{"id":576425,"date":"2026-04-16T09:44:39","date_gmt":"2026-04-16T07:44:39","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/jurisprudences\/jm-v-secretary-of-state-for-work-and-pensions-anor\/"},"modified":"2026-04-16T09:44:39","modified_gmt":"2026-04-16T07:44:39","slug":"jm-v-secretary-of-state-for-work-and-pensions-anor","status":"publish","type":"kji_decision","link":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/ru\/jurisprudences\/jm-v-secretary-of-state-for-work-and-pensions-anor\/","title":{"rendered":"JM v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions & Anor"},"content":{"rendered":"
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The decision of the Upper Tribunal is to allow the appeal. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved an error of law. Under section 12(2)(a), (b)(i) and (3) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, I set that decision aside and remit the case to be reconsidered by the tribunal in accordance with the following directions. DIRECTIONS 1. The case is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal, to be re-heard, if possible, by the same judge and panel member as decided the case previously in the decision sent to the parties on 3 May 2024. If arranging a hearing with the same judge and panel member will result in unacceptable delay, the case may be re-heard by a new Tribunal. 2. At the remitted hearing, the only issues that should be considered by the Tribunal, and in respect of which the parties may give further evidence and make further argument, are: a. in relation to the claimed figure of \u00a32,509.37 for travel expenses that were not already included under the headings of vehicle fuel, vehicle lease, vehicle repairs and maintenance and parking; and, consequent upon that: b. the overall figure that has been unreasonably diverted; and c. the overall figure in respect of which it is just and equitable to make a variation. 3. Save as aforesaid, the Tribunal at the remitted hearing should adopt and re-make the decision as previously sent to the parties on 3 May 2024 and neither party may seek to re-open any other part of that decision (save as the First-tier Tribunal may otherwise permit under its Rules). REASONS FOR DECISION Introduction 1. The appellant was the second respondent before the First-tier Tribunal and is the non-resident parent in this matter. I will refer to him as the \u201cNRP\u201d. The second respondent was the appellant below and is the person with care. I will refer to her as \u201cPWC\u201d. The first respondent is the Secretary of State for Work Pensions, who I refer to as \u201cSSWP\u201d. 2. The appeal concerns a child maintenance calculation under the Child Support Act 1991 (CSA 1991) and The Child Support Maintenance Calculation Regulations 2012 (SI 2012\/2677) (the CSM 2012 Regulations). 3. The NRP appeals against the First-tier Tribunal\u2019s decision of 3 May 2024 allowing PWC\u2019s appeal against the decision of the SSWP of 17 November 2020 relating to the NRP\u2019s liability to the PWC in respect of child maintenance for their two children with effect from 16 October 2020. 4. The decision under appeal was a supersession decision. It was based on a historic income figure for the NRP obtained from HMRC for the tax year 2019\/20 of \u00a32,640. The previous decision of 20 October 2019 had been based on the NRP\u2019s then current income for the 2018\/19 tax of \u00a320,797. 5. The First-tier Tribunal determined, by reference to regulation 71 of the CSM 2012 Regulations, that for the 2019\/20 tax year the NRP had unreasonably diverted income, that it was just and equitable to make a variation, and that his current income should have been treated as being \u00a312,837.77. 6. There was a hearing before the First-tier Tribunal over two days on 16 and 18 April 2024. The First-tier Tribunal\u2019s Statement of Reasons (SoR) was issued on 3 June 2024 and permission to appeal was refused by the First-tier Tribunal in a decision issued on 25 July 2024. The NRP filed the notice of appeal to the Upper Tribunal on 16 August 2024. In a decision issued to the parties on 23 September 2024, I granted permission to appeal, limited to two grounds as follows:- a. Ground 3e \u2013 That the Tribunal erred in law by failing to take into account the cost of the NRP\u2019s office cleaner as miscellaneous expenses; b. Ground 3g \u2013 That the Tribunal erred in law in relation to the appellant\u2019s travel expenses as: (i) there was an arithmetical error in the decision because the Tribunal had deducted \u00a32,000 from the figure of \u00a32,509.37 claimed in the NRP\u2019s accounts and arrived at a figure of \u00a31,509.37 rather than \u00a3509.37; and (ii) the Tribunal\u2019s reasons were inadequate as it was impossible to tell why the Tribunal had used a figure of \u00a32,000 for the NRP\u2019s travel expenses in any event. Why I have not held a hearing to decide this appeal 7. The NRP requested that I hold an oral hearing to determine this appeal. However, the SSWP conceded the appeal and was content for me to determine the case on the papers. The PWC resisted the appeal and complained generally about the delays that have occurred in this case and the conduct of the NRP in failing to pay maintenance in the terms ordered by the First-tier Tribunal pending this appeal. 