{"id":567880,"date":"2026-04-15T12:04:26","date_gmt":"2026-04-15T10:04:26","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/jurisprudences\/nl-v-secretary-of-state-for-work-and-pensions-pip\/"},"modified":"2026-04-15T12:04:26","modified_gmt":"2026-04-15T10:04:26","slug":"nl-v-secretary-of-state-for-work-and-pensions-pip","status":"publish","type":"kji_decision","link":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/ru\/jurisprudences\/nl-v-secretary-of-state-for-work-and-pensions-pip\/","title":{"rendered":"NL v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (PIP)"},"content":{"rendered":"
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The decision of the Upper Tribunal is to dismiss the appeal. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal made on 3 May 2024 under number SC246\/23\/01527 did not involve the making of any material error of law. REASONS FOR DECISION Introduction 1. Permission to appeal was granted to the Appellant (the claimant) by Upper Tribunal Judge Church on 13 January 2025 and the parties were invited to make written submissions on the appeal. In a submission dated 17 February 2025, the Respondent (the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions) supported the appeal. 2. Following receipt of the parties\u2019 submissions, the case was referred to me for determination. I gave case management directions on 20 August 2025 (issued 10 September 2025) indicating that I was minded to dismiss the appeal, and giving the parties an opportunity to make further written submissions. The Respondent\u2019s submissions were received by the Upper Tribunal on 10 October 2025, and the Appellant\u2019s submissions were received on 27 October 2025. 3. Having considered the parties\u2019 further written submissions, I have concluded that, for the reasons set out in my case management directions, any errors of law in the First-tier Tribunal\u2019s decision of 3 May 2024 were not material. I am therefore dismissing the appeal. 4. Neither party has requested an oral hearing of the appeal, and I consider that I can properly determine the case on the papers. Summary for the Appellant 5. I am dismissing your appeal against the First-tier Tribunal decision made on 3\u00a0May 2024, which upheld the DWP\u2019s decision of 1 May 2023 refusing the claim you made for personal independence payment (PIP) on 28 March 2023. I am doing so because I consider that the Tribunal was right to conclude that you were not entitled to PIP in relation to that claim, because you had been outside Great Britain for more than a year in the period of three years immediately before you made the claim. 6. In your submission of 27 October 2025 you asked the Upper Tribunal to consider the medical evidence provided with your submission and to award you further points in addition to the 6 points you were assessed by the DWP as scoring following your PIP claim of 11\u00a0December 2024. However, I am not able to look at the DWP\u2019s decision regarding your claim of 11 December 2024, because this appeal is only against the decision on your original claim of 28 March 2023. As that claim was refused solely because you did not satisfy the requirements regarding the length of time you had been in the country, it was not necessary to assess whether you scored sufficient points for an award of PIP. 7. If you want the decision of the DWP on your 11 December 2024 claim to be looked at again, you will first need to ask the DWP to reconsider that decision, if you have not already done so. As you are outside the one month deadline for requesting reconsideration, you will need to explain to the DWP why you were not able to make the request earlier. There is an absolute 13 month time limit for requesting reconsideration, starting from the date on which you were notified that DWP had refused your claim of 11 December 2024. If you do not request reconsideration before the end of that 13 month period, the DWP may not be able to reconsider the decision. Applicable legislation 8. This case relates to the \u2018past presence test\u2019 which a claimant must satisfy in order to be entitled to PIP, under the provisions of the Welfare Reform Act 2012 and the Social Security (Personal Independence Payment) Regulations 2013 (S.I.\u00a02013\/377, the \u201cPIP Regulations\u201d). 9. Section 77(3) of the Welfare Reform Act 2012 provides that a person is not entitled to PIP \u201cunless the person meets prescribed conditions relating to residence and presence in Great Britain\u201d. The relevant conditions are prescribed in regulation 16 of the PIP Regulations: \u201c16. Subject to the following provisions of this Part, the prescribed conditions for the purposes of section 77(3) of the [Welfare Reform Act 2012] as to residence and presence in Great Britain are that on any day for which [the claimant] claims personal independence payment [the claimant] \u2014 (a) is present in Great Britain; (b) has been present in Great Britain for a period of, or periods amounting in aggregate to, not less than 104 weeks out of the 156 weeks immediately preceding that day; (c) is habitually resident in the United Kingdom, the Republic of Ireland, the Isle of Man or the Channel Islands; and (d) is a person\u2013 (i) who is not subject to immigration control within the meaning of section 115(9) of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999; or (ii) to whom, by virtue of regulation 2 of the Social Security (Immigration and Asylum) Consequential Amendments Regulations 2000, section 115 of that Act does not apply for the purpose of personal independence payment.