{"id":562852,"date":"2026-04-15T00:18:39","date_gmt":"2026-04-14T22:18:39","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/jurisprudences\/sm-v-the-secretary-of-state-for-work-and-pensions-anor\/"},"modified":"2026-04-15T00:18:39","modified_gmt":"2026-04-14T22:18:39","slug":"sm-v-the-secretary-of-state-for-work-and-pensions-anor","status":"publish","type":"kji_decision","link":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/jurisprudences\/sm-v-the-secretary-of-state-for-work-and-pensions-anor\/","title":{"rendered":"SM v The Secretary of State for Work and Pensions & Anor"},"content":{"rendered":"
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As the decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error of law, it is SET ASIDE under section 12(2)(a) and (b)(i) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 and the case is REMITTED to the First-tier Tribunal for rehearing by a fresh tribunal. DIRECTIONS A. The case is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for reconsideration at an oral hearing. B. The new tribunal should not involve the FTT Judge previously involved in considering this appeal on 29 February 2024 or the FTT Judge who made directions about it on 15 February 2023. C. The new Tribunal is directed to consider whether HMRC should be added as a party to AG\u2019s appeal and if so, to take the necessary steps to do so. D. The new Tribunal must not take account of circumstances that did not apply at the time of the Secretary of State\u2019s decision. Later evidence can be considered as long as it relates to the circumstances at the time of that decision: see R(DLA) 2\/01 and R(DLA) 3\/01. E. If the parties have any further written evidence to put before the tribunal, this should be sent to the relevant HMCTS regional tribunal office within one month of the issue of this decision. F. The tribunal hearing the remitted appeal is not bound in any way by the decision of the previous First-tier Tribunal. Depending on the findings of fact it makes, the new tribunal may reach the same or a different outcome from the previous tribunal. G. A copy of this decision shall be added to the bundle to be placed before the First-tier Tribunal hearing the remitted appeal. These Directions may be supplemented by later directions by a tribunal judge, registrar, or case worker, in the Social Entitlement Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal. REASONS FOR DECISION Factual background 1. For the purposes of child maintenance, for a period of time AG was the non-resident parent to his child, \u201cA\u201d, and SM was the person with care of A. On 05 January 2021, AG contacted the Child Maintenance Service (\u201cCMS\u201d) and reported a change in A\u2019s circumstances because he believed A was no longer in full-time education. In a decision dated 18 January 2021, CMS decided not to supersede (which means, change) the existing child maintenance calculation in respect of A. AG asked the CMS to reconsider its decision, which it did on 07 June 2021. However, the CMS maintained its position that AG remained liable to pay child maintenance in respect of A. 2. On 19 August 2021, the First-tier Tribunal received AG\u2019s appeal. On 18 July 2023, a First-tier Tribunal (\u201cFTT\u201d) Judge adjourned the hearing of the appeal on a part-heard basis. The FTT Judge explained they were adjourning the hearing because they needed to consider whether child benefit, which had remained payable for A until September 2021, was properly or lawfully payable (at that time). The FTT Judge wrote, at paragraph 6 of the Directions Notice: \u201cIn order to obtain such information [about child benefit] it is necessary to invite HMRC to become a party to the appeal. HMRC are directed below to provide the relevant information and documentation.\u201d 3. The Directions Notice also stated, at paragraph 11: \u201cHMRC are invited to become a party to the appeal, and must comply with the Directions below. Once the HMRC Response has been received, subject to their Response, they should be added as a party to the appeal. In the event of any difficulty the appeal should be referred back to [name of FTT Judge] for further interlocutory Directions.\u201d 4. Paragraphs 20 to 25 of the Directions Notice were addressed to HMRC. At paragraph 20, the FTT wrote (to HMRC): \u201cYou are invited to become a party to the appeal. This would greatly assist the Tribunal. An issue has arisen in this appeal regarding whether or not Child Benefit was properly and lawfully payable.\u201d 5. On 11 October 2023, an official acting on behalf of the CMS forwarded the FTT a response and attachments provided by HMRC dated 08 October 2023 (pages 110 to 1821 of FTT appeal bundle). Paragraph 25 of the response stated that on 28 September 2023, a Child Benefit Office decision-maker decided SM was not entitled to Child Benefit for A from 06 September 2021 because A had ceased full time non-advanced education and his education undertaken after this point at a place other than a school or college began after his 16th birthday. 