{"id":2204661,"date":"2026-09-26T17:48:02","date_gmt":"2026-09-26T15:48:02","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/nicaragua-germany-icj-arms-exports-france-liability-2026\/"},"modified":"2026-09-26T17:48:02","modified_gmt":"2026-09-26T15:48:02","slug":"nicaragua-germany-icj-arms-exports-france-liability-2026","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/en\/nicaragua-germany-icj-arms-exports-france-liability-2026\/","title":{"rendered":"Nicaragua v. Germany at the ICJ: Can an Arms Supplier Answer for Genocide? What the September 2026 Hearings Mean for France"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>From 7 to 10 September 2026, the International Court of Justice held public hearings at the Peace Palace in The Hague, President Iwasawa presiding, in <a href=\"https:\/\/www.icj-cij.org\/case\/193\">the case concerning Alleged Breaches of Certain International Obligations in respect of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Nicaragua v. Germany)<\/a>. The hearings dealt exclusively with the preliminary objections raised by Germany in October 2025. They did not decide whether Germany violated international law. They decided something almost as important: whether the World Court is even allowed to ask the question. Two weeks later, the case moved again, with a written reply from Nicaragua on 16 September 2026 and written comments from Germany on 22 September 2026 on a question put by Judge Charlesworth. The Court will now deliberate for months before ruling on jurisdiction and admissibility. If it finds that some or all of Nicaragua&#8217;s claims are admissible, the case will proceed to the merits.<\/p>\n<p>For an international audience, and in particular for anyone doing business with or living under the protection of France, this case matters far beyond Germany. Nicaragua&#8217;s core argument is that a State which supplies weapons to a party to an armed conflict, at a moment when the risk of genocide and grave breaches of humanitarian law is publicly documented, breaches its own obligations: the duty to prevent genocide, the prohibition of complicity in genocide, and the duty to respect and to ensure respect for the Geneva Conventions. France is one of the world&#8217;s largest arms exporters and applies the same European licensing rules as Germany. The questions The Hague is now examining \u2014 when does an export licence become complicity, when is the duty to prevent triggered, and can judges review these sovereign decisions at all \u2014 are questions Paris will have to answer too, before its administrative courts and before its criminal courts. This analysis explains what Nicaragua alleges, how Germany defends itself, and where France stands under its own law.<\/p>\n<h2>I. Can Germany be condemned for delivering weapons to Israel?<\/h2>\n<h3>A. What Nicaragua accuses Germany of before the World Court<\/h3>\n<p>Nicaragua brought this case in March 2024, against the backdrop of Israel&#8217;s military attack on the Gaza Strip and the grave humanitarian situation there. Its thesis, as summarised in the case materials, is that while there was an internationally recognised and increasingly serious risk of genocide and widespread violations of international humanitarian law against Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, especially the Gaza Strip, Germany continued to provide political, financial, and military support to Israel, including military equipment. The case is therefore not a case against Israel. Nicaragua asks the Court to examine Germany&#8217;s own conduct and Germany&#8217;s own international obligations as a third State: the supply of arms, academic support, obligations concerning corporations under German jurisdiction, and other forms of material support.<\/p>\n<p>Nicaragua alleges breaches relating to four bodies of rules. First, international humanitarian law, including Germany&#8217;s obligation to respect and ensure respect for the Geneva Conventions and to take appropriate measures to prevent serious violations. That obligation comes from a single famous sentence, Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions, under which the contracting parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the Convention in all circumstances. Nicaragua&#8217;s position is that &#8220;ensure respect&#8221; is not decorative language. It means a State must use the levers it holds \u2014 including arms export licences \u2014 so that the weapons it authorises are not used to commit grave breaches. Second, the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. Third, the prohibition of racial discrimination, segregation and apartheid. Fourth, the 1948 Genocide Convention, including the obligation to prevent genocide and the prohibition of assistance in circumstances where, Nicaragua argues, there was a serious and recognised risk of genocide.