8. I decided that it was not in the interests of justice to hold a hearing in this case. I granted permission to appeal on just two, uncomplicated grounds. There is no need to have a hearing to deal with those two grounds given the SSWP\u2019s concession, and there is nothing in the PWC\u2019s response to the appeal that addresses those two grounds specifically rather than the merits of the case generally. The parties have had a reasonable opportunity to make submissions on the papers in respect of those grounds. In particular in relation to Ground 3e, it would not assist to have an oral hearing because the ground turns on what evidence the NRP gave to the First-tier Tribunal and that has been recorded. 9. The NRP wants a hearing in part because he wants me to deal with a request that he has made to the First-tier Tribunal under the \u201cslip rule\u201d, but that is not a matter I can deal with on appeal in any event because it does not fall within the scope of the grant of permission, and it is an application the NRP has made to the First-tier Tribunal in respect of which there has been no decision as yet (or none that is, so far as I am aware, the subject of an appeal to the Upper Tribunal), so there is no point in holding a hearing in order to enable the appellant to make submissions about that. 10. The PWC is concerned about delay and the best way to reduce that in this case is for me to proceed without a hearing and to remit the case to the same Tribunal so that the error identified can be corrected. Legal framework The legal principles applicable to an appeal to the Upper Tribunal 11. The Upper Tribunal\u2019s jurisdiction under section 11 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (TCEA 2007) is limited to considering whether there are any points of law arising from a decision made by the First-tier Tribunal. 12. An appeal will only succeed if there is a material error of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal. Errors of law include misunderstanding or misapplying the law, taking into account irrelevant factors or failing to take into account irrelevant factors or failing to give adequate reasons for a decision. An error of fact is not an error of law unless the First-tier Tribunal\u2019s conclusion on the facts is perverse. That is a high threshold: it means that the conclusion must be irrational or wholly unsupported by the evidence. An appeal to the Upper Tribunal is not an opportunity to re-argue the case on its merits. These principles are set out in many cases, including R (Iran) v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 982 at [9]-[13]. 13. In scrutinising the judgment of a First-tier Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal is required to read the judgment fairly and as a whole, remembering that the First-tier Tribunal is not required to express every step of its reasoning or to refer to all the evidence, but only to set out sufficient reasons to enable the parties to see why they have lost or won and that no error of law has been made: cf DPP Law Ltd v Greenberg [2021] EWCA Civ 672 at [57] (a case dealing with the employment context, but equally applicable here). That case also makes the point (at [58]) that where the First-tier Tribunal has correctly stated the law, the Upper Tribunal should be slow to conclude that it has misapplied it. The relevant legal principles applicable to child maintenance calculations 14. Under section 4 of the CSA 1991 a person who is, in relation to any qualifying child(ren), either the person with care or the non-resident parent may apply to the Secretary of State for a maintenance calculation to be made under that Act with respect to that child, or any of those children. By section 11 of the CSA 1991 an application for a maintenance calculation must be dealt with in accordance with Part 1 of Schedule 1 to the CSA 1991 and The Child Support Maintenance Calculation Regulations 2012 (SI 2012\/2677) (the CSM 2012 Regulations). 15. The general rule (see reg 34) is that the gross weekly income of a non-resident parent for the purposes of a maintenance calculation is a weekly amount determined at the \u201ceffective date\u201d of the decision on the basis of \u201chistoric income\u201d as defined in the Regulations. However, \u201ccurrent income\u201d as defined in the Regulations must be used instead of \u201chistoric income\u201d if it differs from historic income by an amount that is at least 25% of historic income or if the amount of historic income is nil or no historic income is available (reg 34(2)). 16. The \u201cinitial effective date\u201d is the date notified to the non-resident parent by the Secretary of State under regulation 11. The effective review date is normally every 12 months thereafter: see regulation 19. The effective date in the present case was 16 October 2020. 