{"id":562715,"date":"2026-04-14T23:56:55","date_gmt":"2026-04-14T21:56:55","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/jurisprudences\/c-a-child-transnational-abandonment-wardship-re\/"},"modified":"2026-04-14T23:56:55","modified_gmt":"2026-04-14T21:56:55","slug":"c-a-child-transnational-abandonment-wardship-re","status":"publish","type":"kji_decision","link":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/jurisprudences\/c-a-child-transnational-abandonment-wardship-re\/","title":{"rendered":"C (A Child: Transnational Abandonment: Wardship), Re"},"content":{"rendered":"
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1. This judgment concerns C (born December 2024), now aged just over 14 months. The mother, M (22), and the father, F (26), are both Pakistani nationals. They married in Pakistan in February 2024 and, as I find below, remain married. 2. The mother\u2019s application seeks the following: i) findings of fact; ii) a declaration that this court has jurisdiction to entertain applications relating to C under Part I, Family Law Act 1986 (\u201cFLA 1986\u201d) because C was habitually resident in England and Wales on 29 September 2025 (the date of issue: s.7(c) FLA 1986); and, if jurisdiction is established, iii) wardship and the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction to protect C who, it is alleged, is currently in Pakistan and living in hiding, separated from his primary carer. 3. The father resists the application, contending that the English court lacks jurisdiction; that the mother abandoned C in Pakistan; that C is integrated in Pakistan; that immigration obstacles make return impossible; that wardship would breach his human rights; and that any order would be incapable of implementation and contrary to comity. 4. On the morning of the first hearing day, it appeared that father's counsel was no longer able to represent him due to ill health. I gave permission to Mr Bright ArreyMbi, solicitor, who has been acting for father in these proceedings for some while, to address me. I adjourned the matter to allow Mr Bright Arrey-Mbi time to take further instructions and undertake further preparation, if he wished to continue representing F. I received the father's position statement on the same day, and Mr Bright ArreyMbi confirmed that both he and F were content to proceed with the hearing on the second day. No objections were raised by those acting for M. I again gave permission to Mr Bright Arrey-Mbi to address the court and cross examine mother. 5. I considered a hearing bundle which contained witness statements from both parties and a number of documents exhibited to each of them. I also heard oral evidence from both parents across two days, with interpreters. The hearing was tightly focused on factual controversies necessary to determine habitual residence and protective measures. The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. 6. Appropriate measures were put in place in court having regard to the allegations of domestic abuse and PD12J. Issues 7. The issues can be stated as follows: (1) What are the material facts, including whether the mother and C were stranded inPakistan and whether the alleged divorce is genuine? (2) Whether, as at 29 September 2025, C was habitually resident in England andWales within s.2(1)(b)(ii) FLA 1986, such that this court has jurisdiction to make orders under s.1(1)(a) and\/or s.1(1)(d) FLA 1986 (read with ss.2A, 3 and 7). (3) If jurisdiction is established, whether it is necessary and proportionate to exercisethe inherent jurisdiction by making C a ward of court, having regard to the fact that he is a very young child living in hiding abroad. (4) Whether any of the father\u2019s objections (physical presence, immigration, time and integration, intention, human rights) defeat jurisdiction or militate against wardship. Background 8. The father came to the UK in July 2023 as a Skilled Worker visa holder, valid for two years at that time. The parties were married on 28 February 2024. The mother joined F as a dependant in March 2024. C was born in Birmingham in December 2024. The family lived in the West Midlands; C was registered with a GP and was cared for day to day by the mother. Shortly before April 2025 the family moved belongings to a new home in Walsall in anticipation of occupying it on return from a trip abroad. 9. In December 2024, F made an application for leave to remain in the UK as a skilled worker. The parents were granted leave to remain in the UK until January 2030. Although F gave evidence that he recently lost his employment as a care worker, it was clear from the Home Office documentation that he retains a valid visa. He told the court he currently works, albeit on a seemingly ad hoc basis, delivering take-away food. 10. A \u2018No Time Limit\u2019 application was made by father for C on 13 March 2025 to confirm his indefinite leave to remain in the UK. This application was incorrect as it is only made for children who have Indefinite Leave to Remain in the UK which C did not. Either the father made this application under a misunderstanding as to the correct procedure, but with a clear wish for C to be able to stay in the UK, or as the mother asserts, he made this application to deceive her, so she would agree to travel to Pakistan with C without knowing that he had made the incorrect application and that C would not be able to return to the UK without a visa. 11. The mother had provided no notice to C\u2019s Health Visitor that she was relocating and as a result of the stranding he missed several appointments, with documentary evidence confirming the fact he had not attended for planned appointments. 