{"id":1795958,"date":"2026-08-19T03:05:00","date_gmt":"2026-08-19T01:05:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/belgium-use-202-billion-frozen-russian-assets-eu-liability-euroclear-2026\/"},"modified":"2026-08-19T03:06:14","modified_gmt":"2026-08-19T01:06:14","slug":"belgium-use-202-billion-frozen-russian-assets-eu-liability-euroclear-2026","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/en\/belgium-use-202-billion-frozen-russian-assets-eu-liability-euroclear-2026\/","title":{"rendered":"Can Belgium Use \u20ac202 Billion of Frozen Russian Assets? The EU Liability Problem Behind Euroclear"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>The European debate over the Russian central-bank assets immobilised at Euroclear has entered its most legally sensitive phase. Euroclear reported that, at the end of June 2026, \u20ac202 billion on its balance sheet related to sanctioned Russian assets. The political question is no longer only whether the assets should remain blocked. It is whether the principal, or a financing structure built on it, can be used for Ukraine without converting a temporary immobilisation into a transfer of ownership and without leaving Belgium to absorb the litigation risk.<\/p>\n<p>That distinction matters for France as well as Belgium. French banks, asset managers, public bodies and counsel operate inside the same European sanctions architecture, but they do not have a general power to turn a sanctions freeze into a confiscation. The French rules on frozen funds provide a useful operational comparison: they define what a freeze prevents, how exceptions are authorised and why circumvention is prohibited. They also show the difference between preserving an asset, releasing a strictly authorised amount and appropriating the underlying capital.<\/p>\n<p>This analysis asks the practical question behind the headlines: can Belgium and the European Union use the Russian principal, or a loan secured by it, while preserving the legal position of Euroclear, the rights of affected owners and the credibility of European financial infrastructure? The short answer is that a loan label does not by itself solve the title, immunity, countermeasure, custody and recourse problems. The decisive issue is the legal mechanism chosen for the principal, not the political purpose for which the money is ultimately spent.<\/p>\n<h2>I. Is the EU freezing Russian assets or preparing to use them?<\/h2>\n<h3>A. What does the Euroclear immobilisation actually prohibit?<\/h3>\n<p>The first legal error in this debate is to treat \u201cfrozen\u201d, \u201cimmobilised\u201d, \u201cseized\u201d and \u201cconfiscated\u201d as interchangeable words. They describe different operations. An asset freeze prevents the owner, the custodian or an intermediary from moving, using, transferring or otherwise dealing with the asset. It does not necessarily transfer title to the freezing State. Confiscation is different: it removes the asset, or the economic value of the asset, from the owner under a legal decision or statutory mechanism. A secured loan can fall between those categories. The principal may remain formally frozen and formally owned by Russia while its economic value is committed to a new creditor or used to support expenditure for Ukraine.<\/p>\n<p>The European Union uses more than one sanctions instrument. <a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/legal-content\/EN\/TXT\/?uri=CELEX:32014R0269\">Regulation (EU) No 269\/2014<\/a> is the familiar listing regime for persons and entities associated with the conduct threatening Ukraine\u2019s territorial integrity. <a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/legal-content\/EN\/TXT\/?uri=CELEX:32014R0833\">Regulation (EU) No 833\/2014<\/a> contains the sectoral restrictions and the special rules affecting the assets and cash balances of the Central Bank of Russia. The operative question is therefore always: which act froze which asset, held by whom, through which intermediary, and under which exception?<\/p>\n<p>The French statutory framework makes the distinction concrete. Article L. 562-1 of the Code mon\u00e9taire et financier includes deposits, account balances, securities, claims, financial instruments, interest and dividends within the concept of \u201cfunds\u201d. It defines a funds freeze as \u201cGel des fonds\u201d by \u201ctoute action tendant \u00e0 emp\u00eacher un changement de leur volume, montant, localisation, propri\u00e9t\u00e9, possession, nature, destination\u201d. In English, the definition focuses on preventing a change that could allow use of the money. The rule is not written as an automatic transfer of ownership to the State. It is a control on movement and use.<\/p>\n<p>That is why the \u20ac202 billion figure must be read with care. It refers to assets immobilised within Euroclear\u2019s financial infrastructure, not to cash already owned by the European Union. Euroclear\u2019s own <a href=\"https:\/\/www.euroclear.com\/newsandinsights\/en\/press\/2026\/mr-20-euroclear-h1-2026-results.html\">first-half 2026 results<\/a> describe the scale of the Russian assets and the proceedings brought in Russian courts. The custodian\u2019s role is not the same as the role of a government that decides to apply a countermeasure. Euroclear holds and administers assets under the applicable legal and contractual framework; it does not acquire a free-standing right to spend the principal.