{"id":671675,"date":"2026-04-24T10:53:50","date_gmt":"2026-04-24T08:53:50","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/jurisprudences\/th-v-first-tier-tribunal-social-entitlement-chamber-2\/"},"modified":"2026-04-24T10:53:50","modified_gmt":"2026-04-24T08:53:50","slug":"th-v-first-tier-tribunal-social-entitlement-chamber-2","status":"publish","type":"kji_decision","link":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/ru\/jurisprudences\/th-v-first-tier-tribunal-social-entitlement-chamber-2\/","title":{"rendered":"TH v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber)"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Under section 15 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2008, the proceedings for judicial review of the decision dated 26 November 2020 of the First-tier Tribunal (reference CI011\/15\/00300) are dismissed. REASONS FOR DECISION Introduction and summary 1. The Applicant brings these judicial review proceedings with the permission of Upper Tribunal Judge Levenson. The Applicant\u2019s husband (who was born in 1977) sadly died on 23 November 2009 as a consequence of a criminal injury which he had sustained on 2 August 2009. The Applicant witnessed the horrific, violent attack on her husband, which had taken place outside the family home. All aspects of a claim for criminal injuries compensation for the Applicant and her six children have been resolved, with the exception of the one with which this case is concerned. Intending no disrespect, but in order to preserve anonymity, in this decision I will refer to the Applicant\u2019s husband as \u2018the deceased\u2019. 2. The Respondent First-tier Tribunal has taken no part in the proceedings. The Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority (\u2018CICA\u2019) is an interested party. At an oral hearing held on 2 February 2022 the Applicant was represented by Ms Hunt of Counsel and CICA was represented by Ms Webb. As I said at the conclusion of the hearing, I am grateful to them both for their helpful submissions. 3. The case is governed by the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 2008 (\u2018the Scheme\u2019). The part of the Applicant\u2019s claim with which I am concerned was for \u2018additional compensation\u2019 for loss of financial dependency under paragraph 40 of the Scheme. No award may be made under that paragraph if the deceased person\u2019s only normal income was from social security benefits. The main issue in this case is whether Working Tax Credit (\u2018WTC\u2019) should be categorised as a \u2018social security benefit\u2019 for the purposes of paragraph 40 of the Scheme. This issue is considered at paragraphs 29 — 48 below. 4. CICA refused to make an award under paragraph 40 of the Scheme. The Applicant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal, which conducted an oral hearing of the appeal over the telephone on 26 November 2020. The Applicant, who was also represented by Ms Hunt at that hearing, gave evidence to the tribunal about the deceased\u2019s work history and plans. The tribunal dismissed the Applicant\u2019s appeal on the basis that the deceased\u2019s only normal income was from social security benefits. On 14 January 2021 it provided Written Reasons for its decision. 5. The Applicant applied to bring judicial review proceedings. She relied on two grounds of appeal. The first was that the tribunal had incorrectly characterised WTC as a social security benefit within the meaning of paragraph 40 of the Scheme. The second was that the tribunal had erred in its approach to the evidence in a number of respects. 6. Upper Tribunal Judge Levenson gave permission to proceed with the application for judicial review on the basis that: The grounds of appeal are reasonably arguable (although, at this stage, I put it no higher than that). 7. CICA opposes the application for judicial review. The relevant provisions of the Scheme 8. Paragraphs 37 — 44 of the Scheme provide for \u2018compensation in fatal cases\u2019. The relevant parts of paragraph 38 provide that if a deceased\u2019s death was in consequence of an injury, compensation may be payable to a qualifying claimant under paragraphs 39 — 43. 9. Paragraph 40 concerns a claim for loss of dependency, and paragraph 41 makes provision for the calculation of such a claim. Paragraph 40 is in these terms: 40. (1) Additional compensation calculated in accordance with paragraph 41 may be payable to a qualifying claimant where a claims officer is satisfied that the claimant was financially or physically dependent on the deceased. A financial dependency will not be established where the deceased\u2019s only normal income was from social security benefits. (2) For the purposes of this Scheme, \u201csocial security benefits\u201d includes all United Kingdom social security benefits, other state or local authority benefits and all such benefits or similar payments paid from the funds of other countries. 10. For the purposes of this case, the references to a claims officer are to be taken as references to the First-tier Tribunal. 11. It is not in dispute that it is for an applicant to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that they were financially dependent on the deceased person. Working Tax Credit 12. WTC was introduced by the Tax Credits Act 2002. It provides state support for low-paid working adults. In general terms, a claimant will qualify for WTC if (among other things) they work at last 16 hours per week and their income is sufficiently low. Administered by Her Majesty\u2019s Revenue and Customs (\u2018HMRC\u2019), WTC is calculated as an annual amount and then paid to claimants in instalments every week or every four weeks during the tax year. WTC counts as income for the purposes of entitlement to many means-tested benefits such as housing benefit. 