{"id":666754,"date":"2026-04-24T02:07:28","date_gmt":"2026-04-24T00:07:28","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/jurisprudences\/regina-v-gurpreet-singh-2\/"},"modified":"2026-04-24T02:07:28","modified_gmt":"2026-04-24T00:07:28","slug":"regina-v-gurpreet-singh-2","status":"publish","type":"kji_decision","link":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/ru\/jurisprudences\/regina-v-gurpreet-singh-2\/","title":{"rendered":"REGINA v GURPREET SINGH"},"content":{"rendered":"
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LORD JUSTICE HOLROYDE: 1 On 27\u00a0January\u00a02021, after a\u00a0retrial in the\u00a0Crown Court at Birmingham before HHJ Drew QC and a\u00a0jury, this appellant was convicted of the murder of his second wife, Sarbjit\u00a0Kaur (\u201cSarbjit\u201d). He was sentenced to life imprisonment with a\u00a0minimum term of 19\u00a0years, less the\u00a0days he had spent remanded in custody. He now appeals against his conviction by leave of the full court. 2 The\u00a0facts of the case are quite complicated. We summarise them as briefly as is appropriate. 3 The\u00a0appellant, a\u00a0successful businessman, was first married to Amandeep\u00a0Kaur (\u201cAmandeep\u201d). They had two children and lived in a\u00a0large, detached house in Wolverhampton (\u201cthe\u00a0house\u201d). The\u00a0front gates to the\u00a0house were electronically operated. They could be controlled from within the\u00a0house, or opened from the outside either by entering the\u00a0appropriate code into a\u00a0keypad or by using a\u00a0fob. 4 Amandeep died in India in\u00a0December\u00a02014. The\u00a0cause of her death was recorded as a\u00a0brain haemorrhage. The\u00a0prosecution have at no stage alleged that the appellant had killed her. 5 In 2015 the\u00a0appellant married Sarbjit. She lived with him and the children at the house. She ran a\u00a0business as a\u00a0seamstress, working from a\u00a0sewing room at the house. 6 It was the\u00a0appellant's case that Amandeep's brother, Bikramjit\u00a0Singh (\u201cBikramjit\u201d), and\u00a0his wife (\u201cSukhdip\u201d), were angry with the appellant because of the speed with which he had remarried, and became hostile towards him. That hostility was said to have increased after 2016, when the appellant prevented Bikramjit and Sukhdip from having further contact with his children. 7 On the afternoon of 16\u00a0February\u00a02020 the\u00a0appellant telephoned the\u00a0police to report that he had returned from work to find his wife's dead body in the\u00a0sewing room. She was wearing her night clothes. The\u00a0cause of her death was strangulation, probably manual. She had bruising to her arms, consistent with having been held, and had suffered blunt-force trauma to her head. Red powder, thought to be chili powder which had been used to incapacitate her, was found on her face and body and on the floor. The\u00a0state of the house was suggestive of burglary. 8 In the\u00a0course of the police investigation, CCTV footage recorded by a\u00a0camera at a\u00a0neighbouring property was recovered. From that, and other sources, the\u00a0following sequence of events emerged. At 07.52 the\u00a0appellant left the\u00a0house to take the\u00a0children to school. At 07.54 Sarbjit rang a\u00a0former work colleague whom she had arranged to meet at 08.00, but received no answer because the\u00a0lady concerned was still asleep. At 08.02 the\u00a0appellant returned. Between 08.09 and 08.14 Sarbjit was engaged in her last active phone call. Thereafter, no calls were made from or answered by her phone. At 08.13 an\u00a0unknown person wearing a\u00a0parka with the\u00a0hood up and carrying a\u00a0bag, thought to be a\u00a0woman, arrived at the property. There was an inference\u00a0that she entered through the\u00a0electronic gates, though they were not covered by the\u00a0CCTV. At 09.01 the\u00a0appellant left the\u00a0house. At 09.07 the\u00a0unknown woman left the\u00a0house. There was no CCTV evidence of anyone entering or leaving the\u00a0house from that point on until 16.04 when the\u00a0appellant returned from work. 9 It was the\u00a0prosecution case that the appellant, assisted by the\u00a0unknown woman, had murdered his wife and then staged a\u00a0burglary to provide an\u00a0apparent explanation for someone else having murdered her. 10 Following the\u00a0appellant's arrest for the murder of Sarbjit, Bikramjit and Sukhdip told the\u00a0police that they believed the\u00a0appellant had also murdered Amandeep. Bikramjit said that the appellant and Sarbjit had been having an\u00a0affair for months before Amandeep's death. 