{"id":562910,"date":"2026-04-15T00:26:40","date_gmt":"2026-04-14T22:26:40","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/jurisprudences\/paul-nicholas-arthur-v-the-information-commissioner-3\/"},"modified":"2026-04-15T00:26:40","modified_gmt":"2026-04-14T22:26:40","slug":"paul-nicholas-arthur-v-the-information-commissioner-3","status":"publish","type":"kji_decision","link":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/jurisprudences\/paul-nicholas-arthur-v-the-information-commissioner-3\/","title":{"rendered":"Paul Nicholas Arthur v The Information Commissioner"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Summary 1. This Decision relates to an Appeal brought by Paul Nicholas Arthur against a decision notice (\u201cDN\u201d) issued by the Information Commissioner (\u201cthe Commissioner\u201d) on 28 February 2025 upholding the FCDO\u2019s reliance on section 12 FOIA to refuse two requests made by the Appellant on 21 November 2023. In doing so, the Commissioner accepted that the FCDO was entitled, under section 12(4) FOIA, to aggregate the estimated costs of complying with both requests. 2. For the reasons that follow, the Tribunal allows the appeal on the aggregation point. On the facts before us, the two requests were\u00a0not\u00a0\u201cthe same or similar\u201d within the meaning of section 12(4) FOIA and should not have been aggregated. We remit the matter to the Commissioner for a fresh determination of section 12(1) (cost limit)\u00a0without aggregation, and for any further steps as may be necessary. Request 3. On 21 November 2023, the Appellant submitted 2 requests to the Foreign Commonwealth and Development office (\u2018FCDO\u2019) \u2013 in separate correspondence: \u2018I am requesting under the terms of the FOIA any documentation indicating the extent of FCDO funding of The Centre of [for] Information Resilience for either of the last 2 financial years up until 5th April 2023 or for the calender [sic] years 2021 and 2022, whichever the Foreign Office prefers\u201d [referred to as \u2018Request 1\u2019 in this decision] And \u2018I am requesting under the terms of the FOIA all correspondence (including transcripts of emails) sent from the FCDO to The Centre for Information Resilience from 1st January 2021\u201d [referred to as \u2018Request 2\u2019 in this decision]. 4. On 6 February 2024, the FCDO responded to the request. It confirmed that it held information within the scope of each request but refused to comply with these on the basis of section 12 (cost limit) of FOIA. The FCDO provided advice and assistance in relation to how each request could be refined to bring them within the cost limit: a. In relation to \u2018Request 1\u2019 the FCDO advised the complainant to reduce the timeframe for the request and focus on the amount of funding provided. b. In relation to \u2018Request 2\u2019, the FCDO advised shortening the time frame to 3 months and specifying the subject matter. 5. On 27 February 2024, the Appellant sought internal review. 6. He asserted that although the FCDO aggregated the two requests, they were distinct and should be treated separately: \u201cThe first relates to funding and the second to correspondence\u201d. 7. The Appellant explained that the requests had already been refined at the FCDO\u2019s suggestion, specifically by removing the year 2020 from the alternative calendar-year formulation and leaving the FCDO free to choose either two specific financial years or two specific calendar years. The Appellant submitted that this was a reasonable refinement and that it was inherently improbable that it would take 24 hours for the FCDO to ascertain the total amount of funding provided over either of those standard accounting periods. He noted that government bodies typically report financial data on an annual basis\u2014whether by financial year or calendar year\u2014and that accounting in six-month periods is unusual. 8. The Appellant further stated that he was advised to \u201cfocus on the amount of funding provided\u201d and observed that this is precisely what FOIA Request 1 sought. In his view, the idea that the FCDO\u2019s financial systems were so disorganised that retrieving total annual or biennial funding figures would exceed the cost limit was implausible. 9. Regarding Request 2 (correspondence), the Appellant expressed doubt that correspondence between the FCDO and the CIR was not stored separately or otherwise readily accessible. While he considered it unlikely that there was a large volume of correspondence, he was willing to narrow the scope to correspondence relating to what the CIR described as \u201cdisinformation\u201d. The Appellant maintained that it was inconceivable that locating correspondence with a single organisation\u2014other than major multilateral institutions such as the EU, NATO or the UN\u2014would require more than 24 hours. 10. On 29 July, the FCDO upheld its original position following an internal review. It confirmed that it had aggregated the estimated cost of complying with both requests under section 12(4) FOIA, as each related to the Centre for Information Resilience. 