{"id":699858,"date":"2026-04-27T01:56:58","date_gmt":"2026-04-26T23:56:58","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/jurisprudences\/secretary-of-state-for-the-home-department-v-starkey-2\/"},"modified":"2026-04-27T01:56:58","modified_gmt":"2026-04-26T23:56:58","slug":"secretary-of-state-for-the-home-department-v-starkey-2","status":"publish","type":"kji_decision","link":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/ru\/jurisprudences\/secretary-of-state-for-the-home-department-v-starkey-2\/","title":{"rendered":"Secretary of State for the Home Department v Starkey"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"kji-decision\">\n<div class=\"kji-full-text\">\n<p>Lady Justice Elisabeth Laing DBE : 1. The Secretary of State appeals, with the permission of Newey LJ, from a decision of the Upper Tribunal (Asylum and Immigration Chamber) (\u2018the UT\u2019). The UT had allowed the appeal of Deon Starkey (\u2018the R\u2019) from a decision of the First-tier Tribunal ((Asylum and Immigration Chamber) (\u2018the FTT\u2019)). The UT held that the FTT had made material errors of law, and re-made the decision. The FTT had dismissed the R\u2019s appeal from a decision of the Secretary of State on 25 July 2018 to refuse the R\u2019s human rights claim and to deport him from the United Kingdom. 2. It is common ground that the R suffers from paranoid schizophrenia which is controlled by a drug of last resort, Clozapine. Other drugs had been tried over the years, but had not controlled his symptoms. For reasons which I will explain, the first issue on this appeal is whether the FTT erred in law in its approach to the evidence about the availability of treatment for the R\u2019s illness in South Africa. 3. On this appeal, the Secretary of State was represented by Mr Malik. Ms Sabic and Ms Butler represented the R. We are grateful to all counsel for their written and oral submissions. 4. The FTT did not make a direction for anonymity in this case, but the UT did. It explained why in paragraph 86 of its determination. Before the hearing of the appeal, this Court notified the parties that it would wish to hear oral submissions from them on the question whether that order should continue. I will return to this issue at the end of my judgment. The grounds of appeal 5. There are two grounds of appeal. i. The FTT made no material error of law in dismissing the R\u2019s appeal. The UT erred, therefore, in setting aside the decision of the FTT and in substituting its own decision. ii. In any event, the UT itself erred in law in its approach to the application of section 117C(6) of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (\u2018the 2002 Act\u2019). It failed to recognise that the threshold created by that exception is very high, and reached a decision which was not justified on the evidence. The legal framework 6. The legal context is Part 5A of the 2002 Act. Part 5A is headed \u2018Article 8 of the ECHR; public interest considerations\u2019. It codifies in primary legislation the approach which Parliament has decided should be taken by tribunals and courts to cases in which a person resists removal by relying on the rights protected by article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Section 117B lists public interest considerations which apply to all cases. Section 117C lists considerations which apply to \u2018foreign criminals\u2019 (as defined in section 117D(2)). Such cases all involve a balance between the public interest and the article 8 rights of foreign criminals. 7. Section 117C(1) provides that the deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest, and section 117C(2), that the more serious the offence committed by the foreign criminal, the greater is the public interest in his deportation. 8. Sections 117C(4) and (5) create two exceptions to the general rule created by section 117C(1). The exceptions apply to a foreign criminal (\u2018C\u2019) who has not been sentenced to a period of four years\u2019 imprisonment or more. The first exception (\u2018Exception 1\u2019) applies when C has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of his life, he is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom, and there would be \u2018very significant obstacles\u2019 to his integration into the country to which he is to be deported. The second exception (\u2018Exception 2\u2019) applies when C has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a \u2018qualifying child\u2019 or a \u2018qualifying partner\u2019 (as defined in section 117D(1)). 9. Section 117C(6) applies to a foreign criminal who has been sentenced to a period of four years\u2019 imprisonment or more. In such a case, the public interest requires his deportation unless there are \u2018very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2\u2019. The evidence of the experts 10. The UT\u2019s criticisms of the approach of the FTT turn on the FTT\u2019s approach to the reports of two experts, Dr Nimmagadda and Professor Ashforth. The UT also relied in its re-made decision on a supplementary report by Professor Ashforth and on a report by Dr Naidoo. Dr Nimmagadda\u2019s report 11. Dr Nimmagadda\u2019s report is not dated. It was based on his interview of the R on 4 June 2018. Dr Nimmagadda was instructed to prepare a psychiatric report on the R and to address 11 issues which he listed in paragraphs 17.4-17.16 of his report (report, paragraph 5.1). The report contains a full summary of the R\u2019s family background and history. Dr Nimmagadda records that the R reported that his academic performance at school had been good (paragraph 6.3). The R had been working from the age of 15. He had worked in warehouses for many years, and as a systems engineer for two years. He had left that job because of a \u2018nervous breakdown\u2019 in his early thirties. His last job was working as a Ministry of Defence guard for nearly ten years. He reported that he last worked when he was 37 (paragraph 6.4). 12. Dr Nimmagadda summarised the R\u2019s medical and psychiatric histories. Section 13 is a full summary of the R\u2019s medical records. Dr Nimmagadda noted in paragraphs 13.12 and 13.13 references to the R\u2019s work in prison. Paragraph 14.4 of the report refers to his working in a multi-media workshop in prison. In section 15 of the report, Dr Nimmagadda summarised his interview with the R. The R told Dr Nimmagadda that he had done various courses in prison (bricklaying, decorating, OCR business ventures, business finance and computerised book-keeping and accounts (levels 1 and 2). He had also done computer modules for the European driving licence. 13. In paragraph 15.8 Dr Nimmagadda recorded that the R did not feel he needed any particular treatment interventions. He felt he was benefitting from his current medication, but did not want to take it forever and hoped that it could be reduced and stopped at some point. 14. In paragraph 16.4 Dr Nimmagadda noted that the R\u2019s insight into his problems was good. Dr Nimmagadda described the improvement in the R\u2019s symptoms once he was prescribed Clozapine in 2013. This drug is used for treatment-resistant paranoid schizophrenia (paragraph 17.2). The R had no active or negative symptoms of schizophrenia, though it was likely he had some residual symptoms. He appeared to be \u2018reasonably stabilised\u2019 on Clozapine (paragraph 17.4). 15. Dr Nimmagadda was asked about the prognosis if the R were removed to South Africa \u2018where arguably he would not get the treatment therapy he requires\u2019. His response was that the likely prognosis was poor, \u2018if he were not to receive the treatment therapy he requires\u2019. He needed to be \u2018maintained on Clozapine\u2019. He added that \u2018this treatment also necessitates regular blood monitoring to prevent any serious side effect of agranulocytosis (decrease in white cell count in the blood) which is one of theseriousside effects that occurs in patients who are treated with Clozapine\u2026\u2019 (my emphasis) (paragraph 17.7). He also needed to be maintained on anti-depressant medication. It was \u2018likely that if he were not to have the necessary treatment his mental health is likely to deteriorate and he might present with significant risk behaviours, including self-harming behaviours\u2019 (emphasis supplied) (paragraph 17.7). 