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/treaties.un.org\/pages\/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&#038;mtdsg_no=IV-1&#038;chapter=4&#038;clang=_en\">The Genocide Convention<\/a> is the sharpest blade in the file. Its Article I confirms that genocide, whether committed in peacetime or in wartime, is a crime under international law which the contracting parties undertake to prevent and to punish. Its Article III punishes not only genocide itself but also conspiracy, direct and public incitement, attempt and, at paragraph (e), complicity in genocide. And its Article IV removes the easiest shield in advance, punishing rulers, public officials and private individuals alike. Nicaragua&#8217;s argument is that Germany had independent obligations as a third State and cannot avoid responsibility for its own conduct simply because the alleged underlying violations are being committed by another State. A State&#8217;s foreign-policy commitments \u2014 Germany justifies its support through its Staatsr\u00e4son, its reason of State centred on Israel&#8217;s security \u2014 cannot displace independent obligations under international law.<\/p>\n<p>Procedurally, the case has already survived a first filter. When Nicaragua filed in March 2024, it simultaneously asked the Court to indicate provisional measures, urgent orders intended to protect the rights at issue while the case was pending. After oral hearings in April 2024, the Court decided on 30 April 2024 that the circumstances at that stage did not require it to indicate the measures requested. That decision was not a judgment on the merits of Nicaragua\u2019s case: the Court did not find that Germany had complied with international law, nor did it decide that Nicaragua&#8217;s substantive claims were unfounded, and it declined to remove the case from its General List so that proceedings could continue. The Court&#8217;s refusal rested on information provided by Germany concerning its domestic system for reviewing and licensing arms exports, as well as Germany&#8217;s submission that there had been a significant decrease, since November 2023, in the value of military equipment for which export licences to Israel had been granted. At the same time, the Court emphasised that all States have international obligations concerning the transfer of arms to parties to an armed conflict, and that those obligations apply to Germany in relation to its supply of arms to Israel. Nicaragua then filed its Memorial on the merits in July 2025, setting out its evidence and legal arguments. In October 2025, Germany responded with preliminary objections. Under the Court&#8217;s Rules, the filing of preliminary objections suspended the proceedings on the merits, and Nicaragua answered those objections in February 2026. That is the file the judges heard in September 2026.<\/p>\n<h3>B. Why Germany says the Court cannot even hear the case<\/h3>\n<p>Germany&#8217;s preliminary objections do not argue that its arms exports were lawful. They argue that the Court has no right to examine them at all. Four lines of defence structure the September hearings, and each of them is a classic of ICJ procedure that any lawyer practising before international courts must master.<\/p>\n<p>The first objection concerns the very existence of a dispute. The Court generally requires a genuine dispute between the parties concerning a question of international law before it can exercise jurisdiction, and Germany challenges whether, at the time Nicaragua instituted proceedings, there was a sufficiently established legal dispute between Nicaragua and Germany falling within the Court&#8217;s jurisdiction. Nicaragua argues that it fulfilled all the requirements to establish such a dispute. This point sounds technical, but it is often decisive in The Hague: a State cannot be dragged before the Court on the basis of press releases and general indignation. There must have been a concrete opposition of legal views, with the respondent State aware that its responsibility was invoked. Expect the Court&#8217;s order to examine the diplomatic exchanges of early 2024 line by line.<\/p>\n<p>The second objection concerns the Court&#8217;s jurisdiction over the discrimination claims. Germany challenges whether the Court can hear Nicaragua&#8217;s allegations concerning Germany&#8217;s failure to prevent and condemn racial discrimination, segregation, and apartheid in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The jurisdictional titles for these claims differ from those supporting the Genocide Convention claims, and compromissory clauses must be read strictly. The third objection is temporal: Germany has only accepted the Court&#8217;s jurisdiction over issues arising from &#8220;situations or facts&#8221; after 2008, and it argues that this temporal limitation excludes claims rooted in a longer history, while Nicaragua answers that Germany confuses the background of the case with the claims themselves, which concern German conduct in 2023 and 2024.