{"id":2300950,"date":"2026-10-10T22:51:52","date_gmt":"2026-10-10T20:51:52","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/eu-frozen-russian-assets-reparations-loan-france-immunity-2026\/"},"modified":"2026-10-10T22:51:52","modified_gmt":"2026-10-10T20:51:52","slug":"eu-frozen-russian-assets-reparations-loan-france-immunity-2026","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/en\/eu-frozen-russian-assets-reparations-loan-france-immunity-2026\/","title":{"rendered":"EU Frozen Russian Assets: the Reparations Loan Battle and What French Courts Allow"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Ukraine needs \u20ac23 billion before the end of October 2026 or it cannot keep defending itself. That warning from Kyiv, relayed by <em>Le Figaro<\/em> on 7 October 2026, has turned a technical Brussels debate into a countdown. The European Union already approved a \u20ac90 billion Ukraine Support Loan for 2026 and 2027, and about \u20ac15.7 billion had reached Kyiv by early October. But the 2026 envelope is nearly depleted, the United States is no longer contributing, and the other G7 members have not met their targets. So all eyes are back on the one pot of money nobody has dared to touch in full: roughly \u20ac200 billion in Russian sovereign assets immobilised in Europe.<\/p>\n<p>On 1 October 2026, Spain, Poland, the Netherlands and Sweden, backed by the three Baltic states and 122 members of the European Parliament, put the confiscation option back on the table. On 9 October 2026, Carnegie Europe published a detailed roadmap for turning those assets into financing now. The legal question is no longer theoretical: can the EU convert frozen Russian state money into a loan for Ukraine without breaking sovereign immunity, EU law and the Belgian balance sheet where most of the assets sit? And what does any of this mean in Paris, where French judges have built some of the toughest case law in Europe on seizing foreign state property?<\/p>\n<p>This analysis maps the state of play as of 10 October 2026, then explains the French layer: why immobilised assets in France are shielded by immunity from execution, what the Cour de cassation actually allows, and which court routes exist in Paris for listed persons and for creditors holding awards against Russia.<\/p>\n<h2>I. Can the EU Turn Frozen Russian Assets Into Money for Ukraine? The October 2026 State of Play<\/h2>\n<h3>A. From Windfall Profits to the \u20ac90 Billion Loan: What the EU Has Already Done<\/h3>\n<p>The starting point is a distinction the whole debate turns on: freezing is not confiscating. When the EU immobilised the reserves of the Central Bank of Russia in 2022 under its sanctions regime, notably Council Regulation (EU) No 833\/2014 concerning restrictive measures against Russia and Council Regulation (EU) No 269\/2014 adopted under Council Decision 2014\/145\/CFSP, it blocked transactions and froze funds. Ownership did not move. Russia still owns the assets; it simply cannot access them. Every subsequent scheme has had to work around that property line, because crossing it means expropriating a sovereign state.<\/p>\n<p>The first workaround was the windfall-profits mechanism. On 12 February 2024 the Council decided that central securities depositories holding immobilised assets, in practice Belgium&#8217;s Euroclear, had to set aside the extraordinary cash balances and revenues they generated (see the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/press\/press-releases\/2024\/02\/12\/immobilised-russian-assets-council-decides-to-set-aside-extraordinary-revenues\/\">Council press release of 12 February 2024<\/a>). On 21 May 2024 the Council went one step further and authorised the use of the net windfall profits to support Ukraine&#8217;s self-defence and reconstruction (see the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/press\/press-releases\/2024\/05\/21\/extraordinary-revenues-generated-by-immobilised-russian-assets-council-greenlights-the-use-of-windfall-net-profits-to-support-ukraine-s-self-defence-and-reconstruction\/\">Council press release of 21 May 2024<\/a>). The legal logic was careful: the profits were treated as belonging to the depository, not to Russia, so skimming them arguably touched no sovereign property. Roughly \u20ac1.4 billion was channelled to Ukraine on that basis, and Euroclear earned about $7 billion in interest on the frozen cash in 2024 alone. The principal, around \u20ac185 billion sitting at Euroclear out of \u20ac300 to \u20ac330 billion immobilised worldwide, stayed untouched.