6. HMRC explained the entitlement part of this decision had been made in accordance with sections 141 and 142 of the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992. In the response, HMRC cited regulations 3, 4 and 7(2) (citing case 1, 1.1 and 1.2 of regulation 7(2)) of the Child Benefit (General) Regulations 2006. 7. The FTT held a CVP video hearing of AG\u2019s appeal on 29 February 2024. AG and SM took part, and the CMS was represented by a Presenting Officer. HMRC was not represented at the appeal hearing. It was not listed as a party to the appeal on the paper record of proceedings (page 182 of FTT bundle), in the FTT\u2019s Decision Notice dated 29 February 2024 or in the Statement of Reasons dated 29 July 2024. 8. The FTT allowed AG\u2019s appeal. It decided that A ceased to be in full-time non-advanced education on 26 June 2020, and the effective date for the change of circumstances to AG\u2019s child maintenance liability was 27 June 2020. 9. The FTT provided a Statement of Reasons for that decision on 29 July 2024. On 15 October 2024, the FTT refused SM permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. Permission to appeal 10. On 30 October 2024, SM applied to the Upper Tribunal for permission to appeal. In a decision dated 17 February 2025, I granted SM permission to appeal in relation to the following grounds, which were arguable. 11. The FTT may have misdirected itself when applying the relevant legislation to A\u2019s circumstances: the FTT decided that after 26 June 2020, A did not meet the requirement of being in full-time non-advanced education for the purpose of regulation 3 of the Child Benefit (General) Regulations 2006 (\u201cthe 2006 Regulations\u201d). The FTT decided A was not undertaking full-time non-advanced education at a school or college (regulation 3(2)(a)(i)) and did not meet the conditions in regulation 3(2)(a)(ii) for undertaking that education elsewhere with approval from HMRC. 12. However, HMRC had explained that it decided regulation 7 of the 2006 Regulations applied to A. Regulation 7 identifies specific cases where child benefit continues for a period of time after a qualifying young person has stopped being in full-time non-advanced education. If A fell within any of those cases, they might allow for a \u201crun on\u201d of SM being entitled to child benefit. HMRC decided that A fell within one of the specific cases in regulation 7 allowing entitlement to child benefit after the date he left full-time non-advanced education. 13. In paragraphs 61 to 64 of its Statement of Reasons, the FTT acknowledged that HMRC decided A had remained a qualifying young person until a later date of 06 September 2021. The FTT stated it was, however, unclear why HMRC had decided this. The FTT did not appear to have considered regulation 7 of the 2006 Regulations when making its decision. It was arguable the FTT should have addressed that regulation and failing to do so might represent an error of law. Alternatively, the FTT may have failed to make adequate factual findings or provide adequate reasons to support its decision that A ceased to be a qualifying young person on 26 June 2020. 14. Proceeding with the appeal when HMRC appeared not to have been joined as a party to it: the FTT\u2019s directions referred to having \u201cinvited\u201d HMRC to become a party to the appeal. While this language did not clearly amount to a direction, the second sentence of paragraph 11 of the FTT\u2019s case management directions dated 18 July 2023 appeared to anticipate HMRC would become a party (\u201cshould be added as a party to the appeal\u201d). It appeared HMRC had not been added as a party to the appeal. HMCTS had not sent HMRC documents about the appeal, or notification of the appeal hearing date on 29 February 2024. HMRC was not listed as a party to the appeal on the documents mentioned at paragraph 7 above. 15. The FTT Judge arguably thought they had directed for HMRC to be added as a party to AG\u2019s appeal, given that they wrote the following at paragraph 9 of the Statement of Reasons: \u201cOn 18 July 2023, the Tribunal directed HMRC to be added as party to the appeal. No Presenting Officer from HMRC attended the hearing on 29 February 2024. However, HMRC provided a detailed written submission with documents regarding child benefit.\u201d 16. Rule 31 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (SEC) Rules 2008 (\u201cthe FTT Rules 2008\u201d) deals with proceeding in the absence of a party. In circumstances where the FTT made a direction it believed would add HMRC as a party to the appeal, it was arguably procedurally irregular for the FTT to proceed to decide AG\u2019s appeal in HMRC\u2019s absence, without addressing whether HMRC had been notified of the hearing (or reasonable steps had been taken to notify it) and whether it was in the interests of justice to proceed. Submissions on behalf of the Secretary of State (1st Respondent) 17. Ms Foody is the Secretary of State\u2019s representative in these proceedings. She supports SM\u2019s appeal in a written submission dated 26 March 2025. Ms Foody invites the Upper Tribunal to set aside the FTT\u2019s decision dated 29 February 2024 for containing material errors of law as summarised below. She indicates the Secretary of State does not request a hearing of SM\u2019s appeal to the Upper Tribunal. 