{"id":651635,"date":"2026-04-22T21:31:07","date_gmt":"2026-04-22T19:31:07","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/jurisprudences\/shivsagar-enterprises-ltd-v-the-commissioners-for-hmrc\/"},"modified":"2026-04-22T21:31:07","modified_gmt":"2026-04-22T19:31:07","slug":"shivsagar-enterprises-ltd-v-the-commissioners-for-hmrc","status":"publish","type":"kji_decision","link":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/ru\/jurisprudences\/shivsagar-enterprises-ltd-v-the-commissioners-for-hmrc\/","title":{"rendered":"Shivsagar Enterprises Ltd v The Commissioners for HMRC"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"kji-decision\">\n<div class=\"kji-full-text\">\n<p>Introduction 1. The Appellant (Shivsagar Enterprises Ltd) appeals against HMRC\u2019s decision to issue a \u00a3400 late filing penalty (\u201cLFP\u201d) charged under Paragraph 13, Schedule 55 to the Finance Act 2009 (\u201cSch 55 FA 09\u201d) in respect of the late filing of a Self-Assessment Tax Return for the Soft Drinks Industry Levy (\u201cthe SDIL Return\u201d) for the period from 1 October 2021 to 31 December 2021. Period Date of Penalty \u202f Legislation\u202f Description\u202f Amount\u202f 1.10.2021 \u2013 31.12.2021 16.03.2022 Para 13, Sch. 55 FA 09 Late Filing Penalty \u00a3400 Findings of Fact\u00a0 2. SDIL is a tax payable on the packaging or importation of soft drinks into the United Kingdom. The Appellant, who is liable to pay the levy, is required to file quarterly returns electronically and make any payment of SDIL due within 30 days of the end of each quarter. 3. Regulations 19 and 21 of the Soft Drinks Industry Regulations 2018, provide that the quarterly filing periods are fixed dates, being 30 June, 20 September, 31 December and 31 March. Accordingly, the deadlines for filing are 30 July, 30 October, 30 January, and 30 April, being 30 days of the end of each quarter. 4. 30 July 2022 was the filing date for the Appellant\u2019s quarterly return for the period ending 30 June 2020. On 5 November 2020, the Appellant filed the return, being 98 days late (\u201cthe First Default\u201d). On 16 February 2021, the Respondents issued a \u00a3100 late filing penalty and started a penalty period for SDIL from 1 July 2020 to 30 June 2021, pursuant to Paragraph 13B (2-3), Sch. 55 FA 09. 5. 30 October 2020 was the filing date for the Appellant\u2019s quarterly return for the period ending 30 September 2020. On 16 November 2020, the Appellant filed the return, being 17 days late (\u201cthe Second Default\u201d). On 18 February 2021, the Respondents issued a \u00a3200 late filing penalty and extended the penalty period for SDIL to 31 October 2021, pursuant to Paragraph 13C (2), Sch. 55 FA 09. 6. 30 January 2021 was the filing date for the Appellant\u2019s quarterly return for the period ending 31 December 2020. On 13 February 2021, the Appellant filed the return, being 14 days late (\u201cthe Third Default\u201d). On 12 March 2021, the Respondents issued a \u00a3300 late filing penalty and extended the penalty period for SDIL to 31 January 2022, pursuant to Paragraph 13C (2), Sch. 55 FA 09. 7. 30 April 2021 was the filing date for the Appellant\u2019s quarterly return for the period ending 31 March 2021. On 28 May 2021, the Appellant filed the return, being 28 days late (\u201cthe Fourth Default\u201d). On 7 June 2021, the Respondents issued a \u00a3400 late filing penalty and extended the penalty period for SDIL to 1 May 2022, pursuant to Paragraph 13C (2), Sch. 55 FA 09. 8. 30 January 2022 was the filing date for the Appellant\u2019s quarterly return for the period from 1 October 2021 to 31 December 2021. 9. On 3 February 2022, the Respondents received the SDIL Return, being 4 days late (\u201cthe Fifth Default\u201d). 10. On 24 March 2022, the Respondents issued a \u2018Notice of a late filing penalty for SDIL and extension of penalty period\u2019 (\u201cthe Notice\u201d) to 106 Denecroft Crescent, UB10 9HZ, being the Appellant\u2019s address as confirmed on the Notice of Appeal. The Notice extended the penalty period to 30 January 2023. 11. Prior to 19 April 2022, the Respondents received the Appellant\u2019s appeal against the LFP in accordance with Paragraph 20, Sch.55 FA 09. 12. On 19 April 2022 and before the Respondents replied to the Appellant\u2019s appeal, the Appellant appealed to the Tribunal. 