{"id":1934606,"date":"2026-08-28T09:01:59","date_gmt":"2026-08-28T07:01:59","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/c-667-26-miaccu-european-arrest-warrant-mental-capacity-france-2026\/"},"modified":"2026-08-28T09:03:19","modified_gmt":"2026-08-28T07:03:19","slug":"c-667-26-miaccu-european-arrest-warrant-mental-capacity-france-2026","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/en\/c-667-26-miaccu-european-arrest-warrant-mental-capacity-france-2026\/","title":{"rendered":"C-667\/26 Miaccu II: Can France Refuse a European Arrest Warrant When Mental Capacity Is Irreversibly Lost?"},"content":{"rendered":"<p class=\"chapeau\">A new European arrest warrant question has reached Luxembourg from Milan. On 24 August 2026, the Official Journal published the request for a preliminary ruling in Case C-667\/26, Miaccu II, lodged by the Milan Court of Appeal on 16 June 2026. The referring court asks whether EU law prevents a national rule under which a European arrest warrant cannot be executed when the requested person is in an irreversible mental state that prevents meaningful, fully conscious participation in the criminal proceedings. The Court of Justice has not answered that question. No ruling has yet decided whether surrender must be refused, postponed, or accompanied by procedural guarantees. The question is therefore both urgent and carefully limited. It concerns the legal conditions for cooperation between two judicial systems, not a public verdict on the person identified in the reference. For a person located in France, the answer could affect the evidence required at the first appearance, the information requested from the issuing authority, the use of expert reports, and the difference between a temporary medical obstacle and a permanent inability to take part in a trial. For prosecutors and courts, it tests how mutual recognition operates when the process itself may no longer be intelligible to the person being surrendered.<\/p>\n<p>The issue nevertheless matters immediately in France. A person arrested in France under an Italian, German, Spanish, Romanian or other European arrest warrant will normally appear before the French investigating chamber under the Code of Criminal Procedure. That court must protect fundamental rights without converting a surrender hearing into a trial on the foreign allegations. The difficult boundary is now visible: a serious diagnosis is not automatically a ground for refusing surrender, but a person who cannot understand the proceedings or communicate with counsel may raise a different question about the fairness and practical effectiveness of the entire cross-border process.<\/p>\n<p>This analysis explains what C-667\/26 actually asks, how the French procedure currently works, what the Court of Justice may need to clarify, and what evidence should be prepared before the first hearing. The central warning is simple: Miaccu II is a pending legal signal, not a new French rule and not a decision that makes every mental-health argument decisive.<\/p>\n<h2>I. Can an irreversible mental condition stop a European arrest warrant in France?<\/h2>\n<h3>A. What Case C-667\/26 Miaccu II actually asks<\/h3>\n<p>The first task is to read the new reference narrowly. The official notice identifies Case C-667\/26 as a request from the Milan Court of Appeal, lodged on 16 June 2026, in criminal proceedings against GL. The document uses a fictitious case name and does not provide a factual narrative that would justify conclusions about the individual concerned. It asks a legal question about the relationship between recital 12 and Article 1(3) of Council Framework Decision 2002\/584\/JHA, the EU instrument governing the European arrest warrant and surrender procedures between Member States. The notice is available in the official <a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/legal-content\/EN\/TXT\/?uri=CELEX:62026CN0667\">EUR-Lex record for Case C-667\/26, Miaccu II<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>The question is not whether mental illness is a criminal defence in the issuing State. It is not whether the requested person committed the alleged offence. It is not whether an executing court may examine the evidence as if it were the trial court. The narrower problem is whether a national rule may make execution legally impossible where an irreversible mental condition prevents the person from participating in the proceedings with full awareness. That wording brings the court to the border between the mechanics of surrender and the minimum conditions for a criminal process that remains intelligible, participatory and capable of being defended.