18. Misdirection in law: Ms Foody submits the FTT made an error of law by failing to apply regulation 7 of the 2006 Regulations when determining the date that A ceased to be qualifying young person. 19. Ms Foody highlights that where there stops being a qualifying young person (required for child maintenance liability to exist at all), regulation 18(3)(a) of the Child Support Maintenance Calculation Regulations 2012 provides for the effective date of the change to be the date the child ceases to be a qualifying young person. 20. Ms Foody refers to regulation 7 of the 2006 regulations, which applies to a child who has not reached the age of 20 (but has reached 16). It sets out two cases, and Ms Foody submits that HMRC decided A fell within case 2 of them. 21. Ms Foody submits the cases potentially relevant to A, and provided for by regulation 7, are: \u201cCase 1 1.1 The period is from the date on which he ceases to receive relevant education or approved training, up to and including\u2014 (a) the week including the terminal date, or (b) if he attains the age of 20 on or before that date, the week including the last Monday before he attains that age. 1.2 For the purposes of this Case the \u201cterminal date\u201d means\u2014 (a) the last day in February, (b) the last day in May, (c) the last day in August, (d) the last day in November, whichever first occurs after the date on which the person's relevant education or approved training ceased (but subject to paragraph 1.3 of this Case). [1.3 \u2013 deals with Scotland and is not relevant here.] Case 2 2.1. Where a person's name is entered as a candidate for any external examination in connection with relevant education which he is receiving at that time, so long as his name continues to be so entered before ceasing to receive such education, the prescribed period is\u2014 (a) from the later of\u2014 (i) date when that person ceased to receive relevant education, or (ii) the date on which he attained the age of 16, (b) up to and including\u2014 (i) whichever of the dates in paragraph 1.2 (as modified by paragraph 1.3 where appropriate) first occurs after the conclusion of the examination (or the last of the examinations if the person is entered for more than one), or (ii) the expiry of the week which includes the last Monday before his 20th birthday, whichever is the earlier.\u201d 22. Ms Foody submits that the FTT made an error of law by failing to consider regulation 7 and whether A ceased to be a qualifying young person by reference to a date calculated using that regulation. 23. Ms Foody acknowledges the FTT was entitled to make its own findings based on the evidence before it. She submits, however, that part of that evidence included HMRC deciding to treat A as a qualifying young person until 05 September 2021, and HMRC\u2019s explanation that it had applied regulation 7 of the 2006 Regulations to do so. Ms Food submits that the FTT failed to address that evidence and therefore made an error of law. 24. Deciding the appeal in HMRC\u2019s absence: Ms Foody submits that the FTT failed to add HMRC as a party to the appeal. She observes that while the FTT stated it had directed for this to happen, it did not occur and HMRC was neither added as a party, nor notified of the hearing date on 29 February 2024. 25. Ms Foody submits that in these circumstances, the FTT should have considered whether it was fair and just to proceed with the hearing while HMRC was absent, applying rule 31 of the FTT Rules 2008. Ms Foody observes that HMRC was not notified of the hearing date and not given the opportunity to attend it (which are considerations under rule 31(a)). Ms Foody argues that while the FTT referred to the evidence HMRC had provided in its written submission, the FTT still appeared uncertain about why HMRC considered A was a qualifying young person until September 2021. She submits the FTT may have benefitted from HMRC participating in the hearing of AG\u2019s appeal. 26. Ms Foody also submits that the FTT has not made clear in its Statement of Reasons whether it considered whether it was fair to proceed in HMRC\u2019s absence. Rule 31(b) of the FTT Rules 2008 requires the FTT to consider it is in the interests of justice to proceed with a hearing, before it can decide an appeal in the absence of a party who fails to attend. 