13. On 3 May 2022, the Respondents acknowledged the Appellant\u2019s appeal received prior to 19 April 2022 stating \u201cThank you for your recent letter asking for a review of your [SDIL] Late Filing Penalty in respect of the quarter ending 31\/12\/2021. Your request has been passed to our Technical team who will contact you in due course.\u201d 14. On 13 May 2022, the Respondents replied to the Appellant\u2019s appeal (received prior to 19 April 2022) confirming that a \u201c\u2026waiver is not applicable and that you will need to request a Review of our decision or appeal by contacting the Appeal Tribunal direct.\u201d I note that there is an inherent contradiction between the letter dated 3 May 2022 which acknowledge receipt of the Appellant\u2019s request for a review and this letter informing the Appellant that it needed to request a review. 15. On 15 July 2022, the Respondents were notified by the Tribunal of the Appellant\u2019s appeal. The Law\u00a0 16. The relevant statutory provisions and authorities are not in dispute and, so far as necessary, are included as an Appendix to this decision.\u202f\u202f\u00a0 17. HMRC bear the burden of proof. This means that they must show, on the balance of probabilities, that the LFP is due. If they do so, the burden then shifts to the Appellant to show there is a reasonable excuse for late filing.\u202f\u00a0 The Appellant\u2019s Contentions\u00a0 18. The Appellant\u2019s contentions are set out the document attached to the Notice of Appel. In summary, the Appellant contends that the Fifth Default was caused by the Respondents\u2019 website not working properly. The Appellant states that it has video proof of the website malfunctioning. On 25 November 2022, I directed the Appellant to provide such video evidence to the Respondents and the Tribunal within 7 days. Also, I informed the Appellant that \u201c\u2026if such evidence is not provided within 7 days, then the appeal will be determined without reference to it.\u201d No such video evidence has been provided and, accordingly, I have determined this appeal without reference to it. HMRC\u2019s Contentions\u00a0 19. HMRC contend that:\u202f\u00a0 (1) The penalty was correctly issued.\u00a0 (2) The Appellant does not have a reasonable excuse for the late filing of the SDIL Return.\u00a0 (3) The Respondents\u2019 decision in relation to special reduction of the penalties was not flawed.\u00a0 Discussion\u00a0 20. I have carefully considered the papers.\u202f\u00a0 21. As to the validity of the LFP, I am satisfied that the Appellant is liable to a penalty of \u00a3400 for failing to file the SDIL Return by the filing date. In reaching this decision, I refer to and rely on the following:\u202f\u00a0 (1) On 16 February 2021, a penalty period began to run as a result of the First Default, Paragraph 13B, Sch. 55 FA 09. (2) As a result of the Second, Third and Fourth Defaults, the penalty period was extended on 3 separate occasions such that it was eventually due to expire on 1 May 2022. (3) Pursuant to Regulation 21 (1) SDIL Regulations, the Appellant\u2019s SDIL Return for the period ending 31 December 2021 was due by 30 January 2022.\u00a0 (4) The Respondents received the SDIL Return on 3 February 2022. (5) The SDIL Return was 4 days late. (6) This was the Appellants Fifth Default and occurred within the penalty period. (7) In accordance with\u00a0 Paragraph 13C (6), Schedule 55 FA 09 the Appellant is liable to a penalty of \u00a3400. 22. \u00a0As to reasonable excuse:\u202f\u00a0 (1) Pursuant to paragraph 23, Schedule 55 FA 09, liability to a penalty under any paragraph of this Schedule does not arise in relation to a failure to make a return if the Appellant satisfies me that there is a reasonable excuse for the failure.\u202f\u00a0 (2) The Appellant bears the burden of proof. This means that the Appellant must show, on the balance of probabilities, that there is a reasonable excuse for the failure to make a return.\u202f\u00a0 (3) Save that Paragraph 23 (2) (a-c), Schedule 55 FA 09 sets out three situations that are incapable of constituting a reasonable excuse, there is no statutory definition of what constitutes a reasonable excuse. Whether or not a person had a reasonable excuse is an objective test and &quot;is a matter to be considered in the light of all the circumstances of the particular case&quot;Rowland v HMRC (2006) STC (SCD) 536 at paragraph 18.