{"id":792650,"date":"2026-05-01T01:21:32","date_gmt":"2026-04-30T23:21:32","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/jurisprudences\/pbc-v-jma-ors\/"},"modified":"2026-05-01T01:21:32","modified_gmt":"2026-04-30T23:21:32","slug":"pbc-v-jma-ors","status":"publish","type":"kji_decision","link":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/ru\/jurisprudences\/pbc-v-jma-ors\/","title":{"rendered":"PBC v JMA &amp; Ors"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"kji-decision\">\n<div class=\"kji-full-text\">\n<p>1. PBC is the son of JMA, and was appointed as her sole attorney for property and affairs by a Lasting Power of Attorney executed on 5th August 2010 and registered by the Public Guardian on 16th December 2010. He seeks the authority of the Court to make from JMA\u2019s estate various gifts together exceeding \u00a37 million. The purpose of such gifting, openly stated from the outset of the application, is to achieve \u2013 as long as JMA lives at least a further 3 years &#8212; reduction of inheritance tax liabilities. 2. The parties have reached an agreement between themselves. Together, they ask the Court to make orders to give effect to their agreement. The matter was listed for hearing because the Court sought assistance in order to reach a conclusion as to whether or not the terms of that agreement are in the best interests of JMA. Documents considered 3. I have read the following documents, most of which have been collated into a hearing bundle in two files: For the Applicant: Statements by PBC dated 30th June 2015, 14th February 2017, 3rd April 2017 and 26th October 2017; Statements by Neil Morris solicitor dated 30th June 2015, 24th December 2015 and 28th March 2018; Position statement by Mr Rees QC dated 26th March 2018 For JMA: Statement by Karen Bayley solicitor dated 23rd March 2018 Submissions by Sarah Haren of Counsel dated 5th October 2017, 21st November 2017 and 26th March 2018 For the Second and Third Respondents: Statements by Gaynor Jackson solicitor both dated 5th October 2015 Submissions by Deborah Spence solicitor dated 26th March 2018 For JAA: Statement by JAA dated 19th April 2017 Statement by JMA (his father) dated 18th April 2018 Statement by SA (his stepmother) dated 4th June 2017 Statement by RC (his girlfriend\u2019s stepfather) dated 1st June 2017 Statement by CW (his employer) dated 5th June 2017 Position statement by Ms. Watson dated 27th March 2018 4. Additionally I have read quite extensive correspondence which has been gathered together in Part A of the main bundle and tabs 1 -5 of the supplementary bundle. The Proceedings 5. The application was made on a COP1 form dated 29th June 2015. The proposed gifts were identified at section 5.2. In response to the question at section 5.3 (\u201cHow would the order benefit the person to whom the application relates?\u201d) it was stated that \u201c\u2026if the following gifts were made now and [JMA] were to survive at least a further three years, then there would be significant inheritance tax savings on her death.\u201d 6. The Court made various directions orders on 6th August and 1st December 2015, 28th January, 27th April, 24th June and 24th September 2016, and 3rd January 2017. The matter was then listed for an attended directions hearing before a District Judge on 9th March 2017. On that occasion JAA was joined as party, the Applicant was directed to file a further statement and the matter was set down for final hearing. That hearing did not take place because the parties reached agreement. Further orders were made on 14th June and 2nd August 2017, each by consent providing further time for the parties to file agreed submissions and draft orders. 7. The paper submissions were considered by District Judge Eldergill on 11th October 2017. He did not grant the application but directed the Official Solicitor to: \u201cfile a further statement which assists the courts (sic) with the following matters: (a) The existing case law as to why the court should assume that a significant IHT saving is in P\u2019s best interests, rather than the interests of beneficiaries or donees in cases where P has not previously made significant arrangements to mitigate tax liability. I have set out the terms of the (handwritten) order which DJ Eldergill actually made. As explained to the parties at the hearing, the order as issued contained a transcription error in that the word \u201cnot\u201d before \u201cpreviously made\u201d was omitted. Additionally, where DJ Eldergill had used the generic \u2018P\u2019, the order as issued referred specifically to JMA. (b) The status of the deeds referred to in paragraph 8 of the Position Statement of 5th October 2017.\u201d 8. The District Judge gave permission to the Applicant to file a statement addressing the same issues if he so wished and required him to file a copy of the will of RA, JMA\u2019s deceased husband. 9. The matter was subsequently referred to me. On 26th February 2018 I made an order which listed the matter for an attended hearing, explaining in the recitals that: \u201cThe Court requires further assistance as to why the proposed order is considered to be in the best interests of the Donor. In particular, the Court is concerned to establish: a. In what sense the proposed gifts may be for the benefit of the Donor; b. To what extent the proposed gifts may be in accordance with the Donor\u2019s past and present wishes, feelings, values and beliefs (including as to tax planning and previous levels of gifting); c. Whether proper consideration has been given to the expression of a wish in the will of RA (the deceased husband of the Donor, from whom it is said that the bulk of her estate derives) that the Donor \u201cconsider making gifts similar\u201d to those set out in paragraphs 6-8 of his will\u2026\u201d 10. At the hearing I had the benefit of oral submissions from Mr. Rees QC, Ms. Rodgers, Ms. Watson and Ms. Haren. Their submissions have been of considerable assistance and I am now able to reach a conclusion, although I acknowledge that I have not had the benefit of adversarial argument. Factual Background 11. JMA was born on 15th December 1945 and is therefore now 72 years old. Sadly she suffers from an early onset dementia and requires full time care. Since June 2014 she has lived in a care home which she pays for privately. In an attendance note by her legal representative, JMA is described as wheelchair bound and no longer able to converse, although \u201cshe can look at you and maybe smile when you speak to her;\u201d and it is said that she does recognise PBC and the care staff. 12. A COP3 assessment by JMA\u2019s GP has been filed. The parties agree, and I accept, that JMA no longer has capacity to make decisions about making gifts. The same GP has considered JMA\u2019s life expectancy and estimates it as \u201cup to 10 years\u201d but considers it \u201cmore likely that she will only survive between 3 and 5 years\u201d (277). 13. JMA was one of eight children but only one of her siblings is mentioned in the papers as having continuing significance in her adult life: her sister, JG, who is now deceased but whose husband and son have visited JMA in her current care home. JMA\u2019s long-term adviser, Neil Morris, says that \u201cBefore this application, I was not aware that [JMA] had other siblings.\u201d (para 3.3 of third statement) 14. JMA had two children from her first marriage \u2013 the Applicant, and a daughter JA. The Fourth Respondent, JAA, is JA\u2019s son and JMA\u2019s only grandchild. There were two further marriages and then, in or around 1998, JMA married RA. 15. There is no information before the Court as to the relationship between RA and JMA\u2019s children Mr Rees describes the significance of the relationship between the Applicant and RA as \u201ctangential,\u201d on the basis that on his death RA \u201cgave the totality of his estate to his wife, knowing that she would be free to dispose of it as she wished.