<\/p>\n<p>That border matters because the European arrest warrant is designed to replace ordinary extradition between Member States with judicial cooperation based on mutual recognition. The French starting point is Article 695-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It defines the instrument as a judicial decision issued by one EU Member State for the arrest and surrender of a person sought for prosecution or for execution of a custodial sentence or detention order. The statute begins with the words <q lang=\"fr\">Le mandat d&#8217;arr\u00eat europ\u00e9en est une d\u00e9cision judiciaire \u00e9mise par un Etat membre de l&#8217;Union europ\u00e9enne<\/q>. The English meaning is that the warrant is a judicial instrument within a system of inter-state execution, not a fresh French prosecution. The current text is set out in <a href=\"https:\/\/www.legifrance.gouv.fr\/codes\/article_lc\/LEGIARTI000006577347\">Article 695-11 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>The issuing threshold is separate from the requested person&#8217;s capacity. Article 695-12 permits a warrant for acts punishable in the issuing State by at least one year of imprisonment, or, where a sentence has been imposed, where the sentence is at least four months. Its exact French threshold is <q lang=\"fr\">une peine privative de libert\u00e9 d&#8217;une dur\u00e9e \u00e9gale ou sup\u00e9rieure \u00e0 un an<\/q>. That condition addresses the seriousness of the offence and the length of the sentence; it says nothing about whether the person can understand the future proceedings. The French provision is available at <a href=\"https:\/\/www.legifrance.gouv.fr\/loda\/article_lc\/LEGIARTI000020632064\/2026-04-18\">Article 695-12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>The warrant must also carry enough information to make the request legally intelligible. Article 695-13 requires the identity and nationality of the person sought, the issuing judicial authority, the underlying judgment or decision, the legal classification of the offence, the date, place and circumstances of the alleged conduct, the degree of participation, and the applicable sentence or penalty. The opening formula is <q lang=\"fr\">Tout mandat d&#8217;arr\u00eat europ\u00e9en contient les renseignements suivants<\/q>. This content requirement is directly relevant to a mental-capacity challenge: counsel needs a reliable description of the proceedings, the procedural stage, the legal basis for the warrant and the purpose of the requested surrender before an expert can assess what participation would involve. The official provision is <a href=\"https:\/\/www.legifrance.gouv.fr\/codes\/article_lc\/LEGIARTI000033518854\">Article 695-13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Language is not a minor administrative detail in this setting. Article 695-14 requires a European arrest warrant addressed to another Member State to be translated into an official language of the executing State, an accepted official language of the EU institutions, or another language accepted by that State. Its wording begins <q lang=\"fr\">Le mandat d&#8217;arr\u00eat europ\u00e9en adress\u00e9 \u00e0 l&#8217;autorit\u00e9 comp\u00e9tente d&#8217;un autre Etat membre doit \u00eatre traduit<\/q>. A person whose cognitive condition makes comprehension fragile may be affected by the quality, timing and accessibility of that translation in a way that is not captured by a diagnosis alone. The statutory text appears at <a href=\"https:\/\/www.legifrance.gouv.fr\/codes\/article_lc\/LEGIARTI000027813066\">Article 695-14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Transmission also has a legal function. Under Article 695-15, the warrant may be sent directly to the executing judicial authority by a written and authenticatable method, or through the Schengen Information System, the secure judicial network, Interpol where necessary, or another traceable method. The statute refers to <q lang=\"fr\">tout moyen laissant une trace \u00e9crite<\/q> and requires conditions allowing the executing authority to verify authenticity. This matters when the defence disputes whether the document before the French court is complete, current or accompanied by the medical and procedural information needed to assess a request for additional details. The official text is <a href=\"https:\/\/www.legifrance.gouv.fr\/codes\/article_lc\/LEGIARTI000006577351\/2021-06-28\">Article 695-15 of the Code of Criminal Procedure<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Against that French framework, Miaccu II asks the Court of Justice to interpret the EU rule itself. Article 1(2) of the Framework Decision makes execution the general rule on the basis of mutual recognition. Article 1(3), however, states that the Framework Decision does not modify the obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles. The official consolidated text records both the execution obligation and the safeguard in <a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/legal-content\/EN\/TXT\/?uri=CELEX:32002F0584\">Council Framework Decision 2002\/584\/JHA<\/a>. Recital 12 also explains that the instrument respects fundamental rights. The new reference therefore asks whether the obligation to surrender can operate when the person is permanently unable to engage with the criminal process in a meaningful way.<\/p>\n<p>That formulation leaves several matters open. The Court may need to distinguish a person who cannot participate at a particular moment from a person whose condition is irreversible. It may need to distinguish inability to understand the proceedings from inability to travel, receive treatment or tolerate detention. It may need to decide whether the relevant risk concerns the trial in the issuing State, the surrender process in France, or both. It may also need to identify whether the executing authority must conduct an individual assessment, request assurances or additional information, postpone surrender, or recognise a refusal ground in exceptional cases. None of those answers can be attributed to the Court before it gives judgment.