<\/p>\n<p>The second step was the loan architecture built with the G7. Under the Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration (ERA) mechanism, G7 lenders advanced funds to Ukraine to be repaid from future windfall flows. Then, in December 2025, after the European Council of 23 October 2025 failed to agree on touching the principal, EU leaders approved a \u20ac90 billion Ukraine Support Loan for 2026 and 2027, presented by the Commission as a limited-recourse loan (see the <a href=\"https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/ip_26_90\">Commission press release IP\/26\/90<\/a> and the European Parliament briefing <a href=\"https:\/\/www.europarl.europa.eu\/thinktank\/en\/document\/EPRS_BRI(2025)779267\">EPRS BRI(2025)779267 on financing Ukraine in 2026 and 2027<\/a>). The first tranche was released in June 2026. By early October 2026 Kyiv had received about \u20ac15.7 billion under the scheme, according to Carnegie Europe&#8217;s 9 October 2026 assessment. The IMF treats the loan as a non-recourse contingent liability, repaid only if Ukraine ever receives Russian reparations, which is why it does not wreck Ukraine&#8217;s debt sustainability analysis.<\/p>\n<p>December 2025 also produced the quiet legal revolution that makes today&#8217;s debate possible. The Council decided to prohibit transfers of immobilised Central Bank of Russia assets back to Russia for as long as necessary, replacing the old six-month unanimity renewals (see the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/press\/press-releases\/2025\/12\/12\/council-decides-to-prohibit-transfers-of-immobilised-central-bank-of-russia-assets-back-to-russia\/\">Council press release of 12 December 2025<\/a>). A single member state can no longer veto its way to an unfreeze. On the American side, a 2024 federal statute locked the same door: Russian sovereign assets in the United States effectively cannot be returned until hostilities cease and Ukraine is fully compensated. Immobilisation is now close to permanent. The assets cannot go back; the only open question is whether, and how, they can go to Ukraine.<\/p>\n<h3>B. The Reparations Loan and ERA 2.0: the Two Live Options and Their Legal Tripwires<\/h3>\n<p>Two proposals now compete to close the funding gap, and both were live in the press this week.<\/p>\n<p>The first is the reparations loan. The Commission proposed lending Ukraine up to \u20ac165 billion backed by the cash value of frozen Russian state assets held in Belgium, including about \u20ac25 billion of immobilised assets located in other member states. Ukraine would repay only from reparations that Russia would one day pay; if Moscow never pays, the lenders absorb the loss. Germany&#8217;s Chancellor Friedrich Merz pushed the idea hard in 2025. It floundered on one obstacle: Belgium. Euroclear, a Belgian private company, holds the bulk of the assets, and Brussels demanded that the legal and liquidity risks concentrated on its territory be shared across the Union before it would agree. The European Parliament briefing on the saga is explicit: at the 23 October 2025 European Council, member states could not agree, mainly because of Belgium&#8217;s reticence, and the Commission was sent back to produce more financing options. On 3 December 2025 the Commission tabled five legislative proposals underpinning two possible paths, and leaders ended up choosing the \u20ac90 billion loan instead, declining to use the frozen principal. The October 2026 revival, driven by Madrid, Warsaw, The Hague and Stockholm with Baltic and parliamentary support, changes the politics but not the legal file: any reparations loan still needs a mechanism to move funds out of Belgium to a Union-level vehicle, explicit risk-sharing for Euroclear, and a legal theory explaining why using the cash value of someone else&#8217;s property is not expropriation. Work on a transfer structure is reportedly underway in Brussels, and the issue is expected back at the leaders&#8217; table at the end of the year, when Kyiv&#8217;s needs will be even more acute.