16. A protective factor was the R\u2019s good insight into his illness and his need to take medication. He had not shown any \u2018risk behaviours in prison during the course of his imprisonment\u2019. Support from his family was \u2018very beneficial to maintain his emotional wellbeing\u2019 (paragraph 17.8). He did not express any suicidal ideas and had not harmed himself for more than seven years in prison (paragraph 17.9). 17. The final question Dr Nimmagadda was asked was whether he considered any further issues were relevant. In paragraph 17.14 he said that in his opinion, it was \u2018unlikely that [the R] will receive the immediate treatment and monitoring he requires in his country of origin\u2019 (my emphasis). \u2018Therefore this needs to be clarified before any arrangements for deportation are considered\u2019. The R \u2018needs to continue to be on clozapine medication, which is a treatment of choice for treatment resistant psychotic illness. He has responded to this treatment\u2026\u2019. His conclusions (paragraph 17.15) were that the R was extremely frustrated and anxious because of his detention and he was emotionally distressed on occasions, but had complied with his medication and engaged with sessions given by a mental health nurse. 18. Dr Nimmagadda\u2019s further conclusion, in paragraph 17.16, was that it was necessary to clarify whether the R would receive \u2018the immediate treatment and monitoring he requires in his country of origin\u2019. The R needed to continue to be on Clozapine. \u2018He has responded well to this treatment after various anti-psychotic medications had failed to resolve his symptoms of psychosis\u2019. Professor Ashforth\u2019s report 19. Professor Ashforth\u2019s first report is dated 23 May 2018. He appears from his curriculum vitae to have done ethnographic research in Soweto and in Kwa\/Zulu Natal. He also appears to have an academic interest in witchcraft: see paragraphs 1.2 and 1.3 of his qualifications. The focus of his current teaching is \u2018global health in African perspectives\u2019. He has no medical qualifications. 20. The first question he was asked was whether mental health services in South Africa were available and adequate in the private and public sectors. His reply was that \u2018On paper South Africa has an exemplary mental health system\u2019. He quoted from the report by a judge after an arbitration involving the families of 144 dead mental patients and 1400 survivors of a \u2018torturous\u2019 programme of \u2018deinstitutionalization from a long-term residential service provider\u2019 called \u2018Life Esidimeni\u2019, which showed that the treatment of mental patients could be \u2018torturous and murderous\u2019. This \u2018tragedy\u2019, in his view was \u2018indicative of the deep malaise of South African public mental health services\u2019. Rich people in South Africa who could pay substantial fees could get excellent treatment. \u2018For the rest, public facilities have declined to below the standards once considered inadequate for Blacks\u2019. Two causes were the HIV crisis and corruption and incompetence by officials \u2018deeply compromised by state capture\u2019; that is, \u2018the wholesale expropriation of public resources for private purposes\u2019. 21. Hospital-based treatment had been reduced, but the community infrastructure necessary to support that had not been developed. The share of budgets devoted to mental health had declined. An \u2018already inadequate system has become worse\u2019. There were not enough specialist staff, facilities were overcrowded, treatment protocols were routinely ignored and it was common for supplies of drugs to run out. 22. Professor Ashforth was asked whether mental health treatment was accessible in both the public and private sectors. His view was that, if deported, the R would most likely to be dependent on the public health system for continued treatment. Clozapine was \u2018available in South Africa although supplies in the public health system are not always reliable\u2019. He added that administration of the drug is \u2018complex and requires regular monitoring and laboratory tests if possibly fatal side effects are to be minimised\u2019. Administration in the public health system was \u2018far from satisfactory\u2019. In support of that observation, Professor Ashforth quoted a study of the administration of Clozapine in a \u2018major mental hospital\u2019 in Port Elizabeth in 2013. Footnote 10 shows that the research was a dissertation for the degree of M Pharm by M. Moolman at North-West University. Professor Ashforth does not say what the sample size for the report was; this is not obvious to the lay reader from the material he cites. Nor does he say what period was covered by the research. The report showed that Hospital\u2019s metabolic and haematological monitoring of out-patients did not comply with international protocols and guidelines in the vast majority of cases. The report found that the monitoring was inadequate. 23. Professor Ashforth commented that the hospital was a specialist hospital and thus among \u2018by far the most experienced and knowledgeable institutions dispensing psychiatric medicines in South Africa\u2019. The study suggested that treatment with Clozapine \u2018consistent with international protocols for schizophrenia is unlikely to be successful in the public sector in South Africa.\u2019 24. He then said that Clozapine and psychiatric treatment would be available in the private sector. The cost of a month\u2019s supply of Clozapine and of psychiatric consultations were such that unless the R could get a well-paying job, with health insurance, he would be unlikely to be able to afford the costs of private treatment on arrival. South Africa had a \u2018substantial social support system\u2019. The R might be eligible for a Disability Grant. The monthly income he would receive from this would cover the cost of Clozapine and one meal in \u2018a modest suburban restaurant\u2019. Without family support, the R would be \u2018navigating the extremely complex maze of public health clinics in order to maintain his treatment regimen\u2019. Most people get access to treatment for mental illness in public clinics after being referred by the police. 25. Even if he were not suffering from mental illness, if he did not have \u2018substantial resources\u2019, he would be in serious difficulties. He would have to live in an informal settlement. He would be considered a foreigner and would be \u2018extremely vulnerable\u2019. His schizophrenia would make him more vulnerable. Many people in Africa interpret auditory hallucinations as \u2018real communications with invisible beings\u2019. He would be at risk of attack as \u2018an embodiment of evil spiritual powers intent on causing harm to the community\u2019. Professor Ashforth\u2019s supplementary report 26. Professor Ashforth\u2019s supplementary report was produced in response to questions about the impact of the R\u2019s racial identity which were asked by the UT in the error of law hearing. He explained that the R was of mixed race. He would be identified in South Africa as \u2018Coloured\u2019. Such people have always been marginalised in South Africa. Many felt that their circumstances had become much worse since the end of Apartheid. The areas in which they live are subject to control by organised gangs. They are \u2018extremely dangerous\u2019. The murder rate is very high. The R would be very exposed, and would not be able to rely on protection from the state. South Africa has the \u2018largest private security industry in the world, with more than 9,000 registered companies employing in excess of 2 million employees\u2019. Dr Naidoo\u2019s report 27. Dr Naidoo had treated the R since March 2019. His report was dated 31 October 2019, so was written when he had been treating the R for just over six months. The R was released from prison on 1 March 2019. The R was deemed stable on his release. His prescription meant that his blood had to be monitored monthly. The R had \u2018maintained employment\u2019 in prison and had complied with his medication. 