\u201d both of whom, I summise, were adult before his marriage to their mother. There is also no information before the Court as to JMA\u2019s financial resources or standard of living before her marriage to RA but the Applicant explains in his first statement (125) that: \u201cIt was [RA] who created my mother\u2019s wealth. He and his first wife sold a business\u2026.and this accounted for a substantial part of their wealth. I believe the businesses were sold for approximately \u00a311 000 000 in the 1990s.\u201d 16. In April 2002 JMA purchased a property at 4SH \u201cwith monies supplied by\u2026 RA at the time that [PBC\u2019s] marriage broke down\u2026.it provided a home rent-free for [PBC]\u201d (statement of Neil Morris at 180) 17. In January 2009, JMA\u2019s daughter sadly died. The circumstances before and of her death have clearly had a significant impact on family relations both then and now, across all three generations. 18. In January 2010, RA also died. His will (321), which was made on 20th January 2005, left his entire estate to JMA provided that she survived him by thirty days. An attendance note of the day when RA executed his will (supplementary bundle tab 13) records that he: \u201c\u2026 just wanted to make sure that there was provision for [JMA] in that she would get the whole of his estate should anything happen to him. In this regard [RA] read the first page of the will and was satisfied that [JMA] was provided for as discussed\u2026.\u201d 19. In the event that JMA did not survive RA as provided, his will made \u201cresiduary provisions\u201d including pecuniary legacies ranging between \u00a350 000 and \u00a3500 000 to his two brothers, his sister, his six nieces and nephews, and three named individuals who had worked at RA\u2019s company; and legacies ranging between \u00a3100 000 and \u00a3500 000 to each of six charities. 20. Clause 5 of RA\u2019s will provides that if JMA inherits: \u201c\u2026it is my wish that [she] has regard to\u2026..[the Residuary Provisions] that I had intended to take effect if [JMA] had not survived me for a period of thirty days and [JMA] shall consider making such similar or lesser gifts as those contained in the Residuary Provisions as her circumstances allow and as she thinks fit to those beneficiaries named in the Residuary Provisions either in her lifetime or by her will.\u201d 21. An attendance note of the day before the will was executed (supplementary bundle tab 13) records a telephone discussion between Mr Morris and RA: \u201cYou need to make a codicil to your will that everything should go to [JMA]\u2026. You are having a hernia operation tomorrow and you want to sign this before the operation. In the unlikely event of you dying you hope that she would make some bequest in line with your previous will and there should be a wish expressed to that effect.\u201d 22. On 5th August 2010, JMA executed a Lasting Power of Attorney for property and financial affairs in which she appointed her son, PBC, as the only attorney. At section 8, where there is the option to identify people to be told when the LPA is registered, JMA identified only her sister, JG. The Part B Certificate of understanding was completed by Neil Morris, JMA\u2019s long-standing solicitor and adviser. The LPA was registered on 16th December 2010. 23. In October 2010 JMA provided funds of \u00a3586 499 for the purchase of 3DR, the property where PBC now lives. Neil Morris explains that \u201cAfter [RA] died, [JMA] wanted [PBC] to live in a better area.\u201d (180) 24. On 12th April 2011 JMA executed a will (149) which: a. Gave specific legacies to her sister JG and her husband jointly or the survivor of them, and to her sister\u2019s son; b. Gave to her grandson JAA a legacy of \u00a3100 000; c. Gave to each of eight charities a legacy of \u00a3100 000; d. Left the residuary estate to her son, PBC absolutely. 25. Some insight into JMA\u2019s approach to her will can be gleaned from the various attendance notes exhibited to statements: \u2022 A note dated 26th April 2010 (supplementary bundle tab 13) records that JMA\u2019s sister and her husband \u201chave been very good to [her] in respect of the property\u2026that was held for her daughter [JA] who died last year.\u201d \u2022 A note dated 1st November 2010 (238) records that four of the charities were included \u201cbecause the money had derived from RA and [RA] was particularly fond of these charities.\u201d (In fact all six of the charities named in RA\u2019s will were also named as beneficiaries in JMA\u2019s will.) The \u201climited benefit\u201d to JAA is also explained as based upon limited contact with him. 26. In April 2012, on the sale of a property at 1CC, which JMA owned but her late daughter had lived in, JMA made a gift of \u00a350 000 to PBC \u201cto provide a fund for [PBC] to help maintain the properties\u201d (180). At the same time she made a gift of \u00a315 000 to her sister, JG. 27. JMA\u2019s estate is currently worth \u201cin the region of \u00a318 650 000\u201d (128). When the application was made, it included her matrimonial home but that has been sold so that, apart from five paintings of significant value, the estate is now entirely held in investments. JMA\u2019s lifetime gifting 28. It is clear that over a considerable period RA and JMA together and, since RA\u2019s death, JMA alone have taken professional advice about the management of their assets: \u201cboth have retained Neil Morris whose specialist area is tax advice for high net worth individuals.\u201d (186) 29. The gifts made by JMA (as set out chronologically above) are listed by the Applicant in a schedule exhibited to his second statement (241). There is no suggestion of any gifting other than the provision of rent-free accommodation to both PBC and JA during the lifetime of RA but within ten months of RA\u2019s death, JMA gifted to her son the purchase cost of the home where he now lives; and within approximately 3 years, a further \u00a350 000 liquid funds and the beneficial interest in the property at 4SH to the Applicant, and \u00a315 000 to her sister. 30. An attendance note dated 1st March 2012 (221) records discussions about the cash gifts in the following terms: \u201c[JA] died four years ago and her house was now being sold at just over \u00a392 000. You had already agreed that \u00a315 000 from the sale proceeds should go to your sister [JG] and her husband. [Mr. Morris] mentioned that you had very kindly set [PBC] up with his own house and had also given him [4SH]. However, he does not have any cash for maintenance or anything else and it would be kind to give him some money. It was agreed that \u00a350 000 from the sale of the house\u2026should be paid to [PBC]. You said that you had been very remiss when it came to cash where [PBC] was concerned and you had been thinking that you should make some payment to him to set him up financially.\u201d 31. A subsequent attendance note just over a month later (11th April 2012) (182) is rather different in tone, recording JMA\u2019s confirmation that: \u201c\u2026\u00a350 000 should be paid to your son [PBC] to give him a fund to support the properties that you have given him. [PBC] has had a lot of money in the past and this will be the last payment to assist him. You wanted to give [PBC] protection when his wife kicked him out some years ago and that was when [4SH] was purchased. [PBC] has to know that this is the end of financial support from you. The balance of sale proceeds should go to your Barclays account.\u201d 32. Mr Morris puts a gloss on this later attendance note in his second statement (181): \u201cAlthough [JMA]\u2026is recorded as saying that that would be the last financial support of [PCB], that was not actually what she meant. Over a period of two years, [JMA] had given [PCB] effectively two properties and \u00a350 000 and she intended to hold back for a period.