\u202f\u00a0 (4) In The Clean Car Company v C&amp;E Commissioners [1991] VATTR 234, Medd QC set out the test to be applied when considering whether there is a reasonable excuse as follows:\u202f\u00a0 \u201cThe test of whether or not there is a reasonable excuse is an objective one. In my judgement it is an objective test in this sense. One must ask oneself: was what the taxpayer did a reasonable thing for a responsible taxpayer conscious of and intending to comply with his obligations regarding tax, but having the experience and other relevant attributes of the taxpayer and placed in the situation that the taxpayer found himself at the relevant time, a reasonable thing to do?\u201d (5) Further, in Perrin v HMRC [2018] UKUT 156 at paragraph 81, the Upper Tribunal provided guidance as to the correct approach to a reasonable excuse defence as follows:\u202f\u00a0 \u201c81. When considering a \u201creasonable excuse\u201d defence, therefore, in our view the FTT can usefully approach matters in the following way:\u202f\u00a0 (1) First, establish what facts the taxpayer asserts give rise to a reasonable excuse (this may include the belief, acts or omissions of the taxpayer or any other person, the taxpayer\u2019s own experience or relevant attributes, the situation of the taxpayer at any relevant time and any other relevant external facts).\u202f\u00a0 (2) Second, decide which of those facts are proven.\u202f\u00a0 (3) Third, decide whether, viewed objectively, those proven facts do indeed amount to an objectively reasonable excuse for the default and the time when that objectively reasonable excuse ceased. In doing so, it should take into account the experience and other relevant attributes of the taxpayer and the situation in which the taxpayer found himself at the relevant time or times. It might assist the FTT, in this context, to ask itself the question \u201cwas what the taxpayer did (or omitted to do or believed) objectively reasonable for this taxpayer in those circumstances?\u201d\u202f\u00a0 (4) Fourth, having decided when any reasonable excuse ceased, decide whether the taxpayer remedied the failure without unreasonable delay after that time (unless, exceptionally, the failure was remedied before the reasonable excuse ceased). In doing so, the FTT should again decide the matter objectively, but taking into account the experience and other relevant attributes of the taxpayer and the situation in which the taxpayer found himself at the relevant time or times.\u201d\u202f\u00a0 (6) In summary, whether there is a reasonable excuse or not depends on the particular circumstances in which the failure occurred and the abilities of the person who failed. The standard by which this falls to be judged is that of a prudent and reasonable taxpayer, exercising reasonable foresight and due diligence, in the position of the taxpayer in question: David Collis v HMRC [2011] UKFTT 588 (TC). What is a reasonable excuse for one person may not be a reasonable excuse for another. Finally, in respect of beliefs, I remind myself that the Upper Tribunal in Perrin concluded that for an honestly held belief to constitute a reasonable excuse, it must also be objectively reasonable for that belief to be held.\u202f\u202f\u00a0 (7) Pursuant to Perrin:\u202f\u00a0 (a) First, it is the Appellant\u2019s case that he has a reasonable excuse for the failure to submit the SDIL Return by the filing date because the Respondents\u2019 website was not working properly. (b) Second, I accept that on 26 January 2022 the Appellant signed into the Respondents website on 3 occasions in very short succession. I accept that this might indicate that the Appellant was experiencing some difficulties using the Respondents\u2019 website, but it does not prove the cause of those difficulties i.e., a fault with the Respondent\u2019s website or with the Appellant\u2019s own internet connection. The Appellant did not use the help link on the website or contact the Respondents by telephone or email for assistance. I also note that the Respondents\u2019 colleagues refer to the website experiencing the \u201cusual and normal level of errors\u201d at the relevant time.However, the Respondents\u2019 website was not offline between 29 October 2021 and 3 February 2022 and there