11 Bikramjit also told the\u00a0police that Jagjeet Uppal (\u201cJagjeet\u201d) had reported to him that in 2013 the\u00a0appellant had solicited Jagjeet's brother Heera\u00a0Uppal (\u201cHeera\u201d) to murder Amandeep. It was said that Heera had had no intention of killing Amandeep, but had taken the\u00a0money offered by the\u00a0appellant used it to travel to India. Jagjeet confirmed this account to the\u00a0police. So too did Heera, who came back to the\u00a0United Kingdom in\u00a0October\u00a02018. 12 The\u00a0appellant first stood trial in April 2019. The\u00a0indictment contained two\u00a0counts. Count\u00a01 charged him with the\u00a0murder on 16\u00a0February\u00a02018 of Sarbjit. Count\u00a02 charged him with soliciting Heera, in 2013, to murder Amandeep. Bikramjit and both Uppal brothers all gave evidence relating to that second count. 13 At the conclusion of the first trial the\u00a0jury found the\u00a0appellant not guilty on Count\u00a02, but were unable to agree a\u00a0verdict on Count\u00a01. They were discharged, and a\u00a0retrial of Count\u00a01 was ordered. 14 At the retrial, the\u00a0prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence in support of their allegation that Sarbjit had been murdered by the appellant, who had come to regret marrying Sarbjit, and his accomplice the\u00a0unknown woman. The\u00a0prosecution relied, amongst other things, on evidence supporting the\u00a0inference that Sarbjit must have been killed soon after her 08.09 phone call, and on what was said to be the\u00a0absence of any evidence that anyone else had entered the\u00a0house after the\u00a0appellant, and a\u00a0few minutes later the\u00a0unknown woman, had left. There was no evidence of any burglary, and although some rooms appeared to have been ransacked there were features which pointed to a\u00a0family member being involved. Sarbjit's failure to return the\u00a0unanswered calls which were made to her phone during the\u00a0morning was said to be uncharacteristic. The\u00a0appellant's actions during the\u00a0day were said to show the\u00a0laying of a\u00a0false trail to exculpate himself, and he was said to have affected a\u00a0show of grief after he claimed to have found Sarbjit's body. These, and\u00a0other circumstances relied upon, were all disputed by the\u00a0defence, who put forward alternative explanations for each of them. 15 It was made clear during the\u00a0prosecution case that the\u00a0defence suggested that Bikramjit was responsible, either directly or indirectly, for the murder of Sarbjit. In support of that case, Mr\u00a0Pownall QC \u2013 then as now representing, together with Mr\u00a0Talbir\u00a0Singh, the\u00a0appellant \u2013 wished to cross-examine Bikramjit, and to adduce evidence with a\u00a0view to showing that Bikramjit and Sukhdip had been hostile to the\u00a0appellant and had displayed their hostility in various ways. In large part the\u00a0course which Mr\u00a0Pownall wished to take was agreed with prosecuting counsel (then as now Mr\u00a0Mason QC and Mr\u00a0Jackson). The\u00a0prosecution did not call either of the\u00a0Uppal brothers to give evidence and did not wish to adduce any evidence-in-chief from Bikramjit, but were willing to tender him so that he could be cross-examined about the\u00a0matters which were accepted as relevant. 16 In addition to those matters, however, Mr\u00a0Pownall wished to cross-examine with a\u00a0view to showing that Bikramjit had put the Uppal brothers up to making a\u00a0false allegation against the\u00a0appellant in relation to the soliciting to murder which had been alleged in the\u00a0previous Count\u00a02. He wished to refer to certain events in that regard, which the\u00a0defence wanted to suggest showed a\u00a0pattern of behaviour by Bikramjit at critical times. He wished to advance the\u00a0case that Bikramjit had done so because he hated the\u00a0appellant, and wanted to divert the\u00a0attention of the police away from any investigation of Bikramjit's own role in the\u00a0killing of Sarbjit. Mr\u00a0Pownall also wished the\u00a0appellant's acquittal on Count\u00a02 of the first trial to be before the\u00a0jury. The\u00a0prosecution objected. 