\u201d 33. JAA does not accept that Mr Morris\u2019 explanation of the later attendance note is reasonable (289) : \u201cIf my grandmother advised him that she no longer wished to support my Uncle, it is confusing that he is able to infer that this is not what she meant, recollecting events some 4-5 years later.\u201d 34. A more expansive account of JMA\u2019s gifting is set out in the third statement of Neil Morris (tab 13 of supplementary bundle), dated just 2 days before the hearing. Mr Morris additionally identifies that JMA \u201cgifted each of the six charities listed in [RA\u2019s] will \u00a310 000 each in September 2010.\u201d Copies of the covering letter for each donation, and the Gift Aid form, are exhibited to the statement. Similarly he describes a further gift of \u00a35 000 to JG and her husband, and exhibits a covering letter dated July 2010. 35. In respect of those persons named in the Residuary Provisions of RA\u2019s will, Mr. Morris provides an account of JMA\u2019s views: a. (paragraph 3.4) RA had created an inter-vivos trust which held \u00a3200 000 \u2013 \u00a3250000 when he died. RA \u201chad expressed a wish that this should pass to his brother MA but the trustees refused to do so without the consent of [JMA]. [JMA] subsequently instructed that the trust fund should be distributed to [MA]. At some later point [MA] informed me that he did not need all of the money in view of his age and was passing \u00a350 000 to his son, [FA];\u201d b. (ex NDM8) He exhibits a file note referring to the death of RA\u2019s other brother; c. (paragraph 3.7) He reports that \u201c[JMA] explained that apart from [MA], she was not close to [RA\u2019s] relatives\u2026\u2026 It has generally been clear that [JMA] did not wish to give any member of [RA\u2019s] family money. I understand that she felt they were not supportive of her after [RA\u2019s] death;\u201d d. (paragraph 3.6) He also recounts discussion with JMA about the persons who had worked at RA\u2019s company, when she explained that \u201cthey were not in contact with her and therefore she was not interested in benefitting them.\u201d 36. It would appear therefore that JMA\u2019s lifetime gifting from her own assets amounted to some \u00a3936 499, most of it to PBC. JMA\u2019s tax planning 37. The Applicant asserts that both his mother and her late husband RA \u201ctook actions to reduce their tax liabilities.\u201d In so far as JMA\u2019s actions are concerned, that assertion is based on two separate matters: a. The bond: In 2011, \u201csome \u00a33m of the monies that [JMA] had with Barclays were transferred into a bond so as to help reduce [JMA\u2019s] income tax liability. We were hoping to keep her below the 50% tax rate\u201d (220); b. 4SH: By November 2010 JMA was in discussion with Mr Morris about disposal of the property which had originally been bought to provide a rent-free home for PBC. She is described in an attendance note (exhibit NDM11 to third statement of Neil Morris) as \u201chappy to give the flat to [PBC]\u201d but was advised that \u201cIt would be better from a tax point of view to put the flat into trust so that there could be a hold over for capital gains tax purposes\u2026. The intention would be to break the trust after a reasonable period of time and hold over the gain on transferring the flat to [PBC.]\u201d In July 2011 [216] JMA was advised that there would be \u201ccapital gains tax liability of approximately \u00a333 600 (28%)\u201d but the use of a trust as previously described avoided that liability \u201cwhich [JMA] was keen to do.\u201d JMA subsequently gave PBC a life interest in the in the property on 24th August 2011, and transferred to him the entire beneficial interest on 19th February 2013. 38. It is to be noted that each of these actions of JMA, in so far as they were concerned with limitation of tax liability, are seemingly focussed on lifetime taxes. The only mention of post-death tax planning appears to be incidental to that focus. The attendance note of 1st November 2010 records that \u201ctransferring the flat to [PBC] would start the seven years running for inheritance tax purposes.\u201d In his second statement Mr. Morris states that JMA \u201cexpressed her satisfaction\u201d that if she survived seven years from the gifts of the properties to PBC \u201cthat would avoid inheritance tax\u201d but the contemporaneous attendance note is silent as to JMA\u2019s view of the impact on post-death taxes. The agreement reached between the parties 39. The agreement which the parties have come to amongst themselves is complex and multi-faceted. I adopt the helpful summary which Mr. Rees has set out in his position statement: \u201cIt has been agreed (subject to court approval) that the following should be authorised: (a) The execution of a statutory will for [JMA]. This replicates [JMA\u2019s] existing will save that: (i) It also includes a legacy of \u00a3100 000 for the Alzheimer\u2019s Society; (ii) It ensures that the amount received by the nine named charities is not less than the amount\u2026..necessary to ensure that the estate is taxed to IHT at the lower rate of 36%; and (iii) In the event of the Applicant predeceasing [JMA], [JAA] and the charities must bring into hotchpot any gifts made to them under the court order. (b) A gift of \u00a36M to the Applicant; (c) Gifts of \u00a350 000 to each of the charities who are named as legatees under the 2011 will, and also to the Alzheimer\u2019s Society; (d) A gift of \u00a3422 800 to be transferred to the trustees of a discretionary settlement under which [JAA] is the primary beneficiary. The IHT in respect of this gift is to be paid out of [JMA\u2019s] estate; (e) Further gifts of certain chattels to the Applicant. The Applicant has agreed to enter into further agreements Ms. Haren explains in her second written submissions that these agreements are \u201creached between the other parties to the application. JMA is not a party to them and the court is not asked to authorise or approve any part of them on JMA\u2019s behalf. They are referred to so the court has before it the full background to the application in order that it may reach an informed view as to whether the application is in her best interests. The purpose of the deeds is to ensure that in the event that the applicant predeceases JMA the charities and [JAA] (as substitutionary beneficiaries under JMA\u2019s will) are not financially worse off after the gift than they would have been if the gift had not been made.\u201d under which he covenants with [JAA] and the eight charities named in the 2011 will that he will make a will which provides that if he predeceased [JMA] they will receive the sums that they would have received under [JMA\u2019s] 2011 will had the gift to the Applicant not been made.\u201d 40. The tax effect of this agreement, if authorised, has been set out in a schedule Ms. Haren identified an error in the schedule. The figures set out above are the corrected ones. (275). Using rounded figures, if no further gifts are made from her estate during JMA\u2019s lifetime, the inheritance tax liability on her death will be approximately \u00a36 200 000. On the other hand, if the proposed gifts and testamentary provisions are made, the inheritance tax liability will taper from approximately \u00a35 600 000 if JMA were to die today, to approximately \u00a33 million if she lives until March 2025. 41. The effect of this agreement, if authorised, on JMA herself would be that her available assets reduce to approximately \u00a310 million (229), which is commonly agreed to be more than amply sufficient to meet all her needs. There is no suggestion that she would have any understanding of the proposed arrangements such as might either give her pleasure or cause her anxiety. The Law 42. Where a person lacks capacity to make a decision in respect of their property and affairs, the powers of the court are set out generally in section 16 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, and more specifically in section 18. The power to make a gift is set out in section 18(1)(b), and to execute a will in section 18(1)(i). 