12. Although F suggests he has no family ties in the UK, in fact both he and M had been living with his extended family (cousins). 13. On 2 April 2025 the parents and C travelled to Pakistan. It is common ground it was a trip planned in advance; the mother understood it to be short; the father says flights existed for late May 2025 and provided documentary evidence showing outbound and return flight details. In July 2025 the father returned to the UK without the mother and C. The mother secured replacement passports for herself and C but could not obtain a UK visa for C without the father\u2019s consent. The mother returned alone to the UK on 23 August 2025; she lives in a women\u2019s refuge. C remains in Pakistan with maternal grandparents. Analysis of the Evidence 14. I have considered a large amount of written and oral evidence and do not propose to refer to it all in detail here. The fact that I have not set out each and every factual matter in this judgment does not mean I have not considered it, rather I have focussed on specific parts of the evidence which I consider to be particularly relevant to the issues which I have to determine. 15. On either party\u2019s case, the trip to Pakistan in April 2025 was intended to be a holiday. M understood that they were going for two weeks (circa 15 days). F says that the family were booked to return to the UK after a holiday on 30 May 2025. While the validity of the evidence of booking was questioned by M, it does not alter the fact that on either party\u2019s case, when the trip to Pakistan was planned, it was intended to be a holiday and not a move to Pakistan to live there permanently. Notably, C's belongings, along with M\u2019s, remained in England and in their home in Walsall when they left in April 2025. 16. F asserted that \u2018after a day or so in Pakistan\u2019 there were disagreements that led to the parties\u2019 divorce. He says that the evidence relied upon by M from the Union Council in Pakistan, as well as from the High Commission in London, (which M says shows that the divorce certificate produced by F is fake), should be rejected, as they are \u2018false' and were procured through illegitimate means by M with the help of her father, who is a police officer in Pakistan. 17. Notably, when cross examined, F then stated he \u2018went to Pakistan to get divorced' which contradicted his earlier and written evidence that the topic of divorce only arose after the parties had arrived in Pakistan, ostensibly for a holiday. He denied M's allegations that she and F had been arguing about F's intended trip to Pakistan to marry H, and that he had hit and slapped her and C in December 2024. F travelled to Pakistan and returned in March 2025 shortly before the planned April holiday. 18. I have also considered the allegations in relation to domestic violence. The mother gave a candid and internally consistent account of coercive and controlling behaviour and physical abuse, escalating during pregnancy and after C\u2019s birth. The police were called on one occasion in England (this is not in dispute) to retrieve M's phone and ensure her safety. 19. M's evidence that F and his cousin had slapped her after an argument in the car in March 2025 was denied by F. Although F had already taken an oath and affirmed before he gave his oral evidence, at this point, he offered to \u2018swear on the Quran' to prove the validity of his testimony. I asked him whether there was a distinction to be made about his evidence given under his previous oath (affirmation) and that which he now wanted to give under oath with the Quran as M's evidence was \u2018all a lie'. After repeating that he would happily \u2018swear on the Quran\u2019, he did not do so. I found this outburst to be at best peculiar and at worst an inference by F that his evidence under the Quran would in some way be more compelling or credible than that under an affirmation. In any event his evidence continued under his previous oath. I observed at another point later in the evidence, F again repeated the request to \u2018swear on the Quran' to support the credibility of his evidence (on that occasion denying that M was \u2018trapped' at the paternal parents' home in Pakistan after arrival in April 2025). 