{"id":574599,"date":"2026-04-16T04:01:04","date_gmt":"2026-04-16T02:01:04","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/jurisprudences\/radoslav-pashamov-v-leon-taylor-anor\/"},"modified":"2026-04-16T04:01:04","modified_gmt":"2026-04-16T02:01:04","slug":"radoslav-pashamov-v-leon-taylor-anor","status":"publish","type":"kji_decision","link":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/ru\/jurisprudences\/radoslav-pashamov-v-leon-taylor-anor\/","title":{"rendered":"Radoslav Pashamov v Leon Taylor & Anor"},"content":{"rendered":"
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1. These are the written reasons for the order I made on 27 May 2025 on (i) costs and (ii) the earliest date of the CMC to be held in relation to the upcoming trial on quantum. 2. That order followed a trial on liability held on 25, 26 and 27 March 2025 in relation to which I handed down judgment on 30 April 2025 ([2025] EWHC 1035 (KB)). 3. I directed the parties to agree, if possible, all consequential matters by 12 May 2025. They were unable to do so. I received written submissions from the Claimant on 20 May 2025 and from each Defendant on 24 May 2025. 4. The claim was against both Defendants in negligence for injuries and loss caused to the Claimant following a road traffic accident. The First Defendant was the driver of the car which collided with the Claimant. The Second Defendant was the employer of the Claimant. At trial, I determined that (i) the First Defendant had no liability to the Claimant and (ii) the Second Defendant was liable to the Claimant for 65% of the losses the Claimant suffered. A trial on quantum will follow in due course. 5. It is not necessary to repeat the underlying facts, all of which are set out in my trial judgment. The facts that are material to this decision are set out with the relevant paragraphs below. Issues 6. The Second Defendant accepted that it was liable to the Claimant for his costs in bringing the claim against it. Those included costs on an indemnity basis (along with the other consequences) because the Claimant had made a Part 36 offer which the Second Defendant had not accepted, and which the Claimant had beaten at trial. 7. There was no dispute that the First Defendant was also entitled to recover his costs. There were, however, two issues in dispute relating to those costs: i) Whether the costs of the First Defendant were payable by the Claimant, or whether they were payable by the Second Defendant by way of a \u201cSanderson\u201d order; and ii) Whether the costs of the Claimant that were payable by the Second Defendant in due course included the Claimant\u2019s own costs in bringing the unsuccessful claim against the First Defendant. 8. There were no submissions disputing the amounts sought as payments on account towards the costs that would ultimately be assessed. 9. In addition, the parties had requested that the CMC in relation to the quantum trial should not be held until at least 27 October 2025. I asked them to explain the reason for the CMC not being held earlier. The relevant legal principles 10. The general rule is that the unsuccessful party will be ordered to pay the costs of the successful party (44.2 (2) (a)). The court may, however, make a \u201cdifferent order\u201d (44.2 (2) (b)). The court has discretion as to whether costs are payable by one party to another (44.2(1)(a)). The list of \u201cdifferent orders\u201d set out at paragraph 6 of rule 44.2 is not exhaustive. 11. It was common ground that the court had the power to order the Second Defendant to pay the costs of the First Defendant and also the costs of the Claimant in bringing the claim against the First Defendant. 12. It was also common ground that if the Claimant was liable to pay the costs of the First Defendant then the Qualified One-Way the Costs Shifting (\u201cQOCS\u201d) rules prior to 6 April 2023 would apply because the claim was issued in 2022. Those rules had, the parties all agreed, the following effects: i) the Claimant would only be liable to pay the costs of the First Defendant once the Claimant had received damages and interest from the Second Defendant; ii) the amount of costs payable to the First Defendant was capped at the amount of damages and interest received by the Claimant from the Second Defendant; and iii) any settlement of the claim against the Second Defendant by accepting a Part 36 offer, or entering into a Tomlin order, would not trigger an entitlement on the part of the First Defendant to enforce the costs order against the Claimant; only an order for damages made by the court will trigger such a liability (Cartwright v Venduct Engineering Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 1654). 