17. By regulation 35, historic income is determined by taking \u201cthe HMRC figure\u201d last requested from HMRC in relation to the non-resident parent (i.e. the figure as requested no more than 30 days before the initial effective date or the review date), adjusted by deducting any relievable pension contributions as permitted by regulation 35(3) and dividing by 365 and multiplying by 7. \u201cThe HMRC figure\u201d is defined in regulation 36 as being the amount identified by HMRC from information provided in a self-assessment return or under the PAYE regulations as the sum of the income on which the non-resident parent was charged to tax for the latest available tax year under the various statutory tax provisions specified in regulation 36(1). There are further detailed provisions about the HMRC figure in regulation 36 but they are not relevant here. 18. By regulation 37(1) \u201ccurrent income\u201d is defined as the sum of the non-resident parent\u2019s income as an employee or office-holder, from self-employment and from a pension calculated or estimated as a weekly amount at the effective date of the relevant calculation decision in accordance with regulations 38 to 42. Regulation 38 contains more detailed provision about income as an employee or office-holder that is not relevant to this case. 19. Regulation 39 contains more detailed provision about income from self-employment. It stipulates that the non-resident parent\u2019s current income from self-employment is to be determined by reference to the profits of any trade, profession or vocation carried on by the non-resident parent at the effective date of the relevant calculation decision (reg 39(1)). These are, by virtue of regulation 39(2), to be determined in accordance with Part 2 of ITTOIA for the most recently completed \u201crelevant period\u201d or, if no such period has been completed, the estimated profits for the current relevant period. The \u201crelevant period\u201d is, by regulation 39(4)), a tax year or such other period in respect of which the non-resident parent should, in the normal course of events, report the profits or losses of the trade, profession or vocation in question to HMRC in a self-assessment return. There is further detailed provision about self-employment income in regulation 39 that is not relevant here, and also provision in regulations 40 and 41 about pension income and deductible pension contributions which is not relevant here. 20. By paragraph 4(1) of Schedule 4B to the CSA 1991 and regulation 71 of the CSM 2012 Regulations, a variation may be agreed where the non-resident parents (a) has the ability to control, whether directly or indirectly, the amount of income that he\/she receives or which is taken into account as gross weekly income and (b) the Secretary of State (the Tribunal on appeal) is satisfied that he\/she has unreasonably reduced the amount of his\/her income which would otherwise fall to be taken into account by diverting it to other persons or for other purposes. 21. All variations must be assessed to ensure that they are just and equitable and regard must be had to the welfare of any child likely to be affected: CSA 1991, section 28F. 22. When exercising any discretionary power relating to child support, the Secretary of State \u201cmust have regard to the welfare of any child likely to be affected by the decision\u201d: CSA 1991, section 2. 23. The Upper Tribunal G\u2019OB v CMEC (CSM) [2010] UKUT 6 (AAC) gave guidance as to the approach to be taken in cases such as this which concern alleged unreasonable diversion of income by an NRP who runs their own business. Judge Mesher held: 19. I reject as misconceived the submissions on behalf of the non-resident parent (see page 268) that: \u201cThe Tribunal was not entitled, as a matter of law, to impose its own assumptions and business preferences upon the appellant in the way in which he ran his business. For example he was entitled to choose to hold money in his company to enable it later to provide him with a pension. This is a business decision which he is entitled to make and which the Tribunal was not entitled to go behind \u2026 The Tribunal was not entitled, as a matter of law, to dismiss as only a theoretical possibility \u2026 the question of whether or not the appellant might need to retain cash as a contingency fund for the acquisition of another business or businesses \u2026\u201d. So to hold as a matter of law would give a non-resident parent complete carte blanche to prefer the increase of his own wealth and business interests to the immediate needs of his own children, and would enable an unscrupulous parent to stultify the purpose of the child support legislation. 