27. Ms Foody refers to the House of Lords\u2019 decision in South Bucks DistrictCouncil v Porter (No. 2) [2004] UKHL 33 (\u201cPorter\u201d) in support of her submission that the FTT failed to provide adequate reasons for its decision. She cites the following part of paragraph 36 of that decision: \u201cThe reasons for a decision must be intelligible and they must be adequate. They must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the \u2018principal important controversial issues\u2019, disclosing how any issue of law or fact was resolved\u201d. 28. Ms Food submits these matters represent the FTT making a material error of law in relation to the second ground on which I granted SM permission to appeal. Submissions from AG (2nd Respondent) 29. AG has made written submissions dated 25 July 2025. He opposes SM\u2019s appeal. AG argues the FTT clearly addressed the relevant facts and used its discretion to determine the appropriate terminal date (for A as a qualifying young person) based on actual attendance, which regulation 7 allows. AG argues this was not a legal error. AG argues the FTT accepted his evidence that A did not have exams or ongoing enrolment. 30. AG argues that while the Secretary of State claims HMRC should have been joined as a party, HMRC\u2019s position was already reflected in the evidence. He submits the suggestion that HMRC\u2019s presence would have changed the outcome is speculative and unfounded. AG argues that the Secretary of State\u2019s reliance on Porter is misplaced, because that case involved complex planning permissions and very special circumstances in the context of the Green Belt. AG argues Porter required a high standard of reasoning because of land use policies and environmental law. AG contrasts Porter with his own appeal to the FTT, which he states involved straightforward factual findings on school attendance. AG argues Porter does not apply to what the FTT was deciding. 31. AG provided his submissions late and explained the delay within the submissions. He asked for an extension of time to make the submissions, which was granted by an Upper Tribunal Registrar on 03 September 2025. 32. AG requested an oral hearing of SM\u2019s appeal to the Upper Tribunal. He wrote that he believes a hearing would give him the opportunity to explain and clarify the facts directly to the judge, especially as the Secretary of State is now relying on complex legal arguments and case law which are not suited to a simple child maintenance dispute. Response from SM 33. On 24 October 2025, SM sent the Upper Tribunal a response to what the other parties had written. Her response explained that SM did not wish to make any further representations and did not want an oral hearing of her appeal to the Upper Tribunal. Why there was no oral hearing of this appeal 34. Neither SM nor the Secretary of State requested an oral hearing of the appeal. AG requested one, giving the reasons summarised at paragraph 32 above. I took the parties\u2019 preferences into account and considered the appeal file and the FTT\u2019s Decision and Statement of Reasons. 35. AG has asked for a hearing so he can refer me to facts. In my assessment, what this really means is that AG wants me to look at evidence and his arguments about that evidence. Evaluating the evidence is a matter for the First-tier Tribunal, not the Upper Tribunal. The Upper Tribunal\u2019s role is not to receive fresh evidence about an appeal. While the evidence is, understandably, important to both AG and SM, it will not assist the Upper Tribunal in deciding the points of law that SM\u2019s appeal has raised. 36. SM\u2019s appeal to the Upper Tribunal is about whether the FTT made one or more material errors of law. In deciding this, the Upper Tribunal must take into account relevant legislation and applicable case law, including focusing on the matters Ms Foody has raised. 37. I have decided the interests of justice do not require an oral hearing of SM\u2019s appeal. Applying the overriding objective in rule 2 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, it is fair, just, proportionate and avoids delay to decide this appeal on the papers. 38. There has been a delay in this appeal being referred back to me to decide, because the Upper Tribunal Office had not appreciated that SM provided her response on 24 October 2025. On behalf of the Upper Tribunal Office, I apologise to the parties for the delay created and the inconvenience it will have caused them. My decision 39. At the permission stage, I only needed to be persuaded that it was arguable with a realistic (as opposed to fanciful) prospect of success that the FTT had made an error of law in a way that was material. 40. At this substantive stage, I need to be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the FTT did make an error or errors of law that were material to its decision. 41. Having considered all the parties\u2019 submissions and arguments, I am satisfied that the FTT made material errors of law in the ways set out at paragraphs 11 to 16 above and addressed by Ms Foody in her submissions (summarised at paragraphs 18 to 28 above). 42. While AG describes the legislation as complicated, the FTT had to identify it and apply all the relevant applicable legislation when deciding AG\u2019s appeal. 43. The starting point is the primary legislation. Section 55(1) of the Child Support Act 1991 defines what is meant by a child for the purpose of determining child maintenance liability. The definition includes a person who has not attained the age of 16 and a person who has not attained the age of 20 and who satisfies prescribed conditions (meaning, conditions set out in regulations). 