13. I was referred to a small number of further legal authorities. I take the following relevant principles from Moon v Garrett ([2006] EWCA the Civ 1121) at paragraphs 38 and 39: i) If the Claimant has behaved reasonably in suing both the First Defendant and the Second Defendant it will be harsh if he ends up paying the costs of the First Defendant; ii) If it was not reasonable to join the First Defendant because the cause of action was practically unsustainable it would be unjust to make the Second Defendant pay the costs of the First Defendant; iii) It will always be a factor whether one defendant has sought to blame another; iv) The fact that cases are in the alternative so far as they are made against two Defendants will be material; v) the fact that claims were not truly alternative does not mean that the court does not have the power to order one Defendant to pay the costs of another. vi) The question of who should pay those costs is peculiarly one for the discretion of the trial judge 14. The first of the above principles reinforced the observations of Keene LJ in King v Zurich Insurance Company ([2002] EWCA Civ 598) as to the pre-CPR approach in which he said \u201c\u2026where a plaintiff behaved reasonably in suing both defendants he should not normally end up paying costs to either party even though he succeeded only against one defendant\u201d. Paragraph 33 15. The principles in Moon v Garrett supplemented those in Irvine v the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis ([2005] EWCA Civ 129) which included the following: i) An important consideration is the reasonableness of the Claimant\u2019s conduct in pursuing a defendant against whom he did not succeed Paragraph 30 ; ii) A significant factor is likely to be whether one defendant puts the blame on another; Paragraph 31 iii) The fact that claims are in the alternative, meaning that the Claimant cannot succeed against both defendants, is the ordinary circumstance when a Sanderson or Bullock order is made, but the court has the power to order such an order even if claims are not in the alternative Paragraphs 25 and 26 ; and iv) the purpose of the court\u2019s power to make a Sanderson order is because it is \u201cdesigned to avoid the injustice that when a the Claimant does not know which one of two or more defendants should be sued for a wrong done to a the Claimant, he can join those who it would be reasonable to join and avoid having what he recovers in damages from the unsuccessful defendant eroded or eliminated by the order for costs against the Claimant in respect of his action against the successful defendant or defendants\u201d Irvine v the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis at paragraph 22 16. In Jabang v Wadman [2017] EWHC 1993 (QB) the court considered whether the costs of the Claimant himself in claiming against the successful defendant should also be payable by the unsuccessful defendant. It determined that part of the purpose of a Bullock order (or, in this case, a Sanderson order) is that the Claimant\u2019s victory ought not to be eroded by paying the costs of the First Defendant, but there would be such an erosion by the Claimant having to meet his own costs of the unsuccessful claims against the First Defendant: \u201c15. \u2026 As between the Claimant and the 2nd Defendant, the Claimant was the successful party and, as such, the general rule is that the 2nd Defendant should pay his costs. \u2026 I have decided that a Bullock order is appropriate and the 2nd Defendant should ultimately bear the costs of the 3rd and 4th Defendant. In those circumstances, I see the logic in saying that the Claimant\u2019s costs of those unsuccessful claims should also be paid by the 2nd Defendant. Part of the purpose of a Bullock order is that the court accepts that, in the particular circumstances, the Claimant\u2019s victory ought not to be eroded, but there would be such an erosion by the Claimant having to meet his own costs of the unsuccessful claims. 16. No authority has been cited to me whether a the Court has made a Bullock order but nonetheless not required the unsuccessful Defendant to pay the Claimant\u2019s costs of the claims against the successful Defendants. Of course, my discretion is wide and not limited to models which have been adopted in the past, but the absence of any such authority, together with the approach of Mr Munro fortify my own conclusion, that having decided to make a Bullock order, I should also draw no distinction between the costs of the Claimant in pursuing his claim against the 2nd Defendant as opposed his costs of bringing his claim against the other Defendants. The 2nd Defendant must pay all of the Claimant\u2019s costs (as assessed or agreed)\u201d. 17. No authority was cited to me where a court has made a Sanderson order, but nonetheless not required the unsuccessful defendant to pay the Claimant\u2019s costs of the claims against the successful defendant. Arguments Claimant 18. The Claimant argued that i) costs payable by the Claimant to the First Defendant should be recoverable by the Claimant from the Second Defendant in the simplified form that the Second Defendant should pay the costs of the First Defendant directly to the First Defendant (a Sanderson order); ii) the Sanderson order is commonly used where the claimant is legally aided but where QOCS applies to the costs liability of the claimant and where there is a split trial on liability on quantum (as here), a Sanderson order is also appropriate; iii) the approach by the courts pre-CPR, was that where a claimant has behaved reasonably in suing both defendants, he should not normally end up paying costs to either party even though he succeeded only against one of the defendants. This discretion survives subject to the overriding objective and the specific provisions of rule 44.2; iv) the rationale behind the discretion to grant a Sanderson order lies in the fact that it avoids injustice to the Claimant in a case where he does not know which of two defendants, or more, should be sued for a wrong done to him, and is at risk of having what he recovers in damages (in this case from the Second Defendant) eroded or eliminated by an order for costs against him in respect of his action against the First Defendant. v) the dominant consideration, but not the only one, is whether the original joinder of the First Defendant in the proceedings was reasonable. 