43. The exercise of those powers is subject to principles set out in section 1 of the Act, including the requirement at section 1(5) that \u201cAn act done, or decision made, under this Act for or on behalf of a person who lacks capacity must be done, or made, in their best interests.\u201d 44. The meaning of \u2018best interests\u2019: As has often been observed, the concept of \u2018best interests\u2019 is not defined within the Mental Capacity Act. Instead, at section 4 of the Act, a series of requirements of the decision-maker are set out: the person making the determination (in this case the court) (1)\u2026 must not make it merely on the basis of (a) a person\u2019s age or appearance, or (b) a condition of his or an aspect of his behaviour which might lead others to make unjustified assumptions about what might be in his best interests; (2) \u2026 must consider all the relevant circumstances; (3) \u2026 must consider (a) whether it is likely that that the person will at some time have capacity in relation to the matter in question and (b) if it appears likely that he will, when that is likely to be. (4)\u2026 must, so far as reasonably practicable, permit and encourage the person to participate, or to improve his ability to participate, as fully as possible in any act done for him and any decision affecting him. (5) \u2026 (6) \u2026 must consider, so far as is reasonably ascertainable \u2013 (a) the person\u2019s past and present wishes and feelings (and, in particular, any relevant written statement made by him when he had capacity), (b) the beliefs and values that would be likely to influence his decision if he had capacity, and (c) the other factors that he would be likely to consider if he were able to do so. (7) \u2026must take into account, if it is practicable and appropriate to consult them, the views of \u2013 (a) \u2026 (b) anyone engaged in caring for the person or interested in his welfare, (c) any done of a lasting power of attorney granted by the person, and (d)\u2026. as to what would be in the person\u2019s best interests and, in particular as to the matters mentioned in subsection (6) \u2026. 45. It is now well understood that the concept of \u201cbest interests\u201d is a broad one. For example: a. An NHS Trust v. MB &amp; Anor [2006] EWHC 507 (Fam), per Holman J at para 16(v): Best interests are used in the widest sense and include every kind of consideration capable of impacting on the decision. In particular they must include the nature of the medical treatment in question, what it involves and its prospects of success and the short, medium and longer-term outcome, best interests goes far beyond the purely medical interests. They must also include non-exhaustively medical, emotional, social, psychological, sensory (pleasure, pain and suffering) and instinctive (the human instinct to survive) considerations. b. Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Sergei Skripal [2018] EWCOP 6 per Williams J at para 26: \u2026the evaluation of what order is in the best interests of [the protected persons] involves a far broader survey or whether the taking of blood samples will have any medical benefit to them and whether the disclosure of their medical records will bring any medical advantage to them. It includes every consideration that might bear on what is in their best interests. 46. It is less commonly considered but equally beyond serious doubt that the concept of \u201cbest interests\u201d is not restricted to \u201cself-interest.\u201d For example: a. The Law Commission Report no. 231 which preceded the implementation of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 specifically considered the wider scope of \u201cbest interests\u201d as compared to the previous legislation: The relevant provisions of the 1983 Act rely on the concept of \u201cbenefit\u201d to the person without capacity rather than the concept of his or her \u201cbest interests.\u201d This means that a special provision was required to cover the giving of gifts. The new \u201cbest interests\u201d factors go wider than \u201cbenefit.\u201d b. Mental Capacity Act 2005 Code of Practice at paragraphs 5.47 and 5.48: Section 4(6)(c) of the Act requires decision-makers to consider any other factors the person who lacks capacity would consider if they were able to do so. This might include the effect of the decision on other people, obligations to dependants or the duties of a responsible citizen. The Act allows actions that benefit other people, as long as they are in the best interests of the person who lacks capacity to make the decision. For example, having considered all the circumstances of the particular case, a decision might be made to take a blood sample from a person who lacks capacity to consent, to check for a genetic link to cancer within the family, because this might benefit someone else in the family. But it might still be in the best interests of the person who lacks capacity. \u201cBest interests\u201d goes beyond the person\u2019s medical interests. For example, courts have previously ruled that possible wider benefits to a person who lacks capacity to consent, such as providing or gaining emotional support from close relationships, are important factors in working out the person\u2019s best interests. If it is likely that the person who lacks capacity would have considered these factors themselves, they can be seen as part of the person\u2019s best interests. c. Re G(TJ) [2010] EWHC 3005 (COP), per Morgan J at para 35: \u2026the word \u201cinterests\u201d in the phrase \u201cbest interests\u201d is not confined to matters of self-interest, or, putting it another way, a court could conclude in an appropriate case that it is in the best interests of P for P to act altruistically.\u201d 47. The determination of \u2018best interests\u2019: The Supreme Court decision in Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v. James [2013] UKSC 67 makes it clear that a holistic approach is to be taken to the application of the best interests test: (39) The most that can be said, therefore, is that in considering the best interests of this particular patient at this particular time, decision-makers must look at his welfare in the widest sense, not just medical but social and psychological; \u2026. they must consider what the outcome of that treatment for the patient is likely to be; they must try and put themselves in the place of the individual patient and ask what his attitude to the treatment is or would be likely to be; and they must consult others who are looking after him or interested in his welfare, in particular for their view on what his attitude would be.\u201d 48. A holistic approach to determining \u201cbest interests\u201d is not, however, a \u201csubstituted judgment\u201d test. As Charles J was keen to emphasis in Briggs v. Briggs [2016] EWCOP 53: [56] in my view, the factors that will give indications as to what the individual P wants include the interests of other people who P would have been likely to take into account and so, for example, many if not most Ps when they had capacity would have taken into account their relationships with others (eg spouse and children), how they think their children should be parented and the impact on those closest to them of what they decide to do. [57] Pausing there, it is clear and important to stress that a conclusion on what P would have done is not determinative of the MCA best interests test and so, by stating that the MCA enables the court to do for the patient what he could do for himself if of full capacity, the Supreme Court is not saying that a conclusion on what the patient would have done is decisive. The test is not a \u2018what P would have done test\u2019, it is a best interests test and so a test that requires the decision maker to perform a weighing or balancing exercise between a range of divergent and competing factors. 