20. Under cross examination, F\u2019s evidence about this episode of alleged domestic violence evolved beyond anything in his written or earlier evidence. The court heard for the first time that F just stopped the car and M left of her own free will and that he parked the car and he ran after M but she was \u2018hiding', notwithstanding that it was cold, she had a small baby, no phone and no blanket. I found F's evidence on this to be lacking credibility and embellished; as Ms Cooper suggested to F, this evidence was completely new and being recounted for the very first time in the witness box. 21. Another important new development in the evidence was during cross examination of F; he told the court that he had spoken to M's father before the trip to Pakistan in April 2025, who told him that if F and M did not get on, then he should come to Pakistan to \u2018get divorced'. This is inconsistent with F's witness statement and parts of his oral evidence in which he said that it was only after his arrival in Pakistan with M that they began having disagreements within a few days and only then did the notion of divorce come up. 22. F stated that there was a divorce on 4 July 2025, that M preferred to live with her family in Pakistan, and that C\u2019s current situation is benign. He alleges that M is fabricating evidence against him in order to be able to remain in the UK by whatever means, including lying to the authorities about domestic abuse. He denies domestic abuse and any involvement in intimidation. 23. When questioned about his subsequent marriage to his \u2018second wife', F stated he got married shortly after divorcing M, on 7 July 2025. However, the marriage certificate registered with the Union Council showed that F had stated he married his second wife (\u2018H') on 25 January 2024. It was put to F that he had given the wrong date deliberately to the Union Council so that he could bring his second wife, H to the UK. H was granted a visa and arrived in the UK in November 2025 to join F. 24. F denied having given the wrong date on the document, stating that M's father had forged or manipulated the document; but there was no evidence before me to support this allegation. Furthermore, it made no sense for M or her father to have forged the documentation in question as that would have effectively meant that F had been married to someone else before her, and that M was therefore \u2018the second wife'. This would have been of no benefit to her either in relation to any Visa application, and could not assist her in these proceedings. I note also that the first time F challenged the authenticity of this document was in his position statement filed with the court the previous day. 25. F says his August 2025 trip (28\u201331 August) was solely to see his father who he described as \u2018fatally ill' and \u2018dying'. 26. M said on landing in Pakistan, F seized her and C\u2019s passports, destroyed her phone, confined her at the paternal home, and continued abuse by F and paternal mother. F left without notice and returned to the UK. She denied any divorce, promptly sought replacement passports and tried to reunite with C in England, but was blocked by F\u2019s refusal to consent to C\u2019s visa. 27. Between April and July 2025, M states she was trapped in Pakistan by her husband and his family, rather than being habitually resident there and it was only after being permitted to move to her parents\u2019 home from that of the paternal family that M was able to fix her phone and then apply for new travel documents. M obtained a new passport for C but was unable to obtain a UK visa for him without F\u2019s consent. M returned to the UK on 23 August 2025 hoping that F would agree to C travelling to the UK. M\u2019s actions and behaviour clearly demonstrating she clearly considered her and C to be living in the UK. M remains living here legally as the dependent spouse of a Skilled Worker and with leave to remain until January 2030. 28. F\u2019s demeanour in evidence was evasive and rhetorical. A telling example arose when squarely asked whether he had slapped the baby, he responded, \u201cWhat father would hit a child?\u201d That is not an answer; it is a deflection. He frequently responded to questions with questions, and shifted his account under pressure. 29. F relied on a divorce certificate said to prove a 4 July 2025 divorce. The Union Council has certified the document as false. The Pakistani High Commission in London confirmed by official verification that the parties remain married. When confronted with this independent verification, the father pivoted in oral evidence to suggest that \u201ceveryone knew about the nikah divorce,\u201d a novel assertion which (i) had not been put forward consistently; (ii) does not answer the documentary verifications; and (iii) conflicts with the formality he earlier asserted. This volte face severely undermined his credibility. 30. The signature on the purported divorce paperwork appeared identical to the father\u2019s signature on his UK provisional driving licence. He provided no credible explanation. Set against the independent High Commission verification, I am driven to conclude the father fabricated or relied upon fabricated documents and then opportunistically changed his story when the forgery became apparent. 31. F contended that the maternal grandfather, a police officer, had the ability to forge or influence numerous agencies. That bare allegation does not sit with the independent High Commission verification supporting M\u2019s case; nor with the Union Council\u2019s confirmation that the father\u2019s divorce document was fake. F could not sensibly meet this point. 