17 Mr\u00a0Pownall applied to the\u00a0judge for leave to cross-examine and to adduce evidence on this issue. He submitted, first, that he was entitled to put forward the evidence against Bikramjit because it was evidence which had to do with the alleged facts of the offence with which the\u00a0appellant was charged, and so was excluded from the statutory definition of bad character evidence and admissible by virtue of s.98 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. In the\u00a0alternative, he submitted that the\u00a0evidence, if it did come within the\u00a0definition of bad character, was admissible by virtue of s.100(1)(a) and\/or (b) of the 2003 Act. 18 For convenience, we shall from here on refer to provisions of the 2003 Act simply by reference to their section numbers. 19 The\u00a0judge refused the\u00a0application. He held that the bare fact that the appellant had been acquitted on Count\u00a02 was neither relevant nor admissible at the retrial of Count\u00a01. As for the application made in reliance on s.98, he held that the proposed evidence was not admissible under either limb of that section. In his detailed ruling he said: "Section 98(a) does not apply because this evidence does not have 'to do with the alleged facts of the offence with which the defendant is charged', that is the murder of Sarbjit. At its highest this evidence 'has to do with' a separate allegation that is to be made against Bikramjit (that he encouraged the Uppals to give false evidence) … Section 98 (b) does not apply because the alleged misconduct (which for these purposes I am required by s.109 CJA 2003 to assume is true) was not undertaken in connection with this investigation, nor in furtherance of the prosecution of this offence; it relates to an entirely separate allegation. I appreciate that the defence have sought to try to make a connection between the two allegations, by suggesting that the false allegation of solicitation to murder was made in order to distract the police from investigating Bikramjit, but in my judgement that stretches the meaning and intention of the statute beyond breaking point." 20 As for the alternative application pursuant to s.100, the\u00a0judge held that the proposed evidence was not admissible through either gateway (a) or (b). He accepted for the purpose of his ruling that the evidence could go to the issues of Bikramjit's motive for killing Sarbjit and his overall credibility and that these were issues of substantial importance. But, he said: "This evidence is not of substantial probative value in relation to those matters in issue. The content of the evidence is, so far as the defence are concerned, only tangentially relevant to the issues in the case, in that it forms the basis for making speculative allegations made against Bikramjit, in relation to a satellite issue, for which there is no evidential support. In my judgement this evidence cannot be said to have substantial probative value in relation to the case as a whole." 21 The\u00a0trial proceeded. Mr\u00a0Pownall of course conducted the\u00a0defence case in accordance with the judge's ruling. The appellant when he gave evidence also complied with that ruling. Very early in his cross-examination however, Mr\u00a0Mason asked questions about the\u00a0suggested motivation of Bikramjit, and pointed out that when the\u00a0appellant was first spoken to by the\u00a0police, as a\u00a0witness, he had said that to his knowledge Amandeep's family were not bad people, adding "They are good. I\u00a0cannot blame them". That early statement was of course at odds with the assertion of Bikramjit's hostility towards the\u00a0appellant, but the\u00a0appellant said by way of explanation, "I\u00a0had no evidence then". Mr\u00a0Mason responded by asking "What is the\u00a0evidence that has changed?" 22 Mr\u00a0Pownall intervened and, in the\u00a0absence of the jury, submitted to the\u00a0judge that answering that question raised the\u00a0possibility that the appellant would need to contravene the\u00a0earlier ruling. The\u00a0judge did not at that stage adjudicate on that submission, because the\u00a0prosecution on reflection decided not to purse that line of questioning. The\u00a0cross-examination then continued without further incident. 