is no suggestion that these \u201cusual and normal level of errors\u201d prevented users from filing returns. Accordingly, I am not satisfied that the Appellant has proved, on the balance of probabilities, that the difficulties experienced with the Respondents\u2019 website were as a result of the Respondents\u2019 website or that they prevented the Appellant from filing the SDIL Return. (c) Third, I must decide whether, viewed objectively, those proven facts amount to an objectively reasonable excuse and the time that reasonable excuse ceased. In so doing, I should ask myself \u201cwas what the taxpayer did (or omitted to do or believed) objectively reasonable for this taxpayer in those circumstances?\u201d As detailed above, I am not satisfied that the Appellant has proven that the Respondents\u2019 website was not working properly at the material time. However, even if the Respondents website was not working properly at the relevant time, I am not satisfied that, viewed objectively, those facts amount to an objectively reasonable excuse for the following reasons:\u202f\u00a0 (i) The Respondents\u2019 records show that on 26 January 2022 the Appellant logged in to the website on three occasions. If, which I do not accept, the Respondents\u2019 website was not working properly on 26 January 2022 then the Appellant should have tried again before the filing date, being 30 January 2022, to file the SDIL Return. The Appellant did not do so despite its awareness, in light of the earlier defaults, of the consequences of failing to file the SDIL Return by the deadline. In fact, the Appellant did not try again until 3 February 2022, being 4 days late, when the SDIL Return was successfully filed. In short, if (which I do not accept) the Respondents\u2019 website was not working properly on 26 January 2022, then the Appellant may have an objectively reasonable excuse for not filing the SDIL that day, but as there is no evidence that the Respondents\u2019 website was not working properly thereafter that does not excuse the Appellant\u2019s failure to file the SDIL in the period between 27-30 January 2022. (d) Fourth, if, which I do not accept, the Appellant had a reasonable excuse for the failure to file the Return then I consider that that reasonable excuse ceased at the latest on 31 January 2022, there being no evidence that the Respondents\u2019 website was malfunctioning or experiencing any \u201cusual and normal level of errors\u201d after that date. In the circumstances, the Appellant did not remedy the failure without unreasonable delay because it took another 3 days to remedy the failure. There was no good reason for this delay especially considering the Appellant\u2019s knowledge of the consequences of failing to file the SDIL on time (e) In all the circumstances, I am not satisfied that the Appellant acted as a prudent and reasonable taxpayer, exercising reasonable foresight and due diligence, in the position of the Appellant at the time.\u202f\u202f 23. As to special reduction:\u202f\u00a0 (1) Pursuant to Paragraph 16, Schedule 55 FA 09, the Respondents have a discretion to reduce any penalty charged under Schedule 55 FA 09 if they think it right so to do because of special circumstances.\u00a0\u00a0 (2) Pursuant to paragraph 20 (2), Schedule 55 FA 09, the Appellant can appeal against the amount of a penalty. Pursuant to paragraph 22 (2-3), Schedule 55 FA 09, the Tribunal can affirm the Respondent\u2019s decision or substitute its own decision. However, the Tribunal can only substitute its decision if the Respondent\u2019s decision is flawed, which is a high test. To be flawed, the Respondent must have considered irrelevant matters, failed to consider relevant matters, or made a decision no reasonable decision maker could have made, Paragraph 22 (4), Sch 55 FA 09.\u202f\u00a0 (3) Save that paragraph 16 (2) (a-b), Sch 55 FA 09 states that neither ability to pay nor the fact that a potential loss of revenue from one taxpayer is balanced by a potential over-payment by another amounts to special circumstances, there is no precise definition of special circumstances.