u2019s powers are limited to procedural issues, rather than the merits or substantive outcome of a complaint. 27. Section 165 deals with the complainant\u2019s right to make a complaint and states that: \u201c(4) If the Commissioner receives a complaint under subsection (2), the Commissioner must\u2014 (a)take\u00a0appropriate steps\u00a0to respond to the complaint, (b)inform the complainant of the outcome of the complaint, (c)inform the complainant of the rights under section 166, and (d)if asked to do so by the complainant, provide the complainant with further information about how to pursue the complaint. (5) The reference in subsection (4)(a) to taking\u00a0appropriate steps\u00a0in response to a\u00a0complaint\u00a0includes\u2014 (a)investigating the subject matter of the complaint, to the extent\u00a0appropriate, and (b)informing the complainant about progress on the complaint, including about whether further investigation or co-ordination\u00a0with\u00a0 foreign\u00a0designated authority is necessary.\u201d 28. In the case of\u00a0Killock\u00a0v Information Commissioner\u00a0[2022] 1 WLR 2241, the Upper Tribunal at paragraph 74 stated – "\u2026It is plain from the statutory words that, on an application under section 166, the Tribunal will not be concerned and has no power to deal with the merits of the complaint or its outcome. We reach this conclusion on the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory\u00a0language\u00a0but it is supported by the Explanatory Notes to the Act which regard the section 166 remedy as reflecting the provisions of article 78(2) which are procedural. Any attempt by a party to divert a tribunal from the procedural failings listed in section 166 towards a decision on the merits of the complaint must be firmly resisted by tribunals." 29. Mostyn J in the High Court in\u00a0R (Delo) v Information Commissioner\u00a0[2023] 1 WLR 1327, paragraph 57 – "The treatment of such complaints by the commissioner, as before, remains within his exclusive discretion. He decides the scale of an investigation of a complaint to the extent that he thinks\u00a0appropriate. He decides therefore whether an investigation is to be short,\u00a0narrow\u00a0and light or whether it is to be long,\u00a0wide\u00a0and heavy. He decides what weight, if any, to give to the ability of a data subject to apply to a court against a data controller or processor under article 79. And then he decides whether he shall, or shall not, reach a conclusive determination…\u201d. 30. Mostyn J\u2019s decision in\u00a0Delo\u00a0was upheld by the Court of Appeal ([2023] EWCA\u00a0Civ\u00a01141) \u2013 \u201cFor the reasons I have given I would uphold the conclusion of the judge at [85] that the legislative scheme requires the Commissioner to receive and consider a complaint and then provides the Commissioner with a broad discretion as to whether to conduct a further investigation and, if so, to what extent. I would further hold, in agreement with the judge, that having done that much the Commissioner is entitled to conclude that it is unnecessary to determine whether there has been an infringement but sufficient to reach and express a view about the likelihood that this is so and to take no further action. By doing so the Commissioner discharges his duty to inform the complainant of the outcome of their complaint.\u201d (paragraph 80, Warby LJ). 31. The decision of the Upper Tribunal in\u00a0Cortes v Information Commissioner\u00a0(UA-2023-001298-GDPA) which applied both\u00a0Killock\u00a0and\u00a0Delo\u00a0confirmed that the nature of section 166 is that of a limited procedural provision only. \u201cThe Tribunal is tasked with specifying appropriate \u201csteps to respond\u201d and not with assessing the appropriateness of a response that has already been given (which would raise substantial regulatory questions susceptible only to the supervision of the High Court)\u2026.As such, the fallacy in the Applicant\u2019s central argument is laid bare. If Professor Engelman is correct, then any data subject who is dissatisfied with the outcome of their complaint to the Commissioner could simply allege that it was reached after an inadequate investigation, and thereby launch a collateral attack on the outcome itself with the aim of the complaint decision being re-made with a different outcome. Such a scenario would be inconsistent with the purport of Article 78.2, the heading and text of section 166 and the thrust of the decisions and reasoning in both\u00a0Killock\u00a0and Veale and R (on the application of Delo). It would also make a nonsense of the jurisdictional demarcation line between the FTT under section 166 and the High Court on an application for judicial review.\u201d\u00a0(paragraph 33). 