<\/p>\n<p>The second proposal, published by Carnegie Europe on 9 October 2026, is ERA 2.0: extend the existing windfall-revenue model instead of touching the principal. The EU and the G7 would commit Russian-derived revenues to a second round of loans until they are repaid, pair any eventual release of assets with a Russian reparations obligation for the outstanding balance, protect returns on cash balances with explicit guarantees or risk-sharing where legally feasible, and make the new loans fully non-recourse so Kyiv repays only from reparations or an agreed backstop. Raising the ceiling to \u20ac135\u2013150 billion would free another \u20ac45\u201360 billion through the same structure. The attraction is legal continuity: ERA 2.0 reuses the 2024 windfall theory that has already survived two years of practice, keeps the IMF&#8217;s favourable contingent-liability treatment, and avoids the expropriation debate entirely. Its weakness is arithmetic: it drips money where Ukraine now needs a flood, and it depends on G7 coordination at a moment when Washington has stopped contributing.<\/p>\n<p>Behind both options sits the same unresolved legal core: sovereign immunity. Under customary international law, reflected in the 2004 United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, one state may not seize another state&#8217;s property for non-commercial public purposes, and central bank reserves enjoy the strongest protection of all. Confiscating them as a countermeasure for aggression is defended by some international lawyers and rejected by others; no consensus exists, which is exactly why Belgium, the ECB and several capitals keep asking who pays if Russia one day wins an unlawful-expropriation case. That deadlock is what gives Paris a central role, because France is where the immunity doctrine has been tested hardest in actual courtrooms.<\/p>\n<h2>II. What France Changes: Immunity, Judges and Remedies in Paris<\/h2>\n<h3>A. Frozen Is Not Seized: Why French Courts Shield Russian State Assets From Execution<\/h3>\n<p>France combines two features that matter enormously for the assets debate: it implements EU freezes through its own national machinery, and its courts have spent a decade refining one of Europe&#8217;s strictest immunity-from-execution regimes. Anyone reasoning about Russian assets in France must start with the Code des proc\u00e9dures civiles d&#8217;ex\u00e9cution.<\/p>\n<p>The foundation is <a href=\"https:\/\/www.legifrance.gouv.fr\/codes\/article_lc\/LEGIARTI000025025642\">Article L. 111-1 of the Code des proc\u00e9dures civiles d&#8217;ex\u00e9cution<\/a>: &#8220;Tout cr\u00e9ancier peut, dans les conditions pr\u00e9vues par la loi, contraindre son d\u00e9biteur d\u00e9faillant \u00e0 ex\u00e9cuter ses obligations \u00e0 son \u00e9gard. Tout cr\u00e9ancier peut pratiquer une mesure conservatoire pour assurer la sauvegarde de ses droits. L&#8217;ex\u00e9cution forc\u00e9e et les mesures conservatoires ne sont pas applicables aux personnes qui b\u00e9n\u00e9ficient d&#8217;une immunit\u00e9 d&#8217;ex\u00e9cution.&#8221; Execution and protective measures simply do not apply to persons enjoying immunity from execution. For foreign states, the Code then builds a three-stage lock. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.legifrance.gouv.fr\/codes\/article_lc\/LEGIARTI000033563436\">Article L. 111-1-1<\/a> provides: &#8220;Des mesures conservatoires ou des mesures d&#8217;ex\u00e9cution forc\u00e9e ne peuvent \u00eatre mises en \u0153uvre sur un bien appartenant \u00e0 un Etat \u00e9tranger que sur autorisation pr\u00e9alable du juge par ordonnance rendue sur requ\u00eate.&#8221; No seizure of a foreign state&#8217;s property without a prior court order. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.legifrance.gouv.fr\/codes\/article_lc\/LEGIARTI000033563438\">Article L. 111-1-2<\/a> allows the judge to grant that authorisation only on three alternative conditions: &#8220;1\u00b0 L&#8217;Etat concern\u00e9 a express\u00e9ment consenti \u00e0 l&#8217;application d&#8217;une telle mesure ; 2\u00b0 L&#8217;Etat concern\u00e9 a r\u00e9serv\u00e9 ou affect\u00e9 ce bien \u00e0 la satisfaction de la demande qui fait l&#8217;objet de la proc\u00e9dure ; 3\u00b0 Lorsqu&#8217;un jugement ou une sentence arbitrale a \u00e9t\u00e9 rendu contre l&#8217;Etat concern\u00e9 et que le bien en question est sp\u00e9cifiquement utilis\u00e9 ou destin\u00e9 \u00e0 \u00eatre utilis\u00e9 par ledit Etat autrement qu&#8217;\u00e0 des fins de service public non commerciales et entretient un lien avec l&#8217;entit\u00e9 contre laquelle la proc\u00e9dure a \u00e9t\u00e9 intent\u00e9e.