11. The FCDO explained that, although it could identify payments made to the organisation and could therefore answer part of Request 1, the supporting documentation was not held centrally. It gave the same explanation for Request 2, noting that relevant correspondence was similarly dispersed. The FCDO stated that funding to the Centre for Information Resilience was delivered through several programmes administered by different internal departments, and compliance would require multiple teams to search and compile information from numerous data sources. 12. The internal review upheld the application of section 12 FOIA. It added that some information about payments to the Centre for Information Resilience between January 2021 and May 2022, as well as information about the organisation\u2019s work for the FCDO, was already publicly available. Complaint to the ICO and the Council\u2019s amendment 13. On 22 August 2024, the Appellant contacted the ICO to complain that the FCDO\u2019s handling of his requests. In particular: a. He disputed the FCDO\u2019s decision to aggregate the requests; b. He disputed the FCDO\u2019s decision to refuse both requests on the basis of s.12(1) of FOIA; c. In relation to Request 1, he argued that that the FCDO\u2019s finance department already holds the information requested centrally and that it can be easily obtained at minimal cost; d. In relation to Request 2, he submitted that it seemed likely the FCDO would maintain a central file of correspondence with the CIR, if only for reasons of administrative efficiency, and therefore this could be used to find the correspondence sought with ease. He submitted that the Internal Review implied the CDPO had not carried out a preliminary examination of the files in order to determine how much correspondence may fall withing the scope of the request. Decision Notice (28 February 2025) 14. The ICO came to the following conclusions. \u2018Complaint A\u2019 15. The Appellant submitted that s.12(4) allows for the aggregation of the \u2018same or similar\u2019 requests, but he considered the two requests to be discrete. He submitted that Request 1 relates to the funding of the CIR whereas Request 2 related to the operations of that organisation. 16. The FCDO argued that as both requests sought information regarding its relationship with the CIR, the test for aggregating the requests was met. 17. The ICO favoured the FCDO\u2019s findings on this point as both requests sought information about its relationship with the CIR, \u2018whilst the information being sought is not the same information in the Commissioner\u2019s view it does have a clear commonality or similarity given that both requests seek details of the FCDO\u2019s engagement \u2013 either payments to or correspondence with \u2013 one specific organisation\u2019. The ICO was therefore satisfied that the FCDO was entitled to aggregate the costs of complying with both requests when determining whether the cost of compliance exceeded the cost limit. \u2018Complaint B\u2019 18. The Appellant submitted that the FCDO would be able to respond to both requests \u2013 whether the costs for compliance were aggregated or not \u2013 within the cost limit. 19. In relation to Request 1, the Appellant submitted that the FCDO\u2019s finance department would hold centralised records of the payments made and therefore information sought by the request would be easy to locate. He therefore rejected the findings of the internal review that complying with the request would \u2018require multiple departments to sift, identify and compile relevant documentation and correspondence with a wide range from a wide range of data sources\u2019. 20. In relation to Request 2, the Appellant submitted that it was likely the FCDO would maintain a central file of correspondence with the CIR, if only for reasons of administrative efficiency and this could be used to find the correspondence sought. 21. The Appellant argued that the internal review suggested that the FCDO had not carried out a preliminary examination of the relevant files to determine how much correspondence may fall within scope. 22. The FCDO told the ICO that a sample search by a member of the Afghanistan team\u2014who manages one CIR-funded project\u2014identified around 390 emails with the organisation. It noted that several other staff involved in the same project would likely hold similar volumes, and that approximately 20 projects across different teams fund the CIR. On this basis, each relevant individual would need to search their own emails and shared workspaces to identify correspondence with the organisation. 23. The FCDO therefore estimated that up to 400 emails per project could exist, equating to as many as 8,000 emails over the 23-month period, all of which would need review to determine which fell within scope. 24. It explained that CIR-related correspondence is held within individual email accounts and team-specific shared areas, with no business need to store all such material centrally. This differs from its finance system, which centrally records all payments. 25. While payment information is centrally held, the FCDO stated that each funding team retains its own associated correspondence. Beyond payment data, there is no operational need for central storage, and teams can only access their own shared areas. 