19. The Claimant argued that it was reasonable for him to have brought the claim against the First Defendant. He said that i) the injuries sustained by the Claimant were life changing including not just a traumatic brain injury in the moderate\/severe category, but also significant orthopaedic injuries including at his left elbow, right knee, and ankle. He has been left with the left elbow fracture which has not fully united. He has suffered seizures for which he needs to take antiepileptic medication. He suffered neurological weakness and involuntary movements affecting the right arm, daily post-traumatic headache and impaired cognition, mood disturbance, fatigue, light sensitivity and change in behaviour. He has not been able to return to work; ii)the full liability value of the claim is estimated to exceed \u00a31,000,000; iii) the value of the claim made it proportionate to pursue all reasonable avenues to recover damages; iv) the Claimant had no memory of the actual collision. At the outset of the case the pre-action letters of claim had been met with denials of liability both by the First Defendant and the Second Defendant. The Second Defendant asserted that this was not a workplace accident as the Claimant was not working at the time. The First Defendant asserted that the Claimant had run out from behind a bus; v) given that the Second Defendant had denied liability entirely, and was effectively stating that no duty of care was owed to the Claimant, and given that the Claimant knew that he had not come from \u201cbehind the bus\u201d, it was reasonable to join the First Defendant as a Defendant as a) he would be left with no recourse if he failed against the Second Defendant; b) from his perspective, on the information available at the time, there was no reason why he had not been seen by the First Defendant in time such that the collision could have been avoided; vi) the likely value of the claim meant that it was proportionate, within the meaning of the overriding objective, to pursue the First Defendant; and vii) this is not a case in which the claim against the First Defendant was\u201cpractically unsustainable\u201d. 20. The Claimant argued that if the Second Defendant had accepted liability at the start (albeit alleging contributory negligence) then the Claimant would never have claimed against the First Defendant. He said it was certain that the Claimant would not have pursued the First Defendant as there would have been no advantage in doing so: the quantum of damages would have been identical whether the claim was successful against the First Defendant or the Second Defendant. The Claimant said this is a relevant consideration (Jabangat paragraph 10). 21. The fact that the liable Defendant had not sought to blame the other Defendants, is a relevant, but not a determinative, factor against a Sanderson order. 22. The Second Defendant decided to defend the Claimant\u2019s claim on extremely narrow grounds i) he was not at work at the time; and ii) no duty of care was owed. 23. The Second Defendant appears not to have considered the implications of the risk assessment. It was never clear to the Claimant whether or not there was a contemporaneous risk assessment, as the risk assessment disclosed by the Second Defendant post-dated the accident, causing the Claimant to serve a notice to admit, to which no response was received. 24. The Claimant had no knowledge of what risk assessment, if any, existed at the relevant time, until trial. The first time that the Second Defendant clarified its position in relation to the existence of a contemporaneous risk assessment was in the second witness statement of Camelia Longley dated 14 March 2025, though even then it was not made clear whether or not that risk assessment was identical to the risk assessment that had been disclosed: this was only revealed in the course of cross examination. 25. The existence of the risk assessment in terms found by the court, which was within the knowledge of the Second Defendant throughout, made it extremely risky for the Second Defendant to defend the claim on primary liability. It was obvious that the risk assessment had not been complied with and was causative of the accident. It is submitted that, having decided to take that risk, and having failed in its defence, it would not be unjust to make a Sanderson order against the Second Defendant. 26. The Claimant argued that the costs he should recover from the Second Defendant included his own costs of bringing the claim against the First Defendant. He relied onJabang v Wadmanat paragraphs 15 to 16. 