{"id":2285481,"date":"2026-10-07T12:59:19","date_gmt":"2026-10-07T10:59:19","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/gaza-three-years-october-7-icc-warrants-ceasefire-french-courts-2026\/"},"modified":"2026-10-07T12:59:19","modified_gmt":"2026-10-07T10:59:19","slug":"gaza-three-years-october-7-icc-warrants-ceasefire-french-courts-2026","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/en\/gaza-three-years-october-7-icc-warrants-ceasefire-french-courts-2026\/","title":{"rendered":"Gaza Three Years After October 7: Do ICC Arrest Warrants Survive a Ceasefire, and What Can French Courts Do?"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>On 7 October 2026, Israel marked three years since the Hamas-led attacks of 7 October 2023, while a fragile American-brokered ceasefire, in force since 10 October 2025, still holds in name but not entirely on the ground. According to Reuters reporting published on the anniversary of 7 October 2026, this is the first commemoration with no hostages still held in Gaza, after successive exchanges and the recovery in January of the remains of the last Israeli hostage, and it comes twenty days before an Israeli general election widely described as a referendum on the long tenure of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The same reporting notes that Israel now controls close to two-thirds of the Gaza Strip, that more than 1,400 Palestinians have been killed there since the ceasefire under Israeli bombardment, according to Gaza health authorities, and that the two sides remain deadlocked over disarmament, with Israel refusing to withdraw until Hamas fully disarms and Hamas refusing to disarm while Israeli strikes continue. In his message for the anniversary (United Nations press release SGSM23317), United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres recalled that Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups had launched, three years earlier, what he called an abhorrent large-scale terror attack, urged all parties to implement their commitments in full and to move to the next phase of the ceasefire, and insisted that the moment had come to make the truce permanent, to allow humanitarian assistance at scale, and to respect international law. For lawyers, journalists, victims and their families, the anniversary raises three hard practical questions that a ceasefire does not answer by itself. Do the arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court survive a truce. What would France actually do if a person wanted by the Court were found on French soil. And what can French courts prosecute on their own, at the request of victims living in France, for torture, hostage-taking, war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Gaza or in Israel since 7 October 2023. This article answers each question from French and European procedure as it stands on the day of publication.<\/p>\n<h2>I. Do the ICC arrest warrants over Gaza survive the ceasefire, and would France enforce them on its soil<\/h2>\n<h3>A. Why the Netanyahu and Gallant warrants remain in force while the Hamas-side warrant ended with death<\/h3>\n<p>The starting point is <a href=\"https:\/\/www.icc-cpi.int\/news\/situation-state-palestine-icc-pre-trial-chamber-i-rejects-state-israels-challenges\">a press release of the International Criminal Court dated 21 November 2024<\/a>, in which Pre-Trial Chamber I announced that it had unanimously rejected the jurisdictional challenges brought by the State of Israel and issued warrants of arrest. In the words of the Court itself, Today, on 21 November 2024, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court, in its composition for the Situation in the State of Palestine, unanimously issued two decisions rejecting challenges by the State of Israel brought under articles 18 and 19 of the Rome Statute. It also issued warrants of arrest for Mr Benjamin Netanyahu and Mr Yoav Gallant. The Chamber recalled that the acceptance by Israel of the Court&#8217;s jurisdiction is not required, because the Court exercises jurisdiction on the basis of the territorial jurisdiction of Palestine, as settled in an earlier ruling of the same Chamber, and it held that states cannot challenge jurisdiction under article 19 before a warrant has even been issued. Two consequences follow for the anniversary debate. First, the warrants rest on a confirmed jurisdictional basis that a ceasefire agreement cannot undo, because a bilateral or American-brokered truce is not a ruling of the Court and does not amend the Rome Statute. Second, nothing in the public record of the case indicates that the warrants have been withdrawn, stayed or executed since, so they remain outstanding and enforceable in every state that accepts to cooperate with the Court.