44. The relevant applicable regulations for AG\u2019s child maintenance liability were the Child Support Maintenance Calculation Regulations 2012. Regulation 76 of those regulations explains the prescribed condition in section 55(1) for a person who has attained the age of 16, but not 20, is that they are a \u201cqualifying young person\u201d as defined in section 142(2) of the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992 (\u201cthe 1992 Act\u201d). 45. Section 142 of the 1992 Act provides for a qualifying young person to be defined by reference to prescribed conditions. Those conditions are set out in the 2006 Regulations. The FTT therefore needed to consider and apply all relevant provisions in the 2006 Regulations to A\u2019s situation, to identify whether he was a qualifying young person giving AG the liability to pay child maintenance for him. 46. The FTT\u2019s Statement of Reasons confirms it considered regulation 3 of the 2006 Regulations. But this was not the end of the matter. Regulation 3 sets out education and training conditions to be met by a person below the age of 20. Regulations 4, 5, 6 and 7 allow a person under the age of 20 to be entitled to child benefit in other circumstances, if they meet the specific conditions set out in the individual regulations. 47. Having decided that A did not meet the condition in regulation 3 of the 2006 Regulations, the FTT therefore needed to consider whether A fell within any of the circumstances provided in regulations 4 to 7. 48. AG argues that regulation 7 is based on actual attendance, but this is incorrect. It provides for entitlement to child benefit to continue past the date when a qualifying young person stops attending full-time non-advanced education, if the person meets other specific conditions. The same is true for regulations 4 to 6. These regulations allow a person to meet the conditions for child benefit even where they are not, in fact, attending full-time non-advanced education. 49. AG also argues the FTT accepted evidence that A did not have exams or ongoing enrolment. At paragraph 6 of its Decision Notice dated 29 February 2024, the FTT accepted that A attended a school for the purpose of his GCSE resits in June 2021. The FTT considered the resits but only did so in terms of whether this meant A was in full-time non-advanced education (relevant to regulation 3). See, for example, paragraph 58 of the FTT\u2019s Statement of Reasons. 50. Having read the FTT\u2019s Statement of Reasons, and in particular, paragraphs 61 to 64 of it, I am satisfied the FTT did not consider regulation 7 of the 2006 Regulations and did not decide whether A fell within any of the cases set out within that regulation. This was a misdirection in law, which is an error of law. It is material because, having applied regulation 7 to A\u2019s circumstances, HMRC had decided he ceased to be a qualifying young person at a later point in time than the FTT decided. The error of law was therefore capable of making a difference to when AG\u2019s liability to pay child maintenance for A might end. 51. AG also argues the principle in Porter cited by Ms Foody is not relevant to assessing the FTT\u2019s explanation for its decision about his appeal. I do not agree. Paragraph 35 of Porter stated the authorities being summarised were about a reasons challenge in the planning context. However, the statement of principle that Lord Brown of Eaton-Under-Heywood set out at paragraph 36 of Porter has been acknowledged as applying to written reasons for Tribunal decisions generally. See, for example, the Practice Direction from the Senior President of Tribunals: Reasons for decisions (04 June 2024). This is guidance the Senior President has given to all First-tier Tribunals, including the Social Entitlement Chamber deciding AG\u2019s appeal. Paragraph 5 of the Practice Direction cites the principle established in Porter as one of general application when giving written reasons for decisions in the First-tier Tribunal. 52. I am also satisfied the FTT made an error of law in failing to address, and explain, why it decided AG\u2019s appeal without HMRC present at a time when it believed it was a party to the appeal. The FTT had directed for HMRC to be made a party. While HMCTS had not taken the steps required for that, the FTT evidently believed HMRC was now a party to the appeal. In those circumstances, the FTT should have applied rule 31 of the FTT Rules 2008 and considered both whether HMRC had been notified of the hearing date (or reasonable steps had been taken to do this) and whether it was in the interests of justice to go ahead. 