13. The forerunners to WTC were Family Income Supplement (introduced in 1971 and administered by the Department of Health and Social Security Family Income Supplement Act 1970 ) and Family Credit (which replaced Family Income Supplement in 1988 and which was administered by the Department of Social Security Social Security Act 1986 ). It should also be noted that WTC has now transitioned to Universal Credit, a benefit which is administered by the Department for Work and Pensions Welfare Reform Act 2012 . 14. For completeness, I should add that there is another tax credit which was introduced by the Tax Credits Act 2002. It is called Child Tax Credit. It is received independently of a person\u2019s employment. The First-tier Tribunal 15. If a deceased person was dependent on \u2018social security benefits\u2019 for a time or times, it is a question of fact as to whether those benefits constituted their \u2018only normal income\u2019 for the purposes of paragraph 40 of the Scheme. For those purposes, a tribunal will look at what periods were spent with and without dependence on those benefits. And if a deceased person was dependent on those benefits at the time of death, a tribunal may consider whether that dependency was shortly about to change to the extent that the benefits may not be considered to constitute the deceased person\u2019s \u2018only normal income\u2019 or, alternatively, whether that dependency represented matters as they stood. 16. It was, therefore, incumbent on the First-tier Tribunal to conduct an analysis of the deceased\u2019s earning history. Given the rather chequered history, the tribunal accepted the Applicant\u2019s invitation to consider the bigger picture of the deceased\u2019s employment, rather than focussing on a short period. 17. The following matters were not in dispute: a. The deceased had various low paid jobs on unknown dates between leaving school in around 1993 to 2002. Information from the deceased\u2019s National Insurance Contributions Records showed that during this period the deceased was either unemployed and in receipt of benefits or working and in receipt of WTC. b. The deceased was employed by Royal Mail as a postman from 25 March 2002 until 31 May 2005 when he resigned. (In 2004 the deceased had had a breakdown in his mental health). He received gross annual earnings of around \u00a316,000 during that period. c. After leaving Royal Mail the deceased received benefits, firstly in the form of Incapacity Benefit and then, from 2007, Jobseeker\u2019s Allowance. d. On 10 November 2008 the deceased obtained part-time work at Matalan. At around this time he also worked on a part-time basis for Woolworth\u2019s, but that employment ended on 21 December 2008. Whilst working, the deceased claimed tax credits, including WTC. e. The deceased left his job at Matalan on 14 June 2009. f. Thereafter, the deceased was unemployed until the time of the attack on him on 2 August 2009, following which he was hospitalised until his death on 23 November 2009. 18. The Applicant\u2019s case to the First-tier Tribunal was that WTC did not constitute a \u2018social security benefit\u2019 for the purposes of paragraph 40 of the Scheme, but rather it should be counted as part of the deceased\u2019s income when assessing whether the Applicant had been financially dependent on him. 19. Furthermore, it was submitted on behalf of the Applicant that there was no established pattern of unemployment. Rather, contended the Applicant, the deceased was unusually and temporarily unemployed at the time of his death. The Applicant also submitted that the deceased had been motivated to obtain full-time work, that he had left his part-time work with Matalan in order to achieve this, and that teaching was his long-term goal, with a short-term goal of obtaining full-time work to provide for his family. Thus, although the deceased had been unemployed at the date of his death, the overall picture was one of employment and a fixed intention to return to work. In short, the Applicant argued that she had been financially dependent on the deceased, and so was entitled to additional compensation under paragraph 40. 20. CICA\u2019s case to the First-tier Tribunal was that the Applicant had not established that she was financially dependent on the deceased. CICA submitted that WTC fell within the definition of \u2018social security benefits\u2019 for the purposes of paragraph 40 of the Scheme. Its case was that as the deceased\u2019s \u2018only normal income\u2019 had been from \u2018social security benefits\u2019, the Applicant had not been financially dependent on the deceased. 21. CICA highlighted that the deceased had not been in employment at the time of his death, and that his work history had been inconsistent, with long periods of unemployment outweighing his periods of employment. CICA focussed on the period from 2006. There had been a total reliance upon benefits for the tax years 2006\/7 and 2007\/8. The following year (2008\/9) showed 30 weeks on Jobseeker\u2019s Allowance, and earnings from Woolworths and Matalan totalling \u00a32813.94 (i.e. \u00a3127.90 per week) plus tax credits. 