<\/p>\n<h3>B. Why the French executing court cannot turn surrender into a second trial<\/h3>\n<p>French procedure gives the investigating chamber a defined office. The court checks the conditions of surrender; it does not decide whether the foreign accusation is proved. The distinction protects both sides. A person sought by a European arrest warrant must have a real opportunity to challenge an unlawful surrender, but the French court cannot use the hearing to re-litigate the issuing State&#8217;s evidence, credibility assessments or substantive criminal law. A mental-capacity argument must therefore be connected to a recognised procedural or fundamental-rights risk, not presented as a general request for France to take over the criminal case.<\/p>\n<p>The statutory grounds of refusal illustrate the limits. Article 695-22 lists mandatory refusal situations, including amnesty, a final decision for the same acts, age-based criminal irresponsibility and a warrant issued for discriminatory purposes. The provision opens with <q lang=\"fr\">L&#8217;ex\u00e9cution d&#8217;un mandat d&#8217;arr\u00eat europ\u00e9en est refus\u00e9e dans les cas suivants<\/q>. Its current wording can be consulted at <a href=\"https:\/\/www.legifrance.gouv.fr\/codes\/article_lc\/LEGIARTI000044570223\">Article 695-22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure<\/a>. Irreversible mental incapacity is not named in that list. That does not settle the EU-law question, because Article 1(3) and the Court&#8217;s interpretation of fundamental rights may affect the way the listed framework operates, but it does mean that counsel should identify the precise legal route rather than ask for an unstructured humanitarian exception.<\/p>\n<p>Article 695-23 concerns double criminality. For offences outside the listed categories, execution may be refused where the conduct is not an offence under French law; for listed offences meeting the EU threshold, the executing State does not review double criminality. The French text states that execution <q lang=\"fr\">peut \u00e9galement \u00eatre refus\u00e9e si le fait faisant l&#8217;objet dudit mandat d&#8217;arr\u00eat ne constitue pas une infraction au regard de la loi fran\u00e7aise<\/q>. That is a classification rule, not a capacity rule. It may be relevant in a wider defence, but it cannot substitute for evidence showing why the requested person&#8217;s condition makes the surrender process or the subsequent proceedings fundamentally ineffective. The provision is linked here: <a href=\"https:\/\/www.legifrance.gouv.fr\/codes\/article_lc\/LEGIARTI000044570214\/2023-10-04\">Article 695-23 of the Code of Criminal Procedure<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Article 695-24 sets out optional grounds of refusal, including French proceedings for the same acts, the possibility of executing a sentence in France for certain French nationals or residents, territorial jurisdiction, a final third-State decision and prescription. The statute uses the formulation <q lang=\"fr\">L&#8217;ex\u00e9cution d&#8217;un mandat d&#8217;arr\u00eat europ\u00e9en peut \u00eatre refus\u00e9e<\/q>. The complete list is available at <a href=\"https:\/\/www.legifrance.gouv.fr\/codes\/article_lc\/LEGIARTI000044570206\">Article 695-24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure<\/a>. A mental-capacity submission should not be forced into one of those categories if the actual argument concerns effective participation and fundamental rights. The better analysis is to explain how the EU framework, read with Article 1(3), should respond to a concrete and evidenced risk.<\/p>\n<p>Whatever route is argued, a refusal must be reasoned. Article 695-25 states in one sentence: <q lang=\"fr\">Tout refus d&#8217;ex\u00e9cuter un mandat d&#8217;arr\u00eat europ\u00e9en doit \u00eatre motiv\u00e9.<\/q> This requirement has practical consequences. A chamber that refuses cannot merely say that the person is unwell. It must identify the evidence, the legal standard, the link between the condition and the proceedings, and why any additional information, assurance or procedural adaptation would not remove the risk. Conversely, a decision to surrender should address a properly documented capacity objection rather than treating the diagnosis as irrelevant. The official text is <a href=\"https:\/\/www.legifrance.gouv.fr\/codes\/article_lc\/LEGIARTI000006577362\">Article 695-25 of the Code of Criminal Procedure<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>The French hearing is also time-sensitive. A person apprehended under a European arrest warrant must be brought before the territorially competent prosecutor general within forty-eight hours under Article 695-27. The exact text begins <q lang=\"fr\">Toute personne appr\u00e9hend\u00e9e en ex\u00e9cution d&#8217;un mandat d&#8217;arr\u00eat europ\u00e9en doit \u00eatre conduite dans les quarante-huit heures<\/q>. It also provides for information about the warrant, assistance by chosen or appointed counsel, and the possibility of requesting a lawyer in the issuing State. See <a href=\"https:\/\/www.legifrance.gouv.fr\/loda\/article_lc\/LEGIARTI000032655493\/2022-03-28\">Article 695-27 of the Code of Criminal Procedure<\/a>. A family that waits for a complete long-term medical file before alerting counsel may lose the first procedural opportunity to request an urgent assessment or a tailored arrangement.