23 As Mr\u00a0Pownall was approaching the\u00a0end of his re-examination, he asked the\u00a0judge to rule on whether he could ask the\u00a0appellant to identity the evidence which had changed his view about Bikramjit and his family. Mr\u00a0Pownall expected that if asked the\u00a0appellant would wish, amongst other things, to refer to the\u00a0false allegation made by the\u00a0Uppal brothers and Bikramjit's part in that. He submitted that the appellant should be permitted to do so and should be permitted to tell the\u00a0jury about the evidence given at the first trial and the acquittal on Count 2. The\u00a0prosecution opposed that submission. 24 The\u00a0judge refused the\u00a0application. He said that on the face of it: "There is an extremely powerful argument for saying that, having asked this question, 'What has changed', the prosecution have opened up that as a route for the defence arguing that the defendant can only properly answer the question by giving him the opportunity to include all his explanation." But, the\u00a0judge said, he could not see how any of this could actually assist the\u00a0jury. The\u00a0issue was what actual evidence there was of Bikramjit being hostile towards the\u00a0appellant, not the\u00a0appellant's belief as to Bikramjit's motives. The\u00a0jury had already heard a\u00a0substantial body of evidence of hostility between Bikramjit and the appellant. The\u00a0appellant's present state of mind, based on what may have happened at the first trial, was not an\u00a0issue of any substance: on the contrary, he said, it was a\u00a0distraction. The\u00a0judge concluded: "In those circumstances, although I am sympathetic to the defence submission that the Crown have or may have opened the way to this line of cross-examination, in my judgement, allowing re-examination which will include an examination of all those matters — which essentially, as I say, are simply a vehicle for the defendant to express his opinion about what took place — is, in my judgement, a distraction and it would not assist this jury and, in all the circumstances, would go behind the ruling that I made at the start of this trial, causing many of the issues and problems that I identified at the start of this trial to resurface, creating very great difficulties for this jury, acting as a significant distraction to them in resolving this case." The\u00a0judge therefore ruled that Mr\u00a0Pownall could not re-examine on that particular point. 25 The\u00a0grounds of appeal challenge each of those rulings. They contend that the conviction is unsafe because the\u00a0judge erred in ruling that questions about the\u00a0bad character of Bikramjit required the\u00a0leave of the\u00a0court (Ground 1); in refusing to permit cross-examination of Bikramjit pursuant to s.100 (Ground\u00a02), and in refusing the\u00a0defence application to introduce material in re-examination (Ground 3). The\u00a0full court refused leave to appeal on a\u00a0fourth ground, and we need say no more about it. 26 We have been assisted by the written submissions and skeleton arguments on both sides and by the\u00a0oral submissions of counsel, for all of which we are grateful. 27 In relation to Ground 1, Mr\u00a0Pownall submits that the evidence he wished to adduce during the\u00a0prosecution case was not bad character evidence as defined in the\u00a02003 Act and so did not require leave. It was relevant and admissible on common law principles. He submits that in the\u00a0very unusual circumstances of this case, both limbs of s.98 were engaged, though in oral argument he particularly relied on limb (b). In that respect he relies on the decision of this court in R v Apabhai & Ors [2011] EWCA Crim 917 as to the\u00a0application of s.98(b), pointing out that in the first trial the\u00a0jury were directed that if they convicted the\u00a0appellant on Count 2, they could use his guilt of that offence as supporting the\u00a0prosecution case on Count\u00a01. He argues that the circumstantial evidence which the\u00a0defendant wished to adduce went beyond a\u00a0mere assertion that Bikramjit had caused the\u00a0Uppal brothers to make a\u00a0false allegation. The\u00a0fact that other evidence was before the jury showing Bikramjit's hostility was not a\u00a0reason for excluding this evidence. 28 On Ground 2 Mr\u00a0Pownall no longer seeks to rely on s.100(a), but says that the evidence was of substantial probative value and should have been admitted under s.100(b). He relies on what he submits were striking similarities between the\u00a0circumstances of Sarbjit's murder and the\u00a0false allegation said to have been made by the Uppal brothers in relation to the\u00a0death of Amandeep. 