32. The case of\u00a0Dr Michael Guy Smith v Information Commissioner\u00a0[2025] UKUT 74 (AAC), noted at paragraph 60 that \u201cit is for the Tribunal to decide, applying an objective test, if an \u201cappropriate step\u201d has been omitted, but observe that, in practice, that is unlikely to be the case where an \u2018outcome\u2019 has been produced. That is for two main reasons: first, because section 166 is a procedural provision and, as the principal mechanisms for enforcing rights or challenging the Commissioner are either claims against the data controller or judicial review of the Commissioner, section 166 should not be used to obtain \u2018by the back door\u2019 a remedy normally only available in those proceedings; secondly, because, if the Commissioner has already produced an outcome then, given the very wide discretion that the Commissioner has, both as to what and how to investigate and as to outcome, the scope for the Tribunal to say that an appropriate step has been omitted is limited.\u201d In considering this the Tribunal must, as set out in paragraph 85 of\u00a0Killick\u00a0\u201cwhen deciding objectively whether any (further) appropriate step needs to be taken by the Commissioner, take into account and give weight to the views of the Commissioner as an expert regulator.\u201d 33. Paragraph 85 of\u00a0Killick\u00a0reads as follows: \u201cHowever, in considering appropriateness, the Tribunal will be bound to take into consideration and give weight to the views of the Commissioner as an expert regulator. The GRC is a specialist tribunal and may deploy (as in Platts) its non-legal members appointed to the Tribunal for their\u00a0expertise. It is nevertheless our view that, in the sphere of complaints, the Commissioner has the institutional competence and is in the best position to decide what investigations she should undertake into any\u00a0particular issue, and how she should conduct those investigations. As Mr Milford emphasised, her decisions about these matters will be informed not only by the nature of the complaint itself but also by a range of other factors such as her own regulatory priorities, other investigations in the same subject area and her judgment on how to deploy her limited resources most effectively. Any decision of a Tribunal which\u00a0fails to\u00a0recognise the wider regulatory context of a complaint and to\u00a0demonstrate\u00a0respect for the special position of the Commissioner may be susceptible to appeal in this Chamber.\u201d 34. The Upper Tribunal also said in Smith at paragraph 136 \u201cIt is clear from Killock and Veale and Delo that challenges to the legal merits of the outcome of a complaint (and challenges to the adequacy of the Commissioner\u2019s reasons for his decision are also challenges to the legal merits) should be taken to the High Court on judicial review. They should not be \u2018dressed up\u2019 as procedural errors and brought as section 166 applications to the First-tier Tribunal\u2026 the appellant\u2019s complaints are in reality challenges to the merits of the Commissioner\u2019s outcome decision and, as such, they belonged in the High Court and not in the First-tier Tribunal.\u201d Procedural matters concerning the hearing 35. The hearing was held remotely by cloud video platform (CVP).\u00a0\u00a0The Tribunal was satisfied that it was fair and just to conduct the hearing in this way. 36. The Tribunal considered a hearing bundle (157 pages) and an authorities bundle (153 pages). It also had the benefit of s skeleton argument from Mr Willis for the IC. 37. It became apparent at the beginning of the hearing that the initial email from Mr Kennaugh dated 16 August 2024 had not been sent to the IC. Upon my forwarding this to the parties present in the hearing chat box, the IC had an opportunity to consider this and make submissions as to whether or not the hearing should proceed. The IC commented on the procedural fairness of not having seen what is, in effect, the Applicant\u2019s grounds before the hearing. Mr Kennaugh commented that he did not consider the issue of whether or not he had been informed of his rights was sufficiently significant to warrant adjourning and delaying the hearing further. Having heard from both parties, I considered that the only matter raised in that email which was not also raised in the Reply was the issue of whether IC had informed Mr Kennaugh of his rights under section 165. Accordingly, taking into account the overriding objective and, in particular, avoiding unnecessary formality and seeking flexibility in the proceedings and ensuring, so far as practicable, that the parties are able to participate fully in the proceedings, it appeared to me appropriate to proceed with the hearing rather than adjourning it as the parties had had an opportunity to understand the main thrust of each other's cases before the hearing. Evidence and submissions 38. We heard oral evidence from Mr Kennaugh, who also made submissions in the hearing. In summary, he made the following points: 1. His complaint concerned the decision by WYCA to impose an arrangement through which his communication with WYCA is through a single point of contact on the grounds of \u201cunreasonable behaviour\u201d. 2. He said that the IC had not looked at the response provided by WYCA to his request to see if it provides what was requested. 