26. In respect of Request 1, the ICO accepts that although the FCDO\u2019s finance department holds a central record of payments to the CIR, the request is broader. It seeks \u201cdocumentation indicating the extent of FCDO funding\u201d, which may include analysis, discussion or other material concerning the level of such funding. This information may not be held centrally. 27. The ICO considers it plausible that departments commissioning the CIR hold documentation relating to funding decisions, and that this material would fall within scope. Consequently, processing Request 1 would require each funding team to search its own records for relevant information. 28. Based on the FCDO\u2019s sample exercise, the ICO accepts its estimate that approximately 8,000 emails relating to CIR-funded projects are likely to exist across around 20 teams. To comply with the request, the FCDO would need to locate and review all such emails\u2014held both in shared areas and individual inboxes\u2014to identify those containing information on the extent of CIR funding. 29. Given the dispersed locations of this material, the ICO recognises that locating and gathering it would be time-consuming. Although the FCDO provided no precise figure, the ICO is satisfied that the volume of material means the work would exceed the 24-hour cost limit. 30. The ICO notes that even if locating the emails were straightforward, reviewing 8,000 emails to determine which fall within scope would clearly be onerous. Reviewing each email would take substantially more than 24 hours\u2014approximately 66 hours at 30 seconds per email, or 33 hours at 15 seconds\u2014before even accounting for collation time. Section 12(1) therefore applies. 31. In respect of Request 2, the ICO accepts that the FCDO does not hold a single repository of all correspondence with the CIR, and that it would need first to gather the same 8,000 emails and then identify those sent by the FCDO to the CIR. While filtering tools might reduce the time needed to review this correspondence (unlike Request 1), the ICO is satisfied that the costs of the two requests can be aggregated. As the aggregated cost would exceed the limit, section 12(1) can also be relied upon to refuse Request 2. Grounds of Appeal 32. On 22 March 2025 November 2025, the Appellant appealed against the decision on the following grounds: \u2018\u2026 First, I challenge the IC\u2019s decision to allow the FCDO\u2019s decision to aggregate the 2 quite separate requests \u2013 FOI2023\/23623, which was about funding, and FOI2023\/23624, which was about correspondence. The fact that both FOIA requests relate to the FCDO and the Centre for Information Resilience (CIR) does not of itself make them \u2018similar\u2019 one concerns finance, the other activities in what sense are they \u2018similar\u2019? I take it as self-evidence that they are not, and neither the FCDO nor the IC quote any Tribunal or Court Decision holding that 2 separate FOIA requests can be considered \u2018similar\u2019 purely on the grounds that the FOIA requests refer to the same organisations. The subject matter of the requests is not similar at all. Would an FOIA request asking for levels of funding to Oxfam be considered \u2018similar\u2019 to an FOIA request asking what information had been obtained by [illegible] from Oxfam about its priorities in delivering flood relief to Pakistan? I think not\u2026.. [I] wish to disaggregate the 2 requests and appeal against only one of the 2. I wish to appeal only against the decision of the FC pertaining to FOIA request FOI2023\/23623 relating to FCDO funding of the CIR\u2026. My request refers to \u2018the extent of FCDO funding\u2019 of the CIR. The \u2018extent of funding\u2019 clearly refers to the full amount of that funding; which one would expect to be expressed in pounds and pence. That is the \u2018plain words meaning\u2019 of my FOIA request\u2019. The Foreign Office, however in an effort to resist disclosure, has conjured up an Alice in Wonderland interpretation of my words\u2026.the key paragraphs of the Decision Notice are 27-29. A key sentence is: \u2018that is to say, the Commissioner understands that request not only to be seeking a list of payments made to the CIR but also information about the extent of such funding\u2019. I observe, first, that this is false, it is false because I never asked for a list of (individual) payments. Reference to such a list was made by the FCDO as a way of fobbing me off. I repeat that I only asked about the \u2018extent of FCDO funding\u2019\u2026.there is no \u2018also\u2019 about it. Now we come to the Alice in Wonderland aspect of the FCDO\u2019s reasoning\u2026at the bottom of para 27 appears to suggest that \u2018information about the extent of such funding\u2019 might include \u2018information discussing or analysing the level of funding provided to CIR\u2019, which in the Commissioner\u2019s view \u2018would fall within the scope of the request\u2019 (para 27 . This is nonsense. If I had wanted to ask for information about analysis or discussions around the extent of the