<\/p>\n<p>The investigating chamber is seized immediately, and the person sought must appear before it within five working days of presentation to the prosecutor general under Article 695-29. The statutory sentence is <q lang=\"fr\">La personne recherch\u00e9e compara\u00eet devant elle dans un d\u00e9lai de cinq jours ouvrables<\/q>. That deadline is reproduced in <a href=\"https:\/\/www.legifrance.gouv.fr\/codes\/article_lc\/LEGIARTI000006577366\">Article 695-29 of the Code of Criminal Procedure<\/a>. Article 695-30 then provides that the chamber establishes identity and receives statements, with counsel and an interpreter where appropriate; the official provision is <a href=\"https:\/\/www.legifrance.gouv.fr\/codes\/article_lc\/LEGIARTI000006577367\">Article 695-30 of the Code of Criminal Procedure<\/a>. These are not the final merits hearing, but they are the moment when a capacity issue must be made concrete and placed on the record.<\/p>\n<p>The Court of Cassation recently underlined that limited function in a different procedural context. In <a href=\"https:\/\/www.legifrance.gouv.fr\/juri\/id\/JURITEXT000054606715\">Criminal Chamber, 29 July 2026, No. 26-84.072<\/a>, a published decision concerning surrender to Romania, the court described the hearing under Article 695-30 as a step intended to establish identity, receive observations on the procedure and allow the person to consent or refuse consent; it treated that formality as preliminary to the debate. That ruling does not answer the Miaccu II question, but it is a useful warning against attempting to litigate the full foreign criminal case during the first appearance. The defence should use the hearing to preserve the rights issue, request the necessary procedural steps and prepare the fuller argument for the decision on surrender.<\/p>\n<p>Finally, Article 695-31 provides the decision timetable. Where the person does not consent, the chamber decides within twenty days of the appearance, unless additional information has been ordered under Article 695-33; a consenting person is subject to a separate seven-day timetable and cannot casually withdraw that consent. The statute says, for the non-consenting route, <q lang=\"fr\">la chambre de l&#8217;instruction statue par une d\u00e9cision dans le d\u00e9lai de vingt jours<\/q>. The provision is available at <a href=\"https:\/\/www.legifrance.gouv.fr\/codes\/article_lc\/LEGIARTI000006577368\">Article 695-31 of the Code of Criminal Procedure<\/a>. A person whose ability to understand or communicate is disputed should not be pushed into an irreversible consent decision before the court has addressed capacity and legal advice.<\/p>\n<h2>II. What would a CJEU answer change for the person sought and the issuing state?<\/h2>\n<h3>A. How French safeguards, evidence and timing would interact<\/h3>\n<p>The most useful comparison is Case C-699\/21, E.D.L. There, the Court of Justice dealt with a European arrest warrant and a serious, chronic and potentially irreversible illness. The official record describes the interaction between Article 1(3), Article 23(4), the duty of sincere cooperation and Article 4 of the Charter in <a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/legal-content\/EN\/TXT\/?uri=CELEX:62021CA0699\">Case C-699\/21, E.D.L. (Ground for refusal based on illness)<\/a>. The Court held that the Framework Decision does not provide for refusal solely because the requested person suffers from serious, chronic and potentially irreversible illnesses. It nevertheless recognised a route for temporary postponement where objective medical material shows a manifest risk to health, followed by requests for information to the issuing authority. If the risk of inhuman or degrading treatment cannot be ruled out within a reasonable period, execution cannot proceed.<\/p>\n<p>That reasoning is important but not conclusive for Miaccu II. E.D.L. focused on the physical and medical consequences of surrender, including the risk that the transfer would seriously harm health. Miaccu II focuses on the person&#8217;s ability to participate with full awareness in the criminal proceedings. A person may be physically fit to travel yet unable to understand the charge, instruct counsel or follow a hearing. Conversely, a person may have a serious diagnosis while retaining meaningful procedural capacity with appropriate support. Treating the two questions as identical would erase the distinction the new reference is asking the Court to examine. The existing <a href=\"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/en\/paul-of-romania-france-delay-eaw-surrender-medical-reasons-2026\/\">French analysis of postponing European arrest warrant surrender for medical reasons<\/a> provides the related health-protection context; this article addresses the narrower capacity-to-participate question raised by the new reference.