29 On Ground 3 Mr\u00a0Pownall suggests that the offending question was given particular significance by the prosecution because it was asked at the beginning of cross-examination, and must have been thought by the\u00a0prosecution to have been a\u00a0question on a\u00a0relevant matter. He makes clear that there is no suggestion that the\u00a0prosecution would deliberately try to take advantage of the judge's ruling in order to make an\u00a0unfair point, but submits that the\u00a0question was ill-advised and put the\u00a0appellant at an\u00a0unfair disadvantage. 30 In over-arching submissions, Mr\u00a0Pownall submits that the\u00a0conviction is unsafe. He points out that in the\u00a0first trial the\u00a0jury were unable to agree upon a\u00a0verdict; and he submits that the\u00a0circumstantial case presented by the\u00a0prosecution at the retrial was, if anything, weaker than their case at the first trial, because of the emergence of certain evidence casting doubt on the reliability of the CCTV footage as a\u00a0guide to who had entered and left the\u00a0house. Mr\u00a0Pownall asks, rhetorically, what had changed between the\u00a0first trial and the retrial to have a\u00a0justifiable result that evidence which the\u00a0appellant was able to deploy without objection at his first trial was prohibited at the retrial. 31 For the respondent, Mr\u00a0Mason submits in essence that each of the judge's rulings was correct. He submits that the evidence which the\u00a0defence wish to adduce was neither relevant nor admissible on any basis. Even if it was relevant to any issue in the\u00a0case, it was not admissible either under s.98 or under s.100. He submits that the line of questioning which Mr\u00a0Pownall wished to pursue was based on speculative allegations and did not have substantial probative value. He further submits that leave to re-examine was rightly refused because it would have added nothing which could assist the\u00a0jury. In his written submissions Mr\u00a0Mason had pointed out that Mr\u00a0Pownall could have invited the\u00a0judge to give a\u00a0specific direction to the\u00a0jury to ignore the\u00a0question, but did not do so. 32 Having reflected on those submissions, our views are as follows. Ground\u00a01 33 Section 99 of the\u00a02003 Act abolished the\u00a0common law rules governing "the\u00a0admissibility of evidence of bad character in criminal proceedings". Evidence of bad character is now admissible only through the\u00a0gateways permitted by s.100 in relation to persons other than the\u00a0defendant and s.101 in relation to the\u00a0defendant. The\u00a0meaning of the evidence of bad character in this context is, however, limited by s.98, which provides: "References in this Chapter to evidence of a person\u2019s 'bad character' are to evidence of, or of a disposition towards, misconduct on his part, other than evidence which \u2014 (a) has to do with the alleged facts of the offence with which the defendant is charged, or (b) is evidence of misconduct in connection with the investigation or prosecution of that offence." 34 The\u00a0effect of those provisions is that evidence of bad character (as defined) must meet strict statutory criteria before it may be admitted, whereas evidence falling within s.98(a) or (b) is admissible in accordance with common law principles. 35 The\u00a0restrictions imposed by s.100 and 101 will be eroded, and their purpose impeded, if too wide an\u00a0interpretation is given to paragraphs (a) and (b) of s.98: see in this regard the\u00a0discussion R v Byrne & Ors [2021] EWCA Crim 107 at paras.131 to 133. Case law accordingly shows that to come within those paragraphs, the\u00a0evidence concerned must not merely be relevant, but must have a\u00a0close nexus with, the\u00a0offence with which the\u00a0defendant is charged; that is to say, the\u00a0offence or offences on which a\u00a0verdict or verdicts are to be returned. The\u00a0cases further show that such a\u00a0nexus may be established in a\u00a0number of ways, including on the\u00a0basis that the evidence concerned directly relates to matters contemporaneous with, or close in time to, the\u00a0offence charged and closely associated with the alleged facts of that offence, or on the\u00a0basis that the\u00a0evidence concerned directly relates to the\u00a0defendant's motive or reasoning for committing the\u00a0offence charged. Where the necessary nexus cannot be shown, the\u00a0evidence concerned may be admissible through one of the gateways in s.100 or s.101 provided it meets the\u00a0statutory criteria for the relevant gateway. Where the\u00a0evidence may be regarded as falling near the\u00a0boundaries of s.98(a) and (b), judges will often consider admissibility both under those paragraphs and through one of the statutory gateways in s.100 or 101. 