22. The tribunal dismissed the Applicant\u2019s appeal. It decided that Applicant could not establish a financial dependency on the deceased because his \u2018only normal income was from social security benefits\u2019. Significantly, the tribunal accepted CICA\u2019s submissions that WTC constituted \u2018social security benefits\u2019 for the purposes of paragraph 40. 23. The tribunal found that the deceased had not had a solid employment history since he had entered the job market after leaving school at sixteen, save for the three year period working for Royal Mail. The employment history showed a series of part-time and low paid jobs which did not generate income sufficient to support the deceased, let alone his family. From examination of bank statements, the tribunal concluded that the family was living off circa \u00a3400 per week. The tribunal found that the only period during which the deceased\u2019s income approached this figure was when he was employed by Royal Mail. 24. The tribunal found that until his employment with Royal Mail, the deceased had relied upon social security benefits. Whilst the position had changed during the period of employment with Royal Mail, the deceased had reverted to a reliance on social security benefits following his departure from that employment. Even when working for Woolworths\/Matalan: the income he received was so low that he continued to be reliant upon social security benefits for the income of the family. (paragraph 59). 25. In summary, the tribunal found: Thus, for 12 years out of the 15 year employment history, the deceased was reliant upon social security benefits to the extent that these must be regarded as his normal income. (paragraph 49). 26. Looking at the position in the round, the tribunal also found that although the deceased had been fit to work from 2007 (because he had been in receipt of Jobseeker\u2019s Allowance rather than Incapacity Benefit), he had been content to remain unemployed and claim social security benefits, as long as there were sufficient savings to enable to the family to take days out. His return to work in late 2008 had been prompted by finances, rather than a reluctance to claim social security benefits as the Applicant had claimed; and the work that he had then done had been part-time and temporary. 27. With regard to the circumstances since the deceased had left work in June 2009, the tribunal found that: a. The deceased had left the employment with Matalan without having secured any further employment, despite this being his stated objective. b. Although the Applicant had said that the deceased had applied for several jobs after leaving Matalan, he had not got one, and no evidence had been provided that he had applied for any such jobs. It seemed to the tribunal that the deceased felt he would be better off staying at home and claiming social security benefits. c. The deceased had not re-applied for a position at Royal Mail: d. No evidence had been provided that the situation which prevailed at the time of the deceased\u2019s death was about to change. e. There had been no evidence provided that the deceased had any serious, or fixed, intent to become a teacher. 28. In summary, having analysed the periods spent with and without what the tribunal considered to be a dependency on social security benefits, together with an evaluation as to whether or not that dependency was shortly about to change, the tribunal concluded that the deceased\u2019s \u2018only normal income was from social security benefits\u2019, including WTC. The first ground 29. For ease of reference, I will set out again the provisions of paragraph 40 of the Scheme: 40. (1) Additional compensation calculated in accordance with paragraph 41 may be payable to a qualifying claimant where a claims officer is satisfied that the claimant was financially or physically dependent on the deceased. A financial dependency will not be established where the deceased\u2019s only normal income was from social security benefits. (2) For the purposes of this Scheme, \u201csocial security benefits\u201d includes all United Kingdom social security benefits, other state or local authority benefits and all such benefits or similar payments paid from the funds of other countries. 30. In the application for a judicial review, the Applicant submitted that the First-tier Tribunal incorrectly characterised WTC as a \u2018social security benefit\u2019 within the meaning of paragraph 40. The Applicant relied on the fact that WTC is paid for by HMRC rather than the Department for Work and Pensions (\u2018DWP\u2019). 31. In its written response, CICA submitted that the tribunal correctly characterised WTC as a \u2018social security benefit\u2019 for the purposes of paragraph 40. Highlighting the provisions of paragraph 40(2), which define what is meant by \u2018social security benefits\u2019 for the purposes of the Scheme, CICA contended that it is clear that the concept is broader than just United Kingdom social security benefits; it extends to include \u2018other state or local authority benefits\u2019, as well as benefits and similar payments received from abroad. CICA argued that WTC is quite clearly a \u2018state \u2026 benefit\u2019, administered by HMRC, a department of the state, and thus it falls squarely within the definition of a \u2018social security benefit\u2019 for the purposes of paragraph 40. 32. Furthermore, CICA commented that it was notable that the Applicant had not set out in her grounds the basis on which it was said that WTC is not a \u2018state benefit\u2019, nor had she addressed the Scheme\u2019s definition of \u2018social security benefits\u2019 as outlined in paragraph 40(2). 