32. The father\u2019s explanation for his 28\u201331 August 2025 trip to Pakistan\u2014that his father was \u201cfatally ill\u201d\u2014was likewise unconvincing. The medical material produced comprised investigations (bloods, X rays, head\/heart tests\/scans) that were undated or loosely dated, with entries from June, August, and October 2025, including investigations post dating the trip. There is no medical opinion stating that his father was fatally ill in late August 2025; indeed, the father\u2019s father died months later. I accept the documents relate to health investigations, but they do not credibly support an urgent, time critical visit for a dying man. 33. That visit coincided with an attempted snatch abduction of C by unidentified men on motorbikes and a firearms incident by the maternal grandparents\u2019 home. I do not make a finding that the father orchestrated these events. However, the proximity of his return, following his knowledge that the mother had reached the UK and that C remained with the grandparents at a known location, and the absence of convincing medical justification, leads me to find that he travelled at that time at least in part to intimidate the mother\u2019s family and to exert coercive pressure. 34. On the mother\u2019s side, I found her measured, consistent with contemporaneous material (including C\u2019s GP registration, the family\u2019s move to Walsall pre trip, and the independent verifications from Pakistani authorities). She accepted where her recollection was uncertain. Her actions\u2014seeking replacement passports, attempting to secure a visa for C, and returning to the UK to try to resolve matters lawfully\u2014are entirely consistent with a stranded primary carer acting to secure her child\u2019s safety and reunification. Domestic abuse; transnational marriage abandonment 35. I find that the mother was subjected to domestic abuse within PD12J, including coercive and controlling behaviour and physical violence. I accept her account that in England there were incidents during pregnancy and after birth; that in Pakistan the father escalated control by removing documents and destroying her phone. The pattern is consistent with transnational marriage abandonment, as recognised in PD12J (para 2B, 3) and described in Re S (Wardship: Stranded Spouses) [2010] EWHC 1669 (Fam) and Re A (Children) [2019] EWCA Civ 74, Moylan LJ at [70]\u2013 [71]: \u201c70. \u2026 It is clear from the Practice Direction that the words abandonment and stranding are not terms of art and that they are not intended to be applied in a formulaic manner. This is because there are a number of ways in which a spouse might be said to have been abandoned or stranded abroad or in which the other spouse might have sought to achieve this. I would agree with Mr Gration when he submitted that cases can include many differing elements which militates against their being placed in distinct categories. 71. The core feature of the concept of stranding or abandonment is the exploitation or the attempted exploitation by one spouse of the other\u2019s vulnerability or weakness to seek to ensure that they are not able to come to or return to the UK. As Peter Jackson J (as he then was) said in ZM v AM (Stranded Spouse) [2014] EWHC 2110 (Fam), [2014] Fam Law 1402, at para [1], it can be the \u2018opportunity\u2019 the secure immigration status of one spouse and the insecure immigration status of the other gives \u2018the former to exploit the latter\u2019s weakness\u2019. However, as PD 12J makes clear, it is based more generally on \u2018controlling, coercive or threatening behaviour, violence or abuse\u2019.\u201d 36. The father\u2019s conduct exploited the mother\u2019s immigration vulnerability to strand her and separate her from C. It matters not, per Re A (Children) at [78], whether each attempt succeeded; it evidences controlling and coercive behaviour. Stranding; divorce 37. I therefore find: i) The trip to Pakistan on 2 April 2025 was intended to be temporary; there was no agreement to relocate. ii) The mother\u2019s and child\u2019s travel documents were seized; the mother\u2019s phone was destroyed; the mother was confined at the paternal family home in Pakistan. iii) The father returned to the UK in July 2025 leaving mother and child in Pakistan without documents or consent to a visa for C. iv) The alleged divorce of 4 July 2025 is false; the parties remain married as verified by the High Commission. v) The mother did not consent to C living in Pakistan; she acted promptly to obtain replacement passports and to reunify in England. vi) The mother and child were stranded in Pakistan, and C remains separated from his primary carer and living in hiding. vii) Father had already decided to re-marry and had planned to marry her almost immediately after the purported divorce. The Law: Habitual Residence and Jurisdiction 38. Habitual residence is a question of fact, not a legal status: A v A (Children: Habitual Residence) [2013] UKSC 60. The core test is whether the child\u2019s residence reflects some degree of integration in a social and family environment. For an infant, that environment is substantially that of the primary carer: Re B [2016] UKSC 4. The inquiry is present focused and holistic; the depth and quality of the child\u2019s integration is key; temporary absences, even if extended, do not of themselves dislodge habitual residence; and the court should avoid placing a child in a jurisdictional limbo – see Re B, and the structured summary by Williams J in Re J v H [2024] EWHC 1395 (Fam): 27. The Supreme Court in Re B [2016] UKSC 4 emphasised that it is in a child's best interests to have a habitual residence so as to avoid falling into a jurisdictional limbo. Where a set of facts might reasonably lead to a finding of habitual residence or no habitual residence the court should find a habitual residence. 