36 In considering Mr\u00a0Pownall's submission that the judge should have admitted evidence and permitted cross-examination on the basis that it fell within s.98(a) or (b), it is important to keep in mind that the offence with which the\u00a0appellant was charged was the\u00a0murder of Sarbjit in\u00a0February\u00a02018. The\u00a0evidence which the\u00a0defence wished to adduce, however, related to the\u00a0alleged fabrication by Bikramjit and the Uppal brothers of evidence purporting to show that the appellant had in 2013 solicited the\u00a0murder of Amandeep. Far from relating directly to the\u00a0offence with which the appellant was charged therefore, it related to what was said by the appellant to be a\u00a0false allegation by others of an\u00a0offence which he had not committed and with which he was no longer charged. Its indirect connection with the offence with which the\u00a0appellant was charged was said to be that it provided support for the defence case that Bikramjit himself was or may have been responsible for the murder of Sarbjit, and was trying to avoid the\u00a0consequences of that crime by falsely implicating the\u00a0appellant in a\u00a0suggested earlier crime. 37 We accept that, as R v Apabhai makes clear, the\u00a0ambit of s.98(b) is not restricted to evidence of misconduct by the\u00a0prosecution authorities. The\u00a0evidence concerned must, however, be evidence of misconduct in connection with the investigation or prosecution of the offence with which the\u00a0defendant is charged. In Apabhai the\u00a0evidence was of misconduct by a\u00a0co-accused who was jointly indicted with the appellant on the charge of conspiracy to defraud. The\u00a0decision of the court in that case, that the judge was entitled to find that the evidence fell within s.98(b), does not in our view lend any support to this appellant's submissions relating to a\u00a0very different factual context. 38 In those circumstances, we are satisfied that the\u00a0judge was correct to rule that the proposed evidence did not come within s.98. For the reasons which the\u00a0judge gave, it did not have to do with the alleged facts of the murder of Sarbjit and it was not evidence of misconduct in connection with the investigation of that murder. On that basis alone, Ground 1 fails. Ground\u00a02 39 Like the\u00a0judge, we approach this ground of appeal on the basis that the\u00a0issues of Bikramjit's alleged motive for killing Sarbjit, and his overall credibility, are matters which were in issue in the\u00a0proceedings and were of substantial importance in the\u00a0context of the case as a\u00a0whole. The\u00a0question for this court, therefore, is whether the\u00a0judge was wrong to conclude that the evidence and cross-examination which the\u00a0appellant wished to go before the\u00a0jury did not have substantial probative value in relation to those matters. In that regard, it was necessary for the judge to have regard to the\u00a0non-exhaustive list of factors in s.100(3) and any other factors he considered relevant. 40 Like the\u00a0judge, we start with the\u00a0well-established principle that evidence of a\u00a0previous acquittal will generally be irrelevant and inadmissible because it is no more than evidence of the\u00a0opinion of the jury in the\u00a0previous trial: see R v Hui\u00a0Chi-Ming [1992] 1 AC 34. That decision of the\u00a0Privy Council recognised that there may in a\u00a0particular case be an\u00a0exceptional feature which makes the\u00a0evidence admissible. An\u00a0example which can be drawn from the\u00a0reported case law is a\u00a0situation in which a\u00a0witness whose evidence at an\u00a0earlier trial did not persuade the\u00a0jury of that defendant's guilt is now giving evidence on a\u00a0related matter in the\u00a0second trial. 