27. The Claimant submitted that taking all the factors into consideration: i) it was reasonable for the Claimant to join the First Defendant; ii) it would not be unjust to order the Second Defendant to pay the First Defendant\u2019s costs. iii) the order for costs in favour of the Claimant against the Second Defendant should include those of investigating and bringing the claim against the First Defendant. Submissions from the First Defendant 28. The First Defendant agreed with the submissions put forward by the Claimant. In addition, the First Defendant emphasised the following matters: i) if the Claimant were ordered to pay the First Defendant\u2019s costs then the First Defendant\u2019s costs would not be paid until the claim against the Second Defendant concluded and the costs were agreed or assessed; ii) if the claim were determined at trial then this would not be until mid 2026 at the earliest and possibly much later; iii) if the claim were settled by acceptance of a Part 36 offer or by settlement and Tomlin Order then the First Defendant would never recover his costs from the Claimant as there would be no court order to which his claim to costs would attach in line with the authority of Cartwright v Venduct Engineering Ltd; iv) for a Sanderson order to be made, there is no requirement for the Second Defendant to have directly blamed the First Defendant, nor is it necessary that the claim against defendants are claims in the alternative (per Moon v Garrett para 39). Ultimately, when exercising its discretion the Court may consider all the circumstances including whether it was reasonable for the Claimant to have joined the First Defendant. When inviting the Court to exercise that discretion as sought by the Claimant and the First Defendant, in addition to the points made by the Claimant, the First Defendant added the following: a) given the application of the Limitation Act 1980, the Claimant did not have the luxury of issuing proceedings against the Second Defendant alone, and in the event those proceedings failed commencing proceedings against the First Defendant. b) the fact the defence was successful is obviously not of itself, determinative of whether it was reasonable to bring the claim. c) at no stage did the First Defendant make an application for the Claimant\u2019s claim to be struck out for disclosing no reasonable grounds for bringing or defending a claim, nor would such an application have been arguable or successful. d) the Court gave both the Claimant and the First Defendant permission to rely on expert evidence in the field of accident reconstruction. Implicit in such direction at that stage is the fact that the Court accepted that such evidence was reasonably required and proportionate. The reason this is implicit is that under the CPR Part 35.1 \u201cexpert evidence shall be restricted to that which is reasonably required to resolve the proceedings\u201d; e) the Second Defendant had the opportunity at the time of the Claimant\u2019s Letter of the Claim, at the time of filing its Defence, at the time of a mediation which took place in September 2024, prior to trial or any time in between to admit primary liability and avoid the First Defendants costs being incurred at all and avoid the Claimant\u2019s costs of pursuing the First Defendant from being incurred. The Second Defendant declined to do so; f) the fact that the parties had agreed to liability being determined as a preliminary issue means that the only costs being incurred related to liability, an issue which the Second Defendant has now lost; g) whilst the First Defendant did not actively advance a positive case against the Second Defendant (the First Defendant\u2019s primary defence being that the Claimant was the author of his own misfortune), as set out at paragraph 18 of the First Defendant\u2019s Defence the First Defendant stated \u201cTo the extent the Court finds that the position of the bus contributed to the accident, the First Defendant repeats and adopts the allegations made by the Claimant against the Second Defendant at paragraph 8 of the Particulars of the Claim\u201d. The Court has found that the position of the bus did contribute to the accident and judgment has been entered against the Second Defendant; and h) the accident took place in June 2020, very nearly 5 years ago. Had the Second Defendant admitted liability and proceedings had not been brought against the First Defendant, no costs would have been incurred by the First Defendant but having been incurred it would be unfair and unreasonable for the First Defendant to have to wait a further protracted period of time to recover those costs. 