<\/p>\n<p>Under the Rome Statute, an arrest warrant does not expire because the guns fall silent. The only lawful ways to neutralise an outstanding warrant are a decision of the judges themselves, for example when the Prosecutor withdraws the request or the Chamber quashes it, a deferral decided by the United Nations Security Council under article 16 of the Statute, which is temporary and renewable, or the death of the suspect, which extinguishes the case against that person alone. A ceasefire, a peace plan, an election, or even a change of government in the state concerned belongs to none of these categories. It may change the political context in which states decide to cooperate, and it may affect travel plans, as shown by the intense speculation before each international summit about which airspace a wanted leader can cross, but it does not erase the judicial act. That is why the anniversary commentaries that present the truce as closing the justice chapter are legally wrong. The truce suspends or limits hostilities between the parties that accepted it. It does not suspend the Court.<\/p>\n<p>The Hamas side of the same situation illustrates the point in reverse, because there the proceedings ended for a reason the Statute recognises. On the same day, 21 November 2024, the Court also <a href=\"https:\/\/www.icc-cpi.int\/defendant\/deif\">issued a warrant of arrest for Mohammed Diab Ibrahim Al-Masri<\/a>, commonly known as Deif, born in 1965 and described by the Court as the highest commander of the military wing of Hamas, the Al-Qassam Brigades, at the time of the alleged conduct. The published charges against him covered the crimes against humanity of murder, extermination, torture, and rape and other forms of sexual violence, as well as the war crimes of murder, cruel treatment, torture, taking hostages, outrages upon personal dignity, and rape and other forms of sexual violence, allegedly committed on the territory of the State of Israel and the State of Palestine from at least 7 October 2023. Then, on 26 February 2025, Pre-Trial Chamber I terminated the proceedings against him following the confirmation of his death. The contrast is instructive and must be stated plainly. On one side, warrants that survive because their targets are alive and no judicial decision has lifted them. On the other, a case closed because death was established through the proper procedure. A ceasefire produces neither effect. It neither confirms a death nor quashes a warrant, and lawyers who advise victims, journalists who report on the talks, and officials who prepare summits should keep those two registers strictly separate.<\/p>\n<p>France&#8217;s position in this architecture is fixed by statute, not by the mood of the negotiations. French law (<a href=\"https:\/\/www.legifrance.gouv.fr\/codes\/article_lc\/LEGIARTI000006577110\">Article 627 of the Code of Criminal Procedure<\/a>) provides that, for the application of the Statute of the International Criminal Court signed on 18 July 1998, France participates in the punishment of the offences and cooperates with that jurisdiction under the conditions set by the dedicated title of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The exact official wording is that Pour l&#8217;application du statut de la Cour p\u00e9nale internationale sign\u00e9 le 18 juillet 1998, la France participe \u00e0 la r\u00e9pression des infractions et coop\u00e8re avec cette juridiction dans les conditions fix\u00e9es par le pr\u00e9sent titre, and the provision adds that the rules apply to any person prosecuted before the Court or convicted by it for acts constituting, within the meaning of articles 6 to 8 and 25 of the Statute, genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes. In plain terms, France has written cooperation with the Court into its own criminal procedure, and a French prosecutor, a French liberty and custody judge and the Paris investigating chamber apply these rules whenever the Court transmits a request concerning a person on French territory. The anniversary and the truce change nothing to that statutory duty. What can change, in practice, is whether the person travels to France at all, which is precisely why the warrants keep shaping diplomacy long after the fighting slows.