49. Charles J further considered how to approach the balancing exercise, in the context of property and affairs, in Watt v. ABC and the Official Solicitor [2016] EWHC 2532 (COP): 71. In my view, an approach based on a presumption, or a starting point that must be displaced, as to the result that is in P\u2019s best interests runs counter to the underlying rationale and purpose of the MCA and, in particular, of its decision and fact sensitive approach to the application of its best interests test in all the circumstances of a given case. 72. Further, in my view an approach such as that which exists under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 of there being a bias in favour of a particular result\u2026.does not exist under the MCA in determining what order in a given case should be made to best promote the best interests of the relevant P. In the context of the making of orders that the COP has jurisdiction to make, there is nothing in the MCA that says or has the effect that the result will be \u201cX\u201d unless the factors in favour of another result outweigh those in favour of \u201cX\u201d. \u2026 75. In short, the weighing or balancing of competing factors is at the heart of decision making under the MCA and it does not fit with presumptions, starting points or a bias that have to be displaced. 50. The making of gifts: The parties have identified two authorities which specifically consider the concept of \u201cbest interests\u201d in the context of the making of gifts: a. In Re G(TJ) [2010] EWHC 3005 (COP) the parties had reached agreement that, but the Court sought further assistance to determine whether, it was in the best interests of Mrs G for her deputy to make payments by way of maintenance to her adult daughter C. Morgan J\u2019s general approach was that \u2026it is appropriate in this case to be cautious in making assessments ..of what the future might bring\u2026 I am satisfied that that the payments which I am asked to direct in favour of C will come out of funds which are surplus to Mrs G\u2019s own proper requirements for the remainder of her days. (para 23) He specifically considered whether the payments proposed could be said to benefit Mrs G: \u2026 the payments will not be, in any real sense, for the benefit of Mrs G. If the word \u201cinterests\u201d in the phrase \u201cbest interests\u201d refers to the self-interest of Mrs G, it might be asked: what self-interest of Mrs G is advanced by payments to C? If the suggested answer is that such payments will benefit Mrs G and be in her best interests because Mrs G will be pleased that the payments are made to her daughter, on the facts of this case, Mrs G will never know that the payments are being made and there will be no reaction, or pleasure or otherwise, to that fact. (para 32) He considered the meaning of \u201cbest interests\u201d: .. the word \u201cinterest\u201d in the best interests test does not confine the court to considering the self-interest of P. The actual wishes of P, which are altruistic and not in any way, directly or indirectly self-interested, can be a relevant factor. Further the wishes which P would have formed, if P had capacity, which may be altruistic wishes, can be a relevant factor. It is not necessary to establish that P would have been aware of the fact that P\u2019s wishes were carried into effect. Respect for P\u2019s wishes actual or putative, can be a relevant factor even where P has no awareness of, and no reaction to the fact that such wishes are being respected. (para 56) The tax effect of the gifts in question were not a significant factor in the application but Morgan J observed that: \u2026The tax saving possibility is a factor in favour of making the gifts in question but the factor has limited weight on the facts of this case having regard to the amount involved and the life expectancy of Mrs. G. Nonetheless, this factor does not count against the making of the order which is sought. (para 62) Morgan J approved the making of gifts in accordance with the agreement reached between the parties. b. Re KGS [2012] EWCOP 302 concerned anapplication for a gift to be made to the parents of a young man, James, who had been awarded damages for clinical negligence, for the stated purpose of reducing the amount of inheritance tax that his parents may have to pay on his death. The applicant contended that, if the proposal was implemented, there would be sufficient sums to meet P\u2019s future needs even on a cautious approach but the Official Solicitor on behalf of James did not support the application \u201cmainly because he did not believe that it was in P\u2019s best interests to dispose of such a large amount of capital which he may need in years to come\u2026\u201d (para 13) The Official Solicitor\u2019s submissions included the observation that: In the case of a person such as James, whose capacity has been severely impaired since birth, there is little (if any) scope for the court to rely on subjective beliefs and values. It is limited to relying on an assumption that James would have been guided by the belief that, all other things being equal, he should seek to minimise insofar as is financially prudent and reasonably practicable, the exposure of his estate to IHT with a view to maximising the benefit from that estate receivable by his family. However, given that this is a mere generalisation, and is not reflective of any particular beliefs or values that, in fact, are exhibited by James, the weight to be attributed to this factor must be limited. In more general terms, however, the Official Solicitor accepts that James would, if he had the requisite capacity, wish to benefit his parents (who, of course, are his primary carers) as far as reasonably possible, practicable and sensible in the light of his own actual and potential needs and requirements. (para 19) Senior Judge Lush observed that: \u2026 it is not the function of the court to anticipate, ring-fence or maximise any potential inheritance for the benefit of family members on the death of a protected party, because this is not the purpose for which compensation for personal injury was intended. The position would be different, of course, if the individual concerned had substantial funds surplus to his requirements that were derived from another source, such as an inheritance or a lottery win. (para 39) He concluded that it was not in the best interests of James to make the proposed gift to mitigate inheritance tax liability. The Parties\u2019 Submissions 51. On behalf of the Applicant, Mr Rees asserts that the application does not seek to change the ultimate devolution of JMA\u2019s estate. Rather, the Court \u201cis being asked to consider if those persons she wanted to benefit could be in the position of benefitting a bit more in order to get tax saving.\u201d He accepts that the gifts proposed are more substantial than gifts actually made during JMA\u2019s lifetime but explains this on the basis of JMA\u2019s own change of circumstances: \u201c17\u2026 At the time of her husband\u2019s death in 2010 [JMA] was a relatively young widow who had just attained her 64th birthday. At that point she doubtless looked forward to many years of life still ahead of her. She was not in employment or likely to be so. She was used to a comfortable lifestyle which she needed to fund from her investment income and capital assets. She was understandably concerned to ensure that money was available to meet her expenses when she needed to pay them [Tab 34 p219]. Even then she was willing to make significant gifts to the Applicant (and more modest sums to her selected charities) and was willing to invest her assets in a manner designed to minimise her tax liabilities. Also, at this time a significant part of her wealth was tied up in her house. 