3. He expected the IC to instruct WYCA to provide the information requested. He was unsatisfied with the IC\u2019s response because the IC dismissed his complaint and said that WYCA had responded and that was good enough. 4. He is seeking from the Tribunal an order that the IC should order WYCA to provide the information requested. Specifically, he wants from WYCA a copy of the decision deeming him to be unreasonable and the evidence leading to that decision. 5. He said that the IC appears to have an entrenched view of him from earlier interactions and that this coloured their approach to responding to his complaint. He explained that this arose from an earlier incident where he reported crimes during the pandemic but did not include his date of birth and address on the form because the form asked for the victim\u2019s details and he did not consider himself to have been the victim. The IC found against him in that context and he said that this attitude has informed all the IC\u2019s decisions against him. 6. He said that the IC is supposed to enforce data protection regulations but has not. 7. He said that his complaint involved three separate information requests, relating to a warrant, evidence for it and processing of his data. He said that the IC had focused only on a single complaint, not subsequent complaints and clarifications about the same issues. 39. The IC, in summary, made the following submissions in its skeleton argument and at the hearing: 1. The Applicant has refused to use any of the Tribunal\u2019s forms and has not provided the IC with any supporting documents setting out the basis of his application. The parties are entitled to know the essentials of the other party\u2019s case in advance. 2. The response dated 20 June 2024 was in fact an outcome to the complaint, which was confirmed and reiterated in the response dated 10 July 2024. The Application is, in effect, a challenge to this outcome, which is an impermissible use of section 166. 3. The Applicant appears to be bringing a judicial review-style challenge to the outcome of his complaint and\/or the procedure which the IC followed in handling his complaint. This includes allegations of misdirection as to the application of UK GDPR, irrationality, bias and predetermination. If the Applicant wishes to challenge the outcome, whether on the grounds of legal or factual errors or the decision-making process leading to it, the Applicant can apply for permission for judicial review. The High Court is the appropriate forum for the challenge in this application, not the First-tier Tribunal. Alternatively, if the Applicant wishes to apply for a compliance order under section 167 of the DPA 2018, it is open to him to do so in the County Court or High Court, but not in this Tribunal. 4. It is within the IC's regulatory discretion when handling the section 165 complaint of 19 June 2023 to focus on the substance of that complaint not subsequent complaints. It is clear that the IC has undertaken investigation which falls well within the IC\u2019s discretion to do so and reached an outcome, so the Tribunal has limited power to order further steps. 5. There is no requirement on the IC to provide copies of evidence it has obtained from the public authority in investigating a complaint to the complainant, only to inform the complainant of progress and\/or an outcome. The issues 40. The key issue in dispute is whether the IC took appropriate steps in responding to the Applicant\u2019s complaint. 41. Other issues are whether an outcome to the Applicant complaint was issued and whether the Tribunal has the jurisdiction to grant the outcomes which the Applicant seeks. 42. The Applicant also complains that the IC did not inform him of his right to refer the matter to the Tribunal under section 165(4)(c). The Applicant commented that this possibly had prejudiced him given the tight timescale for applying for judicial review, but that it was not a big enough issue to warrant adjourning the hearing to deal with it. As the IC had not had notice of this point before the hearing, it did not make submissions on this other than to say that procedurally ordering the IC to take this step at this stage would not achieve anything. Discussion and conclusions 43. This Application is in relation to the Applicant\u2019s complaint reference IC-239469-C4K7. The Applicant may have made other complaints to the IC about WYCA, and I find that he did provide a number of comments and clarifications in the course of the IC dealing with this complaint, but this is the complaint before the Tribunal in the context of this Application. 