\u202f\u202f\u202f\u00a0 (4) In Barry Edwards v HMRC [2019] UKUT 131 (TCC), the Upper Tribunal stated as follows:\u202f\u00a0 \u201c68. There are many appeals in the FTT where the question as to whether there are special circumstances justifying a reduction in the amount of a penalty has been considered. Accordingly, from time to time the FTT has made general observations about what might constitute special circumstances. In many of those decisions, reference is made to Crabtree v Hinchcliffe (Inspector of Taxes) [1972] AC 707 where Viscount Dilhorne (in a rather different context to that with which we are concerned) suggested at page 739E that:\u00a0 \u00a0\u201cFor circumstances to be special [they] must be exceptional, abnormal or unusual&#8230;\u201d\u00a0 69. In Warren v HMRC [2012] UKFTT 57, the FTT put a gloss on the meaning of \u201cspecial\u201d. It said at [54] that:\u00a0 \u201cThe adjective \u201cspecial\u201d requires simply that the circumstances be peculiar or distinctive. But that does not necessarily mean that the circumstances which affect most taxpayers could not be special: an ultra vires assertion by HMRC that for a period penalties would be halved might well be special circumstances; but generally special circumstances will be those confined to particular taxpayers or possibly classes of taxpayers. They must encompass the situation in which it would be significantly unfair to the taxpayer to bear the whole penalty.\u201d\u00a0 70. In Welland v HMRC [2017] UKFTT 0870 the FTT likewise did not confine the meaning to circumstances which did not affect many taxpayers. After referring to the passage in Warren cited above, the FTT said at [125]:\u00a0 \u201cWhat was said in Warren seems right, if very general. &#8230; In summary, it seems to me that the alleged special circumstances must be an unusual 40 event or situation which does not amount to a reasonable excuse but which renders the penalty in whole or part significantly unfair and contrary to what Parliament must have intended when enacting the provisions.\u201d\u00a0 71. By contrast, in Collis v HMRC [2011] UKFTT 588 the FTT said at [40] that:\u00a0 \u201cto be a special circumstance the circumstance in question must operate on the particular individual, and not be a mere general circumstance that applies to many taxpayers by virtue of the scheme of the provisions themselves.\u201d\u00a0 72. In our view, as the FTT said in Advanced Scaffolding (Bristol) Limited v HMRC [2018] UKFTT 0744 (TC) at [99], there is no reason for the FTT to seek to restrict the wording of paragraph 16 of Schedule 55 FA 2019 by adding a judicial gloss to the phrase. In support of that approach the FTT referred to the observation made by Lord Reid in Crabtree v Hinchcliffe at page 731D-E when considering the scope of \u201cspecial circumstances\u201d as follows: \u201cthe respondent argues that this provision has a very limited application&#8230; I can see nothing in the phraseology or in the apparent object of this provision to justify so narrow a reading of it\u201d.\u00a0 73. The FTT then said this at [101] and [102]: \u201c101. I appreciate that care must be taken in deriving principles based on cases dealing with different legislation. However, I can see nothing in schedule 55 which evidences any intention that the phrase \u201cspecial circumstances\u201d should be given a narrow meaning.\u00a0 102. It is clear that, in enacting paragraph 16 of schedule 55, Parliament intended to give HMRC and, if HMRC\u2019s decision is flawed, the Tribunal a wide discretion to reduce a penalty where there are circumstances which, in their view, make it right to do so. The only restriction is that the circumstances must be \u201cspecial\u201d. Whether this is interpreted as being out of the ordinary, uncommon, exceptional, abnormal, unusual, peculiar or distinctive does not really take the debate any further. What matters is whether HMRC (or, where appropriate, the Tribunal) consider that the circumstances are sufficiently special that it is right to reduce the amount of the penalty.\u201d\u00a0 74. We respectfully agree. As the FTT went on to say at [105], special circumstances may or may not operate on the person involved but what is key is whether the circumstance is relevant to the issue under consideration.