20. There is of course a balance to be struck in this context between maintaining a viable and hopefully successful business (which is in the interests of all parties concerned: no one disputes that) and providing a reasonable income stream available forthe children\u2019s immediate maintenance needs (which do not wait, and cannot be left to catch up or come to fruition in later life, in the same way that for example pension or other capital accumulations can). Such questions are resolved by the express terms of the legislation that a non-resident parent\u2019s subjective choice to prefer his own accumulation of wealth and business interests to the provision of maintenance for his children may indeed be overridden in prescribed circumstances where it is just and equitable to do so. Those circumstances, under regulation 19(4), are that it is a case where the Secretary of State (or the tribunal on appeal) is satisfied his diversion of resources away from providing income that could otherwise be available to pay for child maintenance has reached the point where it has become unreasonable. Whether that point has or has not been reached in a particular case is, like other cases where the law provides for a test of reasonableness as a justiciable issue, an objective judgment of fact and degree for the Secretary of State or tribunal to make having regard to all the circumstances. 21. I agree with the well balanced and helpful submission by Mr Ellis on behalf of the CMEC that the tribunal in this case did no more than carry out the objective task thus required of them by regulation 19(4), \u2026 the tribunal members asked themselves the correct question, whether making all reasonable allowances the overall effect fell outside the band of what was reasonable in all the circumstances. 22. I further completely agree with Mr Ellis that although the judgment of what is reasonable or unreasonable for the purposes of regulation 19(4) is a broad one for the good sense of the tribunal, and the legislation places no restriction on the circumstances that may be taken into account, it is a judgment to be made in the context of the child support legislation and the purpose of the variation provisions themselves. As he says: \u201cIn my submission the question as to whether a diversion was unreasonable has to be seen in the context of the regulation (Variation reg 19) and the overall purpose of the Child Support Schemes including the terms of section 1(1) of the Child Support Act which sets out that parents are responsible for maintaining their children. In making financial decisions a parent will obviously have a number of factors to take into account but providing maintenance for his or her children must be very high up in the list of priorities. In my submission the tribunal was both entitled and required to decide as a question of fact whether the choices made by the NRP were \u2018unreasonable\u2019 given the context as I describe it above. It strikes me that the tribunal took particular care to ensure that it took into account the sort of decisions that a prudent businessman would make \u2013 for example the tribunal gave a generous margin when deciding how much the business needed to retain in order to be able to meet contingent liabilities.\u201d Why I am allowing this appeal 24. In this case, the PWC appealed to the First-tier Tribunal seeking a variation under regulation 71 of the CSM 2012 Regulations on the basis that the NRP had unreasonably reduced the amount of his income which would otherwise fall to be taken into account as at the effective date of 17 November 2020. 25. The First-tier Tribunal proceeded by comparing the NRP\u2019s accounts (on which the historic income figure used by the SSWP was based) with actual evidence of his income and expenditure during the 2019\/2020 tax year. 26. In [38] of its SoR it set out a table containing columns showing: (a) the costs the NRP had included in his accounts; (b) the \u201ccost per statements\u201d (which I understand the First-tier Tribunal intended to be a reference to the costs that had been evidenced by the NRP at the hearing); and (c) \u201camount to add back\u201d (which was the difference between columns (a) and (b) and represented the amount of income the First-tier Tribunal concluded had been unreasonably diverted and which needed to be added to the historic income figure used by SSWP in her calculation as a variation. 27. Appeal Ground 3e was that the Tribunal erred in law by failing to take into account the cost of the NRP\u2019s office cleaner as miscellaneous expenses. The NRP\u2019s accounts had included a figure of \u00a32,129.40 for miscellaneous expenses. The Tribunal allowed \u00a3500 and accordingly increased the figure it treated as his current income by \u00a31,629.40. 28. When granting permission on this ground, I made clear that the NRP would need to listen to the recording of the First-tier Tribunal hearing and identify where in that hearing he said he had given evidence about cleaning costs and what that evidence was. He identified that between 36:55 and 38:25 of the recording he gave evidence as to miscellaneous expenses comprising: \u201ccleaning of the office, wiring, office requirement, bin removal, shredding of papers, lights on signpost\u201d. The NRP adds that \u201cThe Entertainer 27\u201d was paid \u00a3105.98 to shred papers on 15 July 2019 (page 155 of the hearing bundle). 