28. The principles which emerge from the decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Justice of the European Union are as follows: i) habitual residence is a question of fact and not a legal concept like domicile. There is no legal rule akin to that whereby a child automatically takes the domicile of his parents; ii) it was the purpose of the FLA 1986 to adopt a concept which was the same as that adopted in the Hague and European Conventions. The 1996 HCPC must be interpreted consistently with those Conventions; iii) the test adopted by the European court is 'the place which reflects some degree of integration by the child in a social and family environment' in the country concerned. The criterion of proximity identified in the Recital incorporates the child's best interests. This depends upon numerous factors, including the reasons for the family's stay in the country in question; iv) the test adopted by the European court and adopted by the courts of England is preferable to that earlier adopted by the English courts, being focused as it is this on the situation of the child, with the purposes and intentions of the parents being merely one of the relevant factors; v) the social and family environment of an infant or young child is shared with those (whether parents or others) upon whom he is dependent. Hence it is necessary to assess the integration of that person or persons in the social and family environment of the country concerned. That of an older child or adolescent is likely to be more distinct from that of the primary carer as they will have integrated in school or other aspects of their community; vi) the essentially factual and individual nature of the inquiry should not be glossed with legal concepts which would produce a different result from that which the factual inquiry would produce; vii) parental intent did play a part in establishing or changing the habitual residence of a child: not parental intent in relation to habitual residence as a legal concept, but parental intent in relation to the reasons for a child's leaving one country and going to stay in another. The intentions or wishes of a parent with rights of custody would have to be considered. The intentions of the parents could not override the objective identification of where the child has in fact resided having regard to the importance of proximity. Subjective factors such as nationality or future intention cannot displace objective factors relating to proximity. They would have to be factored in, along with all the other relevant factors, in particular when deciding whether a move from one country to another had a sufficient degree of stability to amount to a change of habitual residence; viii) the state of mind of the child concerned may also be relevant to assessing their degree of integration. The majority held it was only adolescents or those to be treated as adolescents whose state of mind was relevant. The minority (which included Baroness Hale) held that there was no logical reason to exclude the state of mind of younger children; ix) the assessment of integration of the child involves consideration of objective factors as well as subjective factors. The court is seeking to ascertain the 'centre of the child's life'. It is also a comparative exercise involving consideration of the quality of the previous habitual residence and that of the new. The judge must take sufficiently into account the facts relevant to the old and new lives of the child and the family although need not necessarily do so in a side by side analysis of the sort carried out by Lord Wilson in Re B as long as it is apparent from the judgment as a whole that the exercise has been undertaken. Objective factors which support geographical proximity are likely to be more decisive than subjective factors such as national origins and future intentions but both are to be considered. Temporary absences from the country of their everyday lives, even if measured in months does not alter the country of habitual residence. Ms Cabeza identified a small cohort of cases where a child had been found not to have acquired habitual residence because their presence was pursuant to a court order which could not be made final until their immigration status (or similar) were determined and this prevented acquisition of habitual residence even though they were present for periods measured in many months or years. I regard those as being