33. The Applicant\u2019s written response to CICA\u2019s submissions adopted a rather more nuanced position than the one originally taken. It was submitted that a purposive construction of paragraph 40 was available, because the question whether WTC constituted \u2018social security benefits\u2019 was not clear on the face of the Scheme alone. 34. At the hearing before me, Ms Hunt developed this argument. She submitted that the following analysis pointed to a conclusion that paragraph 40 cannot have been intended to include WTC: WTC is not a \u2018state benefit\u2019 for the purposes of assessing \u2018normal income\u2019 because: a. WTC is only received when a claimant is in work for at least 16 hours a week. Thus, the benefit is intrinsically linked to employment. The fact that it is administered by HMRC, not DWP, is significant. b. The purposes of compensation for loss of earnings pursuant to the Scheme is to compensate a claimant for the loss sustained when unable to work due to their injuries. c. WTC is lost when a claimant is unable to work. d. The starting point under paragraph 40(1) is a \u2018social security\u2019 benefit, not a \u2018state\u2019 benefit, albeit \u2018state benefits\u2019 are expressly referred to in paragraph 40(2). e. WTC is sufficiently distinct from other state benefits that it should be treated as income, and not as a \u2018social security benefit\u2019, to achieve the aim of the Scheme and fairly to compensate claimants. 35. Ms Hunt sought to rely on an extract from Hansard from 2008. It was not in dispute that, if a purposive approach were to be adopted, that passage would be admissible as an external aid to construction. Lord Bach, in the Lords Chamber, outlined amendments which would be made in relation to criminal injuries compensation by the introduction of the Scheme (16 July 2008, Vol. 703). Lord Bach said: As opportunities to amend the scheme arise so rarely, we also want to make a number of other changes. These have become necessary with the passage of time since the scheme was last changed in 2001 and in the light of operational experience. In the main, they are needed to clarify meaning or intent where there is doubt or ambiguity, to provide greater clarity, to restore the original intention of the scheme where court judgments or operational experience suggest that the previous wording was not doing the job, and to help streamline some scheme processes\u2026 Perhaps most importantly, we have substantially recast the paragraphs dealing with additional compensation for loss of earnings and future earning capacity; the payment of awards in fatal cases; and the reduction of compensation on the grounds of benefit received from other sources. Our aim was to modernise the rules to make them simpler and more logical, and to avoid cases of claimants getting double payment from the state in some circumstances. 36. Ms Hunt argued that the amendments to paragraph 40 by the (2008) Scheme may have been to avoid the \u2018double payment from the state\u2019 referred to by Lord Bach. Ms Hunt maintained that by counting WTC as income rather than \u2018social security benefits\u2019 for the purposes of paragraph 40, one would not be giving claimants \u2018double payment\u2019 as, following the death of the working person on whom they depended, they would not longer receive WTC. 37. After the hearing I saw fit to look at the 2001 Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme, which was replaced by the 2008 Scheme. The 2001 scheme had provided as follows: 40. Additional compensation calculated in accordance with the following paragraph may be payable to a qualifying claimant where a claims officer is satisfied that the claimant was financially or physically dependent on the deceased. A financial dependency will not be established where the deceased\u2019s only normal income was from: (a) United Kingdom social security benefits; or (b) social security benefits or similar payments from the funds of other countries. 38. I invited the parties to make written submissions with regard to how, if at all, these provisions helped to ascertain the meaning of the cited passage from Hansard insofar as paragraph 40 of the Scheme was concerned. 39. Ms Hunt\u2019s position was that a comparison of paragraph 40 of the two schemes did not alter the case that she had put forward. The definition of \u2018social security benefits\u2019 was introduced in the (2008) Scheme. Rather than replace or change the phrase \u2018social security benefits\u2019 in paragraph 40, the (2008) Scheme continued to use the phrase, and then added the definition on. Ms Hunt submitted that this bolstered her submissions that the phrase \u2018social security benefits\u2019 is the dominant phrase in paragraph 40, and should be the starting point for a purposive interpretation of the same. 40. Ms Hunt further submitted that if the definition provided in the (2008) Scheme had been intended to include WTC (which had been introduced in the interim) the drafters would have included reference to WTC in the definition, or made its inclusion within the definition much clearer, in keeping with the aim to make the rules \u2018simpler and more logical\u2019. 41. Ms Webb argued that it was not possible to read into the Scheme the meaning contended for by Ms Hunt. The natural and ordinary meaning of \u2018social security benefits\u2019 is clear on its face and there is no gap to be filled. Ms Webb firmly relied on the definition in paragraph 40(2). She submitted that WTC clearly fell within its terms. The crucial point, argued Ms Webb, was that WTC is a financial benefit from the state. Therefore, contended Ms Webb, this is not a case where a purposive approach is required or should be adopted. 