44. The first question is whether the IC has provided an outcome to the Applicant\u2019s complaint.\u00a0The IC provided the Applicant with a response to his complaint on 20 June 2024 with a further response on 10 July 2024. \u00a0I consider that the response dated 20 June 2024 was in fact an outcome to the complaint, because\u00a0it provided\u00a0an answer to all outstanding issues and\u00a0demonstrated\u00a0that the IC had\u00a0given consideration to\u00a0whether there were other\u00a0appropriate steps\u00a0which could be taken to progress the Applicant\u2019s complaint.\u00a0\u00a0 45. Even if I am wrong on this,\u00a0I am satisfied that when taken together\u00a0with the response dated 10 July 2024 \u00a0these responses have provided an outcome to the Applicant\u2019s complaint, provided an answer to all outstanding issues and demonstrated that the IC had given consideration to whether there were other appropriate steps which could be taken to progress the Applicant\u2019s complaint. This is sufficient in my view to\u00a0demonstrate\u00a0that the IC has\u00a0complied with\u00a0the requirements of section 165(4). The fact that the Applicant does not agree with the outcome does not\u00a0render\u00a0it wrong in law.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 46. I have considered the steps taken by the IC to investigate and liaise with WYCA set out in the chronology of facts in the Response and also the criticisms of this approach set out in the Applicant\u2019s Reply. As a matter of fact I find it was not correct that there was no evidence that the IC had not engaged with WYCA. The Tribunal, as explained in the Court of Appeal decision in Delo referred to at paragraph 30 above, has a broad discretion to investigate to the extent it sees fit and I find that the engagement it had with WYCA falls well within this discretion. 47. The Applicant\u2019s primary concern in relation to appropriate steps appears to be that he did not consider it was appropriate for the IC to decide not to take the matter further once it had received a response from WYCA. At this point, the IC had determined that WYCA had provided an appropriate response, and as such there was nothing further that WYCA could be expected to do in relation to the Applicant's request. 48. I have taken into account the relevant passages of Cortes and Smith referred to above. The scope of the Tribunal\u2019s power under section 166(2) is to make an order specifying appropriate steps which the IC should take, not assessing the appropriateness of a response already given. Whilst the Tribunal can specify such steps after an outcome has been, for the reasons set out in Smith, in all the circumstances of this case I consider it is not appropriate to do so. Challenges to the adequacy of a response or outcome are ones which should be dealt with by judicial review. 49. It appears to me therefore that there are no further\u00a0appropriate steps\u00a0which the IC ought\u00a0reasonably to\u00a0take to progress the complaint.\u00a0\u00a0In making this decision I have given significant weight to the view of the IC as the expert regulator that there are no further\u00a0appropriate steps\u00a0he should have taken. 50. The\u00a0outcome\u00a0sought\u00a0by the Applicant\u00a0is also, in effect, challenging the substantive outcome of the complaint to the IC and the adequacy of WYCA\u2019s response. The Tribunal does not have power under section 166 to consider the merits or substantive outcome of a complaint. Section 166 is limited to narrow procedural issues and there is no further procedural failing in respect of which the Tribunal can\u00a0make a decision.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0In an application under section 166, the Tribunal has no power to direct the IC to investigate, in a particular way or at all, to take enforcement action to secure compliance with a request or\u00a0determine\u00a0whether or not\u00a0there has been a breach of the UK GDPR. I also agree with the IC\u2019s position that orders for compliance need to be\u00a0sought\u00a0through civil action. 51. Although this was not an issue dealt with at the hearing, I observe that orders under section 166(2) are procedural remedies which require the IC to take positive steps to progress an investigation. Those rights only arise where an investigation is ongoing. Where an investigation has been concluded, there is no ongoing investigation to progress, so it would be inappropriate to signpost a complainant to a course of action not open to them. 52. Because I consider that there was an outcome\u00a0determining\u00a0the complaint and that there were no further\u00a0appropriate steps\u00a0which should be taken by the IC in handling the complaint, I dismiss the Application. Signed:\u00a0Judge HarrisDate:\u00a0\u00a030 April 2026<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Sources officielles :<\/strong> consulter la page source<\/a><\/p>\n