&#8221; Diplomatic, military, cultural and tax assets are expressly ring-fenced as serving non-commercial public purposes. And <a href=\"https:\/\/www.legifrance.gouv.fr\/codes\/article_lc\/LEGIARTI000033563440\">Article L. 111-1-3<\/a> adds a near-absolute shield for embassy property: &#8220;Des mesures conservatoires ou des mesures d&#8217;ex\u00e9cution forc\u00e9e ne peuvent \u00eatre mises en \u0153uvre sur les biens, y compris les comptes bancaires, utilis\u00e9s ou destin\u00e9s \u00e0 \u00eatre utilis\u00e9s dans l&#8217;exercice des fonctions de la mission diplomatique des Etats \u00e9trangers ou de leurs postes consulaires, de leurs missions sp\u00e9ciales ou de leurs missions aupr\u00e8s des organisations internationales qu&#8217;en cas de renonciation expresse et sp\u00e9ciale des Etats concern\u00e9s.&#8221; Only an express and special waiver opens embassy assets to seizure.<\/p>\n<p>The Cour de cassation has applied this shield with remarkable consistency in the long-running Commisimpex saga against the Republic of Congo, the leading French laboratory for state-asset enforcement. On <a href=\"https:\/\/www.courdecassation.fr\/decision\/602255512fcf2640c5572e86\">3 February 2021 (pourvoi No. 19-10.669)<\/a>, the First Civil Chamber held: &#8220;Selon le droit international coutumier, les missions diplomatiques des Etats \u00e9trangers b\u00e9n\u00e9ficient, pour le fonctionnement de la repr\u00e9sentation de l&#8217;Etat accr\u00e9ditaire, d&#8217;une immunit\u00e9 d&#8217;ex\u00e9cution \u00e0 laquelle il ne peut \u00eatre renonc\u00e9 que de fa\u00e7on expresse et sp\u00e9ciale [&#8230;]&#8221;. Embassy bank accounts fall within that shield and are presumed to serve sovereign needs, a presumption rebuttable by proof by any means. On <a href=\"https:\/\/www.courdecassation.fr\/decision\/6437a1a59477fe04f5cc68a2\">13 April 2023 (pourvoi No. 18-20.915)<\/a>, the Court confirmed the other side of the coin in a case where &#8220;en novembre 2016, la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 Commisimpex a, en ex\u00e9cution d&#8217;une sentence arbitrale condamnant la R\u00e9publique du Congo \u00e0 lui payer diverses sommes, pratiqu\u00e9 une saisie-attribution de cr\u00e9ances entre les mains de la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 EDF Africa Services, redevable \u00e0 la R\u00e9publique du Congo de diff\u00e9rents imp\u00f4ts et taxes&#8221;. The seizure stood: outside diplomatic or consular use, an express waiver of immunity from execution suffices, even for tax claims, with no additional special waiver required. And on <a href=\"https:\/\/www.courdecassation.fr\/decision\/65f14ff828057200093c3e77\">13 March 2024 (pourvoi No. 21-17.599)<\/a>, rejecting Congo&#8217;s challenge to the seizure of a presidential aircraft, seized when &#8220;en juin 2020, la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 Commissions import export (Commisimpex) a, en ex\u00e9cution de deux sentences arbitrales condamnant la R\u00e9publique du Congo \u00e0 lui payer diverses sommes, pratiqu\u00e9 une saisie d&#8217;un a\u00e9ronef lui appartenant&#8221;, the Court ruled: &#8220;Selon les principes du droit international coutumier refl\u00e9t\u00e9s par la Convention des Nations Unies du 2 d\u00e9cembre 2004 sur les immunit\u00e9s des Etats et de leurs biens, la renonciation expresse \u00e0 l&#8217;immunit\u00e9 d&#8217;ex\u00e9cution suffit pour que les biens d&#8217;un Etat, quels qu&#8217;ils soient, puissent faire l&#8217;objet d&#8217;une mesure d&#8217;ex\u00e9cution, sans que soit en outre requise une renonciation sp\u00e9ciale.&#8221; Article L. 111-1-3 is strictly construed: a diplomatic mission&#8217;s functions are distinct from a head of State&#8217;s diplomatic activity, so an aircraft assigned to a presidency but not to the diplomatic mission can be seized on an express waiver alone. The lesson, confirmed as early as <a href=\"https:\/\/www.courdecassation.fr\/decision\/5fcaa0429058359677f3cb36\">10 January 2018 (pourvoi No. 16-22.494)<\/a>, is binary: diplomatic assets are virtually untouchable, while non-diplomatic assets can be seized only with a waiver or an enforceable judgment plus a commercial-use link.