28. Dr Naidoo saw the R twice: on 8 March and 24 June 2019. He was seen weekly by his care co-ordinator, Mr Harrison, after 25 June. The R appeared settled at the first review. He reported an improvement in his mental state since he had been taking Clozapine. In the June assessment he reported hearing voices in his head, which he described as \u2018familiar voices\u2019. They would command him to do things but he could generally resist. He had no other psychotic symptoms. His mood was stable. He had no suicidal thoughts. He did feel anxious and had panic attacks. In his contacts with Mr Harrison, \u2018the overarching theme which contributed to his anxiety was his immigration appeal\u2019. Overall his mental health was stable but anxiety and panic attacks were a recurrent issue. He was to be reviewed in December 2019 and would be started on further medication if his anxiety continued. 29. Dr Naidoo\u2019s opinion was that the R had \u2018some residual symptoms\u2019 of paranoid schizophrenia, in the form of auditory hallucinations. The R\u2019s needs were complex as he was on Clozapine and needed regular blood tests to monitor his white-cell count. A side effect of Clozapine is that it can reduce white blood cells, and without regular blood monitoring, a patient \u2018may be prone to life-threatening infections\u2019. There were no emerging risk issues. If the R were deported, he would be in a very vulnerable position. He would have access to Clozapine but there would be \u2018an absence of the close monitoring and support that he currently receives from his care co-ordinator, as these resources are unavailable in the State sector in South Africa\u2019. The determinations 30. One of the parties contends that the FTT erred in law, and the other, that the UT did so. I will therefore summarise both determinations, so far as they are relevant to the grounds of appeal, and to the points argued by each side in support of, and in opposition to, those grounds. The FTT\u2019s determination 31. The R is a citizen of South Africa, born in 1972. He claimed to have left South Africa when he was two, although the Home Office could not verify his arrival from its records. The supporting evidence suggested that he had been living in the United Kingdom since 25 October 1977, at the earliest. He was taken into care in 1982. He stayed in care until he was an adult. He applied for indefinite leave to remain in 1999. It was granted on 12 February 2001. 32. In 2011, he was convicted of two counts of indecent assault on a female under 14, three counts of gross indecency with a child under 16, and one count of rape of a female who was less than 16 years old. He was sentenced to eight years\u2019 imprisonment. He was required to register on the Sex Offenders Register for life, and banned from working with children for life. 33. The Parole Board authorised the R\u2019s release from a date in early 2016. The R was then detained under immigration powers. A decision was served on the R which wrongly stated that he only had an out-of-country right of appeal. In 2017, he was deported to South Africa, but was not admitted because his escorts had not brought an emergency travel document which had been issued to the R. The R was then admitted to the United Kingdom for the necessary documents to be obtained. In 2018, removal directions were set, but cancelled when the R was admitted to hospital after having some seizures. The R&#039;s solicitors made further submissions on his behalf. 34. The FTT set out the R\u2019s case in paragraphs 10-31 of its determination. This summary was said to be based on his witness statement. The R said that he had entered the United Kingdom when he was two. He had entered on his own passport, with his grandmother. His mother had arrived a year earlier. He never knew his biological father, whom he has only seen on-line a few years ago. He thought that he had been given indefinite leave to remain in 1977. In 1987 he was convicted of three counts of burglary and theft. He was given a supervision order for two years. 35. His case was that the Secretary of State had failed to keep him properly informed before the decision in 2018. The actions of the Home Office had caused him much distress and affected his mental health. Had he been released with \u2018a robust risk management plan\u2019 which was ready in 2015, his mental health would have improved greatly. 36. The FTT recorded R\u2019s description of his family in the United Kingdom in paragraph 20 of its determination. He had a good relationship with three members of his family. His account was that he had suffered physical and emotional abuse from his mother and stepfather. He felt rejected by them. He left home at 14 and spent two years in a children\u2019s home. He left school at 16 and found a job. He had had various jobs since then, but not since 2008, after a breakdown. He said that he had serious issues with his mental health over the years. They peaked in about 2009, when he tried to commit suicide. Voices in his head told him to harm himself. He slashed his wrist once, in front of his mother, was taken to hospital but quickly discharged. The voices got worse, and he again tried to take his own life. He jumped off a bridge into the River Thames. He was rescued and was in hospital for nearly two months. He was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia. 37. The FTT recorded that the R understood the public interest in his deportation but that he argued that there were very compelling circumstances in his case which outweighed that interest. The Secretary of State accepted that the R was socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom but that his integration was undermined by the seriousness of his offences, which showed a disregard for the law. The R did not understand the Secretary of State\u2019s assertion that he could integrate in South Africa because he had only spent his first two years there. He had been in the United Kingdom lawfully for 36 years, if his period of imprisonment was left out of account. 38. He had only ever known the British way of life. He had no family he was aware of in South Africa. His entire support system was in the United Kingdom. Without the support and encouragement of his family in the United Kingdom, he could not see how he could cope in South Africa. The Secretary of State claimed he could get work in South Africa, but had not realised the extent of his mental illness, and its effect. He had been unemployed for three years before his imprisonment. His mental health had stabilised and he was not a risk to himself and others. He could think and function properly. Without a robust management plan, the necessary support and medication, his condition would deteriorate fast. He had a history of self-harm and tried to commit suicide. 39. He relied on the strong social stigma associated with severe mental illness. It would be very hard for him to find a job. No-one would want to employ him for fear his condition would relapse. The chances of that were much higher in South Africa than in the United Kingdom because he would have no support from family and friends there. His mother and siblings had not been able to visit him because of the long distance, the money to travel to visit him in prison. His mother had health problems, but they spoke regularly on the telephone. 40. The R deeply regretted his actions. 