<\/p>\n<h3>B. How France would arrest and surrender a person wanted by the ICC if found on French territory<\/h3>\n<p>Suppose a person sought by the International Criminal Court sets foot in France, whether through Paris airports, a Mediterranean port or an overland border. The procedure that follows is not extradition in the classic sense but surrender, remise, under a self-contained title of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and it moves fast. The official text (<a href=\"https:\/\/www.legifrance.gouv.fr\/codes\/article_lc\/LEGIARTI000024966800\">Article 627-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure<\/a>) provides that Toute personne appr\u00e9hend\u00e9e en vertu d&#8217;une demande d&#8217;arrestation aux fins de remise doit \u00eatre d\u00e9f\u00e9r\u00e9e dans les vingt-quatre heures au procureur de la R\u00e9publique territorialement comp\u00e9tent, with the safeguards of police custody applying in the meantime. After verifying identity, the prosecutor informs the person, in a language she or he understands, that an arrest request for surrender has been issued, that she or he will appear within a maximum of five days before the prosecutor general at the Paris Court of Appeal, and that counsel of her or his choice, or court-appointed counsel, may assist. Three practical lessons emerge for anyone following the Gaza warrants. First, the twenty-four-hour presentation and the five-day appearance deadlines leave no room for prolonged diplomatic negotiation once an arrest has occurred on French soil. Second, the information must be given in a language the person understands, which in high-profile cases means qualified interpretation from the first hour, organised by the prosecution, not by the entourage of the person concerned. Third, the right to counsel applies immediately, including for challenging the identity of the person arrested, which is the only serious short-term defence at this stage, because French authorities do not retry the merits of the ICC case.<\/p>\n<p>The decision itself belongs to the investigating chamber of the Paris Court of Appeal, and its review is deliberately narrow. The statute (<a href=\"https:\/\/www.legifrance.gouv.fr\/codes\/article_lc\/LEGIARTI000024966833\">Article 627-8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure<\/a>) provides that Lorsque la chambre de l&#8217;instruction constate qu&#8217;il n&#8217;y a pas d&#8217;erreur \u00e9vidente, elle ordonne la remise de la personne r\u00e9clam\u00e9e et, si celle-ci est libre, son incarc\u00e9ration \u00e0 cette fin, adding that any other question is referred to the International Criminal Court for appropriate action. The chamber rules within fifteen days of the appearance, and on appeal the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation decides within two months of receiving the file. The phrase erreur evidente is the whole case in most surrender proceedings. It covers mistaken identity, a warrant that plainly does not concern the person arrested, or a file so irregular that no judge could act on it. It does not cover pleas that the warrant is politically motivated, that the situation has changed since a ceasefire, that the person now performs official functions, or that the home state contests the Court&#8217;s legitimacy, because those arguments belong in The Hague, not in Paris. A defence team that walks into the Paris investigating chamber hoping to relitigate the merits of the Palestine situation, the proportionality of the Gaza campaign, or the virtues of the truce will therefore lose on jurisdiction before it even reaches substance, and experienced counsel instead concentrates on identity, on the regularity of the French paperwork, and in parallel on filings before the ICC itself, which alone can vary or quash its warrants.<\/p>\n<p>Two further French particulars matter for the Gaza warrants. First, provisional arrest can precede the formal surrender request when an ICC red notice or a direct request circulates through Interpol channels, which means a routine border check at Roissy or at a Schengen crossing can trigger the whole twenty-four-hour sequence before any ministry has taken a public position. Second, France does not apply to ICC surrender the classic extradition bars that dominate ordinary extradition litigation in Paris, such as the political-offence exception or the nationality exception as understood in state-to-state extradition, because surrender to an international court follows its own title and its own logic. The practical result is binary and should be stated without embellishment. Either the wanted person avoids the territory of cooperating states, which constrains travel, flight paths and summit attendance for as long as the warrant stands, or the person enters such a territory and faces a quasi-automatic judicial pipeline ending, absent an obvious error, in transfer to The Hague. The third anniversary changes neither branch of the alternative. It only reminds every chancellery that the warrants of 21 November 2024 are still the law governing the next trip, the next summit and the next stopover.