42. Ms Webb\u2019s alternative submission was that even if a purposive construction were to be considered, there was no supporting material which helped to ascertain the relevant purpose. Ms Webb submitted that the cited passage from Hansard did not take matters further, not least because it was not clear whether the stated intention in relation to avoiding double recovery applied to paragraph 40 or some other paragraph(s). The passage did not add clarity and did not provide support for the proposition that the straightforward reading of the Scheme should be undermined. 43. In her written submission following the hearing Ms Webb stressed that Lord Bach had stated that the drafters had \u2018substantially recast\u2019 paragraphs of the scheme dealing with matters including \u2018the payments of awards in fatal cases\u2019. The passage also referred to modernising the rules to make them \u2018simpler and more logical\u2019. Ms Webb also relied on the first paragraph of the extract which cited the purpose for the changes to the scheme. 44. Ms Webb submitted that the fact that paragraph 40 of the 2001 scheme provided no definition of the term \u2018social security benefits\u2019, whereas the (2008) Scheme did, suggested that this was an area where it was felt that clarification of meaning was required or was desirable. Therefore, argued Ms Webb, the most likely relevance of the cited passage from Hansard insofar as paragraph 40 of the Scheme is concerned, is to underline that the broad definition of paragraph 40(2) under the Scheme is intended to be applied simply, logically and in a straightforward manner, in line with CICA\u2019s submissions. 45. I begin my analysis with well-established propositions. The ultimate task of construction is to ascertain the meaning of what the drafters have said in the context of the Scheme. Where the meaning is plain, it must be followed. If the words are capable of more than one meaning, a purposive construction may be adopted. Such an approach would interpret the language used, so far as possible, in a way which would best give effect to the Scheme\u2019s purpose insofar as that can be ascertained. 46. In my judgment the words of paragraph 40(1) of the Scheme, taken together with 40(2), are not capable of more than one meaning. The provisions are clear on their face and unambiguous. WTC is undoubtedly a \u2018state benefit\u2019 irrespective of which government department administers it. In providing that the term \u2018social security benefits\u2019 includes not only all United Kingdom social security benefits but also \u2018other state \u2026benefits\u2019, it is abundantly clear that WTC is included in the definition. 47. Given this conclusion, it is not necessary to resort to a purposive approach. However, for completeness I will briefly address the parties\u2019 submissions on the issue. In summary, I agree with Ms Webb. I am satisfied that the cited extract from Hansard does not assist in establishing the purpose of paragraph 40. It is by no means clear that the stated intention to avoid claimants getting double payment played any part in the amendments to paragraph 40. In other words, even if I had been persuaded that a purposive construction may have been appropriate in this case, in my judgment it is not possible to detect from the cited passage a purpose which throws significant light on the construction of the words in issue. 48. For these reasons, the first of the Applicant\u2019s grounds fails. Put simply, my conclusion is that WTC is to be categorised as a \u2018social security benefit\u2019 for the purposes of paragraph 40 of the Scheme. The second ground 49. The second ground relied on by the Applicant is that the tribunal erred in its approach to the evidence. 50. Both parties agreed that Gross LJ helpfully set out the approach to be adopted on a judicial review in CICA v Hutton and others [2016] EWCA Civ 1305: i) First, this Court should exercise restraint and proceed with caution before interfering with decisions of specialist tribunals. Not only do such tribunals have the expertise which the "ordinary" courts may not have but when a specialised statutory scheme has been entrusted by Parliament to tribunals, the Court should not venture too readily into their field. ii) Secondly, if a tribunal decision is clearly based on an error of law, then it must be corrected. This Court should not, however, subject such decisions to inappropriate textual analysis so as to discern an error of law when, on a fair reading of the decision as a whole, none existed. It is probable, as Baroness Hale said, that in understanding and applying the law within their area of expertise, specialist tribunals will have got it right. Moreover, the mere fact that an appellate tribunal or a court would have reached a different conclusion, does not constitute a ground for review or for allowing an appeal. iii) Thirdly, it is of the first importance to identify the tribunal of fact, to keep in mind that it and only it will have heard the evidence and to respect its decisions. When determining whether a question was one of "fact" or "law", this Court should have regard to context, as I would respectfully express it ("pragmatism", "expediency" or "policy", per Jones), so as to ensure both that decisions of tribunals of fact are given proper weight and to provide scope for specialist appellate tribunals to shape the development of law and practice in their field. iv) Fourthly, it is important to note that these authorities not only address the relationship between the courts and specialist appellate tribunals but also between specialist first-tier tribunals and appellate tribunals. 