\u201d 10. There is no dispute that the Appellant met the conditions in paragraphs (a), (c) and (d) of regulation 16 at the time of making her claim for PIP on 28 March 2023. Her claim was rejected on the basis that she did not meet the condition in regulation 16(b) (the \u2018past presence test\u2019). 11. Regulations 17 to 23A provide exceptions from the requirements of regulation 16. Only regulations 17 and 18 are potentially relevant in the present case. They are concerned with cases where a claimant is \u2018temporarily absent\u2019 from Great Britain, that is, where the absence is unlikely to exceed 52 weeks when it begins. Under regulation 17, the claimant may be treated as present in Great Britain for the purposes of regulation 16(a) and (b) for the first 13 weeks of a temporary absence. Under regulation 18, the claimant may be treated as present in Great Britain for those purposes for the first 26 weeks of a temporary absence, if the absence is \u201csolely in connection with arrangements made for the medical treatment of [the claimant] for a disease or bodily or mental disablement which commenced before [the claimant] left Great Britain\u201d. 12. The past presence test must be satisfied \u201con any day for which [the claimant] claims personal independence payment\u201d. As the Appellant made her claim on 28\u00a0March 2023, the Respondent and the First-tier Tribunal considered whether she had been present in Great Britain for at least 104 weeks in the 156 week period ending on 27 March 2023. 13. Although it does not ultimately assist the Appellant in this appeal, for completeness I should note that regulation 33(1) of the Universal Credit, Personal Independence Payment, Jobseeker\u2019s Allowance and Employment and Support Allowance (Claims and Payments) Regulations 2013 (the \u201cClaims and Payments Regulations 2013\u201d) provides as follows: \u201c33(1) Where, although a person does not satisfy the requirements for entitlement to personal independence payment on the date on which the claim is made, the Secretary of State is of the opinion that unless there is a change of circumstances the person will satisfy those requirements for a period beginning on a day (\u201cthe relevant day\u201d) not more than 3 months after the date on which the decision on the claim is made, the Secretary of State may award personal independence payment from the relevant day subject to the condition that the person satisfies the requirements for entitlement on the relevant day.\u201d 14. Therefore, on 1 May 2023 when the Respondent decided the Appellant\u2019s claim of 28\u00a0March 2023, the Respondent should have considered whether the Appellant might satisfy the past presence test in relation to any date up to 1\u00a0August 2023 (3 months after the date of the decision), rather than solely looking at the period up to the date of her claim. Background: the decisions of the Respondent and First-tier Tribunal 15. The Appellant submitted a claim for PIP on 28 March 2023, and was notified on 1 May 2023 of the Respondent\u2019s decision that she was not entitled to PIP because she did not satisfy the conditions in regulation 16 of the PIP Regulations. The Appellant submitted an appeal to the First-tier Tribunal on 31 July 2023 without having first obtained a mandatory reconsideration decision from the Respondent. On 16\u00a0August 2023 a Legal Officer of the First-tier Tribunal gave directions for the management of the appeal. On 19 September 2023 the Appellant was notified that the Respondent had reconsidered but not changed the decision of 1 May 2023. 16. The Respondent\u2019s response to the First-tier Tribunal appeal states that the Appellant submitted a new claim for PIP on 31 July 2023 (the same day on which she submitted her appeal). It is unclear what happened in respect of that claim. On 30 August 2023 the Appellant submitted a PIP \u2018How your disability affects you\u2019 questionnaire to the Respondent. 17. On 23 October and 8 November 2023 the Respondent wrote to the Appellant requesting further information regarding her absences from Great Britain and she provided additional information and evidence on 16 November 2023. 18. The First-tier Tribunal heard the appeal remotely on 3 May 2024. The Appellant did not attend the hearing. A representative attended on behalf of the Respondent. The tribunal dismissed the appeal. The Appellant requested a statement of reasons (SoR) which was issued on 16 July 2024. She applied to the First-tier Tribunal for permission to appeal and her application was refused by the District Judge on 7 October 2024. Upper Tribunal proceedings 19. The Appellant submitted her application for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal on 17 October 2024. By a decision dated 13 January 2025 (issued on 17 January), Upper Tribunal Judge Church granted the Appellant permission to appeal. In his reasons for the decision, the Judge noted that the First-tier Tribunal\u2019s decision notice identified the decision under appeal as the Respondent\u2019s decision made on 19 September 2023, while the SoR identified the decision under appeal as the decision dated 1 May 2023. The Judge noted that this inconsistency gave rise to confusion about which decision was under appeal. 