FCDO\u2019s funding of CIR I could have done so, but I didn\u2019t. As para 4 of the decision notice demonstrates, I asked only about the \u2018Extent of FCDO funding\u2019, and not about the extent of discussions around that funding\u2026. The DN goes on to suggest that according to this interpretation of the wording of my request, which, in the Commissioner\u2019s view includes \u2018documentation concerning funding decisions in relation to the CIR\u2019 (para 28), \u2018The FCDO would have to get various departments who funded the organisation over the time period to search for any relevant information\u2019 (para 28). He goes on \u2026para 29 to suggest that this could involve 8000 emails which could involve 66 hours of work (para 31) and so justify resistance to disclosure under s.12(1) of FOIA. If I had asked for this additional information about \u2018information discussing or analysing the level of fundraising provided to CIR\u2019 (para 27`) then these estimates about 8,000 emails and many hours of work might very well be valid but I didn\u2019t ask for any such information, just as I didn\u2019t ask for a list of individual payments by the FCDO to the CIR, I asked only for information indicating the extent of FCDO funding during the periods referred to in para 4 of the Decision Notice ie the total amount of such funding during those periods. I suggest that the interpretation of my words which the IC has accepted \u2026para 27 is both contrived and wholly unwarranted and ofends [sic] against the plain words meaning' interpretative rule that [illegible] in the courts of England and Wales. This is laid-out clearly by Lord Neuberger in\u00a0Arnold v Britton\u00a0in the context of contracts but has also been applied in relation to the wording of legislation and any wording which gives rise to legal effect. Even without this jurisprudence, I believe it would be clear that neither the FCDO nor the IC would be entitled to contrive a meaning to my words which they clearly do not carry. So what exactly is the cost of complying with disclosure of the information that I actually requested? Very little. Crucially, the IC admits in para. 26 that there is a central repository of payments made to the CIR, as there would need to be if the FCDO were to conduct an annual audit of funds dispersed. The time it would take to access the total extent of funding for the specified periods would be literally seconds for the central financial comptroller. Information relating to those payments and correspondence (para. 26) is not what I asked for, and is, accordingly, irrelevant, and cannot be used as the basis for costings under section 12(1) FOIA that are invoked to resist disclosure\u2019. ICO\u2019s Response 33. In its response dated 16 April 2025, the ICO submits that the Appellant\u2019s request was made in the following terms:\u00a0\u201cany documentation indicating the extent of FCDO funding of the Centre for Information Resilience\u2026\u201d\u00a0for the specified periods. The ICO maintains that FOIA requests must be interpreted objectively. On this basis, he considers that the words \u201cany documentation\u201d were clear and not limited merely to the total amount of funding. If the Appellant intended to confine the request more narrowly, the ICO submits that a fresh, more specific request would have been required. 34. The ICO further submits that, for the reasons set out in the DN, the two requests were properly aggregated under section 12(4) FOIA and that the Appellant\u2019s Grounds disclose no basis to disturb that finding. 35. In relation to section 12(1), the Appellant contends that compliance would require very little time, as the total funding could be retrieved within seconds from central finance records. The ICO finds, however, that a public authority\u2019s estimate must reflect how information is actually held, referring to\u00a0Kirkham v IC\u00a0[2018] UKUT 126 (AAC), which confirms that an estimate must be sensible and sufficiently precise for determining whether the cost limit would be exceeded. A reasonable estimate is one that is \u201csensible, realistic and supported by cogent evidence\u201d, as described in\u00a0Randall v IC and MHRA\u00a0(EA\/2006\/0004). 36. The ICO maintains that the FCDO\u2019s account of how relevant information is held, and its sampling exercise\u2014set out at paragraphs 23\u201326 of the DN \u2014demonstrate that compliance would exceed the statutory cost limit. He remains satisfied that the FCDO\u2019s description of the work required is credible and consistent with how its records are kept. Citing\u00a0Clyne v IC and Lambeth (EA\/2011\/0190) and\u00a0Oates v IC and ARB\u00a0(EA\/2011\/0138), the Commissioner submits that there is no evidence the FCDO attempted to mislead, and therefore the DN should be upheld. Legal Framework 37. A person who seeks information from a public authority is entitled to be informed whether that authority holds the requested information (section 1(1)(a) FOIA). 38. If the information is held, the requester is further entitled to have it communicated to them (section 1(1)(b) FOIA). 