18. The position has now fundamentally changed. Her life expectancy has in all probability been limited by the onset of dementia. The impact of the dementia has also shrunk the boundaries of her world. She is now in permanent residential care and her house has been sold. .. The balance between her overall wealth on the one hand and the funds that she may need to meet her expenditure has shifted, such that there is now (unlike in 2011) a clear surplus capable of being gifted to effect a substantial tax saving without in any way adversely affecting her care or quality of life.\u201d 52. Mr Rees submits that the proposed arrangements are in accord with JMA\u2019s past wishes and feelings in that they benefit the persons and bodies she selected for benefit in her will; and in accord with the beliefs and values that would be likely to influence her in that she previously demonstrated willingness to structure her affairs in a tax efficient manner. They reflect an agreement reached between interested parties, which is a factor JMA would have considered if she were able to. Where JMA was fully open to the prospect of minimising tax liabilities in the past, and there is the possibility of effecting a very substantial tax saving by accelerating gifts to persons who stand to benefit under her will in any event, it would be \u201cthe right thing Referring to a line of authority derived from the decision of Lewison J in Re P (Statutory Will) [2010] Ch 33 as to the importance of P being remembered for having done \u201cthe right thing\u201d by their will. \u201d for the court to approve the gifts proposed. 53. In respect of RA\u2019s wishes expressed at clause 5 of his will, Mr Rees orally submitted that the best evidence of the extent to which those wishes would now be taken into account by JMA is how she did in fact take them into account in the terms of her own will. When asked, Mr Rees did not accept that the \u201cfundamental change\u201d as to availability of surplus wealth would impact on her consideration not just of when persons may receive benefit from her estate but also of who should benefit, asserting that there is \u201cnothing to justify interfering with what JMA set out in her will.\u201d 54. Addressing the question posed in District Judge Eldergill\u2019s order, Mr. Rees submits that \u201cit is not surprising that [JMA] did not embark on IHT planning\u201d in the light of her relative youth when she lost capacity but \u201cwithin those constraints, she did seek tax advice and took steps to deal with her estate in a tax efficient manner.\u201d He submits that \u201cin the absence of evidence that P is going to act in a manner which does not mitigate tax, the default position should be that most people are motivated by a desire to save tax if that benefits their relatives.\u201d He distinguished the taking of \u201caggressive steps\u201d from the proposals currently under consideration, which he characterised as \u201cplain vanilla\u201d tax planning, \u201csuch as any High Street Solicitor would recommend to any client.\u201d The absence of any such steps taken by JMA herself whilst she had capacity does not, Mr Rees says, take the matter out of his \u2018default\u2019 approach because of the fundamental change in her circumstances: what is possible now, was not possible when she had an expensive lifestyle and was concerned about meeting her needs. Instead, the matter falls squarely within the \u2018default\u2019 approach because of the evidence that JMA was motivated to save lifetime tax where she could, even to the extent of a \u201cslightly esoteric\u201d trust arrangement. Mr Rees accepted that \u201cthere are limits\u201d to this default approach, emphasising that the gifts under consideration will still leave JMA with \u201cten times more than what she needs.\u201d 55. In respect of the benefit to the recipient of the gifts, Mr Rees submitted that such benefit is a relevant consideration, because benefitting her son, the charities and JAA was something that JMA herself wanted to do. She selected them all for benefit under her will. Her best interests now include consideration of her capacitous wish to benefit these people and bodies. The change of circumstances means that she can accelerate and maximise the benefits she can bestow. In so far as any concern may arise from the magnitude of the proposed gifts, Mr. Rees submitted that \u201cthe quantum does not affect the principle.\u201d 56. On behalf of the Respondent charities, Ms. Rodgers declined the opportunity to make oral submissions. Their written submissions made clear their support of the Official Solicitor\u2019s position. 57. On behalf of JAA Ms. Watson\u2019s written submissions conceded that the proposed gifts \u201cwill not be of any direct financial benefit to JMA\u201d but adopted the Official Solicitor\u2019s submissions as to why they could nonetheless be considered to be in her best interests. In oral submissions, she referred to a \u201creasonable presumption\u2026that, by benefiting family members in a tax efficient manner, one is also benefitting the Donor.\u201d She relied on \u201cthe clear evidence, in the way in which JMA dealt with her property and affairs when she inherited, of her desire especially in difficult times, to see that family members were supported;\u201d and submitted that \u201cif [JMA] were appraised of [JAA\u2019s] circumstances, she would wish to do that for him.\u201d 58. On behalf of the Official Solicitor acting as Litigation Friend for JMA, Ms. Haren\u2019s first written submission (313) identified the factors relevant to determination of her best interests as: a. The value of JMA\u2019s estate; b. The fact that substantial gifts are affordable without any risk that JMA will be left with insufficient to meet her needs for the rest of her life; c. The likelihood that JMA, if she had capacity, would have been advised about the potential inheritance tax savings which\u2026in effect, accelerate the inheritance the applicant would take under her will; d. Evidence that JMA would structure her affairs so as to reduce her exposure to tax where she could do so without adversely affecting her own financial security; e. JMA\u2019s provision for the charities in her will; f. There is agreement between the parties, which provides for the position of the substitutionary beneficiaries if the applicant predeceases and which may lessen disharmony in family relations. 59. In her second written submissions (334) Ms. Haren addressed the magnitude of the gifts proposed in the light of JMA\u2019s previous gifting: \u201c\u2026 one cannot infer from the fact that JMA did not make a gift of this magnitude whilst she retained capacity that she had formed a decision never to do so. It is not clear that she was ever given advice about IHT planning in this way and in any event understandable that she should not have contemplated doing so at a time when she was relatively young and healthy.\u201d And she (cautiously) added to the list of factors in favour of the application, the side agreement reached between the parties: \u201c..because it means that on JMA\u2019s death the question of who benefits from the assets now in JMA\u2019s estate will be much the same whether or not the gift is made. However, it does not seem to the Official Solicitor that the factor impinges greatly on the assessment of JMA\u2019s best interests. It seems unlikely that, if JMA had retained capacity and was contemplating making a gift of this sort, she would in normal circumstances have been significantly influenced in the decision whether to do so by the possibility that the applicant might predecease her.