<\/p>\n<p>Apply that grid to Russian sovereign assets in France and the conclusion is stark. Central bank reserves and state accounts serve non-commercial public purposes par excellence; Russia has consented to nothing and earmarked nothing for any claimant. No French enforcement judge (juge de l&#8217;ex\u00e9cution) could authorise their seizure under L. 111-1-2 today, and diplomatic property is doubly locked. The EU freeze itself operates on a different plane: it is a restrictive police measure under EU regulations, implemented in France through the national freezing power in <a href=\"https:\/\/www.legifrance.gouv.fr\/codes\/article_lc\/LEGIARTI000042498801\">Article L. 562-3 of the Code mon\u00e9taire et financier<\/a>, under which &#8220;Le ministre charg\u00e9 de l&#8217;\u00e9conomie peut d\u00e9cider, pour une dur\u00e9e de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources \u00e9conomiques&#8221; belonging to designated persons. Freezing preserves; it does not transfer. Moving from freeze to confiscation, or even to using the cash value as loan collateral, would require either a new EU legal basis that survives immunity review or a French court order that current doctrine forbids. That is the precise legal tripwire on which the reparations loan could still fail, and it explains why Paris doctrine is cited in every Brussels memo on the subject.<\/p>\n<h3>B. Challenging or Enforcing in Paris: the Practical Routes Open Now<\/h3>\n<p>If the principal cannot be seized, what can actually be done in Paris today? Three routes matter, for three different audiences.<\/p>\n<p>First, persons and entities listed under EU sanctions who hold frozen funds in France are not without remedies. A listing can be challenged by an annulment action before the General Court of the European Union in Luxembourg, where the Council must defend the statement of reasons with sufficiently solid evidence; several Russian applicants have obtained delistings that way in recent years. In parallel, French law provides a safety valve for daily life: the authorisation to release frozen funds for basic needs, legal fees and other essential expenses. Our broader analysis of how EU sanctions awards are enforced and challenged from France details that two-track strategy of Luxembourg annulment plus French unblocking authorisations (see <a href=\"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/en\/eu-sanctions-arbitration-isds-awards-enforcement-france-2026\/\">EU Sanctions, Arbitration and Awards: Enforcement and Challenge Routes From France<\/a>). The practical point for October 2026 is that any reparations-loan vehicle will multiply these disputes: the closer the EU moves from freezing revenues to mobilising capital value, the more listing challenges and unblocking requests Paris practitioners will have to file, and the more the General Court will be asked to police the boundary between restrictive measures and expropriation.<\/p>\n<p>Second, creditors holding arbitral awards or judgments against the Russian state face the L. 111-1-1 gateway. The procedural path runs through Paris in three stages: obtain or recognise the enforceable title in France through exequatur before the Paris judicial court, since <a href=\"https:\/\/www.legifrance.gouv.fr\/codes\/article_lc\/LEGIARTI000053936502\">Article L. 111-3 of the Code des proc\u00e9dures civiles d&#8217;ex\u00e9cution<\/a> counts among enforceable titles only &#8220;Les actes et les jugements \u00e9trangers ainsi que les sentences arbitrales d\u00e9clar\u00e9s ex\u00e9cutoires par une d\u00e9cision non susceptible d&#8217;un recours suspensif d&#8217;ex\u00e9cution&#8221;; then petition the enforcement judge for prior authorisation to seize, proving one of the three L. 111-1-2 conditions. Once authorised, the classic tool is third-party seizure, because <a href=\"https:\/\/www.legifrance.gouv.fr\/codes\/article_lc\/LEGIARTI000048447281\">Article L. 211-1<\/a> provides that &#8220;Tout cr\u00e9ancier muni d&#8217;un titre ex\u00e9cutoire constatant une cr\u00e9ance liquide et exigible peut, pour en obtenir le paiement, saisir entre les mains d&#8217;un tiers les cr\u00e9ances de son d\u00e9biteur portant sur une somme d&#8217;argent&#8221;. The State itself is bound to assist enforcement, as <a href=\"https:\/\/www.legifrance.gouv.fr\/codes\/article_lc\/LEGIARTI000047900091\">Article L. 153-1<\/a> states that &#8220;L&#8217;Etat est tenu de pr\u00eater son concours \u00e0 l&#8217;ex\u00e9cution des jugements et des autres titres ex\u00e9cutoires. Le refus de l&#8217;Etat de pr\u00eater son concours ouvre droit \u00e0 r\u00e9paration.