39. However, where the cost of complying would exceed the appropriate limit, a public authority is not required to comply. S.12 FOIA states: \u201c(1) Section 1(1) does not oblige a public authority to comply with a request forinformation if the authority estimates that the cost of complying with therequest would exceed the appropriate limit. (2) Subsection (1) does not exempt the public authority from its obligation tocomply with paragraph (a) of section 1(1) unless the estimated cost ofcomplying with that paragraph alone would exceed the appropriate limit. (3) In subsections (1) and (2) \u201cthe appropriate limit\u201d means such amount as maybe prescribed, and different amounts may be prescribed in relation to differentcases. (4) The [Secretary of State] may by regulations provide that, in suchcircumstances as may be prescribed, where two or more requests forinformation are made to a public authority\u2014 (a) by one person, or (b) by different persons who appear to the public authority to be acting inconcert or in pursuance of a campaign,the estimated cost of complying with any of the requests is to be taken to bethe estimated total cost of complying with all of them. (5) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision for the purposes ofthis section as to the cost to be estimated and as to the manner in which theyare to be estimated.\u201d 40. The regulations made pursuant to sections 12(4) and 12(5) FOIA\u2014namely, the Freedom of Information and Data Protection (Appropriate Limits and Fees) Regulations 2004 (\u201cthe Fees Regulations\u201d)\u2014set out the relevant provisions concerning the \u201cappropriate limit\u201d and specify the categories of cost that may be considered when calculating that limit: a. Regulation 3 of the Fees Regulations, read in conjunction with Schedule 1 FOIA, provides that \u2018the appropriate limit\u2019for the purposes of section 12(1) FOIA is \u00a3600 for central government departments (reg.3(2)), and \u00a3450 in the case of any other public authority (reg.3(3)). b. Not all costs which may be incurred in complying with the request may be taken into account. Regulation 4 of the Fees Regulations sets out the activities which can be taken into account when estimating the cost of compliance with s.1(1) FOIA for the purposes of the appropriate limit, together with the estimated cost for the time spent in undertaking those activities: \u201c(3) In a case in which this regulation has effect, a public authority may, forthe purpose of its estimate, take account only of the costs itreasonably expects to incur in relation to the request in- (a) determining whether it holds the information, (b) locating the information, or a document which may contain theinformation, (c)retrieving the information, or a document which may containthe information, and (d) extracting the information from a document containing it. (4) To the extent to which any of the costs which a public authority takesinto account are attributable to the time which persons undertakingany of the activities mentioned in paragraph (3) on behalf of theauthority are expected to spend on those activities, those costs are tobe estimated at a rate of \u00a325 per person per hour.\u201d 41. When a public authority is estimating whether the appropriate limit is likely to be exceeded, it can include the costs of complying with two or more requests if the conditions laid out in regulation 5 of the Freedom of Information and Data Protection (Appropriate Limit and Fees) Regulations 2004 (\u201cthe Fees Regulations\u201d) can be satisfied. 42. Section 12(4) of FOIA states: \u201cThe Secretary of State may by regulations provide that, in such circumstances as may be prescribed, where two or more requests for information are made to a publicauthority \u2013 (a) by one person, or (b) by different persons who appear to the public authority to be acting inconcert or in pursuance of a campaign, the estimated cost of complyingwith any of the requests is to be taken to be the estimated total cost ofcomplying with all of them.\u201d 43. Regulation 5 of the Fees Regulations states: \u201c(1) In circumstances in which this regulation applies, where two or more requests forinformation to which section 1(1) of the 2000 Act would, apart from the appropriatelimit, to any extent apply, are made to a public authority \u2013 (a) by one person, or (b) by different persons who appear to the public authority to be acting inconcern or in pursuance of a campaign, the estimated cost of complying withany of the requests is to be taken to be the total costs which may be taken intoaccount by the authority, under regulation 4, of complying with all of them. (2) This regulation applies in circumstances in which \u2013 (a) the two or more requests referred to in paragraph (1) relate, to any extent,to the same or similar information, and (b) those requests are received by the public authority within any period of sixtyconsecutive working days.