51. Ms Hunt urged me to read the tribunal\u2019s Written Reasons as a whole to ascertain whether the effect of the tribunal\u2019s decision and comments, taken together, rendered the decision unsafe. Ms Hunt relied on a number of examples. She realistically acknowledged that each alone may not be sufficient, but she submitted that it was their cumulative impact that gave the impression that the tribunal had discounted the Applicant\u2019s evidence without good reason. I will address the examples individually before considering the position as a whole. 2007 — 2008 52. The Applicant took issue with the tribunal\u2019s conclusion that: 56. Although fit for work from 2007, the deceased was content to remain unemployed, and claiming social security benefits, as long as there were sufficient savings to enable the family to take days out. His return to work was prompted by finances, rather than a reluctance to claim social security benefits, as claimed. 53. Ms Hunt submitted that the tribunal had engaged in mere speculation and its finding was imbued with an unacceptable level of judgment. Ms Webb, on the other hand, maintained that the tribunal\u2019s conclusion was consistent with its earlier finding of fact (at paragraph 32 of the Written Reasons) that the deceased had chosen to return to work in 2008 because the family\u2019s savings had been exhausted. That finding, argued Ms Webb, had been based upon the Applicant\u2019s own evidence. 54. I do not accept Ms Hunt\u2019s submissions. The tribunal heard oral evidence from the Applicant and, having considered that evidence, the tribunal made a finding that was open to it to make. Unemployment post-Matalan 55. Ms Hunt challenged the tribunal\u2019s findings in relation to the deceased\u2019s unemployment after he had left Matalan in 2009. The tribunal found: 40. The appellant\u2019s evidence that the Matalan job was not financially worth him working, is telling. It seems that the deceased felt he would be better off staying at home and claiming social security benefits than he would be continuing with his job at Matalan. 41. The appellant did not re-apply for a position at Royal Mail. According to the appellant there were no positions available. Royal Mail employed in excess of 180,000 people in 2008. The Tribunal did not accept the claim that there were no vacancies of any kind, as credible. 56. As to paragraph 40 of the Written Reasons, Ms Hunt again submitted that the tribunal had engaged in speculation. In response, Ms Webb pointed out that the tribunal had found (at paragraph 37 of the Written Reasons) that the deceased\u2019s decision to leave his job before he had another job had been explored with the Applicant, and according to the Applicant\u2019s evidence, \u2018this was because he wished to explore becoming a teacher but also because the Matalan job was not well paid enough to justify him being away from the children\u2019. 57. I accept Ms Webb\u2019s submission that the criticism of speculation is ungrounded. The tribunal explained what it made of the evidence before it, and it was entitled to draw legitimate inferences from it. There was material in the Applicant\u2019s oral evidence to support a finding that there had been a calculation that financially it made better sense for the deceased to be at home and not working. 58. As to the tribunal\u2019s findings in paragraph 41 of the Written Reasons, Ms Hunt submitted that the tribunal appeared to have attributed to the Applicant a claim that she had never made \u2013 that there were \u2018no vacancies of any kind\u2019 available with the Royal Mail at the time of the deceased\u2019s death. Rather, submitted Ms Hunt, it had been the Applicant\u2019s evidence that there had been no \u2018suitable\u2019 vacancies available for which the deceased could apply. 59. Ms Webb submitted that the tribunal had clearly understood the Applicant\u2019s evidence to be that there were no vacancies available. A transcript of the hearing has not been provided to determine the issue definitively The parties agreed that it would be disproportionate to adjourn the hearing for a transcript to be provided. , but nonetheless it was CICA\u2019s position that nothing turned on the issue in any event. Whether the evidence had been that there were no vacancies or no suitable vacancies available, the undisputed evidence was that the deceased had not re-applied for a position at the Royal Mail. Furthermore, Ms Webb argued that the central issue in this case was whether the deceased\u2019s only normal income was from social security benefits. The question of job applications to one particular employer was at best marginal to the factual analysis. 60. Ms Webb\u2019s submission that there is limited scope for challenging a tribunal\u2019s findings of fact in proceedings for judicial review is well-founded. As Gross LJ said in Hutton (above), \u2018it is the FTT \u2013 not the UT \u2013 which is the tribunal of fact and which heard the evidence\u2019 (at [58]). There is no objective or uncontentious evidence before me which could point to a mistake of fact on the part of the tribunal in its treatment of the Applicant\u2019s evidence on this point. In any case, I accept Ms Webb\u2019s submissions on materiality. 