<\/p>\n<p>The fourth objection is the most spectacular and the one international media followed most closely: the Monetary Gold argument. Germany argues that Nicaragua&#8217;s claims depend on findings concerning Israel&#8217;s conduct, including whether Israel has committed violations of the Genocide Convention or international humanitarian law, while Israel is not a party to the case. It therefore invokes the Monetary Gold precedent, under which, in certain circumstances, the Court cannot decide a dispute where doing so would necessarily require it to determine the legal responsibility of an absent third State. Nicaragua rejects this characterisation entirely: the case concerns Germany&#8217;s own international obligations and Germany&#8217;s own conduct, and judging an arms supplier&#8217;s due diligence does not require convicting the buyer. The Court&#8217;s answer on this point will be read far beyond this case, because every future claim against a State that facilitates another State&#8217;s violations \u2014 through weapons, financing, intelligence, or logistics \u2014 will run into the same shield. If the shield holds here, third-State responsibility litigation becomes nearly impossible whenever the principal author refuses to appear. If it falls, every major arms-exporting State acquires a new litigation risk in The Hague.<\/p>\n<p>Germany also asked the Court, in substance, to dismiss the case at this stage and defended its domestic arms export review standards as the guarantee that its licences comply with international law. The Court will now take months to rule. If it upholds the objections in full, the case ends without any finding on the merits. If it rejects them in whole or in part, the case proceeds to a full examination of whether supplying weapons in the circumstances of Gaza breached the Genocide Convention, the Geneva Conventions, and the other invoked rules \u2014 a first in the history of the Court for a respondent State sued purely as a supplier.<\/p>\n<h2>II. What would France risk if it sat in Germany&#8217;s seat?<\/h2>\n<h3>A. Who authorises French arms exports, and on what conditions can a licence be attacked?<\/h3>\n<p>France applies the same European framework as Germany, and its domestic system concentrates the decision in the executive \u2014 which is precisely why judicial review matters. Under <a href=\"https:\/\/www.legifrance.gouv.fr\/codes\/article_lc\/LEGIARTI000029227371\">Article L2335-2 of the Defence Code<\/a>, &#8220;L&#8217;exportation sans autorisation pr\u00e9alable de mat\u00e9riels de guerre et mat\u00e9riels assimil\u00e9s vers des Etats non membres de l&#8217;Union europ\u00e9enne ainsi que des territoires exclus du territoire douanier de l&#8217;Union europ\u00e9enne est prohib\u00e9e.&#8221; No export of war material to a non-EU State without prior authorisation: that is the starting point. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.legifrance.gouv.fr\/codes\/article_lc\/LEGIARTI000038666158\">Article L2335-3 then organises<\/a> the licensing itself: &#8220;L&#8217;autorisation pr\u00e9alable d&#8217;exportation, d\u00e9nomm\u00e9e licence d&#8217;exportation, est accord\u00e9e par l&#8217;autorit\u00e9 administrative,&#8221; in the form of general export licences, global licences notified to the exporter, or individual licences for identified recipients. In practice, each file is examined at interministerial level before the Prime Minister decides, but legally the licence remains an administrative authorisation granted by the administration \u2014 and administrative authorisations can be challenged before the administrative courts.<\/p>\n<p>The substantive conditions come largely from European Union law, which binds Paris exactly as it binds Berlin. <a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/legal-content\/EN\/TXT\/?uri=CELEX:32008E0944\">Council Common Position 2008\/944\/CFSP<\/a>, which defines the common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment, imposes eight assessment criteria. Criterion Two, on respect for human rights and humanitarian law in the country of final destination, provides that Member States, after assessing the recipient country&#8217;s attitude, \u201crefusent l\u2019autorisation d\u2019exportation s\u2019il existe un risque manifeste que la technologie ou les \u00e9quipements militaires dont l\u2019exportation est envisag\u00e9e servent \u00e0 la r\u00e9pression interne\u201d and, after assessing the recipient country&#8217;s attitude towards instruments of international humanitarian law, \u201crefusent l\u2019autorisation d\u2019exportation s\u2019il existe un risque manifeste que la technologie ou les \u00e9quipements militaires dont l\u2019exportation est envisag\u00e9e servent \u00e0 commettre des violations graves du droit humanitaire international.