<\/p>\n<p>E.D.L. also supplies a procedural model. A French chamber faced with a substantiated objection should not choose between automatic surrender and automatic refusal without first identifying whether information from the issuing authority can resolve the problem. It may need to know whether the issuing State has already assessed capacity, whether an expert assessment can be conducted there, what representation is available, whether the person can meet counsel in an accessible format, whether a guardian or support measure exists, and whether the trial can lawfully proceed while the person remains unable to understand it. These questions do not ask the French court to decide guilt. They ask the issuing judicial authority to explain how the right to participate will work in practice.<\/p>\n<p>The detention cases reinforce that individualised method. In the joined cases <a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/legal-content\/EN\/TXT\/PDF\/?uri=CELEX:62015CA0404\">C-404\/15 and C-659\/15 PPU, Aranyosi and C\u0103ld\u0103raru<\/a>, the Court required the executing authority to examine objective, reliable, specific and properly updated evidence, assess the individual risk concretely and precisely, and obtain supplementary information from the issuing authority. The Court&#8217;s operative part uses the phrase \u201cobjective, reliable, specific and properly updated evidence\u201d. The issue there was Article 4 of the Charter and detention conditions, not mental capacity. The method is nevertheless relevant: a broad concern about another State&#8217;s system is not enough, and a bare assurance is not the end of the analysis when the evidence identifies a real individual risk.<\/p>\n<p>In <a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/legal-content\/EN\/CASE\/?uri=CELEX:62018CJ0220\">Case C-220\/18 PPU, ML<\/a>, the Court likewise addressed the scope of the executing authority&#8217;s assessment of detention conditions and the significance of assurances from the issuing State. The case concerned whether the conditions in the prisons where the person was actually intended to be held created a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment. The lesson for a capacity challenge is not that detention jurisprudence automatically governs mental incapacity. It is that the court must connect a rights-based objection to the real conditions the person will face, not to an abstract description of a foreign system.<\/p>\n<p>The French procedural provisions already contain tools for that dialogue. Article 695-33 allows the investigating chamber to ask the issuing judicial authority for additional information when the information in the warrant is insufficient to decide surrender. The exact statutory wording is <q lang=\"fr\">la fourniture, dans le d\u00e9lai maximum de dix jours pour leur r\u00e9ception, des informations compl\u00e9mentaires n\u00e9cessaires<\/q>. It is reproduced in <a href=\"https:\/\/www.legifrance.gouv.fr\/codes\/article_lc\/LEGIARTI000006577371\">Article 695-33 of the Code of Criminal Procedure<\/a>. The ten-day reference is demanding, but it gives counsel a concrete request: identify the unanswered questions, explain why they bear on the legal decision, and ask for a defined response rather than a general delay.<\/p>\n<p>Release and communication arrangements may also matter while that information is collected. Article 695-34 provides that release may be requested at any time before the chamber in the forms set out by the Code. Its opening sentence is <q lang=\"fr\">La mise en libert\u00e9 peut \u00eatre demand\u00e9e \u00e0 tout moment \u00e0 la chambre de l&#8217;instruction<\/q>. The official text is at <a href=\"https:\/\/www.legifrance.gouv.fr\/codes\/article_lc\/LEGIARTI000023876871\/2021-04-16\">Article 695-34 of the Code of Criminal Procedure<\/a>. A release application is not a substitute for the substantive surrender argument, but it may be relevant where detention, medication disruption or communication barriers are worsening the very condition on which the defence relies.<\/p>\n<p>The Court of Cassation&#8217;s decision in <a href=\"https:\/\/www.legifrance.gouv.fr\/juri\/id\/JURITEXT000054167498\">Criminal Chamber, 27 May 2026, No. 25-88.114<\/a>, also provides a useful French due-process reference, while arising from extradition to Mexico rather than a European arrest warrant. The court held that a person placed under extradition detention abroad had to receive timely access, through counsel, to the arrest warrant, the prosecutor&#8217;s opinion and the specifically identified procedural documents on which the court relied. The decision states: <q lang=\"fr\">la chambre de l&#8217;instruction &#8230; doit avoir permis l&#8217;acc\u00e8s en temps utile<\/q> to those materials. It also held that the referral court had to rule within a short period not exceeding two months in the circumstances before it. The decision does not create a mental-capacity ground, but it supports a basic proposition: a rights challenge cannot be meaningful if the person and counsel cannot see the material needed to test the legal basis for detention and surrender.<\/p>\n<p>For a French case, the evidence should therefore be organised around function and timing rather than labels. A useful expert report would address diagnosis, prognosis and whether the condition is reversible, but it should also answer whether the person can understand the nature and purpose of the foreign proceedings, recognise the roles of the judge, prosecutor and defence lawyer, communicate instructions, make or refuse decisions, follow interpretation, recall advice and respond coherently over the relevant period. The report should distinguish a fluctuation, a temporary decompensation, a communication disability and an irreversible loss of procedural capacity. It should state its sources, the date of assessment, the limitations of the evaluation and whether treatment or reasonable support changes the conclusion.