20. The Respondent submitted a response to the appeal on 17 February 2025, in which she supported the appeal and invited the Upper Tribunal to set aside the First-tier Tribunal decision and remit the appeal for rehearing. With regard to the inconsistency between the FtT decision notice and SoR, the Respondent cited the following paragraphs of the Upper Tribunal decision in CE\/1136\/2014: \u201c11. The Tribunal\u2019s statement of reasons and its decision notice are to be read as one. That follows from the statement\u2019s declaration that it is to be read with the decision notice. There is nothing wrong with this approach. The Tribunal in seeking to comply with its duty to produce a written statement of reasons for its decision is entitled to incorporate an earlier partial expression of its reasons (the duty is found in rule 34(1) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Social Entitlement Chamber) Rules 2008). 12. While there may be two documents involved, there can only ever have been a single reasoning process. Therefore, if the contents of the two documents are inconsistent, the Tribunal will not have given adequate reasons. No one can know exactly what the reasons were. In fact, the need for consistency applies even if the two documents are not unified by a statement that they are to be read together (see the decision of Social Security Commissioner Jacobs, as he then was, in CCR\/3396\/2000)\u201d. 21. The Respondent went on to submit: \u201c10. As the DN and SOR are to be read as one it is unclear which decision [\u2026] the FTT believed the appeal was in relation to. The decision made on 01\/05\/2023 is the \u2018original decision\u2019 that the appellant did not satisfy entitlement to PIP due to not meeting the residency requirement to be entitled to benefit. The decision made on 19\/09\/2023 was a mandatory reconsideration and involved a decision maker looking at the case again and making a refusal to revise the 01\/05\/2023 decision. The operative decision in this case is the 01\/05\/2023 decision, this is the decision that should be under appeal. 11. Applying CE\/1136\/2014 to the case at hand as the contents of both the DN and SOR are inconsistent it is unclear which decision was being considered within the hearing. Although arguably if the 19\/09\/2023 decision was considered it would result in the same outcome, the refusal to revise does not carry appeal rights, it would be the \u2018original decision\u2019 under appeal. The FTT confused matters by referring to differing decisions in both the SOR and DN, making the reasoning inadequate as it is unclear whether the FTT were looking at the decision made 01\/05\/2023 or the refusal to revise made 19\/09\/2023. If the reasoning for the decision is unclear, it amounts to an error of law as held in South Bucks District Council v Porter (No 2) [2004] UKHL 33: \u201cThe reasons for a decision must be intelligible and they must be adequate. They must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the \u2018principal important controversial issues\u2019, disclosing how any issue of law or fact was resolved\u201d. 12. As such, I submit the FTT have erred in law, we do not know exactly what the FTT\u2019s reasons were and whether they have misdirected themselves in this case. I request the decision be set-aside and remitted back to a freshly constituted tribunal.\u201d 22. In the Appellant\u2019s reply she stated: \u201cI have since been awarded 6 points with the requirement being 8 for PIP. I have sent in multiple pieces of evidence with my last statement to support the increased number of points to qualify in the other areas and including where I am still receiving weekly support with therapists, consultants and doctors for ongoing medical challenges\u201d. Case management directions and further submissions 23. In my case management directions of 20 August 2025 I summarised my provisional view as follows: \u201c2. It is not disputed that the Appellant was absent from Great Britain from 24 January 2021 until 12 July 2022, and again from 15 December 2022 to 11 January 2023. It appears likely that the Appellant could be treated as present in Great Britain during the whole of the second period, by virtue of the exceptions prescribed in legislation. It is also possible that there were grounds for treating her as present during the first 13 weeks of the earlier period of absence. The Appellant was therefore present (or could be treated as present) in Great Britain for, at most, a total of 91 weeks out of the relevant 156 week period, which was insufficient to satisfy the past presence test. 3. Therefore, although in my view the First-tier Tribunal decision may have involved errors of law, there was no material error. In other words, even if the First-tier Tribunal had not made any error of law, it would inevitably have dismissed the appeal and upheld the Respondent\u2019s decision of 1 May 2023 that the Appellant was not entitled to PIP. 4. As there was no material error in the First-tier Tribunal decision, and the Appellant has nothing to gain from a rehearing of her appeal by a fresh First-tier Tribunal, I propose to dismiss the appeal.