\u201d Criterion Three adds: \u201cLes \u00c9tats membres refusent l\u2019autorisation d\u2019exportation de technologie ou d\u2019\u00e9quipements militaires susceptibles de provoquer ou de prolonger des conflits arm\u00e9s ou d\u2019aggraver des tensions ou des conflits existants dans le pays de destination finale.\u201d The phrase \u201crisque manifeste\u201d (clear risk) is the hinge of the whole system: it does not require proof that the weapons will be misused, only a clearly identified risk, assessed case by case in light of the nature of the equipment and the documented behaviour of the end user, including findings by competent United Nations, European Union or Council of Europe bodies.<\/p>\n<p>This is where the Nicaragua case bites for France. The ICJ&#8217;s April 2024 order already emphasised that all States have international obligations concerning the transfer of arms to parties to an armed conflict. If the Court, at the merits stage, clarifies when the duty to prevent genocide is triggered for a supplying State \u2014 from which level of public knowledge of atrocity risk, from which volume of deliveries, and with what due-diligence obligations on the licensing authority \u2014 that clarification will apply to French licences as much as to German ones. A French export licence granted after UN commissions of inquiry, the Court&#8217;s own provisional-measures orders in the South Africa v. Israel case, and advisory opinions have publicly documented the risk would be exposed to the same reasoning. Associations and competitors already seize the French administrative courts against export licences; the Nicaragua proceedings hand them a ready-made legal vocabulary \u2014 &#8220;clear risk,&#8221; &#8220;ensure respect,&#8221; &#8220;duty to prevent&#8221; \u2014 and, potentially, an ICJ authority confirming that these are not political slogans but enforceable legal standards. For companies in the defence supply chain, the practical lesson is immediate: document end-use guarantees, follow the published criteria file by file, and treat licences concerning a party to an ongoing conflict as litigation-sensitive acts rather than routine paperwork.<\/p>\n<p>France&#8217;s position as a permanent member of the Security Council and a nuclear-weapon State does not change this analysis. Immunities and privileges protect representatives; they do not licence exports. And the political character of the licensing decision \u2014 taken at the highest level of government \u2014 does not place it beyond all judicial reach: French administrative courts review export licences for manifest error of assessment and for compatibility with international commitments, and European law gives the Common Position&#8217;s criteria direct invocability. The Hague case therefore functions as a stress test of a system France shares. Whatever the Court decides on Germany&#8217;s objections, exporters, advisers, and reviewing judges in Paris will read the order as the operating manual for the next decade of French licensing litigation.<\/p>\n<h3>B. Can French criminal courts prosecute complicity in genocide committed abroad?<\/h3>\n<p>The second French mirror is criminal. Suppose weapons authorised in France are used to commit genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes abroad. Can French criminal courts prosecute the French intermediaries \u2014 executives, brokers, officials who facilitated the transfer? French law answers yes, through a combination of broad definitions and a universal-jurisdiction architecture built precisely for the gravest crimes.<\/p>\n<p>The definitions are deliberately wide. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.legifrance.gouv.fr\/codes\/article_lc\/LEGIARTI000006417533\">Article 211-1 of the Criminal Code<\/a> provides that &#8220;Constitue un g\u00e9nocide le fait, en ex\u00e9cution d&#8217;un plan concert\u00e9 tendant \u00e0 la destruction totale ou partielle d&#8217;un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux, ou d&#8217;un groupe d\u00e9termin\u00e9 \u00e0 partir de tout autre crit\u00e8re arbitraire, de commettre ou de faire commettre, \u00e0 l&#8217;encontre de membres de ce groupe, l\u2019un des actes suivants :&#8221;, followed by five listed acts \u2014 wilful killing, grave attacks on physical or mental integrity, subjection to conditions of existence likely to bring about the group&#8217;s destruction, measures to prevent births, forcible transfer of children \u2014 and punishes genocide with life imprisonment. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.legifrance.gouv.fr\/codes\/article_lc\/LEGIARTI000027811403\">Article 212-1 extends<\/a> the same punishment to crimes against humanity, including at its tenth paragraph the acts of segregation committed within an institutionalised regime of systematic oppression and domination of one racial group over another with the intention of maintaining that regime. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.legifrance.gouv.fr\/codes\/article_lc\/LEGIARTI000022686501\">Article 461-1 defines<\/a> war crimes as the offences in the relevant book &#8220;commises, lors d&#8217;un conflit arm\u00e9 international ou non international et en relation avec ce conflit, en violation des lois et coutumes de la guerre ou des conventions internationales applicables aux conflits arm\u00e9s&#8221;, against the persons and property protected by the articles that follow. And complicity itself is defined by <a href=\"https:\/\/www.legifrance.gouv.fr\/codes\/article_lc\/LEGIARTI000006417212\">Article 121-7:<\/a> &#8220;Est complice d&#8217;un crime ou d&#8217;un d\u00e9lit la personne qui sciemment, par aide ou assistance, en a facilit\u00e9 la pr\u00e9paration ou la consommation.&#8221; It adds complicity for anyone who by gift, promise, threat, order, or abuse of authority provoked the offence or gave instructions to commit it. Knowingly facilitating, by aid or assistance, the preparation or consummation of a genocide \u2014 for example by securing the weapons for it \u2014 fits this definition without stretching a single word.<\/p>\n<p>Jurisdiction follows. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.legifrance.gouv.fr\/codes\/article_lc\/LEGIARTI000021486423\">Article 689 of the Code of Criminal Procedure<\/a> allows French courts to try perpetrators of and accomplices to offences committed outside France where French law applies or where an international convention gives French courts jurisdiction. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.legifrance.gouv.fr\/codes\/article_lc\/LEGIARTI000048442165\">Article 689-11 goes further<\/a> for the gravest crimes: outside the ICC-cooperation framework, &#8220;peut \u00eatre poursuivie et jug\u00e9e par les juridictions fran\u00e7aises toute personne soup\u00e7onn\u00e9e d&#8217;avoir commis \u00e0 l&#8217;\u00e9tranger&#8221; genocide as defined in the Criminal Code, other crimes against humanity, and war crimes as defined in Articles 461-1 to 461-31. The suspect must have habitual residence in France, understood as a sufficient connecting link assessed in particular on the length of current or foreseeable presence. The conditions are strict \u2014 presence on French territory, subsidiarity to other jurisdictions, prosecution by the public prosecutor alone \u2014 but the door is open, and specialised prosecutors and investigating judges in Paris use it: complaints with constitution de partie civile have produced investigations into Syrian, Liberian, and Rwandan files, and trials have been held in Paris for crimes committed thousands of kilometres away.<\/p>\n<p>The sharpest French precedent on the limits of such prosecutions was set on 25 July 2025, when the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.courdecassation.fr\/decision\/68836da7c6072b5ce8fd57b5\">Assembly pl\u00e9ni\u00e8re of the Cour de cassation<\/a>, the Court&#8217;s most solemn formation, ruled on the arrest warrant issued in Paris against a sitting foreign head of State for complicity in crimes against humanity and war crimes, in appeal no. 24-84.393. The Court quashed the Paris investigating chamber&#8217;s decision and held, as a matter of current international law, that &#8220;les crimes contre l&#8217;humanit\u00e9 et les crimes de guerre ne font pas exception au principe de l&#8217;immunit\u00e9 de juridiction des chefs d&#8217;\u00c9tat \u00e9trangers en exercice&#8221; \u2014 crimes against humanity and war crimes are no exception to the jurisdictional immunity of a sitting foreign head of State. It recalled that personal immunity &#8220;doit \u00eatre examin\u00e9e d&#8217;office par le juge,&#8221; covers all acts whether private or official, and constitutes a manifest procedural bar, before cassation followed &#8220;sans renvoi,&#8221; without remand. But the same decision carefully preserved the other half of the edifice: after leaving office, a head of State may only claim functional immunity, and that immunity, as the Court now holds, cannot be opposed to prosecutions for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, as confirmed the same day in appeal no. 24-84.071. The lesson for suppliers and intermediaries is therefore double-edged: no sitting head of State can be arrested in Paris, but everyone else in the chain \u2014 officials without personal immunity, executives, brokers, and former leaders \u2014 enjoys no protection once the file shows knowing facilitation of international crimes. An arms dealer cannot borrow his client&#8217;s immunity.