<\/p>\n<p>The legal file should then connect each clinical conclusion to the foreign process. Counsel should obtain the warrant and its translation, the issuing authority&#8217;s description of the charges and procedural stage, any decision already made about fitness or representation, the timetable of the foreign case, the conditions of detention or transfer, and the facilities available for confidential communication. If the argument is that the person cannot participate in a trial, the file should explain why representation or supported decision-making would not cure the problem, if that is the expert&#8217;s view. If a temporary postponement would protect the person, the file should say what new event or treatment would permit the case to continue and how that can be verified.<\/p>\n<h3>B. What counsel, families and prosecutors should prepare now<\/h3>\n<p>Until the Court of Justice answers C-667\/26, the safest practical position is neither \u201cevery diagnosis defeats surrender\u201d nor \u201cmental capacity is irrelevant at the surrender stage\u201d. The argument should be framed as a structured rights assessment. First identify the legal purpose of the warrant: prosecution or execution of an existing sentence. Then identify the procedural act that the person cannot perform or understand. Finally show the real consequence: a risk that the person will be surrendered into a process in which the defence cannot be effective, or a risk that the transfer itself will produce serious and irreparable harm. The distinction may affect which existing CJEU line of authority is most persuasive and what information the French court should request.<\/p>\n<p>For the person sought and family, the first step is to secure counsel in France and, where possible, counsel in the issuing State. The French statute expressly contemplates legal assistance during the first appearance and communication with a lawyer in the issuing State under Article 695-27. The family should gather prior assessments, treatment records, hospital or care-provider reports, medication information, evidence of communication needs, interpreter requirements and any foreign procedural document already received. The material should be translated reliably and presented in a chronological bundle. A family statement can explain observed changes, but it should not replace an independent assessment of functional capacity.<\/p>\n<p>For French counsel, the first hearing should be used to protect the record. The person should not be invited to consent to surrender until the court has addressed whether the person understands the choice and its consequences. If capacity is in doubt, counsel should request an appropriate evaluation, an interpreter or communication support, time to obtain the relevant documents, and a request for additional information from the issuing authority. The request should identify the precise questions under Article 695-33 and explain why the answers are necessary to decide the legal conditions of surrender. A general assertion that the foreign system is inadequate is less useful than a documented explanation of what the individual cannot understand or do.<\/p>\n<p>For the issuing judicial authority, the immediate practical response is to give the executing court information that is concrete, current and capable of verification. It should explain the procedural stage, the legal rules on participation and representation, the role of counsel, the availability of expert assessment, the arrangements for treatment and communication, and the consequences if the person is unable to participate. It should not assume that mutual trust eliminates the need to answer a reasoned request. The Framework Decision itself is built on mutual recognition, but Article 1(3) preserves fundamental-rights obligations. The quality of the judicial dialogue may determine whether surrender can lawfully proceed without either State treating the other as incapable of protecting rights.<\/p>\n<p>There are at least three possible lines the Court of Justice could take in Miaccu II. This is an assessment of possible outcomes, not a prediction of the judgment. The first would be a restrictive approach: Article 1(3) would not permit a Member State to create a new blanket refusal ground outside the Framework Decision, but the executing authority could still postpone surrender or refuse it where the E.D.L. type of serious rights risk remains after an individual assessment. Under that model, an irreversible condition would be highly relevant evidence but not an automatic legal result.<\/p>\n<p>The second possible line would treat effective participation as a distinct fundamental-rights concern. The Court could hold that a rule preventing execution in an exceptional case is compatible with Article 1(3) when objective evidence establishes that the requested person cannot understand the proceedings or communicate with the defence and no reasonable procedural support can cure the problem. Even then, the wording would likely require individualised findings, a proportionate response and a genuine opportunity for the issuing authority to provide information. A rule that operates solely from a diagnostic label would be harder to reconcile with mutual recognition and the Court&#8217;s insistence that refusal remains exceptional.