fact-specific examples where a degree of uncertainty undermined integration. Ms Cabeza referred to them to argue that Nora could not have become habitually resident in Thailand even now because a return order had been in force since 1 March 2023. x) The previous rule that 'habitual residence' cannot be changed without the consent of all holders of parental responsibility is to be discarded. Whether a holder of parental responsibility has consented may affect the quality of integration but is not a bar to habitual residence changing. Similarly, the extent of the relationship between a child and a parent in another country may affect the quality of the child's integration but the complete absence of a relationship would not prevent the child acquiring habitual residence. Ms Chokowry submitted that the poor contact between the mother and Nora in the period 2019-22 prevented her acquiring habitual residence in England. xi) A young infant cannot gain habitual residence in a state where he was not born and which he has not visited and has been living with his primary carer elsewhere since birth . A child cannot be habitually resident in a country in which he has never been present; xii) a child will usually not be left without a habitual residence and if a set of facts could reasonably lead to a finding of habitual residence or no habitual residence the former should be preferred. As integration is gained in one country it is lost in another. Complete integration is not required but 'some'. 29. In Re B (as above) Lord Wilson set out three expectations: [45] I conclude that the modern concept of a child's habitual residence operates in such a way as to make it highly unlikely, albeit conceivable, that a child will be in the limbo in which the courts below have placed B. The concept operates in the expectation that, when a child gains a new habitual residence, he loses his old one. Simple analogies are best: consider a see-saw. As, probably quite quickly, he puts down those first roots which represent the requisite degree of integration in the environment of the new state, up will probably come the child's roots in that of the old state to the point at which he achieves the requisite de-integration (or, better, disengagement) from it. [46] In making the following three suggestions about the point at which habitual residence might be lost and gained, I offer not subrules but expectations which the fact-finder may well find to be unfulfilled in the case before him: (a) the deeper the child's integration in the old state, probably the less fast his achievement of the requisite degree of integration in the new state; (b) the greater the amount of adult pre-planning of the move, including prearrangements for the child's day-to-day life in the new state, probably the faster his achievement of that requisite degree; and (c) were all the central members of the child's life in the old state to have moved with him, probably the faster his achievement of it and, conversely, were any of them to have remained behind and thus to represent for him a continuing link with the old state, probably the less fast his achievement of it.' 39. Parental intention is relevant, but the test centres upon the child\u2019s situation; nationality, domicile, and immigration status are not determinative. Critically, a child cannot lose habitual residence or acquire a new one through coercion, abuse, or wrongful retention: Re A (Children) [2019] EWCA Civ 74 at [70]\u2013[71], [78]. 40. Jurisdiction to make orders in respect of a child habitually resident in England and Wales lies under Part I FLA 1986\u2014in particular s.1(1)(a) (s.8 Children Act 1989 orders) and s.1(1)(d) (orders under the inherent jurisdiction relating to a child\u2019s care, contact or education), when the conditions in ss.2A and 3 are met; and the relevant date for habitual residence is the date of the application: s.7(c). 41. Where the relief sought falls within s.1(1)(a) and\/or (d) (as here), the court proceeds under Part I and does not invoke the separate nationality based inherent jurisdiction used in A v A [2013] UKSC 60 (which concerned different relief and a British child). That nationality route is not available or needed in this case and, indeed, would be inappropriate where Part I provides the statutory scheme. Application of the Law to the Facts Habitual residence at the relevant date (29 September 2025) 42. C was born in England, lived here continuously until 2 April 2025, was registered with a GP, and lived in a family unit rooted in England. The parents\u2019 leave to remain ran (on the documents before the court) to January 2030. The family had moved belongings to Walsall as their intended home immediately before the short trip. 43. The trip was temporary. The father\u2019s own case on booking dates (late May 2025) is consistent with a holiday, not a relocation. There was no shared settled intention to move to Pakistan. 44. C\u2019s continued presence in Pakistan from April 2025 was not voluntary or an incident of ordinary life. The father seized the documents, smashed the phone, and left the mother and C without the means to return. When the mother had replacement passports, she could not obtain a UK visa for C without the father\u2019s consent, which he withheld. The mother returned to the UK alone on 23 August 2025, in lawful exercise of her existing leave, intending to secure C\u2019s return. 