&#8221; In practice, that means identifying specific non-diplomatic, commercially used assets with a link to the debtor entity, which is why claimants have chased aircraft, commercial receivables and non-sovereign accounts rather than central bank reserves. The Commisimpex line of cases shows both the possibility and the narrowness of the opening: an aircraft assigned to a presidency could be seized on an express waiver, but embassy accounts survived because of the sovereignty presumption. For award creditors watching the reparations debate, the strategic question is whether a future EU instrument would create the missing link, for example by designating certain cash balances as available for enforcement, or whether national courts will keep applying the strict grid. Either way, the file must be built now: titles recognised, asset mapping done, waiver clauses in contracts reviewed.<\/p>\n<p>Third, for companies, banks and custodians operating in France, the Paris angle is compliance and exposure. French establishments apply EU freezes directly, report to the Treasury&#8217;s sanctions unit, and face criminal liability for circumvention. If Brussels moves Euroclear cash balances into a Union-level vehicle, French intermediaries holding Russian-linked positions will need to trace, segregate and report with precision, because any transfer mechanism will live or die on clean chain-of-title evidence. The competent forum for most of these disputes is Paris: the Paris judicial court and its enforcement judges for seizures and exequatur, the Paris Court of Appeal for challenges, and ultimately the First Civil Chamber of the Cour de cassation for immunity questions. Expect proceedings to run in French, to require proof of the exact diplomatic or commercial use of each asset, and to take many months; interim protective measures require the same prior authorisation, so speed must be built into the preparation, not improvised after the dispute erupts. Readers facing parallel human-rights angles, such as cases closed at Strasbourg with frozen-asset dimensions, will find the complementary ECHR route mapped in our analysis of restoration and Paris remedies (see <a href=\"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/en\/echr-closed-case-russia-lebedeva-paris-restoration-frozen-assets-2026\/\">Your ECHR Case Against Russia: Restoration, Frozen Assets and Paris Remedies<\/a>).<\/p>\n<h2>Conclusion<\/h2>\n<p>As of 10 October 2026, the European Union has built a durable system for living off the interest of Russian state money, a \u20ac90 billion loan that is running dry, and an indefinite lock on the principal. It has not yet built a lawful bridge from freezing to using. The reparations loan promises scale but still lacks shared risk-bearing, a transfer vehicle out of Belgium and an immunity-proof legal basis. ERA 2.0 promises legality but offers slower money that depends on G7 partners who are stepping back. Both will be decided as much by judges as by summits: in Luxembourg on the validity of listings, and in Paris on the exact boundary French courts have drawn between untouchable sovereign assets and seizable commercial ones. That boundary, written in Articles L. 111-1 to L. 111-1-3 and hardened by a decade of Cour de cassation rulings, is the filter through which every Brussels plan must pass. Until it is crossed lawfully, \u20ac200 billion will keep earning interest while Ukraine counts days.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Ukraine needs EUR 23 billion by end-October 2026. Can the EU turn EUR 200 billion in frozen Russian assets into a reparations loan? October state of play and French immunity law.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":232070755,"featured_media":9466,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_kj_source_type":"","_kj_official_id":"","_kj_official_url":"","_kj_judilibre_id":"","_kj_jur":"","_kj_lieu":"","_kj_chambre":"","_kj_rg":"","_kj_date":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[301720,301654],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-2300950","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-decryptage","category-international-legal-news"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v28.1 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>EU Frozen Russian Assets: the Reparations Loan Battle and What French Courts Allow<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/en\/eu-frozen-russian-assets-reparations-loan-france-immunity-2026\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"EU Frozen Russian Assets: the Reparations Loan Battle and What French Courts Allow\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Ukraine needs EUR 23 billion by end-October 2026. 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