41 Mr\u00a0Pownall submits that there is an\u00a0exceptional feature in this case, because the\u00a0acquittal at the first trial was proof that the Uppals were lying in their evidence at that trial. The\u00a0problem with that submission, as we see it, is that the\u00a0acquittal of the appellant on Count\u00a02 of the\u00a0original indictment cannot in our view amount to such proof. Indeed, we think that the\u00a0circumstances in which an\u00a0earlier acquittal can amount to such proof will be rare. Clearly the\u00a0jury in the\u00a0first trial were not satisfied that the prosecution had proved to the\u00a0criminal standard all the\u00a0requisite ingredients of the offence charged in Count 2; but the\u00a0precise basis of their verdict is unknown, and no safe inference could be drawn that the jury must have found the\u00a0Uppal brothers to be liars. 42 That gives rise to a\u00a0further problem for the appellant. If evidence of the\u00a0acquittal was inadmissible, as we are satisfied that it was, then the\u00a0remainder of the evidence and cross-examination which the\u00a0defence wish to go before the\u00a0jury would, in our view, have served only to invite speculation by the\u00a0jury. 43 We agree with the\u00a0judge's analysis that the defence application was based on a\u00a0circular argument. The\u00a0appellant asserted that Bikramjit had killed Sarbjit, or been involved in her death, because he was hostile to the\u00a0appellant and Sarbjit; because he had killed her, he had caused the\u00a0Uppal brothers to make false allegations against the\u00a0appellant; and the making of those false allegations is relied upon as support for the argument that it was Bikramjit who killed Sarbjit. In order to pursue that circular argument, the\u00a0defence would be requiring the\u00a0jury to embark upon satellite litigation as to whether Bikramjit had caused the\u00a0Uppal brothers to make false allegations. We do not use the\u00a0phrase "satellite litigation" pejoratively, and we accept Mr\u00a0Pownall's submission that in all the\u00a0circumstances it may not have added very much to the\u00a0length of the trial; but we are entirely sure that, in the\u00a0absence of any solid evidential foundation on which the\u00a0jury could answer that question, they would inevitably have been drawn into speculation. Mr\u00a0Pownall makes submissions as to a\u00a0form of direction which he suggests the\u00a0judge could have given and which would have been sufficient to eliminate this risk. We are unable to agree. The\u00a0jury would, moreover, have been distracted from the real issues in the\u00a0case, namely whether the circumstantial evidence proved for sure that the appellant murdered Sarbjit. 44 We are also unable to accept the\u00a0submission that the\u00a0effect of the\u00a0judge's ruling was unfair to the\u00a0appellant because it prevented him from pursuing a\u00a0line of evidence in the cross-examination which he had been permitted to pursue in the\u00a0first trial. The\u00a0short, but in our view complete, answer to that submission is that the jury at the first trial were considering Count\u00a02, but the\u00a0jury at the retrial were not. The\u00a0evidence which was relevant and admissible at the retrial was, therefore, not necessarily the\u00a0same as at the first trial. 45 For those reasons, Ground\u00a02 fails. Ground\u00a03 46 With respect to Mr\u00a0Mason, we think it unfortunate that the\u00a0appellant was asked the\u00a0question he was in cross-examination. Mr\u00a0Pownall's very proper intervention prevented the\u00a0cross-examination going any further and Mr\u00a0Mason sensibly decided not to pursue his point. The\u00a0question which had been asked nonetheless gave rise to a\u00a0strong argument by Mr\u00a0Pownall that the\u00a0appellant should in fairness be permitted to answer by referring to, amongst other things, the\u00a0allegations which he said were falsely made against him by the\u00a0Uppal brothers and his acquittal at the first trial. 