<\/p>\n<h2>II. What French courts can prosecute themselves over Gaza, and how victims act from France<\/h2>\n<h3>A. Which Gaza crimes French judges can hear under universal jurisdiction, and why the 2023 rulings matter<\/h3>\n<p>Alongside cooperation with The Hague, France can prosecute the gravest crimes itself when the suspects are within reach of its courts. The general gateway is <a href=\"https:\/\/www.legifrance.gouv.fr\/codes\/article_lc\/LEGIARTI000021486423\">article 689 of the Code of Criminal Procedure<\/a>, which provides that les auteurs ou complices d&#8217;infractions commises hors du territoire de la R\u00e9publique peuvent \u00eatre poursuivis et jug\u00e9s par les juridictions fran\u00e7aises soit lorsque, conform\u00e9ment aux dispositions du livre Ier du code p\u00e9nal ou d&#8217;un autre texte l\u00e9gislatif, la loi fran\u00e7aise est applicable, soit lorsqu&#8217;une convention internationale ou un acte pris en application du trait\u00e9 instituant les Communaut\u00e9s europ\u00e9ennes donne comp\u00e9tence aux juridictions fran\u00e7aises pour conna\u00eetre de l&#8217;infraction. For the crimes that dominate the Gaza record since 7 October 2023, namely genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and torture, the operative provision is <a href=\"https:\/\/www.legifrance.gouv.fr\/codes\/article_lc\/LEGIARTI000048442165\">article 689-11<\/a>, whose official wording deserves full quotation because every word is a condition. It states that hors les cas pr\u00e9vus au sous-titre Ier du titre Ier du livre IV pour l&#8217;application de la convention portant statut de la Cour p\u00e9nale internationale, ouverte \u00e0 la signature \u00e0 Rome le 18 juillet 1998, peut \u00eatre poursuivie et jug\u00e9e par les juridictions fran\u00e7aises toute personne soup\u00e7onn\u00e9e d&#8217;avoir commis \u00e0 l&#8217;\u00e9tranger l&#8217;une des infractions suivantes, then lists genocide as defined in the Criminal Code, other crimes against humanity, and war crimes defined in articles 461-1 to 461-31 of the same code. Three cumulative filters then apply, and each has direct Gaza relevance. The suspect must have a habitual residence in France, understood as a sufficient link assessed through the length of presence, its conditions and reasons, the demonstrated wish to settle or remain, and family, social, material or professional ties. Prosecution can only be brought by the national anti-terrorism prosecutor, and only if no international or national court seeks surrender or extradition of the person, which the prosecution must verify, including by checking that the International Criminal Court is not already prosecuting. In short, France offers a real but subsidiary forum. Real, because Paris judges have the statutory tools. Subsidiary, because The Hague goes first and the anti-terrorism prosecutor holds the key.<\/p>\n<p>The scope of that forum was considerably clarified by two landmark rulings of the Court of Cassation sitting in plenary assembly on 12 May 2023, which every Gaza filing in Paris will now have to address. In the first, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.courdecassation.fr\/decision\/645dd86cd1cd71d0f828667b\">appeal number 22-82.468<\/a>, concerning torture, complicity, enforced disappearances, war crimes and related charges arising from the Syrian conflict and the conduct of the armed group Jaysh Al-Islam, the Court rejected the argument that French courts lacked jurisdiction because the accused was not an agent of a state. After recalling that article 689-2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure refers to torture within the meaning of article 1 of the New York Convention against Torture of 10 December 1984, and quoting that definition in full, the Court held that the universal-jurisdiction case under that article is limited to torture attributed to a public official or a person acting in an official capacity or at their instigation or with their express or tacit consent, but then added the decisive extension. The notion of a person having acted in an official capacity, it ruled, doit \u00eatre comprise comme visant \u00e9galement une personne agissant pour le compte ou au nom d&#8217;une entit\u00e9 non gouvernementale, lorsque celle-ci occupe un territoire et exerce une autorit\u00e9 quasi gouvernementale sur ce territoire. The reasoning invokes the very purpose of the Convention, to make the fight against torture effective by avoiding impunity, and observes that where a territory is in fact occupied by a group exercising the authority normally devolved to a government, torture risks going unpunished. For Gaza, the parallel is direct and should be drawn carefully. Any allegation of torture attributable to members of an organised armed group exercising de facto governmental authority over territory, on whichever side of the conflict, fits the exact hypothesis the plenary assembly validated, provided the suspect is later found in France and the remaining conditions of French procedure are met. The ruling does not prejudge any individual file. It removes what used to be the standard jurisdictional shield.