\u201d (5) In summary, special circumstances should not be given a restrictive interpretation. It covers any circumstances which are relevant to the issue under consideration whether relevant to the individual taxpayer and where the decision to charge a penalty at the statutory level is contrary to Parliament\u2019s intention in enacting the penalty regime namely, to encourage timely compliance with filing obligations. Notably, in Barry Edwards v HMRC [2019] UKUT 131 (TCC), at paragraph 86 the Upper Tribunal confirmed that the Schedule 55 regime is proportionate, and penalties are correctly due even in circumstances where there is no additional tax liability.\u00a0Further, I have no power to discharge or adjust a validly issued penalty on the basis that I consider it unfair, Hok Ltd v HMRC [2012] UKUT 363 (TCC). (6) The Respondents have considered the Appellant\u2019s grounds of appeal and concluded that there are no special circumstances which would merit a reduction of the LFP. I have considered the Respondents\u2019 correspondence, specifically the letter issuing the LFP, dated 24 March 2022, and the two subsequent letters dated 3 and 13 May 2022. None of these letters expressly raise or consider special circumstances. In fact, I note that whilst the 3 May 2022 letter acknowledged the Appellant\u2019s request for a review the later letter, dated 13 May 2022, informed the Appellant that a review request would need to be made. In the circumstances, I am not satisfied that the Respondents properly considered special circumstances in advance of the Statement of Case. Accordingly, I consider that the Respondents\u2019 decision is flawed and that I have the power to substitute my own decision. However, I am not satisfied that the grounds relied upon by the Appellant amount to special circumstances for the same reasons that I am not satisfied they amount to a reasonable excuse. I also note that the LFP is in accordance with Parliament\u2019s intention to encourage timely compliance with filing obligations. Therefore, I decline to interfere with the Respondents\u2019 decision 24. The appeal against the LFP of \u00a3400 is dismissed.\u202f\u202f\u00a0The LFP is upheld in its entirety.\u202f\u00a0 Right to apply for permission to appeal 25. This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to \u201cGuidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)\u201d which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice. NEWSTEAD TAYLOR TRIBUNAL JUDGE Release date: 09th DECEMBER 2022<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<hr class=\"kji-sep\" \/>\n<p class=\"kji-source-links\"><strong>Sources officielles :<\/strong> <a class=\"kji-source-link\" href=\"https:\/\/caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk\/ukftt\/tc\/2022\/22\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">consulter la page source<\/a><\/p>\n<p class=\"kji-license-note\"><em>Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).<\/em><\/p>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Introduction 1. The Appellant (Shivsagar Enterprises Ltd) appeals against HMRC\u2019s decision to issue a \u00a3400 late filing penalty (\u201cLFP\u201d) charged under Paragraph 13, Schedule 55 to the Finance Act 2009 (\u201cSch 55 FA 09\u201d) in respect of the late filing of a Self-Assessment Tax Return for the Soft Drinks Industry Levy (\u201cthe SDIL Return\u201d) for the period from 1 October&#8230;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":0,"template":"","meta":{"_crdt_document":""},"kji_country":[7608],"kji_court":[7915],"kji_chamber":[],"kji_year":[32183],"kji_subject":[7612],"kji_keyword":[7633,11512,8045,9725,8444],"kji_language":[7611],"class_list":["post-651635","kji_decision","type-kji_decision","status-publish","hentry","kji_country-royaume-uni","kji_court-first-tier-tribunal-tax-chamber","kji_year-32183","kji_subject-fiscal","kji_keyword-appellant","kji_keyword-circumstances","kji_keyword-penalty","kji_keyword-reasonable","kji_keyword-respondents","kji_language-anglais"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO Premium plugin v27.5 (Yoast SEO v27.5) - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-premium-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>Shivsagar Enterprises Ltd v The Commissioners for HMRC - Ma\u00eetre Hassan Kohen, avocat en droit p\u00e9nal \u00e0 Paris<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/ru\/jurisprudences\/shivsagar-enterprises-ltd-v-the-commissioners-for-hmrc\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"ru_RU\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Shivsagar Enterprises Ltd v The Commissioners for HMRC\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Introduction 1. The Appellant (Shivsagar Enterprises Ltd) appeals against HMRC\u2019s decision to issue a \u00a3400 late filing penalty (\u201cLFP\u201d) charged under Paragraph 13, Schedule 55 to the Finance Act 2009 (\u201cSch 55 FA 09\u201d) in respect of the late filing of a Self-Assessment Tax Return for the Soft Drinks Industry Levy (\u201cthe SDIL Return\u201d) for the period from 1 October...