<\/p>\n<p>Applied to the Nicaragua scenario, the French criminal route would run as follows. Victims or associations file a complaint with constitution de partie civile in Paris for complicity in genocide or war crimes against identified intermediaries habitually resident in France; the specialised unit verifies the subsidiarity and presence conditions of Article 689-11; investigating judges examine export licences, end-user certificates, internal risk assessments, and what the supplier knew of the public documentation of atrocities at the time of delivery. The &#8220;clear risk&#8221; standard of the EU Common Position then reappears as evidence of knowledge: a licence granted despite documented warnings makes the &#8220;sciemment&#8221; \u2014 knowingly \u2014 element of Article 121-7 harder to deny. This is not theory. It is the ordinary working method of France&#8217;s crimes-against-humanity unit, and the Nicaragua hearings give its magistrates an international reference point for the exact question they face in every file: from which moment does continuing to supply become complicity.<\/p>\n<h2>Conclusion<\/h2>\n<p>The September 2026 hearings did not condemn Germany, and they may yet end the case on purely procedural grounds \u2014 no established dispute, claims outside the post-2008 jurisdictional window, or the Monetary Gold shield of Israel&#8217;s absence. But even that outcome would leave behind a detailed public record of what a major exporting State knew, licensed, and defended, plus a Court order, expected within months, that will map the exact boundary between sovereign export policy and third-State responsibility. And if the Court rejects the objections, even partially, it will open the first full trial in history of an arms supplier sued as such before the World Court, with the duty to prevent genocide and the duty to ensure respect for the Geneva Conventions as the substantive yardsticks.<\/p>\n<p>For France, there is no neutral seat from which to watch. Paris licenses under the same European criteria, prosecutes complicity under <a href=\"https:\/\/www.legifrance.gouv.fr\/codes\/article_lc\/LEGIARTI000006417212\">Articles 121-7, 211-1, 212-1, and 461-1<\/a>, and asserts universal jurisdiction under <a href=\"https:\/\/www.legifrance.gouv.fr\/codes\/article_lc\/LEGIARTI000021486423\">Articles 689 and 689-11<\/a> while protecting sitting heads of State under the immunity rule confirmed on 25 July 2025. Exporters should therefore read the coming ICJ order as advance notice: licences granted in the face of publicly documented atrocity risks will be examined, in Luxembourg-style administrative review today and potentially in The Hague or in Paris criminal courts tomorrow, through the lens of &#8220;clear risk&#8221; and knowing facilitation. Victims and their counsel, conversely, now hold a procedural template \u2014 dispute crystallisation, Memorial discipline, and the answer to Monetary Gold \u2014 tested in real time before the world&#8217;s highest court. Whichever way the order goes, the age in which arms export decisions were treated as unreviewable acts of sovereignty is ending, and France, as exporter, prosecutor, and host of universal-jurisdiction trials, stands at the centre of what comes next.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>The ICJ held hearings on 7-10 September 2026 on Germany&#8217;s objections in Nicaragua&#8217;s arms-supply case. A Paris lawyer explains the genocide-complicity claims and what they mean for French export licences and criminal courts.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":232070755,"featured_media":4706,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_kj_source_type":"","_kj_official_id":"","_kj_official_url":"","_kj_judilibre_id":"","_kj_jur":"","_kj_lieu":"","_kj_chambre":"","_kj_rg":"","_kj_date":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[301720,301654],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-2204661","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-decryptage","category-international-legal-news"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v28.1 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>Nicaragua v. Germany at the ICJ: Can an Arms Supplier Answer for Genocide? What the September 2026 Hearings Mean for France<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/en\/nicaragua-germany-icj-arms-exports-france-liability-2026\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Nicaragua v. Germany at the ICJ: Can an Arms Supplier Answer for Genocide? What the September 2026 Hearings Mean for France\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"The ICJ held hearings on 7-10 September 2026 on Germany&#039;s objections in Nicaragua&#039;s arms-supply case. 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