<\/p>\n<p>The second plenary ruling of the same day, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.courdecassation.fr\/decision\/645dd86cd1cd71d0f8286679\">appeal number 22-80.057<\/a>, completes the picture for crimes against humanity and for the role of victims. There, the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons had excluded a Syrian national from international protection after finding plausible reasons to suspect acts contrary to the purposes of the United Nations, and the Paris prosecutor opened a judicial investigation against him for torture, crimes against humanity and complicity. The plenary assembly rejected the challenge, confirming that the French investigation could proceed. The file also shows victims associations joining as civil parties at the investigative stage. Three lessons for Gaza victims living in France follow. First, an administrative signal, such as an exclusion from refugee protection or any official finding of implication in atrocities, can feed a criminal file, and the same logic applies to any documented signal concerning Gaza suspects present in France. Second, associations as well as individual victims can enter the proceedings early as civil parties, which gives access to the file, the right to request investigative acts, and standing to appeal closure decisions. Third, the habitual-residence filter of article 689-11 remains the decisive factual battle in most files, because everything turns on proving the sufficient link with France through duration, conditions, intention to remain, and family, social, material or professional ties, exactly as the statute phrases it.<\/p>\n<p>The substantive definitions that Paris judges would apply are written in the Criminal Code in terms broad enough to cover the documented patterns of the Gaza conflict, subject in each case to proof of the specific intent and context the law requires. Genocide is defined (<a href=\"https:\/\/www.legifrance.gouv.fr\/codes\/article_lc\/LEGIARTI000006417533\">Article 211-1 of the Criminal Code<\/a>) as the fact, in execution of a concerted plan aimed at the total or partial destruction of a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, or of a group determined by any other arbitrary criterion, of committing or causing to be committed against members of that group one of the listed acts, including wilful attacks on life, grave attacks on physical or mental integrity, subjection to conditions of existence likely to bring about the destruction of the group, measures to prevent births, and forced transfer of children. The exact opening words are worth keeping verbatim, because they contain the evidentiary mountain every genocide allegation must climb. Constitue un g\u00e9nocide le fait, en ex\u00e9cution d&#8217;un plan concert\u00e9 tendant \u00e0 la destruction totale ou partielle d&#8217;un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux, ou d&#8217;un groupe d\u00e9termin\u00e9 \u00e0 partir de tout autre crit\u00e8re arbitraire, de commettre ou de faire commettre, \u00e0 l&#8217;encontre de membres de ce groupe, l&#8217;un des actes suivants. Crimes against humanity are defined in parallel (<a href=\"https:\/\/www.legifrance.gouv.fr\/codes\/article_lc\/LEGIARTI000027811403\">Article 212-1 of the Criminal Code<\/a>) as one of the listed acts, including wilful killing, extermination, enslavement, deportation or forcible transfer, imprisonment or other grave deprivation of liberty, torture, and sexual violence, committed in execution of a concerted plan against a civilian population group within a widespread or systematic attack, punishable by life imprisonment. The statute opens with the words constitue \u00e9galement un crime contre l&#8217;humanit\u00e9 et est puni de la r\u00e9clusion criminelle \u00e0 perp\u00e9tuit\u00e9 l&#8217;un des actes ci-apr\u00e8s commis en ex\u00e9cution d&#8217;un plan concert\u00e9 \u00e0 l&#8217;encontre d&#8217;un groupe de population civile dans le cadre d&#8217;une attaque g\u00e9n\u00e9ralis\u00e9e ou syst\u00e9matique. War crimes are defined (<a href=\"https:\/\/www.legifrance.gouv.fr\/codes\/article_lc\/LEGIARTI000022686501\">Article 461-1 of the Criminal Code<\/a>) as the offences in the relevant book committed, during an international or non-international armed conflict and in connection with it, in violation of the laws and customs of war or the applicable international conventions, against the protected persons or property listed in the following articles, namely constituent des crimes ou des d\u00e9lits de guerre les infractions d\u00e9finies par le pr\u00e9sent livre commises, lors d&#8217;un conflit arm\u00e9 international ou non international et en relation avec ce conflit, en violation des lois et coutumes de la guerre ou des conventions internationales applicables aux conflits arm\u00e9s, \u00e0 l&#8217;encontre des personnes ou des biens vis\u00e9s