41. There would not be sufficient care for him in South Africa. The Secretary of State\u2019s objective evidence dated from 2005, whereas the report of his expert, Dr Ashforth, was based on sources published in 2017. The severity of his mental illness, if his medication were not managed, and the lack of support in South Africa could make him a target. The Secretary of State had failed to take into account that if removed, the R would be homeless, and a risk to himself and others if his medication were not managed. He would not have the money to pay for medication, even if he could get access to it. His mother and siblings would not be able to support him financially or to protect him from physical harm. They lead their own lives in the United Kingdom and have their own expenses. They have rebuilt their relationship and rely on each other for moral and psychological support but they would not be able to send money to him in South Africa to support him financially and keep him safe. 42. The FTT summarised the Secretary of State\u2019s case in paragraphs 3-38. The Secretary of State submitted that the R\u2019s deportation was conducive to the public good and in the public interest because of the seriousness of the R\u2019s offences. The public interest required deportation unless there were very compelling circumstances, over and above those set out in Exceptions 1 and 2. Evidence of a very strong article 8 claim was needed to outweigh the very strong public interest in deportation. 43. The Secretary of State contended that there would be no obstacles to the R\u2019s reintegration in South Africa. The R had no family ties in South Africa, but he was 45 and it was not unreasonable to expect him to live independently there. He had provided no evidence to show that he could not get a job. Anyone who had a family or other relationship with the R would be able to support him financially and emotionally while he established himself in South Africa. 44. The Secretary of State relied on the sentencing remarks of the judge. He accepted that the R was \u2018psychologically vulnerable\u2019 but recorded that it had not been suggested to him at sentence that he should use his powers under the Mental Health Act 1983. He also recorded that the offences had started when the R was fifteen and his victim was five years old. She must have suffered psychologically and her normal adult relationships would have been undermined by the destruction of the R as a role model. The abuse continued until the R was in his early twenties. He had abused his role in relation to her. His victim had probably been fifteen when he raped her. The offence was \u2018a one-off offence, it was a short offence, there was limited violence\u2026\u2019 45. The Secretary of State did not accept that there were very compelling circumstances which outweighed the public interest in the R\u2019s deportation. The Secretary of State had considered the R\u2019s claim that his deportation would breach article 3. The objective evidence did not confirm the report from Dr Ashforth which said that it would be difficult for the R to get adequate treatment in South Africa. The Secretary of State also claimed that the R\u2019s mother could support him financially in South Africa from the United Kingdom. 46. The FTT heard evidence from the R. He adopted his witness statement dated 26 October 2018 which the FTT had summarised. As the FTT recorded, it considered a witness statement from the R\u2019s mother, but did not give it great weight, as she did not attend the hearing, and gave no explanation for that (paragraph 59). 47. In paragraphs 40-86 of the determination are headed \u2018Consideration and Reasons\u2019. The FTT described the legal framework. There is no criticism of that exposition. In paragraph 45, the FTT said that it had to consider \u2018to what extent\u2019 the R\u2019s \u2018circumstances\u2019 fell within Exception 1 or 2, recognising that that was not determinative of the question posed by section 117C(6), but that it was a \u2018helpful starting point\u2019. The FTT added, \u2018I am also aware that those factors that are not encompassed in Exceptions 1 and 2 can be considered holistically under this provision\u2019. 48. The FTT concentrated on Exception 2, as Exception 1 was not relevant (paragraphs 46 and 47). The FTT accepted that the R came to the United Kingdom when he was two, and that he had been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of his life (paragraph 49). The FTT also accepted that the R was socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom (paragraph 52). The issue was whether there would be \u2018very significant obstacles to his integration in South Africa\u2019 (paragraph 53). The R no longer had ties to South Africa (paragraph 54). The R had \u2018no real close ties with his family\u2019 in the United Kingdom (paragraph 55). 49. The FTT summarised the somewhat contradictory evidence about the support, emotional and practical, which the R\u2019s family might provide him with in the United Kingdom and in South Africa (paragraphs 56-60). By the time of his FTT hearing, the R had been in prison, either serving his sentence, or in immigration detention, for about seven years. No member of his family had visited him in prison (paragraph 58, last two sentences). In the light of that, the finding in paragraph 55, and the fact that none of his family had attended the hearing, the FTT could \u2018not simply accept the evidence of [the R] and his mother that [his family] would provide him with emotional support\u2026\u2019 (that is, in the United Kingdom). Even if the FTT could accept that the R\u2019s family would give him some sort of support in the United Kingdom, the FTT found that such support \u2018including the emotional and financial support can be given to the [R] in South Africa\u2019 (paragraph 60). 50. The FTT recorded the R\u2019s submission that his mental health conditions would be very significant obstacles to the R\u2019s integration in South Africa. The R relied on the report of Dr Nimmagadda. The FTT summarised that report at paragraphs 61-64 of its determination. That summary is very full. It is accurate, so far as it goes, apart from the fact that, as Ms Sabic pointed out, the FTT seems to have thought R\u2019s current medication was Olanzapine, not Clozapine. However, as she also pointed out, the summary does not refer to the need for regular blood monitoring to avoid a serious side effects (see paragraph 17.7 of Dr Nimmagadda\u2019s report, referred to in paragraph 15, above). 51. Mr Malik submitted that paragraph 63 was significant because it contained four findings, which were securely based on Dr Nimmagadda\u2019s assessment of the R. i. The R was not, on his current medication, having any positive symptoms, such as command hallucinations. ii. The R was not having any negative symptoms, such as apathy. iii. He had some residual symptoms. He heard voices occasionally, but was reasonably stable on his medication. iv. He had no active symptoms of depression. 52. The FTT\u2019s conclusion was \u2018It is clear from the evidence that [the R\u2019s] current regime of treatment is in the form of medication. There is no satisfactory evidence before me to suggest that [the R] will not receive the immediate treatment that he requires. I accept that disparity in treatment does not assist [the R]\u2019. 53. In paragraphs 67 and 68, the FTT considered the report of Professor Ashforth. The FTT took into account the Secretary of State\u2019s comments on the report. I interpose that those \u2018comments\u2019, in the decision letter, were simply that \u2018Dr Adam Ashworth have also claimed that it will be difficult for you, however the objective evidence does not confirm this\u2019. It does not appear to me that the decision letter identifies or cites objective evidence which is inconsistent with that statement. 54. In paragraph 68, the FTT referred to a submission for the R that if he were deported to South Africa, he would be likely to depend on the public health system for continued treatment, a system which had \u2018declined substantially\u2019. The FTT recorded a concession that \u2018Olanzapine\u2019 (Clozapine must be meant) was available in South Africa, although supplies in the public system were not always reliable. The FTT recorded a further submission that unless the R could get a well-paying job, with health insurance, \u2018on arrival it is unlikely he will be able to afford the costs of private treatment\u2019. 55. The FTT took into consideration, in paragraph 69, that the R\u2019s paranoid schizophrenia was stable on medication \u2018and that there is no satisfactory evidence before me to suggest that [the R] will not be able to receive the medication and treatment (if necessary) for his mental health conditions\u2019. The FTT then explained why it found that \u2018there is no reason why [the R] would not be able to find some form of employment in South Africa\u2019. He was of an age and maturity to be able to \u2018start a new life there without family support\u2019. The FTT concluded that the R\u2019s mental health conditions would not impede his integration in South Africa. 