\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/ru\/jurisprudences\/shivsagar-enterprises-ltd-v-the-commissioners-for-hmrc\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Ma\u00eetre Hassan Kohen, avocat en droit p\u00e9nal \u00e0 Paris\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"\u041f\u0440\u0438\u043c\u0435\u0440\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u0432\u0440\u0435\u043c\u044f \u0434\u043b\u044f \u0447\u0442\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"18 \u043c\u0438\u043d\u0443\u0442\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/ru\\\/jurisprudences\\\/shivsagar-enterprises-ltd-v-the-commissioners-for-hmrc\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/ru\\\/jurisprudences\\\/shivsagar-enterprises-ltd-v-the-commissioners-for-hmrc\\\/\",\"name\":\"Shivsagar Enterprises Ltd v The Commissioners for HMRC - Ma\u00eetre Hassan Kohen, avocat en droit p\u00e9nal \u00e0 Paris\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/ru\\\/#website\"},\"datePublished\":\"2026-04-22T19:31:07+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/ru\\\/jurisprudences\\\/shivsagar-enterprises-ltd-v-the-commissioners-for-hmrc\\\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"ru-RU\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/ru\\\/jurisprudences\\\/shivsagar-enterprises-ltd-v-the-commissioners-for-hmrc\\\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/ru\\\/jurisprudences\\\/shivsagar-enterprises-ltd-v-the-commissioners-for-hmrc\\\/#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/ru\\\/avocats-en-droit-penal-a-paris-conseil-et-defense-strategique\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Jurisprudences\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/ru\\\/jurisprudences\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":3,\"name\":\"Shivsagar Enterprises Ltd v The Commissioners for HMRC\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/ru\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/ru\\\/\",\"name\":\"Kohen Avocats\",\"description\":\"Ma\u00eetre Hassan Kohen, avocat p\u00e9naliste \u00e0 Paris, intervient exclusivement en droit p\u00e9nal pour la d\u00e9fense des particuliers, notamment en mati\u00e8re d\u2019accusations de viol. Il assure un accompagnement rigoureux d\u00e8s la garde \u00e0 vue jusqu\u2019\u00e0 la Cour d\u2019assises, veillant au strict respect des garanties proc\u00e9durales.\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/ru\\\/#organization\"},\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/ru\\\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"ru-RU\"},{\"@type\":\"Organization\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/ru\\\/#organization\",\"name\":\"Kohen Avocats\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/ru\\\/\",\"logo\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"ru-RU\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/ru\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2026\\\/01\\\/Logo-2-1.webp\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2026\\\/01\\\/Logo-2-1.webp\",\"width\":2114,\"height\":1253,\"caption\":\"Kohen Avocats\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/ru\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\"}}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO Premium plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Shivsagar Enterprises Ltd v The Commissioners for HMRC - Ma\u00eetre Hassan Kohen, avocat en droit p\u00e9nal \u00e0 Paris","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/ru\/jurisprudences\/shivsagar-enterprises-ltd-v-the-commissioners-for-hmrc\/","og_locale":"ru_RU","og_type":"article","og_title":"Shivsagar Enterprises Ltd v The Commissioners for HMRC","og_description":"Introduction 1. 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