61. Also in relation to paragraph 41 of the Written Reasons, Ms Hunt submitted that, in finding that the Royal Mail employed in excess of 180,000 people in 2008, the tribunal improperly relied on evidence obtained outside the course of the hearing. Ms Hunt said that there had been no evidence adduced at the hearing to that effect. 62. I must say that this submission gave me pause for thought. Whilst there was no transcript of the hearing, I take notice that Ms Hunt had been present at the hearing and I have no reason to doubt what she told me. If the tribunal had, in fact, found this information for itself, the principles of natural justice require that the evidence should have been put before the parties so that they may have had a chance to comment on it. The tribunal\u2019s failure to do so would have constituted an error of law. 63. In many cases such an error would amount to a sufficiently material one such that an appeal or judicial review (as appropriate) would be allowed. However, Ms Webb submitted that in this case any such error would not have given rise to a different result to the appeal. 64. After having given the matter careful consideration, I have concluded that in the particular circumstances of this case any error there may have been would not have affected the outcome of the proceedings. Like the question of job applications to Royal Mail, the question of how many people Royal Mail employed was, put at its highest, a peripheral one to the central issue on the appeal. I am, therefore, of the view that the tribunal\u2019s decision would have been the same notwithstanding any such error. Put another way, any error the tribunal may have made does not amount to a material error such as to justify the tribunal\u2019s decision being set aside. 65. For the avoidance of doubt, nothing I have said should be taken to condone a tribunal actively consulting online sources of information and then failing to put them before the parties for comment. As Upper Tribunal Judge Jacobs said in HI v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2014] UKUT 0238 (AAC) at [17]: \u2018tribunals need to take the greatest care before relying on information obtained in this way\u2019. Future plans 66. The next challenges to the tribunal\u2019s reasons related to the findings with regard to the deceased\u2019s future working potential: 62. No evidence has been provided that [the deceased] applied for any jobs following his resignation from Matalan. The appellant states that there is compelling evidence that the deceased would have gone on to work. There is no such evidence that this would have happened. The appellant was not able to point to a single job application that the deceased had made. 67. Ms Hunt argued that the tribunal was not entitled to find that \u2018no evidence\u2019 had been provided, as the tribunal had already recorded (at paragraph 39 of the Written Reasons) that the Applicant had stated that the deceased had applied for several jobs after leaving Matalan. In response, Ms Webb submitted that the tribunal had recorded that the question of job applications had been explored in the evidence, and it would be a fair reading of the Written Reasons that the tribunal had found that there was no evidence of any job applications having been made other than the Applicant\u2019s oral statement that the deceased had made applications. Such a reading was consistent with the tribunal\u2019s explanation for the basis of its decision, in the same paragraph, that the Applicant had been unable to point to a single job application that the deceased had made. 68. I prefer Ms Webb\u2019s submissions. Whilst it may, perhaps, have been better if the tribunal had said that it had not been persuaded by the Applicant\u2019s oral evidence in the absence of any written evidence of job applications, that absence was not fatal to the tribunal\u2019s decision. 69. Ms Hunt also submitted that the tribunal erred in taking no account of the effect of the passage of time on the ability of the Applicant to recall details, particularly bearing in mind the horrific experience that the Applicant had endured in 2009 and its impact on her and her family thereafter. 70. Ms Webb responded that it is apparent from the Written Reasons that the tribunal had fully engaged with the Applicant\u2019s evidence, and had properly explored matters with her. It does not follow that the mere fact that the tribunal did not refer to the effect of the passage of time on the Applicant\u2019s memory means that it did not properly apply its mind to it. A tribunal is not expected to deal with every matter raised in the case. 71. I do not accept that the tribunal erred in the respect suggested by Ms Hunt. It is settled that a generous interpretation ought to be given to a tribunal\u2019s reasoning. The fact that the tribunal did not specifically refer to the impact of the passage of time on the Applicant\u2019s memory does not render its reasons inadequate when read in the round. 72. Ms Hunt then challenged the tribunal\u2019s findings concerning the deceased\u2019s plans to become a teacher. The tribunal found: 57. There has been no evidence provided that the deceased had any serious, or fixed, intent to become a teacher. The deceased had not applied for any teaching course or set aside the required deposit. The extent of his interest had been to obtain a brochure. The deceased was aware that the job centre will assist with the deposit but he had not pursued this. 73. Ms Hunt submitted that the tribunal failed to take account of the Applicant\u2019s oral evidence to the tribunal, which had described in clear terms the deceased\u2019s intention to become a teacher. Ms Hunt also submitted that the tribunal had disregarded the Applicant\u2019s evidence which it had summarised at paragraph 12 of its Written Reasons \u2013 the Applicant had said that the deceased had \u2018researched the possibility online and had obtained some leaflets\u2019. 