56. The FTT went on to consider, in the light of that analysis, whether there were \u2018very compelling circumstances over and above\u2019 Exception 1. For the reasons it gave in paragraphs 73-86, it held that there were no such circumstances. It noted that the R had not pleaded guilty. It acknowledged that a low risk of re-offending was one facet of the public interest, but in the case of serious crimes, not the most important, though it could be an important factor in a few cases. His rehabilitation and the low risk posed by the R should not be treated as an important factor in this case. Further, the R \u2018was assessed as posing a medium risk of causing serious harm to children and while the risk of re-offending was assessed as low, it was not negligible\u2019. The determination of the UT The hearing 57. The heading of the determination suggests that there was only one hearing, on 10 February 2020. Internal evidence (in particular paragraphs 63 and 64 of the determination; see paragraph 71, below) suggests that there were two hearings: a hearing at which the UT heard argument about whether the FTT had erred in law, decided that it had, and a further hearing to enable it to re-make the decision. I do not know the date of the first of those hearings. At those hearings, the R was represented by counsel, and the Secretary of State by a Senior Presenting Officer, Mr Tan. It seems from internal evidence that Professor Ashforth was present at at least one of those hearings. The Secretary of State has helpfully confirmed, in response to the draft judgment, that there were indeed two hearings; on 19 July 2019 (the error of law hearing) and on 10 February 2020, when the decision was re-made. The decision to set aside the determination of the FTT 58. The hearing was on 10 February 2020. The UT summarised the FTT\u2019s determination (UT\u2019s determination, paragraphs 7-8). It summarised the five grounds of appeal in paragraph 10. The second ground of appeal was that the FTT had failed to take material facts into account, in particular, that the FTT had found that the R would be able to find work and support himself in South Africa, so enabling him to buy the medication\/ treatment he needed for his paranoid schizophrenia. The FTT had failed to have regard among other things to the impact of his illness on his ability to orientate himself and so get work within a reasonable time of his arrival. In fact, it was said, the evidence was that the R was \u2018very unlikely to be able to secure employment and\/or access his medication within a reasonable time\u2019. 59. In paragraph 21, the UT said that the \u2018crux\u2019 of the appeal was whether the R was \u2018actually able to establish some kind of meaningful private \u2013 or family \u2013 life\u2026in South Africa\u2019. If the effect of removal would be that \u2018his mental health spirals out of control and that he finds himself a stranger in a strange land, living rough\u2026scavenging for food and presenting an easy prey for criminals, it could be said that his would amount to \u201cvery compelling circumstances\u201d of the sort that might tip the balance, no matter how deeply abhorrent his crimes. The analysis of [the R\u2019s] personal characteristics, and how he might fare in the South Africa of today, was therefore determinative\u2019. 60. The UT described the R\u2019s medical history in paragraph 22. It said that it seemed that medication had kept the R stable, or contributed to his stability. In paragraph 23, it added that \u2018the evidence about the availability of [the R\u2019s] treatment regime in South Africa was of some significance\u2019. If it could be maintained, \u2018this would support the [FTT\u2019s] conclusion that [the R] would be able to surmount obstacles such as obtaining work, housing, friends, and all the other constituent parts of a normal life. If it could not, then this would throw that conclusion into doubt\u2019. 61. The UT recorded the R\u2019s concession that the drugs the R needs are available in South Africa (determination, paragraph 24). This concession was rightly made. The expert evidence which dealt with this issue, of Dr Naidoo (which had not been before the FTT, but was before the UT) and of Professor Ashforth were clear about this. The UT said that Professor Ashworth\u2019s report showed that the drugs were available privately, for those with the money to pay for them. They were also available in the public healthcare system, albeit supplies were \u2018not always reliable\u2019, and according to one 2013 study, in one leading hospital, the monitoring and prescription of the drugs did not comply with international protocols. The UT said that Professor Ashforth\u2019s conclusion was that unless the R could get a well-paying job with health insurance, it was unlikely that he would be able to afford the costs of private treatment. If he were eligible for a Disability Grant, that would leave him with very little money after buying a month\u2019s supply of medication. He would have \u2018difficulty in navigating the extremely complex maze of public health clinics\u2026\u2019 62. The UT recorded that it was against that background that the R submitted that the FTT was not rationally entitled to conclude, in paragraph 66 of its determination, that \u2018there is no satisfactory evidence before me to suggest that [the R] will not receive the immediate treatment that he requires\u2019. The R accepted that the FTT had \u2018register[ed] some regard to\u2019 Professor Ashforth\u2019s report, but asked the UT to note that that reference came only after the conclusion at paragraph 66. It is a small point, but this particular criticism of the FTT is unfair, since paragraph 66 expresses its conclusions about the evidence of Dr Nimmagadda, whereas the FTT considered Professor Ashforth\u2019s report after that, in paragraphs 67 and 68 of its determination. 63. In paragraph 28, the UT accepted that the FTT \u2018did err in fact when it said that there was \u201cno satisfactory evidence\u201d to suggest that treatment would not be \u201cimmediately available\u201d\u2019, as that was the whole import of Professor Ashforth\u2019s \u2018unchallenged and uncriticised, evidence\u2019. Looking at the determination as a whole, it was possible to say that the FTT had in mind the later conclusion, expressed in paragraph 69, that the R would be able to find work and support himself. If that were so, he might be able to afford the medication he needed, but \u2018It is, however, difficult to see here that the [FTT] has had regard to the mechanics: if [the R] needs a job to get his medication, it is extremely unlikely that his access to medication would be \u201cimmediate\u201d\u2019. No consideration had been given to whether the R\u2019s history, mental illness and long absence from South Africa might affect his ability to find work. 64. The UT then quoted a long passage from Professor Ashforth\u2019s report, which it described as \u2018a bleak assessment\u2019 which the FTT\u2019s determination did not deal with. This is the passage in which Professor Ashforth speculates about what might happen to the R if he returned to South Africa with little or no money, and with no social network, problems which would be made worse by the R\u2019s schizophrenia, and by the likely reaction to that because of the views of \u2018many people in Africa\u2019 to auditory hallucinations, and the risk of attack to which those might expose him. 65. The UT said that given the views of Dr Nimmagadda that the R has auditory hallucinations even with his medication, this evidence was \u2018obviously pertinent to whether [the R] would be able to safely re-establish himself in South Africa. The omission to weight it in the balance was an error of law\u2019 (paragraph 30). It was \u2018fundamental to the overall decision\u2019. It followed that the decision should be set aside (paragraph 30). The UT observed that \u2018the appeal is likely to turn on [the R\u2019s] likely circumstances upon return to South Africa. Either they will drop below the level considered acceptable in humanitarian terms, or they will not\u2019 (paragraph 33). The re-made decision 66. At paragraphs 35, 36, 37 and 53, the UT correctly stated and described the relevant test. The UT referred to it as \u2018an extremely high threshold\u2019, and \u2018an extremely demanding test\u2019. The UT echoed the statement that \u2018 \u201cCompelling\u201d means circumstances that have a \u201cpowerful, irresistible and convincing effect\u201d\u2019. The UT said that \u2018only the most extreme consequences could justify allowing this appeal\u2019. The UT was careful not to equate the test with the test for establishing a breach of article 3, but \u2018in a case like this the threshold must be approaching that highest of benchmarks\u2019. 