<\/p>\n<p>The distinction also explains the European use of extraordinary revenues. The Union has authorised mechanisms allowing interest or extraordinary profits generated by immobilised assets to support Ukraine while the underlying principal remains blocked. A revenue stream created by the freeze is not necessarily identical to the frozen reserve itself. The legal analysis becomes much harder when the principal is pledged, transferred, lent against or made available to a third party. The new transaction may be described as a loan, but the court examining it will look at its legal effects: who bears the loss if the owner obtains repayment, who owes the principal, who controls the proceeds and what happens if the sanctions end.<\/p>\n<p>For French clients, the practical lesson is immediate. A reference to \u201cRussian frozen assets\u201d does not identify a single compliance risk. A bank must determine whether it is dealing with a listed private person, a designated company, a central-bank reserve, interest detached from the reserve, a security held through a central securities depository or a payment arising from an authorised exception. A law firm advising on a proposed transaction must preserve the same distinctions. Treating all Russian-related money as identical can produce either unlawful release or an unjustified refusal.<\/p>\n<p>The existing <a href=\"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/en\/eu-1600-company-russia-sanctions-french-businesses-legal-challenge-2026\/\">analysis of the proposed wider Russia sanctions package<\/a> covers the exposure of French businesses to new listings. The Euroclear issue is narrower and more constitutional: it concerns the legal status of sovereign reserves held by a European intermediary and the allocation of loss if the European project fails. That is the point at which ordinary sanctions compliance becomes a question of public international law and financial-system governance.<\/p>\n<h3>B. Can Belgium use the principal without breaching sovereign immunity?<\/h3>\n<p>The answer depends on the legal theory offered for the use. The most straightforward theory is that the Union has merely immobilised the assets and is entitled to keep them frozen until Russia complies with its international obligations. That theory does not, by itself, authorise the Union to spend the principal. A second theory is that the use is a lawful countermeasure responding to an internationally wrongful act. A third theory is that a loan backed by the immobilised assets does not amount to confiscation because Russia retains a future claim to repayment. Each theory carries a different burden of justification.<\/p>\n<p>State immunity is not an absolute answer to every dispute, but it is a serious obstacle to an ordinary execution measure against sovereign property. The French Court of Cassation stated in its First Civil Chamber decision of 14 March 1984, no. 82-12.462, that \u201cl&#8217;immunit\u00e9 d&#8217;ex\u00e9cution dont jouit l&#8217;Etat \u00e9tranger est de principe\u201d. The same decision recognises that the principle can be displaced in limited circumstances, particularly where the property is assigned to a private economic or commercial activity connected with the claim. That reasoning cannot simply be transposed to central-bank reserves. A reserve held for sovereign monetary functions is not equivalent to an ordinary commercial account.<\/p>\n<p>The Court later addressed the conditions for waiver in its First Civil Chamber decision of 13 May 2015, no. 13-17.751. The official decision explains that customary international law does not require a waiver beyond an express waiver, while the surrounding facts concerned diplomatic accounts and an execution measure. The decision is useful because it shows the importance of the asset\u2019s function and of the exact wording of any waiver. There is no general waiver hidden in the fact that a State placed its reserves in a European securities infrastructure. Custody is not consent to confiscation.<\/p>\n<p>The international-law countermeasure argument is more substantial, but it is not self-executing. The International Law Commission\u2019s <a href=\"https:\/\/legal.un.org\/ilc\/texts\/instruments\/english\/draft_articles\/9_6_2001.pdf\">Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts<\/a> treat countermeasures as conditional responses designed to induce compliance, not as a general licence to take the property of another State. A countermeasure must respond to an internationally wrongful act, be directed at the responsible State, remain proportionate and respect limits protecting fundamental obligations. A court would also ask whether the measure was reversible, whether less intrusive measures existed and whether the affected asset was protected by a specific immunity rule.<\/p>\n<p>The difference between a private listed asset and a sovereign reserve is central. A listed private person may have a claim against a listing regulation, and the asset may be frozen under a regulation that expressly prohibits making funds available. The Russian central bank may argue that its reserves are State property, held for public purposes and protected by customary immunity. The Union may answer that the reserves are subject to a sanctions regime adopted after a serious breach of international law and that the proposed financing structure does not finally transfer ownership. Neither position can be established merely by repeating the political objective of supporting Ukraine.<\/p>\n<p>Belgium\u2019s exposure is unusually concentrated because Euroclear is incorporated and supervised there. Euroclear has its own contractual obligations to account holders, legal duties to comply with European measures and operational duty to protect the integrity of the settlement system. If the Union instructs or legally obliges the institution to make the principal available, Russia may sue in a Russian court, seek enforcement against European interests in Russia or bring proceedings in a forum with jurisdiction over Euroclear. The enforceability of a Russian judgment in Belgium is a separate question from the cost and disruption of defending the claim.