29. The above was an explanation of the First Defendant\u2019s preference. The First Defendant contended this is a factor which the Court may, and should, take into account when exercising its discretion. The rationale behind the introduction of QOCS was, the First Defendant said, to protect the Claimants in relation to the enforcement of costs orders. It was not to protect defendants or their insurers in circumstances where they defend to trial a claim they ultimately lose in circumstances when such costs did not need to be incurred had an admission of liability been forthcoming. To order the Claimant pay the First Defendant\u2019s cost would not only prejudice the Claimant it would also prejudice the First Defendant. Applying the legal tests identified in the submissions of the Claimant, the First Defendant contends that in all the circumstances a Sanderson order is the appropriate order. Submissions from the Second Defendant 30. The Second Defendant argued that the Claimant should be ordered to pay the First Defendant\u2019s costs but that because of QOCS ultimately the Claimant would not pay the First Defendant\u2019s costs. The Second Defendant said it had the \u201cexpectation\u2026that [the First Defendant]\u2019s costs of fighting the litigation would not be recovered\u201d. 31. The Second Defendant accepted that the court had discretion as to whether costs are payable by one party to another. It said the court shall have regard to the conduct of the parties and, ultimately that discretion must be exercised so as to produce a fair and just outcome. 32. At no time before or during the litigation did the Second Defendant ever seek to blame the First Defendant. The Second Defendant argued that this was highly persuasive that the Second Defendant should not pay the costs of the First Defendant. 33. The Second Defendant argued that much of the cost of the proceedings, including at trial, related to the way in which the Claimant and the First Defendant conducted the litigation. The Second Defendant argued that \u201ca battle raged between the Claimant and the First Defendant. As evidenced by their respective actions in relation to seeking permission for Accident Reconstruction evidence and thereafter the numerous applications and submissions made by both the Claimant and the First Defendant for joint statements, additional joint statements, et al.. In relation to accident reconstruction evidence, the Claimant fought tooth and claw to the very bitter end; was incredibly hard-fought litigation for which no quarter was given and enormous energy and time was expended by both the Claimant and the First Defendant.\u201d 34. The Second Defendant argued that it was an innocent bystander for that entire accident reconstruction battle which took place exclusively between the Claimant and the First Defendant. The Second Defendant did not get any expert evidence and remained completely isolated from those issues between the Claimant and the First Defendant. 35. The Second Defendant accepted that the Claimant was concerned about risk of losing damages to pay the First Defendant\u2019s costs, but said there are only very limited circumstances in which this might occur. The First Defendant\u2019s entitlement to apply to be allowed to enforce their costs would only be triggered if the Claimant was to be awarded damages after a trial. Any settlement would not trigger the First Defendant\u2019s entitlement to apply. 36. The Second Defendant acknowledged that if the Claimant was ordered to pay the First Defendant\u2019s costs, there was only a small prospect of the First Defendant ever being entitled to enforce their costs. 37. The Second Defendant did not agree the Claimant\u2019s approach to the reasonableness or otherwise of joining the First Defendant or the way in which the Claimant pursued them. There is a notable double standard, the Second Defendant said, in the Claimant asserting that, \u201cwithout the benefit of hindsight\u201d it was reasonable for him to claim against the First Defendant, but that \u201chad the Second Defendant admitted primary liability at the outset\u2026 it is certain that the Claimant would not have pursued the First Defendant.\u201d 38. The Claimant pursued both Defendants prior to the issuing of proceedings and subsequently issued the claim against both Defendants. This was tactical: he was concerned that if he did not include the First Defendant or failed against him, he would be left without recourse. The Second Defendant submitted that the Claimant took that course notwithstanding the fact that the police report, available to all parties early on in the case, stated that \u201cMr Pashamov has failed to check the road is clear and has walked into vehicle 1\u201d. 39. The Second Defendant argued that the Claimant could, as soon as the evidence showed that the First Defendant was not at fault, have informed the First Defendant that he would discontinue and continue solely against the Second Defendant. The Claimant\u2019s decision to pursue the claim against the First Defendant was an error of judgment. 