\u201d The Tribunal's Role 44. By section 58 FOIA the Tribunal\u2019s role is to consider whether the DN is in accordance with the law or where the ICO\u2019s decision involved exercising discretion, whether it should have exercised it differently. It is a full merits jurisdiction. The tribunal may receive evidence that was not before the ICO and may make different findings of fact from the ICO. If the Tribunal determines the DN was not in accordance with the law or that a discretion should have been exercised differently it can allow the appeal and\/or substitute a different Notice that could have been served by the ICO.\u00a0 Unless these apply the Tribunal shall dismiss the Appeal. 45. For the purposes of determining this appeal, we have considered those documents contained within the open bundle consisting of 77 (electronic) pages. Discussion and Conclusions 46. The Tribunal is asked to determine as a preliminary issue whether the FCDO was entitled, on the facts, to aggregate the estimated costs of the two requests under s. 12(4) FOIA. If so, we are invited to consider whether s.12(1) was applicable. 47. Given our conclusion on aggregation, we do not make final findings on s.12(1). (a) Should the requests have been aggregated? 48. The Appellant submits that the two requests are discrete in nature: Request 1 concerns funding totals (extent of FCDO funding of CIR over specified periods); Request 2 concerns\u00a0correspondence sent\u00a0from the FCDO to CIR over a wider period. He argues that funding data and outward correspondence are qualitatively different categories of information, compiled and held for different purposes, and not \u201cthe same or similar\u201d within section 12(4). 49. The FCDO and the ICO submit that both requests concern the FCDO\u2019s engagement with the same organisation (CIR). On that footing, they argue that the requests share sufficient commonality to be \u201csimilar\u201d for aggregation purposes. 50. We accept that both requests relate to the FCDO\u2019s dealings with the\u00a0same third-party entity\u00a0(CIR). However, the statutory test is not whether two requests relate to the same\u00a0organisation\u00a0or share a general\u00a0subject. It is whether the requests are for the\u00a0same or similar information. 51. On a fair and objective reading, Request 1\u00a0is directed to\u00a0funding information\u2014in essence, information indicating the total extent of funding provided by the FCDO to CIR over specified standard accounting periods. Even if there were a legitimate debate as to whether the words \u201cany documentation indicating the extent\u201d extends beyond totals to include associated explanatory material (as asserted in the ICO\u2019s response, dated 16 April 2025), the core character of the information sought is\u00a0financial\/funding-extent information. 52. In contrast, Request 2 is directed to\u00a0outgoing correspondence\u00a0over a longer period, irrespective of whether such correspondence concerns funding, policy, operational issues, or otherwise, and regardless of whether it contains financial data. It is\u00a0transactional\/documentary communications\u00a0information. 53. The\u00a0nature\u00a0and\u00a0character\u00a0of these information sets are materially different. Funding extent information is likely to be derived from finance systems and associated records of payments; outward correspondence is likely to reside in email accounts and team repositories and encompass a broad range of topics. That both sets of information involve the same external counterparty (CIR) does not render them \u201csimilar\u201d within the meaning of section 12(4). The overlap is\u00a0contextual\u00a0rather than\u00a0informational. 54. We place some weight on the FCDO\u2019s own explanations. The FCDO stated that payments are centrally recorded in finance systems (albeit that some supporting documentation may be dispersed), whereas correspondence is not centrally held but distributed across individual accounts and shared areas. That description underscores the essential difference between\u00a0what\u00a0is being sought in each request. Similarity in\u00a0how\u00a0the records might be searched, or the fact that teams connected with CIR would need to be consulted, is not determinative: section 12(4) focuses on the\u00a0requested information, not the\u00a0search task. 55. We therefore reject the proposition that requests are \u201csimilar\u201d for section 12(4) merely because they \u201cseek details of the FCDO\u2019s engagement\u2014either payments to or correspondence with\u2014one specific organisation\u201d. That formulation collapses the statutory requirement into a broad \u201csame topic\/organisation\u201d test, which is not what Parliament enacted. If that were sufficient, almost any pair of requests touching on the same third party would be treated as \u201csimilar\u201d, contrary to the ordinary meaning of the language and the need to construe section 12(4) as a\u00a0narrow exception\u00a0to the general right of access. 