<\/p>\n<p>The third possible line would emphasise cooperation and procedural adaptation. The Court could require the executing and issuing authorities to determine whether the person can be assessed, represented, treated or heard through safeguards before reaching the point of refusal. That would place a premium on medical expertise, an accessible hearing, confidential contact with counsel and a clear explanation of how the trial can remain fair. It might also distinguish prosecution warrants from sentence-execution warrants, because a person awaiting trial and a person already finally convicted do not face the same procedural question. The reference itself does not tell us which of these distinctions will control.<\/p>\n<p>French counsel should also keep separate the Miaccu II argument and ordinary objections to the warrant. Article 695-13 may reveal an incomplete description of the foreign decision. Article 695-14 may expose a translation problem. Article 695-22 may raise a final-judgment or age issue. Article 695-23 may raise double criminality. Article 695-24 may raise French jurisdiction, prescription or execution of a sentence in France. The Court of Cassation&#8217;s published decision in No. 26-84.072 confirms that the initial Article 695-30 hearing is limited in purpose, while Article 695-31 governs the final surrender decision and its time limit. These issues can coexist, but blending them can make the mental-capacity argument harder to decide.<\/p>\n<p>The same care is needed with medical postponement. Under E.D.L., the relevant question was not simply whether a condition was chronic or irreversible; the Court&#8217;s reasoning focused on objective material and a manifest risk that surrender would endanger health, followed by cooperation with the issuing State. A capacity argument should therefore state whether it seeks a short postponement for assessment, a longer postponement while a treatment or evaluation occurs, an assurance about participation and representation, or a final refusal because no procedural solution can make the proceedings fair. A request that does not identify the requested remedy may invite the court to answer a simpler question than the defence intended.<\/p>\n<p>Public authorities and practitioners should monitor C-667\/26 without treating the Official Journal notice as a precedent. A request for a preliminary ruling records the referring court&#8217;s legal uncertainty; it does not establish the facts, decide the dispute or bind the French courts on the outcome. The eventual judgment may refine the relationship between the Framework Decision, the Charter, national capacity rules and the executing authority&#8217;s duty to cooperate. Until then, French courts remain bound by the current statutory timetable, the existing CJEU authorities on health and fundamental rights, and the requirement to decide on the evidence actually placed before them.<\/p>\n<h2>Conclusion<\/h2>\n<p>Case C-667\/26, Miaccu II, is significant because it isolates a question that the European arrest warrant system has not yet answered with precision: what happens when the person sought is not merely ill or vulnerable, but irreversibly unable to participate in the proceedings with meaningful awareness? France cannot answer that question by treating every mental-health concern as a veto, and it cannot answer it by treating capacity as outside the surrender court&#8217;s responsibility. The correct immediate approach is an individualised, evidence-led request that connects functional capacity to the concrete foreign proceedings and gives the issuing authority a chance to explain the available safeguards.<\/p>\n<p>For a person arrested in France, the first forty-eight hours, the five-working-day appearance and the twenty-day decision timetable make preparation decisive. The warrant, translation, expert evidence, procedural information, legal representation and communication arrangements should be assembled before the court is asked to choose between surrender and refusal. The pending reference may change the legal vocabulary, but the need for a precise record already exists.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>A new CJEU reference asks whether irreversible loss of mental capacity can prevent surrender under a European arrest warrant\u2014and what France should do now.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":232070755,"featured_media":4688,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_kj_source_type":"","_kj_official_id":"","_kj_official_url":"","_kj_judilibre_id":"","_kj_jur":"","_kj_lieu":"","_kj_chambre":"","_kj_rg":"","_kj_date":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[301720,301654],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1934606","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-decryptage","category-international-legal-news"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v28.1 - 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