\u201d 24. My detailed analysis was set out as follows: \u201cAnalysis — was the past presence test satisfied in respect of the Appellant\u2019s claim of 28 March 2023? 19. The Appellant could not be entitled to PIP pursuant to her claim of 28 March 2023 unless she had been present (or could be treated as having been present) in Great Britain for not less than 104 weeks out of the 156 weeks immediately preceding the date of her claim. The Respondent and the FtT correctly identified the 156 weeks in question as running from 30 March 2020 to 27 March 2023. There is no dispute that the Appellant left Great Britain on 24 January 2021 and returned on 12 July 2022, and that she was also absent from 15 December 2022 to 11 January 2023. By my calculation, she was therefore actually present in Great Britain for a total of roughly 74 weeks during the relevant 156 week period (and absent for 82 weeks). 20. Regulation 17 of the PIP Regulations provides that a claimant is to be treated as present in Great Britain for the purpose of the past presence test for the first 13 weeks of any absence where they are \u201ctemporarily absent\u201d. A claimant is temporarily absent for that purpose if, at the beginning of the period of absence, it is unlikely to exceed 52 weeks. 21. With regard to the Appellant\u2019s absence from 15 December 2022 to 11 January 2023, she stated that she was spending Christmas with her brother abroad (paragraph 9 on page 54 of the Upper Tribunal bundle). In those circumstances it seems very likely that the exception in regulation 17 would apply, and so the Appellant would be treated as present in Great Britain for that whole 4 week period. 22. With regard to the Appellant\u2019s absence from 24 January 2021 to 12 July 2022, while the period of absence did in fact exceed 52 weeks, it is unclear whether or not it was likely to do so at the start of the absence. There are some indications in the papers that the Appellant may have intended to return to the UK earlier than she did (in her appeal to the First-tier Tribunal, at page 3 of the FtT papers, she stated \u201cWhile out of the country for 18 months for the first year the country was still in lockdown, we were in the middle of a pandemic and most flights were halted between major airports, you could not stay in a country for more than 90 days due to covid and you could not get into the UK without being vaccinated. By June 2022 flights were allowed into the UK from certain countries or you had to wait in others for 28 days before flying back to the UK and you couldn\u2019t return to the UK from certain countries\u201d). On the other hand, the Appellant elsewhere states that prior to leaving the UK she entered into a tenancy agreement to let out her house for 12 months from 15 December 2020 (see paragraph 7 on page 53 of the Upper Tribunal bundle), which might suggest that she expected from the outset to be out of the country until at least December 2021. Even if regulation 17 did apply to the period of absence from January 2021 to July 2022, the Appellant would only be treated as present in Great Britain for the first 13 weeks of the period. 23. There are references in the papers to the Appellant having sought medical treatment while abroad between January 2021 and July 2022, and I have therefore considered whether the exception under regulation 18 of the PIP Regulations could apply, such that the Appellant would be treated as present in Great Britain for the first 26 weeks of the period of absence. The Appellant has stated and provided evidence that during the relevant period she continued to have remote therapy sessions with a therapist from whom she had started receiving treatment in 2019 while still in the UK (pages 27-28 of the UT bundle). However, regulation 18 only applies where a claimant\u2019s absence is \u201csolely in connection with\u201d arrangements made for medical treatment. There is no suggestion in the papers that medical treatment was the sole purpose (or even the primary purpose) of the Appellant\u2019s absence from the UK, and so regulation 18 does not appear to apply. [\u2026.] 25. In light of the above it appears that, for the purposes of regulation 16(b) of the PIP Regulations, the Appellant had at most been present (or could be treated as having been present) in Great Britain for 91 weeks out of the relevant 156 week period (74 weeks actually present, and 17 weeks treated as present). As that still fell short of the 104 week minimum threshold, it was insufficient to satisfy the past presence test in relation to the claim made on 28 March 2023. Errors in the First-tier Tribunal decision 26. As noted in the decision granting permission to appeal, the First-tier Tribunal\u2019s decision notice of 3 May 2024 incorrectly stated that the decision under appeal was the Respondent\u2019s decision of 19\u00a0September 2023, which was the mandatory reconsideration decision refusing to revise the decision of 1 May 2023. As a result, the decision notice was