\u201d 60. In her third written submissions Ms Haren addressed factors to be taken into consideration in slightly different terms: a. It might reasonably be expected that someone in JMA\u2019s position would wish to try to minimise the tax burden on her estate and to maximise the amount which the principal beneficiary actually receives, if that can be done without impinging on her own financial security (para 6.1); b. &#8230; before any gift made with the aim of estate planning can be contemplated as being in a donor\u2019s best interests it is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition that the donor is left with ample resources to meet her own needs (estimated on a cautious basis) (para 6.4); c. \u2026 medical evidence suggests there is a realistic prospect of JMA surviving [the gifts] by at least 3 years, so reducing the rate at which inheritance tax will be charged\u2026. Although there is also a real prospect that JMA will die sooner than that, the chance of JMA\u2019s estate benefitting from taper relief is something which, in the circumstances, someone in JMA\u2019s position might reasonably regard as worth trying to benefit from. (para 7). 61. In respect of JMA\u2019s comment recorded in an attendance note that the \u00a350 000 cash gift should regarded as \u201cthe end of financial support\u201d for the Applicant, the Official Solicitor \u201cconsiders that it is significant that the gifts made by JMA to PBC at that time served a different purpose from the Proposed Gifts (ie financial support rather than an acceleration of inheritance) and this comment should be seen in that context.\u201d (para 10.1.3) 62. In respect of RA\u2019s wishes at clause 5 of his will, Ms. Haren notes (para 15) that: \u201c\u2026JMA discussed with [Mr. Morris] the terms of her husband\u2019s will, expressed some displeasure about at least one member of RA\u2019s family and was advised that she was under no obligation to make the gifts referred to in RA\u2019s will. It therefore seems that JMA did indeed consider the provisions of RA\u2019s will, decided to benefit (both by lifetime gift and by including them in her will) the charities he would have favoured, but not the individuals.\u201d 63. In her oral submissions Ms. Haren referred to an \u201cassumption that, unless there is evidence to the contrary, most people would choose to maximise inheritance to persons they\u2019ve chosen to inherit their estates.\u201d She confirmed that RA\u2019s death had created no inheritance tax liability for JMA. She pointed to discussions of JMA\u2019s own approach to investment risk (211-12), whereby shechose to leave investments unmoved rather than trigger a tax charge by changing them to suit her own investment preferences, as indicative of JMA\u2019s likely approach to tax planning. She emphasised that the proposed gifts are \u201conce in a lifetime\u201d gifts \u2013 the circumstances which now make them possible did not exist before, and will not arise again if the agreement is approved. She agreed with the Applicant that JMA had herself already made a decision in respect of RA\u2019s wish in clause 5 of his will, and that there was no reason to think that the identity of people she wished to benefit had changed. Conclusions 64. Affordability: I agree with the Official Solicitor that, where the court is considering the authorisation of gifts, affordability is a \u201cnecessary but not sufficient\u201d consideration. The future needs of the protected person must be considered on a cautious basis, and the level of gifting not such as may put in doubt the donor\u2019s ability to meet those needs. I am satisfied that, even though the gifts proposed in this case are very large, they are amply affordable for JMA. If the parties\u2019 agreement is given effect, she will still have at her disposal funds which are more than sufficient to meet her conceivable needs. That in itself is not however sufficient basis to conclude that making the proposed gifts would be in her best interests. There is no expectation on people who retain capacity to make gifts of their surplus wealth during their lifetime, and nor should there be any expectation that it is in the best interests of persons who lack capacity so to do. 65. Default position\/assumption: The purpose of the gifts presently under consideration has always openly been stated as tax mitigation. In support of the parties\u2019 agreement Mr Rees referred to a \u201cdefault position See paragraph 54 above: \u201cIn the absence of evidence that P is going to act in a manner which does not mitigate tax, the default position should be that most people are motivated by a desire to save tax if that benefits their relatives.\u201d \u201d and Ms. Haren referred to a \u201creasonable expectation See paragraph 60 above: \u201cIt might reasonably be expected that someone in JMA\u2019s position would wish to try to minimise the tax burden on her estate and to maximise the amount which the principal beneficiary actually receives, if that can be done without impinging on her own financial security \u201d or \u201cassumption See paragraph 63 above: \u201c..unless there is evidence to the contrary, most people would choose to maximise inheritance to persons they\u2019ve chosen to inherit their estates.\u201d \u201d in favour of such measures. Similarly, I note that the Official Solicitor in Re KGS referred to a \u201cgeneralisation. See paragraph 50(b) above: \u201c\u2026that James would have been guided by the belief that, all other things being equal, he should seek to minimise insofar as is financially prudent and reasonably practicable, the expose of his estate to IHT with a view to maximising the benefit from that estate receivable by his family.\u201d \u201d In my judgment, following the exegesis of Charles J in Watts v. ABC , each of these \u201cruns counter to the underlying rationale and purpose of the MCA and, in particular, of its decision and fact sensitive approach to the application of its best interests test in all the circumstances of a given case.\u201d 66. Mitigation of tax, particularly taxes of inter-generational effect and even by completely lawful \u201cvanilla\u201d means, is a matter on which there may be a range of views. The Mental Capacity Act does not permit the Court to rely on default positions, assumptions or generalisations in making a decision about whether gifts to effect tax mitigation are in the best interests of a particular protected person. The Court must decide the application on nothing more and nothing less than a case-specific application of section 4. 67. The balancing exercise: In my judgment, the factors weighing in favour and against the making of the proposed gifts from JMA\u2019s estate may be summarised thus: IN FAVOUR AGAINST The recipients of the proposed gifts are those whom JMA has chosen to benefit in the will she made when she had capacity to do so: \u2022 the benefit they will receive has a good prospect of being increased by the effect of tax mitigation but will otherwise be much the same overall whether or not the gifts are made JMA had on one occasion expressed a wish that her son should know that the end of financial support from her had come. Management of her property and affairs with a view to tax efficiency is consistent with JMA\u2019s beliefs and values as demonstrated by her actions when she had capacity to manage her financial affairs for herself: \u2022 when she could, she took regular financial advice and made decisions in accordance with that advice to minimise her exposure to lifetime taxes, including strategies with incidental inheritance tax benefits \u2022 JMA\u2019s change of circumstances now makes it feasible to consider post-death tax exposure JMA\u2019s tax mitigation whilst she had capacity did not extend to post-death taxes save where that was incidental to life-time tax planning intended to address her own needs The proposed gifts are amply affordable and will have no discernible impact on her ability to meet her conceivable needs from her remaining funds. The proposed gifts reduce JMA\u2019s estate and therefore the funds available to her during her lifetime by approximately 38%. The proposed gifts reflect an agreement reached between the various recipients and with independent representation of JMA herself: \u2022 any further argument is avoided, thereby reducing potential exposure to costs \u2022 giving effect to the agreement may have a beneficial effect on family relationships which have been adversely affected by difficult circumstances. 