29. My listening to the hearing confirms that the NRP\u2019s answer to the Tribunal\u2019s question about miscellaneous expenses included the matters mentioned by the NRP as noted above, although I observe that by \u201coffice requirement\u201d, I understand him to mean \u201coffice maintenance\u201d. The NRP also specifically mentions a figure of \u00a310 for cleaning each week for a year. 30. Having considered the record of the hearing, and the parties\u2019 submission, I have decided that, notwithstanding the SSWP\u2019s concession, there was no error of law in the Tribunal\u2019s decision as regards miscellaneous expenses. The Tribunal at [36] of its SoR explained that the NRP had been unable at the hearing to explain what the claimed expenses of \u00a32,129.40 were, or to point to relevant charges in his bank and credit card statements. The Tribunal therefore opted to use its \u201cspecialist financial expertise\u201d in order to arrive at a figure of \u00a3500 which it considered would be \u201ca reasonable amount for a small office\u201d. 31. In my judgment, the Tribunal was entitled to reach that conclusion given the evidence before it. The Tribunal was as a matter of fact correct that the NRP had been unable to explain how he arrived at expenses of \u00a32,129.40 or to identify relevant charges in his bank statements. On appeal, the NRP has pointed to \u201cThe Entertainer 27\u201d entry in his statement of 15 July 2019, but he did not give that evidence to the Tribunal, so they did not err in failing to take it into account. The figure that the NRP gave for cleaning (even if it was accurate, which seems unlikely given that it was presented as an approximate figure) did not go anywhere near explaining the claimed expenses and the NRP was unable to identify how payment for cleaning was made. In those circumstances, the Tribunal was entitled simply to reject the NRP\u2019s evidence and arrive at a figure that it considered reasonable, applying its own expertise. It cannot be said that \u00a3500 is a perverse figure and the Tribunal\u2019s reasons are in fact adequate once it is known what evidence the NRP gave at the hearing. 32. Appeal Ground 3b therefore fails. 33. Appeal Ground 3g was that the Tribunal erred in law in relation to the NRP\u2019s travel expenses as: (i) there was an arithmetical error in the decision because the Tribunal had deducted \u00a32,000 from the figure of \u00a32,509.37 claimed in the NRP\u2019s accounts and arrived at a figure of \u00a31,509.37 rather than \u00a3509.37; and (ii) the Tribunal\u2019s reasons were inadequate as it was impossible to tell why the Tribunal had used a figure of \u00a32,000 for the NRP\u2019s travel expenses in any event. 34. I uphold both aspects of Ground 3g. The arithmetical error in taking \u00a32,000 away from \u00a32,509.37 and getting \u00a31,509.37 is obviously perverse. I would, however, have been able simply to correct this by re-making the decision in that respect on appeal if I had been able to understand why the Tribunal was using a figure of \u00a32,000, but unfortunately I do not understand where that figure has come from. 35. There is, so far as I can tell, no reasoning in the decision dealing with the NRP\u2019s figure for travel expenses. The reasons appear only to deal with the other heads of travel-related expenditure claimed, i.e. vehicle fuel, vehicle lease, vehicle repairs and maintenance and parking. The Tribunal asked the NRP about the figure claimed for travel expenses at around 35:00 on the recording of the hearing. From that part of the recording, it appears that the NRP was suggesting that these expenses related to train and tube travel rather than motoring expenses. I have not listened to the whole hearing as the parties have not invited me to do so and I do not consider it to be necessary for me to do so in order to determine the appeal. There may therefore be other points in the hearing that the NRP also dealt with this issue. However, there is no reasoning in the SoR dealing with costs of train or tube travel or specifically with the claim for travel expenses as distinct from the other heads of travel-related expenditure claimed. 36. In the circumstances, I conclude that the Tribunal erred in law in its decision in respect of the NRP\u2019s claimed expense of \u00a32,509.37 on travel expenses. What happens next 37. I have found the decision involved the making of an error on a point of law. As such, under section 12(2)(a) of the TCEA 2007 I may, but need not, set the decision aside. I acknowledge that the PWC is concerned at the delays in this case, and what she alleges to be the NRP\u2019s failure to pay the proper rate of maintenance pending this appeal. However, I do not consider that such matters would justify me not setting aside a decision in which I have found there to be an error of law. Nor, I observe, would it necessarily be in the PWC\u2019s interests for me to refuse to set the decision aside because the error in the decision that I have identified may in fact on remission lead to a decision that the NRP must pay more by way of maintenance. I therefore set the decision aside. 