also inconsistent with the statement of reasons, which correctly identified the Respondent\u2019s decision of 1 May 2023 (the decision that the Appellant was not entitled to PIP pursuant to her claim of 28 March 2023) as the decision under appeal. Although it is unfortunate that the decision notice referred to the date of the mandatory reconsideration decision rather than the original decision on the Appellant\u2019s claim, it does not seem to me that the error would be likely to give rise to any genuine uncertainty. The decision under appeal was clearly, in substance, the decision of 1 May 2023 that the Appellant was not entitled to PIP. 27. There is a further error in the decision notice, in that paragraphs 3 and 4 state that the Appellant did not qualify for an award of either the daily living component or the mobility component of PIP because she scored 0 points. However, no assessment of the Appellant\u2019s ability to undertake the daily living activities or mobility activities had been completed for the purposes of the Respondent\u2019s decision of 1 May 2023, and nor had the tribunal undertaken such an assessment on the appeal. 28. The First-tier Tribunal\u2019s statement of reasons indicates potential further errors in its decision. At paragraph 5 it is noted that, in addition to the Appellant\u2019s absence from Great Britain from 24 January 2021 to 12 July 2022, she had been absent for a further period of 4 weeks from December 2022 until 17 January 2023. The tribunal goes on to conclude: \u201cTherefore, we find she has been absent for 108 weeks during the relevant period 30 March 2020 \u2013 27 March 2023\u201d. It is unclear how the tribunal reached the figure of 108 weeks. As set out above, the Appellant had in fact been present in Great Britain for about 74 weeks out of the relevant 156 week period, and so had been absent for about 82 weeks. 29. There is also nothing in the statement of reasons to suggest that the tribunal considered whether the exception in regulation 17 of the PIP Regulations might apply to any of the Appellant\u2019s periods of absence from Great Britain. The tribunal may therefore have erred by failing to apply the legislation correctly.\u201d 25. The Respondent made the following further written submissions on 10 October 2025: \u201c1. In response to the directions dated 20th August 2025 the Secretary of State agrees with the analysis provided by Judge Robinson at paragraphs 19 -29 and agrees that the UT Judge should dismiss this appeal. 2. However, the Secretary of State would like to highlight that if the claimant wished to make a late request for Mandatory Reconsideration on their subsequent decision to PIP dated 31\/07\/2023, we would reconsider this based on the circumstances highlighted by this appeal. 3. For completeness, the UT Judge will wish to know that the claimant has made a further claim to PIP on 11\/12\/2024. However, the claimant scored insufficient points to be awarded any rate of either the daily living or mobility component of PIP.\u201d 26. The Appellant made further written submissions on 27 October 2025. Further to paragraph 2 of the Respondent\u2019s submissions, the Appellant confirmed that she wished to request mandatory reconsideration of the decision regarding her subsequent claim for PIP on 31 July 2023. 27. The Appellant also referred to paragraph 3 of the Respondent\u2019s submission, regarding her PIP claim of 11 December 2024, and its refusal on the basis that she scored insufficient points. In response, the Appellant provided a substantial amount of further medical evidence as appendices to her submission. She asks me to consider the evidence and award her the additional points needed for an award of PIP. As explained at paragraph 6 of this decision, the Respondent\u2019s decision regarding the Appellant\u2019s claim of 11\u00a0December 2024 is not the subject of this appeal, and it is not open to me to consider the Respondent\u2019s assessment of the points scored by the Appellant in relation to the PIP descriptors. Conclusion 28. For the reasons set out in my directions of 20 August 2025, I consider that the First-tier Tribunal was correct in its conclusion that Appellant did not satisfy the past presence test in regulation 16(b) of the PIP Regulations in relation to her claim of 28 March 2023. Therefore, any error of law the First-tier Tribunal may have made in its decision of 3 May 2024 was not material, and so I am dismissing this appeal. 29. For completeness, I wish to address one further point. At paragraph 19 of my directions, I commented that the Respondent and the First-tier Tribunal, in their application of the past presence test, had \u201ccorrectly identified the 156 weeks in question as running from 30 March 2020 to 27\u00a0March 2023\u201d. That overlooked the effect of regulation 33(1) of the Claims and Payments Regulations 2013, which is set out in full at paragraph 13 above. When the Respondent made the decision on 1 May 2023 regarding the Appellant\u2019s claim of 28 March 2023, regulation 33(1) enabled the Respondent to look forward and consider whether, in the absence of a change of circumstances, the Appellant would satisfy the conditions of entitlement from a day not more than 3 months after the date of the decision (ie up to 1 August 2023). 30. However, given the particular facts of this case, regulation 33 does not assist the Appellant, because she was absent from Great Britain from 24 January 2021 until 12 July 2022. Therefore, even if the relevant 156 period ran from July 2020 to July 2023 and the Appellant was present in Great Britain between 28 March 2023 and 1\u00a0August 2023, she would be no closer to reaching the 104 week threshold than she was when looking at the period 30 March 2020 to 27\u00a0March 2023. Helen Robinson Judge of the Upper Tribunal Authorised by the Judge for issue on 13 December 2025<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Sources officielles :<\/strong> consulter la page source<\/a><\/p>\n

Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).<\/em><\/p>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The decision of the Upper Tribunal is to dismiss the appeal. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal made on 3 May 2024 under number SC246\/23\/01527 did not involve the making of any material error of law. REASONS FOR DECISION Introduction 1. Permission to appeal was granted to the Appellant (the claimant) by Upper Tribunal Judge Church on 13 January 2025…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":0,"template":"","meta":{"_crdt_document":""},"kji_country":[7608],"kji_court":[9033],"kji_chamber":[],"kji_year":[8463],"kji_subject":[7712],"kji_keyword":[7705,7633,7623,7634,7636],"kji_language":[7611],"class_list":["post-567880","kji_decision","type-kji_decision","status-publish","hentry","kji_country-royaume-uni","kji_court-upper-tribunal-administrative-appeals-chamber","kji_year-8463","kji_subject-social","kji_keyword-appeal","kji_keyword-appellant","kji_keyword-claim","kji_keyword-respondent","kji_keyword-tribunal","kji_language-anglais"],"yoast_head":"\nNL v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (PIP) - Ma\u00eetre Hassan Kohen, avocat en droit p\u00e9nal \u00e0 Paris<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/ru\/jurisprudences\/nl-v-secretary-of-state-for-work-and-pensions-pip\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"ru_RU\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"NL v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (PIP)\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"The decision of the Upper Tribunal is to dismiss the appeal. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal made on 3 May 2024 under number SC246\/23\/01527 did not involve the making of any material error of law. REASONS FOR DECISION Introduction 1. Permission to appeal was granted to the Appellant (the claimant) by Upper Tribunal Judge Church on 13 January 2025...\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/ru\/jurisprudences\/nl-v-secretary-of-state-for-work-and-pensions-pip\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Ma\u00eetre Hassan Kohen, avocat en droit p\u00e9nal \u00e0 Paris\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"\u041f\u0440\u0438\u043c\u0435\u0440\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u0432\u0440\u0435\u043c\u044f \u0434\u043b\u044f \u0447\u0442\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"21 \u043c\u0438\u043d\u0443\u0442\u0430\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/ru\\\/jurisprudences\\\/nl-v-secretary-of-state-for-work-and-pensions-pip\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/ru\\\/jurisprudences\\\/nl-v-secretary-of-state-for-work-and-pensions-pip\\\/\",\"name\":\"NL v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (PIP) - Ma\u00eetre Hassan Kohen, avocat en droit p\u00e9nal \u00e0 Paris\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/ru\\\/#website\"},\"datePublished\":\"2026-04-15T10:04:26+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/ru\\\/jurisprudences\\\/nl-v-secretary-of-state-for-work-and-pensions-pip\\\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"ru-RU\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/ru\\\/jurisprudences\\\/nl-v-secretary-of-state-for-work-and-pensions-pip\\\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/ru\\\/jurisprudences\\\/nl-v-secretary-of-state-for-work-and-pensions-pip\\\/#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/ru\\\/avocats-en-droit-penal-a-paris-conseil-et-defense-strategique\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Jurisprudences\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/ru\\\/jurisprudences\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":3,\"name\":\"NL v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (PIP)\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/ru\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/ru\\\/\",\"name\":\"Kohen Avocats\",\"description\":\"Ma\u00eetre Hassan Kohen, avocat p\u00e9naliste \u00e0 Paris, intervient exclusivement en droit p\u00e9nal pour la d\u00e9fense des particuliers, notamment en mati\u00e8re d\u2019accusations de viol. 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The decision of the First-tier Tribunal made on 3 May 2024 under number SC246\/23\/01527 did not involve the making of any material error of law. REASONS FOR DECISION Introduction 1. 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