68. I have not entered the tax mitigating effect of the proposed gifts as an independent factor on either side of the balance sheet. Payment of tax from her estate after her death will have no direct impact on JMA either way and it is no part of the Court of Protection\u2019s function to protect either an inheritance or a revenue stream. Inheritance tax mitigating effect can in my view only meaningfully be considered in the best interests balancing exercise as a mechanism which either supports or goes against the particular individual\u2019s wishes and feelings, values and beliefs about gifting and tax planning. In the circumstances of this case, I am satisfied that it is subsumed in the positive factor of enhancing benefit to those whom JMA wished to benefit. 69. JMA herself presently has no discernible wishes in respect of the gifts being proposed or the mitigation of inheritance tax. However, there is clear evidence that she wished in the past to make gifts to her son and charities relevant to her life within the means then available to her; and evidence in the drawing up of her will that she wished to benefit them and her grandson further in due course. Moreover, from the steps she took in respect of the properties which now belong to her son, even if she did not actively turn her mind to post-death tax planning, it is clear that JMA was open to such measures. 70. On one occasion JMA expressed to her professional adviser a wish that her son should know that financial support from her had reached an end. I do not consider that this implies a decision never to benefit her son again during her lifetime. I prefer the interpretation which Mr. Morris gives, on the basis of an established professional relationship with JMA and also RA. I further accept that JMA\u2019s circumstances have now changed significantly; and that the gifts under consideration are not in the nature of \u2018financial support.\u2019 In the balancing exercise, what JMA actually did when she had capacity carries greater weight as a guide to her wishes and feelings than what she is recorded as saying in a single attendance note. 71. When JMA felt able to make gifts to PBC and favoured charities without jeopardising her ability to meet her own needs, she did so. When opportunities arose, she opted to follow professional advice and minimise her lifetime tax payments. The occasions of both gifting and tax mitigation may have been quite few in number and over a relatively short period of time but I am satisfied that this reflects JMA\u2019s circumstances at the time and, sadly, the early onset of her dementia. The gifts now proposed, in the current circumstances of her life, are in my judgment consistent with the beliefs and values JMA demonstrated when she was able to manage her financial affairs for herself. 72. RA\u2019s wishes expressed in the Residuary Provisions of his will are a factor which JMA would be likely to consider if she were able to do so. I am satisfied that she has already considered them and made a capacitous decision to make gifts to charities but not (other than by consenting to the release of funds from the inter vivos trust) to any of the individuals. Mr. Morris has given an explanation of JMA\u2019s approach to the individuals, and I find no basis to draw any different conclusion now. I accept the parties\u2019 assertion that JMA\u2019s own capacitous decisions are the best guide to how the Court should consider RA\u2019s wishes in the context of this application. I am satisfied that the proposals reflect JMA\u2019s own considered position in this respect. 73. The views of other relevant persons as to JMA\u2019s best interests with regard to this proposal are unanimously in favour: a. JMA\u2019s sole surviving child makes the application. Of course it may be said that, since he is the recipient of the largest part of the proposed gifting, the application is self-serving but I am satisfied that it has not been improperly brought. JMA appointed PBC as her sole attorney, indicating a significant degree of trust and faith in him and the decisions he is thereby empowered to make. The proposal he now makes is beyond the scope of his powers as attorney but he makes it with Mr. Morris, JMA\u2019s long-standing adviser, fully in support; b. JMA\u2019s only grandchild also now supports the proposals; c. JMA is independently represented, and her representatives support the proposals; d. There is no indication that anyone else engaged in caring for JMA or interested in her welfare takes a contrary view. 74. Taking all things into consideration, I am satisfied that the factors in favour of the proposed gifts outweigh the factors against. In the context of the wider agreement between the parties, I am satisfied that the proposals are in the best interests of JMA. I will make orders in the terms of the drafts submitted by the parties. Carolyn Hilder 16th April 2018<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<hr class=\"kji-sep\" \/>\n<p class=\"kji-source-links\"><strong>Sources officielles :<\/strong> <a class=\"kji-source-link\" href=\"https:\/\/caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk\/ewcop\/2018\/19\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">consulter la page source<\/a><\/p>\n<p class=\"kji-license-note\"><em>Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).<\/em><\/p>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>1. PBC is the son of JMA, and was appointed as her sole attorney for property and affairs by a Lasting Power of Attorney executed on 5th August 2010 and registered by the Public Guardian on 16th December 2010. He seeks the authority of the Court to make from JMA\u2019s estate various gifts together exceeding \u00a37 million. The purpose of&#8230;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":0,"template":"","meta":{"_crdt_document":""},"kji_country":[7608],"kji_court":[13752],"kji_chamber":[],"kji_year":[47917],"kji_subject":[7612],"kji_keyword":[11549,9038,9155,10574,10975],"kji_language":[7611],"class_list":["post-792650","kji_decision","type-kji_decision","status-publish","hentry","kji_country-royaume-uni","kji_court-court-of-protection","kji_year-47917","kji_subject-fiscal","kji_keyword-benefit","kji_keyword-capacity","kji_keyword-gifts","kji_keyword-interests","kji_keyword-proposed","kji_language-anglais"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO Premium plugin v27.5 (Yoast SEO v27.5) - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-premium-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>PBC v JMA &amp; Ors - Ma\u00eetre Hassan Kohen, avocat en droit p\u00e9nal \u00e0 Paris<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/ru\/jurisprudences\/pbc-v-jma-ors\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"ru_RU\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"PBC v JMA &amp; Ors\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"1. PBC is the son of JMA, and was appointed as her sole attorney for property and affairs by a Lasting Power of Attorney executed on 5th August 2010 and registered by the Public Guardian on 16th December 2010. He seeks the authority of the Court to make from JMA\u2019s estate various gifts together exceeding \u00a37 million. 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