45. I reject the father\u2019s claim that the mother abandoned C. The mother\u2019s actions are entirely consistent with a primary carer stranded and coerced, doing what she could to regularise matters. I also reject the father\u2019s reliance on the false divorce and his later attempt to re characterise it as a non documentary religious divorce. 46. I find that as at 29 September 2025 C had not integrated into ordinary life in Pakistan. He was (and remains) living in hiding, separated from his primary carer, under the cloud of intimidation and a recent attempted snatch abduction and firearms incident near his carers\u2019 home. That existence is the antithesis of the \u201csome degree of integration\u201d in a stable social and family environment that habitual residence requires. 47. Consistent with Re B and Re J v H, where a child\u2019s earlier habitual residence is strong and the subsequent sojourn is unstable, coerced or fearful, the court should be slow to find that habitual residence was lost. I am firmly satisfied that C remained habitually resident in England and Wales on the relevant date. It follows that this court has jurisdiction under s.2(1)(b)(ii) FLA 1986 to entertain orders under s.1(1)(a) and s.1(1) (d). The Father\u2019s Specific Jurisdictional Objections 48. Physical presence: Physical presence is not determinative. Habitual residence is a mixed factual assessment of integration, not a headcount of days. Presence achieved or maintained by coercion cannot found a new habitual residence: Re A (Children) [2019] EWCA Civ 74. 49. Right to enter\/remain (immigration control): Immigration status is not a criterion of habitual residence. It may form part of the background but cannot displace the factual assessment of the child\u2019s life and integration. Here, immigration obstacles were created or exploited by the father\u2019s refusal to consent to C\u2019s visa and the earlier removal of documents. 50. Time and integration: The father points out that C spent \u201conly\u201d three plus months in England and thereafter many months in Pakistan. Time alone is not decisive; the quality of the stay is crucial. A very young child living in hiding, separated from the primary carer through coercion, is not integrated. Re M (Children) [2020] EWCA Civ 1105 does not assist the father; that case cautioned against mechanical see saw reasoning and looked at actual integration in the new environment\u2014precisely what is absent here. 51. Parental intention to remain in the UK: The father says he never intended to settle permanently in the UK (and refers to sponsor licence issues). Habitual residence is not controlled by the future intentions of one parent. For an infant, the court looks to the primary carer\u2019s situation and the reality of the child\u2019s everyday life. Here, the mother\u2019s and child\u2019s ordinary life was in England until they were taken on a temporary trip and then stranded. 52. Human rights: The father argues wardship would breach his Article 8 because he intends to live in Pakistan and would be cut off from C. That is misconceived. Jurisdiction does not predetermine welfare or contact. Wardship does not extinguish his relationship; it protects a vulnerable infant. Any Article 8 analysis is to be undertaken at the welfare stage, and nothing in this judgment precludes remote or supervised contact arrangements or future cross border solutions consistent with C\u2019s safety and best interests. In addition, I note that the father has an extended visa valid for at least two more years and has brought his alleged \u2018second wife' to the UK to live with him. Whilst I accept his previous employment with a care agency has come to an end, it is clear that when faced with a similar employment issue previously, he was able to find alternative work and indicated in court that he was in fact working for \u2018cash\u2019 delivering take-away food. 53. Hague Convention: Pakistan is not a contracting state; the mother does not rely on the Convention. Jurisdiction here is under Part I FLA 1986. The Hague point is irrelevant. 54. Reliance on A v A [2013] UKSC 60 (nationality): The nationality based inherent jurisdiction considered there is not in play where, as here, the orders fall within s.1(1) (a) and (d) FLA 1986 and jurisdiction arises under s.2(1)(b)(ii) by habitual residence. The father\u2019s argument that A v A bars wardship because C is not British fundamentally misunderstands the structure of Part I. 55. Impossibility \/ implementation: The father says orders cannot be implemented: C is abroad; UKVI\/Pakistan High Commission cannot be compelled. Practical difficulty is not a bar to jurisdiction. The High Court may invite cooperation, make protective orders, and set the framework for lawful reunification, without purporting to bind foreign authorities. Comity is respected by requests, not commands. The court\u2019s protective jurisdiction does not depend on a guarantee of mechanical enforcement overseas. 