40. The Second Defendant argued that Sanderson orders are made in circumstances where proceedings are commenced against multiple defendants because a claimant is unsure (at the time of commencing) of which defendant to pursue, and where limitation is approaching, meaning that the claimant is reluctant to take the chance of suing the wrong defendant, only to find that its claim against the correct defendant is time-barred when the claim is finally commenced against the other. The Second Defendant argued that the allegations made against the First Defendant, as the car driver, and the Second Defendant as the employer were entirely different. The Claimant alleged that the First Defendant was negligent in his driving and causing a collision. the Claimant\u2019s allegations against the Second Defendant were failures of systems of work. 41. Having regard to all the circumstances of the case and including the conduct of the Claimant and the First Defendant and their exclusive battle, the Second Defendant submitted that it would be unjust to order the Second Defendant: i) to pay the First Defendant\u2019s costs of the claim; and ii) to pay the Claimant\u2019s costs of pursuing the First Defendant. 42. The Second Defendant argued that if it was wrong on its primary submission then there ought to be an issues-based order. The Second Defendant argued there were costs that could be attributed solely to the claim against one or other of the Defendants. Accident reconstruction evidence was, the Second Defendant said, the most obvious example of costs solely relating to the claim against the First Defendant. Conclusions Was it reasonable for the Claimant to sue the First Defendant? 43. I concluded that, based on the evidence at trial, the Claimant had not proved that the First Defendant had been negligent. Ultimately the Claimant did not succeed on his claim against the First Defendant because there were critical factors that could not be determined precisely enough for the Claimant to show that it was more likely than not that the First Defendant had been negligent. These included the speed of the car that was passing between the Claimant and the First Defendant obscuring their views of each other, the precise speed of the First Defendant\u2019s car, and the time between the Claimant starting to cross the road and the collision. 44. It required forensic assessment of the evidence that was available to reach the conclusion that the Claimant had not proved his case. That included the expert evidence on the collision. It was, however, a finely balanced assessment. 45. The Second Defendant asserted that the police had clearly concluded that the Claimant was entirely to blame for the collision. The evidence at trial, of which the Second Defendant was fully aware when it made its costs submissions, was that the police were, at best, reporting what someone had told them. It was plainly not direct evidence on which any sensible and well-advised Claimant would choose not to sue the First Defendant. 46. I am quite satisfied that it was reasonable for the Claimant to have brought the claim against the First Defendant. Did one defendant blame another? 47. The First Defendant did not generally blame the Second Defendant. He relied on the argument that he had not been negligent when driving his car. However, he said in his Defence that to the extent the position of the bus contributed to the accident, then he repeated the Claimant\u2019s allegation against the Second Defendant. In other words, the First Defendant did actually seek to blame the Second Defendant, at least in part, for the accident. The position of the bus was, indeed, crucial as it parked on the side of a busy road, in breach of the Second Defendant\u2019s own risk assessment recommendations. 48. The Second Defendant did not seek to blame the First Defendant at any stage. It did not, however, need to do so. The Claimant had already blamed the First Defendant. The Second Defendant might benefit from that claim if there was any reduction in its own liability because the First Defendant was also liable. That point on apportionment of liability was left open for the court to consider if it found that both the First Defendant and the Second Defendant were liable. Were the cases against the First Defendant and the Second Defendant made in the alternative? 49. The Second Defendant argued that the claims against the two defendants were of a different nature and thus not truly in the alternative. One was for negligent driving and the other was for failing to provide a safe system of work. It argued that the authorities suggest that a Sanderson or Bullock order is appropriate where there are two defendants of whom one is negligent, but it is merely unknown as to which one. 50. The claims against both defendants were, in my judgment, closely related. They arose out of the same incident. Certainly, if the Claimant had separately sued the First Defendant and the Second Defendant then the court may well have been sympathetic to an application for the proceedings to be consolidated. On the face of it, it would be in accordance with the overriding objective only to have one set of proceedings on these facts. Would the Claimant have sued the First Defendant if the Second Defendant had admitted liability at the start? 51. The Claimant said that if the Second Defendant had accepted liability at the start and relied purely on the Claimant\u2019s contributory negligence then he would not have joined the First Defendant as a defendant. I have some doubt about that assertion. The Claimant would have been taking a risk, towards the end of the limitation period, that the evidence would ultimately show that the Second Defendant\u2019s liability would be unaffected by any negligence of the First Defendant. 