67. The UT then considered a range of factors, and whether they should be given any weight in the proportionality balance. The UT attached \u2018some weight\u2019 to the fact that the R had lived in the United Kingdom for all of his conscious life (paragraph 43). The UT gave no extra weight to the probability that, had he applied for it at the right time, the R would have been entitled to British nationality (paragraphs 44-47). The UT gave some weight to the R\u2019s history of \u2018Childhood Trauma\u2019 (paragraphs 49-50 and 52; the sentencing judge had said, \u2018\u2026it is very easy to understand, as you say yourself, how the abused became the abuser\u2019). The UT gave some, but \u2018necessarily limited\u2019 weight to the low risk of re-offending posed by the R, and to the fact that he had committed no crimes for 23 years. The UT also appears to have given weight to the fact that the R\u2019s crimes only came to light by his own confession (paragraph 52). 68. The UT then turned to the \u2018elements of [the R\u2019s] case which in my view attract the greatest weight: the obstacles that he will face in returning to South Africa\u2026\u2019 (paragraph 53). The UT considered the R\u2019s health in paragraphs 54-58, drawing principally on the reports of Dr Nimmagadda and Dr Naidoo. 69. The UT summarised that psychiatric evidence in paragraphs 56-57. In paragraph 58, she referred to more recent evidence which was given to the UT on the day of the resumed hearing, dated 7 February 2020. The UT summarised the R\u2019s work history in paragraph 59. The prison service had confirmed that the R had worked throughout his time in prison. He had managed, \u2018at least until he became too unwell, to hold down several good jobs.\u2019 The UT listed those. 70. The UT then referred to two reports from Professor Ashforth. It had summarised those already. It described \u2018The global conclusion reached by Professor Ashforth\u2026\u2019 in paragraph 61. This summary, however, is materially inaccurate, as its focus is the cost of paying for Clozapine privately. It does not refer at all to the availability of Clozapine in the public health system, but instead makes a general criticism of the decline of public health facilities since the end of apartheid. In paragraph 62, the UT referred to the \u2018added difficulty of the cultural response towards mental illness\u2019. The UT cited this material again (it was quoted at length in paragraph 28). 71. In paragraph 63, the UT referred to evidence elicited from Professor Ashforth at the resumed hearing about the problems which the R would experience because of his \u2018racial identity\u2019 as what is known in South Africa as a \u2018Coloured\u2019 person (that is, as the UT explained, a person of mixed race, or dual heritage). The UT had specifically asked Professor Ashforth to comment on that. That evidence resulted in an addendum report by Professor Ashforth dated 25 October 2019. The UT summarised that evidence in paragraphs 63-66. In short, the R would have to live in a \u2018Coloured neighbourhood\u2019 all of which were controlled by criminal gangs. The R would need, but would not have, protection from a social network or from the police. 72. The UT observed that Mr Tan took no particular issue with Professor Ashforth\u2019s analysis of South Africa society, but that he objected \u2018strongly\u2019 to the way in which Professor Ashforth had interpreted the evidence about the availability of drugs and treatment for the mentally ill. Mr Tan referred to the two primary sources relied on by Professor Ashforth. He argued that according to the WHO Report, 80% of the population has access to free psychotropic medicines, and they were available at \u2018minimal cost\u2019 (as low as 24 cents a day). The \u2018Stop Stockouts\u2019 report, published in 2017 (which deals with the availability of medicine in South Africa) showed that various anti-psychotics were available in over 90% of the facilities which usually stock medicine. 73. The UT said that \u2018having considered all of the evidence,\u2019 it was \u2018satisfied that Professor Ashforth\u2019s research was valid\u2019 and that it could be given weight. The WHO report dated back to 2007 and only referred to generic anti-psychotics. It was unclear whether it was inconsistent with \u2018the very specific evidence of Professor Ashforth about Clozapine, and its current cost of R1087 per month\u2026\u2019. The recent \u2018Stop Stockouts\u2019 report did not refer specifically to Clozapine. 74. Paragraphs 69-85 are headed \u2018Discussion and Findings\u2019. The weight to be attached to the public interest in deportation was \u2018very great indeed\u2019. The cumulative weight of the \u2018UK factors\u2019 was \u2018indeed compelling\u2019. They fell short of displacing the public interest in this case, however. The UT considered that the \u2018likely consequences\u2019 of returning to South Africa were \u2018far more significant\u2019 (paragraph 69). 75. The UT found that the R \u2018would have little to no chance of integrating\u2019 in South Africa \u2018in the sense of establishing a meaningful private life\u2019 (paragraph 70). The UT was satisfied that the final limb of Exception 1 was established (paragraph 71). The UT then considered whether there were very compelling circumstances over and above Exception 1. The UT started this section of its determination by describing the R\u2019s illness, which it considered was his \u2018defining characteristic\u2019, and its effect on him. The R had continued to have symptoms for many years, despite treatment, which he still had, \u2018even after many years on the drug of last resort for his condition, Clozapine\u2019 (paragraphs 73-76). The UT would assess the likely events after deportation, by \u2018imagining, in the light of the known facts, what the best case scenario might be\u2019 (paragraph 76). 76. The best-case scenario was that the R arrived with enough medicine to last until his next blood test. The Secretary of State had given no undertaking to that effect. I interpose that that might have been because, as the decision letter suggests, the R had not (at least, at the point when the decision was made) consented to the communication of any medical information to the authorities in South Africa. That is supported by paragraph 17 of the R\u2019s witness statement. 77. If the R arrived in a Coloured neighbourhood with enough money for a month\u2019s rent and food, the UT found it hard to see how he would manage after his money ran out. He would be easy prey for criminals. Even on his medication, the R continued to hear hostile voices, and experienced intense feelings of paranoia, anxiety and panic. Professor Ashforth had written extensively about witchcraft. The R would be at risk of being attacked. If A\u2019s symptoms stayed constant, those conditions would \u2018significantly impede\u2019 his ability to find work and to negotiate the maze of the public health system. He would have a month in which to find a clinic and to have his blood monitored for a further prescription of Clozapine. This would be a huge challenge which the R would be unlikely to be able to surmount. He was so anxious that he was housebound. 