74. Ms Webb submitted that the finding that the deceased did not have any serious or fixed intent to become a teacher was one which was open to the tribunal to reach on the evidence for exactly the reasons that it gave. 75. I agree with Ms Webb\u2019s submissions. The fact, whether accepted or not, that the deceased may have expressed an intention to become a teacher, obtained some leaflets and researched the possibility online, was not incompatible with the tribunal\u2019s findings on this issue and was consistent with, and supported, the tribunal\u2019s conclusion that the deceased\u2019s intention was not serious or fixed. 76. In summary, for the reasons given above, each individual challenge to the tribunal\u2019s reasons fails. Looking at the Written Reasons overall 77. I now turn to Ms Hunt\u2019s submission that I should consider the Written Reasons as a whole. Ms Hunt stressed to me that the Applicant had been disheartened to read how her evidence had been treated by the tribunal. Ms Hunt submitted that, when read overall, the tribunal\u2019s Written Reasons give the impression that the tribunal discounted the Applicant\u2019s evidence from the outset without due consideration. Thus, when all the individual matters set out above are considered cumulatively, Ms Hunt submitted that the overriding impression was that the tribunal erred in its approach to the Applicant\u2019s evidence. 78. Ms Webb contended that the tribunal was entitled to reach the decision that it reached on the basis of clear and sustainable findings of fact. It had engaged with the Applicant\u2019s evidence and then drawn supportable conclusions upon its assessment of it. The fact that the conclusions were contrary to points made by the Applicant did not mean that those points were not considered. Ms Webb accordingly argued that, when read overall, the Written Reasons did not disclose any error of law. 79. I remind myself of the limited scope for challenging a tribunal\u2019s findings of fact in proceedings for judicial review. I also remind myself that it is fundamental that the evaluation of evidence is a matter for the fact-finding tribunal which has had the advantage of hearing oral evidence. The Upper Tribunal should, accordingly, be very wary of trying the case on the papers. On a fair reading of the Written Reasons as a whole, having given due consideration to the grounds of challenge, I am unable to find that Ms Hunt\u2019s submissions disclose a material error of law in the way that the tribunal approached the evidence or explained its decision. Conclusion 80. The answer to the central question in this case is that WTC is a \u2018social security benefit\u2019 of the purposes of paragraph 40 of the Scheme. Furthermore, the tribunal did not make a material error of law in its approach to the evidence or in relation to the reasons that it gave for its decision. Accordingly, these proceedings for judicial review of the tribunal\u2019s decision are dismissed. 81. I would like to add that I understand this is not the decision that the Applicant had hoped for. I do not underestimate the toll that these proceedings must have taken on the Applicant, and, like the tribunal, I extend every sympathy for her bereavement. A. Rowley Judge of the Upper Tribunal Authorised for issue on 17 March 2022<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

Sources officielles :<\/strong> consulter la page source<\/a><\/p>\n

Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).<\/em><\/p>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Under section 15 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2008, the proceedings for judicial review of the decision dated 26 November 2020 of the First-tier Tribunal (reference CI011\/15\/00300) are dismissed. REASONS FOR DECISION Introduction and summary 1. The Applicant brings these judicial review proceedings with the permission of Upper Tribunal Judge Levenson. The Applicant\u2019s husband (who was born in…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":0,"template":"","meta":{"_crdt_document":""},"kji_country":[7608],"kji_court":[9033],"kji_chamber":[],"kji_year":[32183],"kji_subject":[7612],"kji_keyword":[7875,13898,9672,7975,7636],"kji_language":[7611],"class_list":["post-671675","kji_decision","type-kji_decision","status-publish","hentry","kji_country-royaume-uni","kji_court-upper-tribunal-administrative-appeals-chamber","kji_year-32183","kji_subject-fiscal","kji_keyword-applicant","kji_keyword-benefits","kji_keyword-deceased","kji_keyword-paragraph","kji_keyword-tribunal","kji_language-anglais"],"yoast_head":"\nTH v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) - Ma\u00eetre Hassan Kohen, avocat en droit p\u00e9nal \u00e0 Paris<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/ru\/jurisprudences\/th-v-first-tier-tribunal-social-entitlement-chamber-2\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"ru_RU\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"TH v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber)\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Under section 15 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2008, the proceedings for judicial review of the decision dated 26 November 2020 of the First-tier Tribunal (reference CI011\/15\/00300) are dismissed. 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