<\/p>\n<p>This is why a European guarantee is not the same thing as a legal authorisation. A guarantee can allocate a financial loss among Member States. It cannot, by itself, cure a defect in title, waive Russia\u2019s immunity, defeat a contractual claim by Euroclear\u2019s clients or prove that a countermeasure is proportionate. It can make the transaction politically manageable while leaving the underlying legality to a later court. For Belgium, that later court risk is the heart of the objection.<\/p>\n<p>The French experience confirms the point. A French court may authorise or supervise a measure affecting property in France, but it cannot unilaterally convert a European freeze into ownership of a sovereign reserve located in Belgium. French courts can provide an analytical model for immunity, execution and sanctions compliance; Belgium remains the principal forum for disputes over Euroclear\u2019s custody and the Belgian State\u2019s responsibility. Any European solution must therefore operate at three levels at once: the EU regulation authorising the mechanism, Belgian law governing the custodian and international law governing the relationship with Russia.<\/p>\n<h2>II. What legal route could the EU and Belgium use next?<\/h2>\n<h3>A. Would a \u201creparations loan\u201d solve the Euroclear liability problem?<\/h3>\n<p>The proposed repair-loan architecture is attractive because it tries to separate use from confiscation. Under the concept discussed by European institutions, the Union would raise money for Ukraine, use the extraordinary value associated with immobilised Russian assets as a support or repayment mechanism and preserve a formal claim that the Russian principal remains frozen. If Russia ultimately pays reparations, the loan could be repaid and the assets could be dealt with under a future settlement. The structure is designed to tell a court: no final expropriation has occurred.<\/p>\n<p>That answer is not enough by itself. Courts examine substance, not the label placed on the instrument. If Euroclear must transfer the principal, pledge it to a new creditor, assume a repayment obligation backed by the reserves or expose the assets to a risk of execution, the transaction may affect ownership, control, availability and economic value even if the paperwork uses the word \u201cloan\u201d. Article 1 of Regulation 269\/2014 defines the concepts of funds and economic resources broadly, and Article 2 prohibits making listed funds or resources available. Regulation 833\/2014 adds a separate set of rules for the Central Bank of Russia and the balances accumulating because of the restrictions. The transaction must be tested against the precise prohibition, not against a general impression that \u201cthe money is still frozen\u201d.<\/p>\n<p>The second problem is repayment. A lender wants a reliable debtor. If the Union borrows against an asset that Russia may later reclaim, the Union must promise either to return equivalent value or to absorb the difference. If the loan is repaid from the extraordinary revenues of the frozen assets, the operation may be easier to defend than a pledge over the principal. If the loan depends on the principal itself, a later court order, peace agreement or lifting of sanctions can create a direct conflict between the Union\u2019s repayment obligation and Euroclear\u2019s duty to its owner.<\/p>\n<p>The third problem is the legal effect of the European act. A regulation under the Union\u2019s external-action powers can direct financial intermediaries and create immunities or safe harbours for good-faith implementation. It cannot make a treaty obligation disappear by declaration. Nor can a political agreement between Member States remove the possibility that a private party or a sovereign owner will challenge the act before a competent court. The Union may have broad discretion in foreign policy, but broad discretion is not the same as immunity from judicial review.<\/p>\n<p>French law offers a precise comparison. Article L. 562-4 of the Code mon\u00e9taire et financier provides that those covered by the provision \u201cSont tenus d&#8217;appliquer sans d\u00e9lai les mesures de gel\u201d. The rule binds persons and institutions within the defined territorial and professional scope. Article L. 562-4-1 requires covered institutions to \u201cmettent en place une organisation et des proc\u00e9dures internes\u201d for EU and French freeze measures and for the prohibition on circumvention. In a French bank, this means that the sanctions filter must operate before a payment is executed, not after a transaction has reached the customer\u2019s account.<\/p>\n<p>Article L. 562-5 then states: \u201cIl est interdit aux personnes mentionn\u00e9es \u00e0 l&#8217;article L. 562-4 de mettre \u00e0 disposition\u201d funds or economic resources for persons whose funds are frozen. That provision is an anti-availability rule. It explains why a French intermediary cannot lend, release or route funds merely because a customer claims that the underlying asset remains owned by the listed person. At the same time, it does not itself authorise the State to take ownership of a frozen asset. The prohibition and the appropriation question must not be confused.