52. On the other hand, even if the Claimant had not sued the First Defendant, it is possible that the Second Defendant might have done. The Second Defendant\u2019s case rested on two arguments. The primary argument was that the Claimant was the author of his own misfortune. If the Claimant had only sued the Second Defendant then it would logical for the Second Defendant to have joined the First Defendant as someone who was also the author, or possibly the co-author, of the Claimant\u2019s misfortune. It seems to me to be a realistic possibility that the Second Defendant would have joined the First Defendant to the proceedings as a person who was also contributorily negligent. There was no impact by the First Defendant in relation to the other main argument raised by the Second Defendant, namely that it was not the employer at the relevant time. Were the costs of the First Defendant incurred in relation to issues that were unrelated to the Second Defendant? 53. The Second Defendant argued that much of the cost of the trial was caused by issues between the Claimant and the First Defendant, in particular the expert and other evidence about the speed of the vehicles and of the Claimant when he crossed the road. The Second Defendant \u201csat back and watched\u201d the argument \u201craging\u201d between the Claimant and the First Defendant. That evidence, however, was also highly relevant to the assessment of the degree to which the Claimant was negligent when crossing the road. If it had shown, for example, that the Claimant had been walking across the road, and the First Defendant\u2019s car had been travelling slowly, then the Claimant\u2019s failure to see the car may have resulted in the Claimant\u2019s own contributory negligence being higher than 35%. In other words, the evidence at trial was highly relevant to the question of the relative liability of the Second Defendant and the Claimant. Conclusion 54. In my judgment the Claimant plainly acted reasonably in bringing the claim against the First Defendant. That means it would be harsh for his damages to be eroded by paying the costs of the First Defendant. 55. The other relevant factors also tend to indicate that it is just for the Second Defendant to pay the costs of the First Defendant. These include that: i) the Second Defendant was in possession at the start of proceedings of the material evidence showing that it was his employer at the relevant time and breached its duty to him, and thus one of its two principle arguments was, at best, weak; ii) the Second Defendant did not accept liability at any point and move to consideration of contributory negligence of the Claimant and\/or the First Defendant; it resisted the whole claim; iii) the First Defendant blamed the Second Defendant, at least in part; iv) the evidence at trial as to the circumstances of the collision was highly relevant to the contributory negligence of the Claimant, and hence the allocation of liability between the Claimant and the Second Defendant. the Second Defendant may have \u201csat on the sidelines\u201d during the evidence but the outcome was highly relevant to their own liability; and v) there is material prejudice to the First Defendant if his costs are payable by the Claimant. That is both in timing and, ultimately, his ability to recover them if the Claimant and the Second Defendant settle the case other than by court order. The Second Defendant did not provide any substantive explanation why this would be a just outcome for the First Defendant. 56. On the other hand, I accept that the Second Defendant did not blame the First Defendant. I also accept that the Second Defendant did not join the First Defendant as a party. I accept that the claims were not in the alternative, although they derived from the same underlying sequence of events and the interaction between the liability of the Claimant, the First Defendant and the Second Defendant was potentially complex. 57. These factors in favour of the Second Defendant do not, in my judgment, outweigh the factors I set out above in favour of the First Defendant being paid his costs now by the Second Defendant. Accordingly, a Sanderson order is the appropriate order. 58. There is a general reluctance in this court to dissect costs on an issue by issue basis as the benefit in doing so rarely outweighs the cost and complexity added. In this case I consider that it would not be appropriate to assess the issues one by one. The main issue as to liability between the Claimant and the First Defendant, namely the circumstances of the collision, was on the facts also crucial in assessing the contributory negligence of the Claimant. There was no other issue that the Second Defendant identified as being a basis for moving to an issue by issue costs analysis. 59. I also accept, for the same reasoning as in paragraphs 15 and 16 of Jabang, that the costs of the Claimant in claiming against the First Defendant should be borne by the Second Defendant. Date of the CMC 60. The Claimant and the Second Defendant both proposed that the case management conference should not be listed as soon as possible. They suggested that it be listed on the first open date after 27 October 2025. 