53. Had the FTT addressed rule 31, it would have realised that HMRC had not been notified about the hearing date and likely would also have realised it had not been added as a party to the appeal. As I explained in paragraph 20 of my decision granting SM permission to appeal, this does not mean the only step the FTT could properly take was to adjourn the hearing so HMRC could take part. If the FTT had realised the correct position, its options included regularising the position by adjourning to add HMRC as a party or deciding to proceed in any event. The FTT\u2019s failure, however, to go through that process, and to explain its approach and reasoning about going ahead, was an error of law. 54. This error of law is material because the FTT might have made a different decision about whether proceeding if it had realised why HMRC was not present at the hearing. AG argues it is speculative to say that HMRC\u2019s presence would have changed the outcome because HMRC\u2019s evidence was already reflected in the evidence. Even with HMRC\u2019s submission, however, the FTT found HMRC\u2019s position unclear (paragraph 63 of Statement of Reasons). The FTT also failed to consider regulation 7 of the 2006 Regulations, despite HMRC having mentioned it above paragraph 34 of its the submission. Had HMRC been asked to clarify its position, it arguably would have explained its reasoning for choosing 06 September 2021 and the FTT would have realised it needed to consider regulation 7 of the 2006 Regulations in addition to considering regulation 3. Conclusion, including disposal 55. I have decided the FTT\u2019s decision involved material errors of law. It is therefore appropriate to exercise my discretion to set aside the Tribunal\u2019s decision dated 29 February 2024 under section 12(2)(a) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. Having done so, section 12(2)(b) of that Act provides that I must either remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal with directions for their reconsideration or remake the decision. 56. No party has invited me to remake the FTT\u2019s decision (about AG\u2019s appeal). In any event, the FTT needs to consider the evidence, including about A\u2019s circumstances, in terms of the relevant legislation. The FTT also needs to consider regulation 7 of the 2006 Regulations, as part of determining AG\u2019s appeal. I therefore remit AG\u2019s appeal to be considered by a new First-tier Tribunal. 57. It is for the First-tier Tribunal to deal with case management of AG\u2019s appeal, including deciding whether to add HMRC as a party to that appeal. I observe, however, that the FTT\u2019s administrative system does not confirm that HMRC has ever been added as a party, despite the directions the FTT judge made on 18 July 2023. I have therefore made a direction on page 2 of this Decision (paragraph C) for the FTT to consider whether HMRC should be added as a party, and if the FTT decides it should be added, to make appropriate directions for this to happen. 58. Although I have set aside the FTT\u2019s decision dated 29 February 2024, I am not making any findings, or expressing any view, about the substance of AG\u2019s appeal to the First-tier Tribunal. The next FTT will need to deal with those matters for itself. Judith Butler Authorised by the Judge for issue: 11 March 2026 Upper Tribunal Judge<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Sources officielles :<\/strong> consulter la page source<\/a><\/p>\n

Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).<\/em><\/p>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

As the decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error of law, it is SET ASIDE under section 12(2)(a) and (b)(i) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 and the case is REMITTED to the First-tier Tribunal for rehearing by a fresh tribunal. DIRECTIONS A. The case is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for reconsideration at…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":0,"template":"","meta":{"_crdt_document":""},"kji_country":[7608],"kji_court":[9033],"kji_chamber":[],"kji_year":[7610],"kji_subject":[7650],"kji_keyword":[7705,8265,7916,9585,7636],"kji_language":[7611],"class_list":["post-562852","kji_decision","type-kji_decision","status-publish","hentry","kji_country-royaume-uni","kji_court-upper-tribunal-administrative-appeals-chamber","kji_year-7610","kji_subject-administratif","kji_keyword-appeal","kji_keyword-child","kji_keyword-hearing","kji_keyword-regulation","kji_keyword-tribunal","kji_language-anglais"],"yoast_head":"\nSM v The Secretary of State for Work and Pensions & Anor - Ma\u00eetre Hassan Kohen, avocat en droit p\u00e9nal \u00e0 Paris<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/jurisprudences\/sm-v-the-secretary-of-state-for-work-and-pensions-anor\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"zh_CN\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"SM v The Secretary of State for Work and Pensions & Anor\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"As the decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error of law, it is SET ASIDE under section 12(2)(a) and (b)(i) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 and the case is REMITTED to the First-tier Tribunal for rehearing by a fresh tribunal. DIRECTIONS A. 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DIRECTIONS A. 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