47 We see no substance in the\u00a0written argument on behalf of the\u00a0respondent that Mr\u00a0Pownall could have asked the\u00a0judge to give a\u00a0specific direction to the\u00a0jury to ignore that ill-advised question. Mr\u00a0Pownall was faced with a\u00a0difficult decision as to how to deal with a\u00a0situation which had arisen unexpectedly. We see no ground for criticising the\u00a0approach he took, which avoided the risk of drawing attention to the\u00a0question wrongly asked. In his oral submissions Mr\u00a0Pownall was concerned that it may be thought that he had been at fault. We disagree. He dealt with this unexpected issue in the\u00a0way which very many experienced advocates would have dealt with it. 48 We do, however, agree with the judge that the\u00a0effect of varying his earlier ruling would have been to create the\u00a0problems which we have mentioned in relation to Ground 2, and which had successfully been avoided as a\u00a0result of the judge's earlier ruling. The\u00a0jury would have been drawn into speculation about a\u00a0matter in respect of which there was an\u00a0assertion of belief by the\u00a0appellant, but no solid evidential basis on which the\u00a0jury could reach the\u00a0right conclusion. 49 The\u00a0judge too was placed in a\u00a0difficult position. He was entitled to take the\u00a0view that the appellant would not suffer any real prejudice as a\u00a0result of the jury hearing the\u00a0question asked but not answered. The\u00a0jury had other evidence to consider on the issue of whether Bikramjit had been involved in the\u00a0murder of Sarbjit and, in our view, they are likely to have understood the\u00a0appellant's answer in cross-examination, "I\u00a0had no evidence then," as referring to all the\u00a0evidence they had heard as part of the defence case. In those circumstances, the\u00a0manner in which the\u00a0judge dealt with the difficulty was not unfair to the\u00a0appellant and was well within the\u00a0proper scope of his discretion. It does not give rise to any doubt as to the\u00a0safety of the\u00a0conviction. 50 Ground\u00a03, accordingly, fails. 51 Standing back, and reflecting on the grounds of appeal collectively, it seems to us that the jury had ample evidence upon which to assess the\u00a0suggestion that Bikramjit was or may have been involved in the\u00a0murder of Sarbjit. They lacked only the\u00a0additional strand of material relating to whether Bikramjit had put the\u00a0Uppal brothers up to making a\u00a0false allegation; but the\u00a0appellant suffered no prejudice or unfairness as a\u00a0result of that. The\u00a0crucial difference between the\u00a0two trials was that the appellant no longer had to defend himself against the\u00a0allegation in Count\u00a02. In circumstances where the\u00a0appellant had no basis for making any\u00a0affirmative allegation of murder against Bikramjit, we are satisfied that his conviction is safe. 52 For those reasons, grateful though we are for the great skill with which Mr\u00a0Pownall has presented these arguments,\u00a0the\u00a0appeal is dismissed. _______________<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

Sources officielles :<\/strong> consulter la page source<\/a><\/p>\n

Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).<\/em><\/p>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

LORD JUSTICE HOLROYDE: 1 On 27 January 2021, after a retrial in the Crown Court at Birmingham before HHJ Drew QC and a jury, this appellant was convicted of the murder of his second wife, Sarbjit Kaur (\u201cSarbjit\u201d). He was sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 19 years, less the days he had spent remanded in custody….<\/p>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":0,"template":"","meta":{"_crdt_document":""},"kji_country":[7608],"kji_court":[8238],"kji_chamber":[],"kji_year":[32183],"kji_subject":[7612],"kji_keyword":[7633,34809,7622,7621,34810],"kji_language":[7611],"class_list":["post-666754","kji_decision","type-kji_decision","status-publish","hentry","kji_country-royaume-uni","kji_court-court-of-appeal-criminal-division","kji_year-32183","kji_subject-fiscal","kji_keyword-appellant","kji_keyword-bikramjit","kji_keyword-evidence","kji_keyword-judge","kji_keyword-sarbjit","kji_language-anglais"],"yoast_head":"\nREGINA v GURPREET SINGH - Ma\u00eetre Hassan Kohen, avocat en droit p\u00e9nal \u00e0 Paris<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/ru\/jurisprudences\/regina-v-gurpreet-singh-2\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"ru_RU\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"REGINA v GURPREET SINGH\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"LORD JUSTICE HOLROYDE: 1 On 27 January 2021, after a retrial in the Crown Court at Birmingham before HHJ Drew QC and a jury, this appellant was convicted of the murder of his second wife, Sarbjit Kaur (\u201cSarbjit\u201d). 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