aux articles 461-2 \u00e0 461-31. And hostage-taking, the crime at the heart of the 251 abductions of 7 October 2023 recalled by the Secretary-General, is punished in France by twenty years imprisonment under <a href=\"https:\/\/www.legifrance.gouv.fr\/codes\/article_lc\/LEGIARTI000027811104\">Article 224-1 of the Criminal Code<\/a>, stating that le fait, sans ordre des autorit\u00e9s constitu\u00e9es et hors les cas pr\u00e9vus par la loi, d&#8217;arr\u00eater, d&#8217;enlever, de d\u00e9tenir ou de s\u00e9questrer une personne, est puni de vingt ans de r\u00e9clusion criminelle. None of these quotations proves that any named individual is guilty of anything. Each of them maps the exact grid through which a Paris judge would examine a Gaza complaint, and each explains why careful files cite the precise article rather than invoking international justice in the abstract.<\/p>\n<h3>B. How victims in France file a Gaza complaint, join the case as civil parties, and protect related rights<\/h3>\n<p>The victims route in France starts with a complaint filed in Paris, in practice before the national anti-terrorism prosecutor, who holds the monopoly for the article 689-11 crimes, and it continues, if the conditions are met, through a judicial investigation led by a Paris investigating judge. French law (<a href=\"https:\/\/www.legifrance.gouv.fr\/codes\/article_lc\/LEGIARTI000024496925\">Article 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure<\/a>) gives every person who personally suffered harm directly caused by a crime, an offence or a petty offence the right to seek compensation through the criminal courts, in the classic formula that l&#8217;action civile en r\u00e9paration du dommage caus\u00e9 par un crime, un d\u00e9lit ou une contravention appartient \u00e0 tous ceux qui ont personnellement souffert du dommage directement caus\u00e9 par l&#8217;infraction. For French nationals and residents among the victims of the 7 October 2023 attacks, including the families of those murdered, those taken hostage, and survivors of sexual violence documented by the United Nations, that provision is the doorway. A complaint with constitution de partie civile before the investigating judge forces a judicial decision, subject to appeal, rather than leaving the file to prosecutorial discretion alone. The Syrian precedents show associations joining alongside individuals, and the 22-80.057 file confirms that practice at the investigative stage. One caution from the statute itself must be repeated to every prospective complainant. Where the anti-terrorism prosecutor closes a case without further action, the remedy runs through the prosecutor general at the Paris Court of Appeal under article 40-3, who hears the complainant if requested and answers a manifestly unfounded appeal by reasoned written decision, exactly as article 689-11 recalls. A closure is therefore not the end of the road, but the second round has its own formalities and deadlines, and missing them is the most common way strong files die quietly.<\/p>\n<p>Evidence is the second battle, and the ceasefire changes its terms without simplifying them. On the one hand, the truce and any stabilisation that follows can improve access for documentation, forensic work, satellite analysis and witness outreach. On the other, three years after the facts, memories fade, sites degrade, chains of custody break, and each side controls the areas where the most probative traces lie. A Gaza file built from France should therefore combine several layers from the outset. Individual proof first, with medical certificates drafted to international standards, dated photographs, correspondence from the period of captivity or bombardment, and detailed chronological accounts. Collective documentation next, drawing on United Nations reports, humanitarian organisations with field methodology, and reputable press investigations, each cited for what it actually establishes rather than for atmosphere. Official and judicial materials then, including the ICC filings and decisions, the Secretary-General&#8217;s statements, and any national proceedings, used for their precise holdings. And finally, targeted requests for international mutual assistance once a French investigation is open, because only a judge can compel telephone records, financial trails, travel data and hygrometry-proof archival production. Families should also preserve everything connected to the hostage period, including proof of payments, intermediaries, and communications, since ransom, logistical support and propaganda financing can generate ancillary charges such as terrorist financing and criminal association that are sometimes easier to prove than the principal atrocity charges and can justify coercive measures earlier in the investigation.