Open Justice Licence v2.0 (The National Archives). Republication avec attribution. Computational analysis necessite accord complementaire.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

NCN: [2026] UKFTT 00648 (GRC) Case Reference: FT\/EA\/2024\/0349\/GDPR First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber) Information Rights Heard by Cloud Video Platform Heard on: 30 April 2026 Decision given on: 01 May 2026 Before JUDGE HARRIS Between KEITH KENNAUGH Applicant and THE INFORMATION COMMISSIONER Respondent Representation: For the Applicant: Mr Kennaugh, representing himself For the Respondent: Samuel Willis Decision: The Application is…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":0,"template":"","meta":[],"kji_country":[7608],"kji_court":[7609],"kji_chamber":[],"kji_year":[7610],"kji_subject":[7632],"kji_keyword":[7875,7694,7874,13402,7661],"kji_language":[7611],"class_list":["post-933438","kji_decision","type-kji_decision","status-publish","hentry","kji_country-royaume-uni","kji_court-first-tier-tribunal-general-regulatory-chamber-information-rights","kji_year-7610","kji_subject-penal","kji_keyword-applicant","kji_keyword-commissioner","kji_keyword-complaint","kji_keyword-response","kji_keyword-section","kji_language-anglais"],"yoast_head":"\nKeith Kennaugh v The Information Commissioner - Ma\u00eetre Hassan Kohen, avocat en droit p\u00e9nal \u00e0 Paris<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/en\/jurisprudences\/keith-kennaugh-v-the-information-commissioner-3\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Keith Kennaugh v The Information Commissioner\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"NCN: [2026] UKFTT 00648 (GRC) Case Reference: FT\/EA\/2024\/0349\/GDPR First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber) Information Rights Heard by Cloud Video Platform Heard on: 30 April 2026 Decision given on: 01 May 2026 Before JUDGE HARRIS Between KEITH KENNAUGH Applicant and THE INFORMATION COMMISSIONER Respondent Representation: For the Applicant: Mr Kennaugh, representing himself For the Respondent: Samuel Willis Decision: The Application is...\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/en\/jurisprudences\/keith-kennaugh-v-the-information-commissioner-3\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Ma\u00eetre Hassan Kohen, avocat en droit p\u00e9nal \u00e0 Paris\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"27 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/en\\\/jurisprudences\\\/keith-kennaugh-v-the-information-commissioner-3\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/en\\\/jurisprudences\\\/keith-kennaugh-v-the-information-commissioner-3\\\/\",\"name\":\"Keith Kennaugh v The Information Commissioner - Ma\u00eetre Hassan Kohen, avocat en droit p\u00e9nal \u00e0 Paris\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/en\\\/#website\"},\"datePublished\":\"2026-05-21T00:09:18+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/en\\\/jurisprudences\\\/keith-kennaugh-v-the-information-commissioner-3\\\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/en\\\/jurisprudences\\\/keith-kennaugh-v-the-information-commissioner-3\\\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/en\\\/jurisprudences\\\/keith-kennaugh-v-the-information-commissioner-3\\\/#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/en\\\/criminal-law-attorneys-in-paris-counsel-and-strategic-defense\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Jurisprudences\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/en\\\/jurisprudences\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":3,\"name\":\"Keith Kennaugh v The Information Commissioner\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/en\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/en\\\/\",\"name\":\"Kohen Avocats\",\"description\":\"Ma\u00eetre Hassan Kohen, avocat p\u00e9naliste \u00e0 Paris, intervient exclusivement en droit p\u00e9nal pour la d\u00e9fense des particuliers, notamment en mati\u00e8re d\u2019accusations de viol. 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