56. Comity \/ Pakistani proceedings: The father may pursue remedies in Pakistan. This court is not dictating the outcome in Pakistan; it is protecting a child habitually resident here from harm associated with coercive separation and living in hiding. There is no disrespect to Pakistani sovereignty in recognising the English habitual residence of an infant whose ordinary life was rooted here and whose removal morphed into stranding by abuse. 57. Security in Pakistan: The father downplays risk, pointing to disputed police reports. I am satisfied there was an attempted snatch and a firearms incident proximate to his August visit; C is living in concealment. The risk picture is driven by my fact find, not merely by paperwork. It would be artificial to treat C\u2019s life in hiding as neutral. Wardship and the Inherent Jurisdiction 58. Having established jurisdiction under Part I FLA 1986, I turn to wardship. Wardship is a protective jurisdiction of last resort but remains vital where a child requires the High Court\u2019s immediate protection. A child\u2019s physical absence does not preclude wardship: see A v A (A Child) [2013] UKSC 60 (different gateway, same principle as to reach of protection). Under s.1(1)(d) FLA 1986, read with ss.2A and 3, the court may exercise the inherent jurisdiction where the child is habitually resident in England and Wales. 59. C is extremely young; he has been coercively separated from his primary carer; he is living in hiding; there is a recent history of intimidation and a proximate attempted abduction; the father has fabricated or relied upon false documentation and shifted his account to meet the case against him. In these circumstances, I am satisfied that no lesser measure would adequately protect the child. 60. The orders I make are necessary and proportionate for immediate protection. They do not conclude welfare. They set the protective frame within which the next steps can be lawfully and safely taken. Conclusions 61. For the reasons given, I make the following findings: i) The trip of 2 April 2025 was temporary; there was no agreement to relocate to Pakistan. ii) The mother\u2019s and C\u2019s passports were removed, her phone destroyed, and she was subjected to domestic abuse and coercive control. iii) The asserted 4 July 2025 divorce is false; the parties remain married (as independently verified). iv) The mother did not consent to C living in Pakistan; she promptly sought replacement passports and attempted to reunify in England. v) The mother and C were stranded in Pakistan against their will; C is living in hiding. vi) The father\u2019s 28\u201331 August 2025 visit, said to be to see a \u201cfatally ill\u201d father, is unconvincing on the medical material; while I do not find he orchestrated the attempted snatch, I find his presence then was intended to intimidate. vii) As at 29 September 2025, C remained habitually resident in England and Wales. viii) This court has jurisdiction under s.2(1)(b)(ii) FLA 1986 to make orders under s.1(1)(a) and s.1(1)(d). ix) It is necessary and proportionate to exercise the inherent jurisdiction and make C a ward of court forthwith. The wardship shall continue until further order. 62. That is my judgment.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

Sources officielles :<\/strong> consulter la page source<\/a><\/p>\n

Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).<\/em><\/p>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

1. This judgment concerns C (born December 2024), now aged just over 14 months. The mother, M (22), and the father, F (26), are both Pakistani nationals. They married in Pakistan in February 2024 and, as I find below, remain married. 2. The mother\u2019s application seeks the following: i) findings of fact; ii) a declaration that this court has jurisdiction…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":0,"template":"","meta":{"_crdt_document":""},"kji_country":[7608],"kji_court":[8046],"kji_chamber":[],"kji_year":[7610],"kji_subject":[7612],"kji_keyword":[8265,8048,9268,9266,9267],"kji_language":[7611],"class_list":["post-562715","kji_decision","type-kji_decision","status-publish","hentry","kji_country-royaume-uni","kji_court-high-court-family-division","kji_year-7610","kji_subject-fiscal","kji_keyword-child","kji_keyword-father","kji_keyword-habitual","kji_keyword-pakistan","kji_keyword-residence","kji_language-anglais"],"yoast_head":"\nC (A Child: Transnational Abandonment: Wardship), Re - Ma\u00eetre Hassan Kohen, avocat en droit p\u00e9nal \u00e0 Paris<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/jurisprudences\/c-a-child-transnational-abandonment-wardship-re\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"zh_CN\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"C (A Child: Transnational Abandonment: Wardship), Re\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"1. This judgment concerns C (born December 2024), now aged just over 14 months. The mother, M (22), and the father, F (26), are both Pakistani nationals. They married in Pakistan in February 2024 and, as I find below, remain married. 2. 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