<\/p>\n<p>The third strand concerns money and movement, because Gaza-related cases increasingly intersect with sanctions, asset freezes and reconstruction disputes. Persons who discover that their funds are frozen under European Union restrictive measures, banks that derisk entire categories of clients with links to the region, and companies exposed to dual-use or settlement-related designations face a separate procedural universe. The listing itself can be challenged by requesting the statement of reasons, submitting observations and delisting requests to the Council, and bringing an annulment action before the General Court of the European Union within the applicable time limits, while national implementation measures, such as a French bank&#8217;s freeze, can be contested before the competent national judge. These actions demand speed, because time limits run from notification or publication, and precision, because the Council&#8217;s reasons must be answered ground by ground rather than denounced in general terms. The reconstruction debate adds a property-law dimension that the anniversary reporting has already flagged, with the American Board of Peace proposals described as failing to account for the property rights of Palestinians whose homes were destroyed. Anyone in the diaspora with title, inheritance or tenancy documents concerning Gaza property should secure, translate and authenticate them now, through notarial channels where available, because future compensation funds, restitution programmes or adverse-possession disputes will reward those who can prove the chain of title and punish those who relied on memory alone. Here as elsewhere, the method is the same. Identify the exact applicable text, calendar the exact deadline, file before the exact competent authority, and keep every original.<\/p>\n<h2>Conclusion<\/h2>\n<p>Three years after 7 October 2023, the law is clearer than the headlines suggest. The ceasefire in force since 10 October 2025 has not lifted the International Criminal Court warrants of 21 November 2024, which remain outstanding until the judges decide otherwise, and it has not repealed the French statutes that oblige France to cooperate with the Court and empower its own judges to prosecute genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, torture and hostage-taking when suspects reside in France and no other court claims them. The Hamas-side proceedings show the only exits the system recognises, with the case against Mohammed Deif terminated on 26 February 2025 after his death was confirmed, while the cases built on living suspects continue regardless of truces, plans and elections. For victims in France, the path runs through a documented complaint to the national anti-terrorism prosecutor, constitution as civil party before the Paris investigating judge, and where needed an appeal to the prosecutor general against closure, supported from day one by medical, documentary and digital evidence preserved with chain-of-custody discipline. For anyone named in a warrant or a listing, the symmetric advice is to verify status before travelling, calendar every remedy, and litigate in the forum that actually holds the power, The Hague for warrants, Luxembourg for European Union listings, Paris for French investigations. The anniversary commemorates the dead and the hostages. The procedure decides what justice still can do, and it remains fully open.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Three years after 7 October 2023, the Gaza ceasefire has not lifted the ICC arrest warrants. A Paris lawyer explains surrender in France, universal jurisdiction and how victims file complaints.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":232070755,"featured_media":4868,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_kj_source_type":"","_kj_official_id":"","_kj_official_url":"","_kj_judilibre_id":"","_kj_jur":"","_kj_lieu":"","_kj_chambre":"","_kj_rg":"","_kj_date":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[301720,301654],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-2285481","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-decryptage","category-international-legal-news"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v28.1 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>Gaza Three Years After October 7: Do ICC Arrest Warrants Survive a Ceasefire, and What Can French Courts Do?<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/en\/gaza-three-years-october-7-icc-warrants-ceasefire-french-courts-2026\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Gaza Three Years After October 7: Do ICC Arrest Warrants Survive a Ceasefire, and What Can French Courts Do?\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Three years after 7 October 2023, the Gaza ceasefire has not lifted the ICC arrest warrants. 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