<\/p>\n<p>The statute also recognises controlled exceptions. Article L. 562-7 provides that \u201cLes interdictions pr\u00e9vues au pr\u00e9sent chapitre ne font pas obstacle aux versements de fonds\u201d into an account whose funds are frozen, subject to the statutory framework and reporting obligations. Article L. 562-11 allows the competent ministers, in defined cases, to \u201cautoriser le d\u00e9blocage et la mise \u00e0 disposition\u201d of part of the frozen funds when the use is compatible with public order and the act that created the freeze. Article L. 562-14 requires a bank designated to open an account for a person subject to a freeze to seek prior authorisation from the Minister for the Economy.<\/p>\n<p>Those provisions show what a safe harbour looks like: a specific legal text, a competent authority, an identified purpose, a limited amount, documentation and a reporting trail. They do not show that a general political decision can transform the principal into a European spending account. A European repair-loan regulation would need to identify the assets, the custodial duties, the permitted transactions, the repayment waterfall, the treatment of income and the allocation of litigation costs. It would also need to address assets that belong to entities other than the Russian central bank but are held in the same infrastructure.<\/p>\n<p>French authorities would face a similar task if French institutions were asked to participate. They would need to record the exact EU measure, the transaction type, the legal basis for the release or pledge, the beneficiary, the origin of the funds and the expected route of repayment. A vague comfort letter from a political institution would not replace an applicable exception. A lawyer advising a bank should request the regulation, implementing act, Treasury guidance and written authorisation before telling a client that a transfer is lawful.<\/p>\n<h3>B. What can investors, banks and counsel challenge in France and Europe?<\/h3>\n<p>The practical remedies depend on the person affected and on the act being challenged. A person listed under an EU restrictive-measures regulation may bring an action for annulment before the General Court under Article 263 TFEU, subject to standing, time limits and the requirements governing restrictive measures. A bank or custodian may challenge an administrative instruction or defend itself in proceedings brought by an account holder. Euroclear may face contractual litigation, regulatory proceedings or a claim for compensation. A sovereign owner may rely on immunity, treaty arguments, customary international law and the rules governing the jurisdiction of the court seized.<\/p>\n<p>An investor should first identify whether the problem concerns the listing, the freeze, the refusal to release, the use of income or the proposed use of the principal. Those are separate decisions. The evidence should include the relevant EU regulation and annex, account statements, the securities chain, beneficial-ownership documents, the correspondence explaining the freeze, any licence or authorisation, and the exact date on which the institution refused or restricted the transaction. Without that chronology, a challenge risks attacking the wrong decision.<\/p>\n<p>The French legal framework illustrates the importance of administrative sequencing. In its Civil Chamber 2 decision of 5 February 2026, no. 23-15.936, the Cour de cassation held, in the context of assets subject to a freeze, that \u201cl&#8217;autorisation administrative doit pr\u00e9c\u00e9der celle du juge de l&#8217;ex\u00e9cution\u201d. The case is not a decision on the Russian sovereign reserves and should not be presented as one. Its value is methodological: a judicial order cannot replace a prior administrative authorisation when the sanctions regime reserves the first decision to the competent authority.<\/p>\n<p>The same caution applies to private attempts to move blocked assets through another account, entity or jurisdiction. The Criminal Chamber of the Cour de cassation, in its decision of 29 November 2023, no. 22-85.867, described a funds freeze as an action preventing a change in \u201cleur volume, montant, localisation, propri\u00e9t\u00e9, possession, nature, destination\u201d. That definition is broad because a transfer to a new account can defeat the purpose of a freeze even when the customer says that the money remains \u201cthe same\u201d. Article L. 562-6 of the Code mon\u00e9taire et financier makes the point expressly: \u201cIl est interdit aux personnes mentionn\u00e9es \u00e0 l&#8217;article L. 562-4 de participer, sciemment et volontairement, \u00e0 des activit\u00e9s ayant pour objet ou pour effet de contourner les mesures\u201d.<\/p>\n<p>For a French bank, a customer\u2019s nationality is not enough to decide the file. The bank should identify the legal owner, the account holder, the beneficial owner, the underlying security, the place of custody, the relevant EU measure, the involvement of any U.S. or U.K. intermediary and the requested use. The bank should distinguish an ordinary payment needed to preserve an asset from a payment that changes ownership or enables disposal. It should also distinguish an authorised interest payment from a distribution of principal. An unexplained refusal can be challenged, but an unrecorded release can expose the institution and its managers to enforcement.<\/p>\n<p>The French Court of Cassation\u2019s extradition jurisprudence provides a parallel lesson about evidence and guarantees. In its Criminal Chamber decision of 25 March 2020, no. 19-82.236, concerning a request from Tunisia, the Court required effective control over assurances against a punishment contrary to French public policy. The official decision states that the extradition court must verify the effectiveness of the guarantee rather than simply defer the issue to a later administrative step. The analogy is limited, but useful: in cross-border law, a promise from a foreign authority must be concrete, attributable and capable of verification.