78. The debate about whether Clozapine was readily available in South Africa \u2018receded in significance\u2019. The UT could accept that the R \u2018in his anxiety-riddled and psychotic state\u2019 could find a clinic where the drug was available at no or little cost. There must, however, \u2018be serious concerns about whether the blood testing and monitoring would be conducted, leaving the drug with reduced efficacy and compromising [the R\u2019s] immune system\u2019. Even if he could find a clinic \u2018complying with international prescription norms\u2019, he would know no-one, and with \u2018serious mental health issues\u2019 he would be trying to integrate into one of the most violent societies in the world (paragraph 83). That was the \u2018very best case scenario\u2019 the UT could \u2018envisage\u2019 for the R. The UT found that the cumulative challenges faced by the R \u2018are such that the very high test\u2019 was met. The public interest required the R\u2019s deportation but \u2018not at the expense of the United Kingdom\u2019s obligations under the ECHR\u2019. The UT was unable to find that the conditions faced by the R would be anything less than inhuman and degrading\u2019. 79. The UT considered it more likely that the stress of deportation would, as Dr Naidoo and Dr Nimmagadda thought likely, make the R\u2019s illness worse. It was more likely than not that the R\u2019s deportation would cause his health to \u2018spiral downward\u2019. Anyone he spoke to would be able to see that he was not \u2018normal\u2019. It was very difficult to see how he could get a job or find somewhere to live. He would very quickly after arrival run out of money and drugs and find himself on the streets. \u2018The public interest does not require that\u2019. Anonymity 80. The UT acknowledged that, as criminal, the R\u2019s identity would not normally be protected. The UT was concerned that disclosure of his identity could lead to the identification of his victim. Further, in accordance with Presidential Guidance Note No 1 of 2013 (\u2018the Note\u2019), the medical evidence made it appropriate for there to be an anonymity order in accordance with rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008. Submissions Ground 1 81. Mr Malik started his oral submissions with five points, for which he cited the relevant authorities, which supported his overall submission that the UT should, in general, exercise restraint in the exercise of its jurisdiction to find errors of law in a decision of the FTT. The UT should not overturn a decision of the FTT just because it disagrees with the outcome. The UT should not turn infelicities of expression, or small gaps in reasoning into errors of law. It can sometimes be inferred that the FTT has taken material into account, even if it has not mentioned it expressly. The FTT is a specialist tribunal and can be taken to know the law unless its determination shows clearly that it has not stated the law correctly. We do not disagree with any of those propositions. They apply as much to the Court of Appeal, when it is invited to find an error of law in a decision of the UT, as they apply to the UT when it is invited to find an error of law in a decision of the FTT. 82. Mr Malik submitted that paragraph 63 of the FTT\u2019s determination contained findings of fact about the medical evidence which the UT should not have overturned. It was open to the FTT to find, as it had, that the R\u2019s regime of treatment was medication, and that that would be immediately available to the R through the public health system. It was open to the FTT to say that a \u2018disparity in treatment\u2019 did not help the R. He emphasised the qualifying phrase \u2018if necessary\u2019 in paragraph 69 of the determination. The phrase \u2018not always reliable\u2019 in Professor Ashforth\u2019s report meant exactly that. The FTT was entitled to find that the R would get a job of some kind. He had worked throughout his time in prison. 83. He contended that paragraph 12 of the UT\u2019s determination, in particular, showed that its approach was not to ask whether the FTT had erred in law, but rather, that its approach was the articulation of a disagreement with the FTT\u2019s conclusions, which conclusion had been open to the FTT on the evidence. That point was supported by the language of the next two paragraphs of the UT\u2019s determination. The UT had also erred in paragraph 28 in criticising the FTT\u2019s finding in paragraph 66, by focussing on the availability of private healthcare and the \u2018mechanics\u2019. The FTT was aware of Professor Ashforth\u2019s report and referred to it. It did not err in law in not citing material from that report. The UT had also erred in concluding that the R was having auditory hallucinations, as the evidence of Dr Nimmagadda was that his psychotic illness was stable and he was only having occasional \u2018residual\u2019 symptoms. 84. Ms Sabic submitted that the FTT had not explained its conclusion in paragraph 69. It was not enough to state a conclusion without giving reasons for it. The requirement of anxious scrutiny, which applies in this context, reinforced that point. Paragraphs 63 and 69 were significantly inaccurate accounts of the evidence. The FTT had failed to grapple with the evidence of Dr Nimmagadda that the R needed his white-cell count to be monitored. The evidence of Professor Ashforth was either unchallenged, or not challenged in any material way. In this context, the duty of anxious scrutiny required the FTT to explain what it had made of the evidence that the R needed to have his white cell count monitored regularly, that there was some doubt whether that monitoring would be available in the public health system, and why that evidence, which was not challenged, was not an obstacle to the FTT\u2019s conclusions that \u2018there was no satisfactory evidence before me that [the R] will not receive the immediate treatment he requires\u2019 and \u2018there is no satisfactory evidence before me to suggest that [the R] will not be able to receive the medication and treatment (if necessary) for his mental health conditions\u2019. The FTT had expressed two conclusions but had not explained them. 85. Mr Malik made two submissions on ground 2. i. The UT had erred in law by disregarding, without proper justification, the evidence that if R re-offended, he posed a medium risk of serious harm to children if he were to re-offend. The UT, moreover, had, in paragraph 57 of its determination, attached some weight to rehabilitation and risk. ii. It was clear from the second paragraph of the UT\u2019s citation of Professor Ashforth\u2019s report in paragraph 28 of its determination that it had adopted Professor Ashforth\u2019s characterisation of the effects of R\u2019s illness rather than that of Dr Nimmagadda. Paragraph 29 of the determination, further, showed that the UT had misunderstood Dr Nimmagadda\u2019s evidence, because it had interpreted that evidence as showing that the R had significant and obvious symptoms of his illness, even on medication. That misunderstanding of the severity of the R\u2019s illness when he was medicated undermined that UT\u2019s assessment of the impact on the R of returning to South Africa in paragraphs 77-84: see, in particular, its references to \u2018a range of symptoms\u2019 in paragraphs 81, 82 and 83 (\u2018his anxiety-riddled and psychotic state\u2019). The UT had departed, without explanation, and without justification, from the FTT\u2019s accurate summary, in paragraph 63 of its determination, of the R\u2019s current condition. 86. Ms Sabic had two responses to Mr Malik\u2019s first argument on ground two. i. The UT did not err in law in not referring the quality of the risk of reoffending; it was the bare risk which was significant. ii. If that was wrong, any error was immaterial, because the UT had, in any event, given little weight to the risk of re-offending. 