61. The principle reasons for seeking to defer the case management conference were: i) continuing investigations into further treatment and rehabilitation, and the value of the claim, were suspended in light of the order for a split trial, which was intended to save costs; ii) in order for there to be a meaningful CMC: a) the Claimant will need to obtain information as to further rehabilitation and treatment needs, and understand what updated expert evidence may be needed identifying any ongoing disability, the need for further treatments and therapies; and b) some expert reports may need updating as they are over three years old; iii) it will probably save costs to defer the CMC until October; as: a) it will allow both parties to have a better understanding of the case on quantum, and therefore a greater likelihood of being able to agree directions; b) if the CMC were to take place prematurely in June it may be necessary for the parties to return for further directions once updated medical treatment records have been obtained and rehabilitation and treatment assessments have taken place. 62. I accepted these submissions and agreed that the matter be listed after 27 October 2025.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Sources officielles :<\/strong> consulter la page source<\/a><\/p>\n

Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).<\/em><\/p>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

1. These are the written reasons for the order I made on 27 May 2025 on (i) costs and (ii) the earliest date of the CMC to be held in relation to the upcoming trial on quantum. 2. That order followed a trial on liability held on 25, 26 and 27 March 2025 in relation to which I handed down…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":0,"template":"","meta":{"_crdt_document":""},"kji_country":[7608],"kji_court":[7909],"kji_chamber":[],"kji_year":[8463],"kji_subject":[7612],"kji_keyword":[7643,8052,7697,7707,9015],"kji_language":[7611],"class_list":["post-574599","kji_decision","type-kji_decision","status-publish","hentry","kji_country-royaume-uni","kji_court-high-court-kings-bench-division","kji_year-8463","kji_subject-fiscal","kji_keyword-claimant","kji_keyword-costs","kji_keyword-defendant","kji_keyword-order","kji_keyword-second","kji_language-anglais"],"yoast_head":"\nRadoslav Pashamov v Leon Taylor & Anor - Ma\u00eetre Hassan Kohen, avocat en droit p\u00e9nal \u00e0 Paris<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/ru\/jurisprudences\/radoslav-pashamov-v-leon-taylor-anor\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"ru_RU\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Radoslav Pashamov v Leon Taylor & Anor\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"1. These are the written reasons for the order I made on 27 May 2025 on (i) costs and (ii) the earliest date of the CMC to be held in relation to the upcoming trial on quantum. 2. That order followed a trial on liability held on 25, 26 and 27 March 2025 in relation to which I handed down...\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/ru\/jurisprudences\/radoslav-pashamov-v-leon-taylor-anor\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Ma\u00eetre Hassan Kohen, avocat en droit p\u00e9nal \u00e0 Paris\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"\u041f\u0440\u0438\u043c\u0435\u0440\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u0432\u0440\u0435\u043c\u044f \u0434\u043b\u044f \u0447\u0442\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"31 \u043c\u0438\u043d\u0443\u0442\u0430\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/ru\\\/jurisprudences\\\/radoslav-pashamov-v-leon-taylor-anor\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/ru\\\/jurisprudences\\\/radoslav-pashamov-v-leon-taylor-anor\\\/\",\"name\":\"Radoslav Pashamov v Leon Taylor & Anor - Ma\u00eetre Hassan Kohen, avocat en droit p\u00e9nal \u00e0 Paris\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/ru\\\/#website\"},\"datePublished\":\"2026-04-16T02:01:04+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/ru\\\/jurisprudences\\\/radoslav-pashamov-v-leon-taylor-anor\\\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"ru-RU\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/ru\\\/jurisprudences\\\/radoslav-pashamov-v-leon-taylor-anor\\\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/ru\\\/jurisprudences\\\/radoslav-pashamov-v-leon-taylor-anor\\\/#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/ru\\\/avocats-en-droit-penal-a-paris-conseil-et-defense-strategique\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Jurisprudences\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/ru\\\/jurisprudences\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":3,\"name\":\"Radoslav Pashamov v Leon Taylor & Anor\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/ru\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/ru\\\/\",\"name\":\"Kohen Avocats\",\"description\":\"Ma\u00eetre Hassan Kohen, avocat p\u00e9naliste \u00e0 Paris, intervient exclusivement en droit p\u00e9nal pour la d\u00e9fense des particuliers, notamment en mati\u00e8re d\u2019accusations de viol. 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