38. Having set the decision aside, I have the option either to remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal for re-hearing or to re-make the decision myself. In terms of delay, it is unlikely to make much difference which option I adopt. That is because in order to determine the point on which I have allowed the appeal, I would have to hold an oral hearing in order to hear further evidence from the parties. The same will have to happen if the case is remitted. Retaining the case in the Upper Tribunal for re-making would, however, have the effect of depriving the parties of their right of appeal to the Upper Tribunal against any decision, which is not normally in the interests of justice where the point to be decided involves the hearing of evidence. 39. I therefore remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal with directions as permitted by section 12(2)(b) and (3). The case should, if possible, be listed before the same Tribunal panel who considered the case previously. The case is being remitted only on a narrow point and it is desirable that the panel with knowledge of the case should deal with it, particularly given the length of the previous hearing before them. This was a substantial case heard over two days. It will save Tribunal time for the same panel to consider the matter again. There is in my judgment no reason why the same panel cannot deal with the case. Although they made an error of law, the decision is otherwise sound and there is nothing about the decision or the circumstances in which it was made that gives me any cause to doubt the professionalism of the Tribunal panel involved or their ability to reconsider the case on the one point that I am remitting. 40. Although I have set aside the decision previously made, so that the Tribunal will on remission need formally to re-make the whole decision, most of that decision has not been the subject of this appeal and\/or is not disturbed by the appeal. It would be an abuse of process for those parts of the decision that are unaffected by this appeal to be re-opened simply because there has been an appeal. When re-making the decision, the Tribunal should therefore do so on the basis that it adopts and re-makes the whole of the previous decision in the same terms as it did previously, without any further argument or evidence from the parties, save in relation: (i) to the claimed figure of \u00a32,509.37 for travel expenses that were not already included under the headings of vehicle fuel, vehicle lease, vehicle repairs and maintenance and parking; and, consequent upon that, (ii) the overall figure that it concludes has been unreasonably diverted; and (iii) the overall figure in respect of which it considers it just and equitable to make a variation. My directions to the Tribunal in this respect do not, of course, prevent it from exercising any powers it has under its rules to deal with any new matter arising between the parties if it considers that doing so would not constitute an abuse of process. Holly Stout Judge of the Upper Tribunal Authorised by the Judge for issue on 14 May 2025<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Sources officielles :<\/strong> consulter la page source<\/a><\/p>\n

Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).<\/em><\/p>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The decision of the Upper Tribunal is to allow the appeal. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved an error of law. Under section 12(2)(a), (b)(i) and (3) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, I set that decision aside and remit the case to be reconsidered by the tribunal in accordance with the following directions. DIRECTIONS 1. The…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":0,"template":"","meta":{"_crdt_document":""},"kji_country":[7608],"kji_court":[9033],"kji_chamber":[],"kji_year":[8463],"kji_subject":[7612],"kji_keyword":[7705,15910,9692,9593,7636],"kji_language":[7611],"class_list":["post-576425","kji_decision","type-kji_decision","status-publish","hentry","kji_country-royaume-uni","kji_court-upper-tribunal-administrative-appeals-chamber","kji_year-8463","kji_subject-fiscal","kji_keyword-appeal","kji_keyword-figure","kji_keyword-first-tier","kji_keyword-income","kji_keyword-tribunal","kji_language-anglais"],"yoast_head":"\nJM v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions & Anor - Ma\u00eetre Hassan Kohen, avocat en droit p\u00e9nal \u00e0 Paris<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/ru\/jurisprudences\/jm-v-secretary-of-state-for-work-and-pensions-anor\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"ru_RU\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"JM v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions & Anor\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"The decision of the Upper Tribunal is to allow the appeal. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved an error of law. Under section 12(2)(a), (b)(i) and (3) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, I set that decision aside and remit the case to be reconsidered by the tribunal in accordance with the following directions. DIRECTIONS 1. 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