87. Her response to the second argument was that there had been no meaningful challenge to the evidence of Professor Ashforth or of Dr Nimmagadda or Dr Naidoo. The UT\u2019s decision was very detailed and very clear. Discussion 88. I have summarised the determinations and the submissions in some detail. This section of my judgment can be relatively short. Ground 1 89. I consider that the FTT\u2019s approach was wrong in law in two linked ways. 90. First, it was clear from the report of Dr Nimmagadda that, in order to guard against the serious side effect of a reduction in the R\u2019s white blood cell count, R\u2019s blood had to be monitored regularly. Professor Ashforth\u2019s report suggested, to put it no higher than this, that there was doubt about whether that monitoring was available in the public health system. The FTT did not refer, in paragraph 63, or in paragraph 69, to this requirement for regular monitoring, or to that doubt. That was a material omission from an otherwise full and accurate summary of the relevant evidence. 91. The conclusions expressed in paragraphs 63 and 69 use the same formula, \u2018There is no satisfactory evidence that\u2026\u2019. The formula is ambiguous. It could be a loose way of saying that there was no evidence, or it could mean that there was evidence, but that the FTT did not consider that it was satisfactory. If the formula has the first meaning it is a materially inaccurate account of the evidence. If it has the second meaning, it begs a question, which is why the FTT considered that the evidence was not satisfactory. In this context of anxious scrutiny, the FTT should have explained why it considered that the evidence was unsatisfactory. I note that, elsewhere in the determination, the FTT did exactly that. In paragraph 59, the FTT was considering what weight it should give to witness statement made by the R\u2019s mother, who did not attend the hearing. The FTT found that \u2018no satisfactory evidence was given by [the R] as to why his mother was not in attendance at the hearing. He simply stated that he was informed by his solicitor last week his mother was not going to attend\u2019. Whatever the FTT meant by this formula, its use in paragraphs 63 and 69 was wrong in law. That is the second flaw in its approach. 92. It follows that the UT did not err in law in setting aside the determination of the FTT. Ground 2 93. Mr Malik, rightly, did not submit that the UT asked itself the wrong question. It is clear from several passages in its determination that it correctly understood that the test posed by section 117C(6) of the 2002 Act is a very demanding one. The harder a test is to meet, however, the more important it is to marshal the relevant factors on each side so that they can be given the weight which the tribunal considers appropriate, and balanced against one another. 94. I accept Mr Malik\u2019s submission that the UT misunderstood the evidence about the severity of the R\u2019s illness when he was receiving the appropriate medication. It appears to have thought that, even with medication, the R would have great difficulty when he arrived in South Africa both in finding a clinic and a job. That approach is inconsistent with the evidence that R\u2019s illness was stable with his medication, that he had worked throughout his time in prison (even though he did not have the right medication throughout), and had gained various vocational qualifications there. That misunderstanding is an essential foundation of the UT\u2019s reasoning about what would happen to the R on his return. It means that the UT\u2019s conclusion that the demanding test in section 117C(6) was met cannot stand. 95. That makes it unnecessary for me to express any view about Mr Malik\u2019s first argument on ground two. I am inclined to think that, even if the argument was correct, it would not, on its own, have led me to allow the appeal. The UT gave only \u2018some, but necessarily limited\u2019 weight to the low risk of re-offending. That was one of a group of factors (\u2018the UK factors\u2019) the collective weight of which, the UT considered, was \u2018indeed compelling\u2019 but which did not displace the public interest in the R\u2019s deportation. The UT said that the \u2018likely consequences\u2019 of the R\u2019s return to South Africa were \u2018far more significant\u2019 (see paragraphs 53 and 69). Conclusion 96. I would allow the appeal of the Secretary of State on ground 2 and remit the appeal to FTT for it to consider it again in the light of any up-to-date evidence which the parties wish to rely on. Anonymity 97. The UT rightly recognised that the fact that the R had committed a serious crime was an argument against anonymity. It made an anonymity order because it was concerned that if the R were not anonymised, there was a risk that that might lead to the identification of his victim. It also considered that an anonymity order was \u2018appropriate\u2019 because of the medical evidence in the case. 98. As My Lord, Dingemans LJ pointed out in argument, the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) does not anonymise defendants in appeals relating to sexual offences, as it is clear that the victim of a sexual offence is, independently, entitled to life-time anonymity, pursuant to section 1 of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992. I therefore consider that the first reason which the UT gave for anonymising the R was not a good one. I also consider that this was a case in which it was not necessary to anonymise the R. It is impossible to understand the arguments in this appeal without an exposition of the medical evidence. The serious crimes committed by the R, and the open justice principle, outweigh any article 8 considerations in his case. For those reasons, I would not continue the anonymity order made by the UT. Lewis LJ 99. I agree. Dingemans LJ 100. I also agree.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<hr class=\"kji-sep\" \/>\n<p class=\"kji-source-links\"><strong>Sources officielles :<\/strong> <a class=\"kji-source-link\" href=\"https:\/\/caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk\/ewca\/civ\/2021\/421\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">consulter la page source<\/a><\/p>\n<p class=\"kji-license-note\"><em>Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).<\/em><\/p>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Lady Justice Elisabeth Laing DBE : 1. The Secretary of State appeals, with the permission of Newey LJ, from a decision of the Upper Tribunal (Asylum and Immigration Chamber) (\u2018the UT\u2019). The UT had allowed the appeal of Deon Starkey (\u2018the R\u2019) from a decision of the First-tier Tribunal ((Asylum and Immigration Chamber) (\u2018the FTT\u2019)). The UT held that the&#8230;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":0,"template":"","meta":{"_crdt_document":""},"kji_country":[7608],"kji_court":[7943],"kji_chamber":[],"kji_year":[36297],"kji_subject":[7612],"kji_keyword":[35036,7622,7975,9006,11059],"kji_language":[7611],"class_list":["post-699858","kji_decision","type-kji_decision","status-publish","hentry","kji_country-royaume-uni","kji_court-court-of-appeal-civil-division","kji_year-36297","kji_subject-fiscal","kji_keyword-africa","kji_keyword-evidence","kji_keyword-paragraph","kji_keyword-report","kji_keyword-south","kji_language-anglais"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO Premium plugin v27.5 (Yoast SEO v27.5) - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-premium-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>Secretary of State for the Home Department v Starkey - Ma\u00eetre Hassan Kohen, avocat en droit p\u00e9nal \u00e0 Paris<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/ru\/jurisprudences\/secretary-of-state-for-the-home-department-v-starkey-2\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"ru_RU\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Secretary of State for the Home Department v Starkey\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Lady Justice Elisabeth Laing DBE : 1. The Secretary of State appeals, with the permission of Newey LJ, from a decision of the Upper Tribunal (Asylum and Immigration Chamber) (\u2018the UT\u2019). The UT had allowed the appeal of Deon Starkey (\u2018the R\u2019) from a decision of the First-tier Tribunal ((Asylum and Immigration Chamber) (\u2018the FTT\u2019)). 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