<\/p>\n<p>The more recent Criminal Chamber decision of 28 January 2026, no. 25-81.433, also shows why the requested State must apply the correct legal system to the specific question. The Court held that prescription is generally assessed under the law of the requesting State, subject to the jurisdictional exception identified in the decision. In an asset dispute, the equivalent discipline is to identify the law governing the asset, the law governing the intermediary and the law governing the alleged breach. The fact that a transaction has a French connection does not make every issue a question of French law.<\/p>\n<p>The remedy for an unjustified French freeze may include a request for clarification, an application for the statutory release or authorisation, a challenge to the administrative decision and, where appropriate, proceedings before the competent judicial court. Article L. 562-11 expressly allows an application by a person affected by the freeze or by a third party asserting a right over the asset, but the applicant must show a permitted purpose. Article L. 562-14 shows that even access to basic banking services may require prior ministerial authorisation when the applicant is actually subject to a freeze. The right to challenge a freeze is not a right to bypass it.<\/p>\n<p>For Euroclear, the litigation map is broader. The institution may need to defend its compliance with EU law while preserving contractual rights of its clients. Belgium may need to decide whether a State guarantee is a full indemnity, a capped contribution or a political undertaking subject to parliamentary approval. The Union may need to define whether the European budget bears the loss, whether Member States contribute jointly or whether Belgium remains the first defendant. Every ambiguity increases the chance that the legal risk will return to Euroclear\u2019s balance sheet.<\/p>\n<p>The strongest European design would therefore contain a transparent judicial-review route, a clear separation between principal and extraordinary income, a published authorisation process, a mechanism for third-party claims and a precise allocation of losses. It would preserve evidence of ownership and valuation, prohibit secret netting and prevent the use of the structure to disguise a transfer. It would also explain what happens after a peace agreement, a lifting of sanctions, a judgment against Euroclear or a finding that the proposed countermeasure exceeded proportionality.<\/p>\n<p>A French lawyer reviewing a client\u2019s exposure should not promise that a European guarantee eliminates the risk. The correct advice is narrower: identify the applicable EU act, classify the asset, test the transaction against the freeze and anti-circumvention rules, check for an express exception, preserve the account holder\u2019s procedural rights and prepare for litigation in the forum with jurisdiction over the custodian. That is the practical boundary between lawful sanctions compliance and an unlawful attempt to make frozen property disappear.<\/p>\n<h2>Conclusion<\/h2>\n<p>Belgium cannot answer the Euroclear problem by choosing a more reassuring noun. Calling the operation a \u201crepair loan\u201d may reduce the political cost of using the Russian principal, but it does not decide whether the principal has been transferred, pledged, made available or exposed to a new creditor. Nor does a guarantee from other Member States automatically waive sovereign immunity, satisfy Euroclear\u2019s contractual duties or prevent Russia and other affected parties from litigating.<\/p>\n<p>The legally safer distinction is the one already visible in the European sanctions framework: keep the principal immobilised, regulate and use extraordinary revenues under an express legal basis, and treat any use of the principal as a new operation requiring its own justification. If the Union chooses a more ambitious structure, it must publish the legal basis, identify the assets, define the countermeasure theory, preserve a route of review and allocate the full downside risk before asking Euroclear or Belgium to implement it.<\/p>\n<p>For French institutions, the same conclusion has an operational form. A freeze is not confiscation; an exception is not a waiver; a bank guarantee is not a title document; and a political commitment is not a licence. The file should be built around the exact regulation, the exact asset and the exact transaction. That is the only credible way to support Ukraine while preserving the rule-of-law standards on which European financial trust depends.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>The European debate over \u20ac202 billion of Russian assets immobilised at Euroclear raises a precise question: can Belgium use the principal without shifting sovereign and litigation risk?<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":232070755,"featured_media":4894,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_kj_source_type":"","_kj_official_id":"","_kj_official_url":"","_kj_judilibre_id":"","_kj_jur":"","_kj_lieu":"","_kj_chambre":"","_kj_rg":"","_kj_date":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[301720,301654],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1795958","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-decryptage","category-international-legal-news"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v28.1 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>Can Belgium Use \u20ac202 Billion of Frozen Russian Assets? 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