56. Nothing in the materials before us demonstrates a\u00a0material informational overlap\u00a0between the two requests. Nor is there evidence (nor is it suggested) that the Appellant orchestrated the two requests so as to subdivide what is, in reality, a single informational inquiry. To the contrary, the record shows two separately framed requests made in separate correspondence, for different classes of information, over different periods, to different practical effect. Indeed the Appellant only wishes to appeal one. 57. In the ICO\u2019s response dated 16 April 2025, he submits that \u201cthe words \u201cany documentation\u2019 were clear and not limited merely to the total amount of funding. If the Appellant intended to confine the request more narrowly, the ICO submits that a fresh, ore specific request would have been required\u201d. 58. However, the Appellant explicitly stated \u2013 before the Internal Review \u2013 in his representations dated 27 February 2024, that \u201cThe first [request] relates to funding and the second to correspondence\u201d. He went on to clarify \u201cIt was suggested I \u2026.\u2019focus on the amount of funding provided\u2019. Well as to the latter, the amount of funding is exactly what I requested in FOIA request 22623\u2019. So even if it was not clear from the outset that the Appellant was requesting the amount of funding provided, this was clarified by the Appellant \u2013 before the Internal Review. 59. We therefore conclude that the FCDO was\u00a0not\u00a0entitled to aggregate the estimated costs of complying with the two requests under section 12(4) FOIA. The Commissioner erred in law in upholding that approach. Was s.12(1) applicable? 60. Because the aggregation was impermissible, the cost-limit analysis must be conducted\u00a0separately\u00a0for each request. The DN\u2019s reliance on a combined estimate, and on sampling\/estimates predicated on aggregated searching (e.g. global counts of emails across projects) cannot sustain refusal of either request absent a proper,\u00a0disaggregated\u00a0estimate for each. 61. We make no final determination on whether section 12(1) is available in respect of either request when considered\u00a0individually. The Appellant stated in the Grounds of Appeal that he only wishes to appeal against Request 1, in those circumstances, the FCDO should consider Request 1 afresh. 62. Without deciding the point, we observe that the parties\u2019 submissions disclose an\u00a0evident divergence\u00a0as to the proper objective reading of \u201cany documentation indicating the extent of FCDO funding\u201d in Request 1. The FCDO, on remittal, may consider whether clarification under section 16 FOIA would assist in focusing that request (for example, whether the Appellant is content to confine it to\u00a0total monetary amounts\u00a0for specified periods). Any such clarification should be recorded and factored into the cost estimate for Request 1\u00a0alone. SignedDate: Judge Kiai 20 February 2026<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Sources officielles :<\/strong> consulter la page source<\/a><\/p>\n

Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).<\/em><\/p>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Summary 1. This Decision relates to an Appeal brought by Paul Nicholas Arthur against a decision notice (\u201cDN\u201d) issued by the Information Commissioner (\u201cthe Commissioner\u201d) on 28 February 2025 upholding the FCDO\u2019s reliance on section 12 FOIA to refuse two requests made by the Appellant on 21 November 2023. In doing so, the Commissioner accepted that the FCDO was entitled,…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":0,"template":"","meta":{"_crdt_document":""},"kji_country":[7608],"kji_court":[7609],"kji_chamber":[],"kji_year":[7610],"kji_subject":[7612],"kji_keyword":[9658,8351,7615,7695,7691],"kji_language":[7611],"class_list":["post-562910","kji_decision","type-kji_decision","status-publish","hentry","kji_country-royaume-uni","kji_court-first-tier-tribunal-general-regulatory-chamber-information-rights","kji_year-7610","kji_subject-fiscal","kji_keyword-correspondence","kji_keyword-funding","kji_keyword-information","kji_keyword-request","kji_keyword-requests","kji_language-anglais"],"yoast_head":"\nPaul Nicholas Arthur v The Information Commissioner - Ma\u00eetre Hassan Kohen, avocat en droit p\u00e9nal \u00e0 Paris<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/jurisprudences\/paul-nicholas-arthur-v-the-information-commissioner-3\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"zh_CN\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Paul Nicholas Arthur v The Information Commissioner\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Summary 1. This Decision relates to an Appeal brought by Paul Nicholas Arthur against a decision notice (\u201cDN\u201d) issued by the Information Commissioner (\u201cthe Commissioner\u201d) on 28 February 2025 upholding the FCDO\u2019s reliance on section 12 FOIA to refuse two requests made by the Appellant on 21 November 2023. In doing so, the Commissioner accepted that the FCDO was entitled,...\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/jurisprudences\/paul-nicholas-arthur-v-the-information-commissioner-3\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Ma\u00eetre Hassan Kohen, avocat en droit p\u00e9nal \u00e0 Paris\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"\u9884\u8ba1\u9605\u8bfb\u65f6\u95f4\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"25 \u5206\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/zh-hans\\\/jurisprudences\\\/paul-nicholas-arthur-v-the-information-commissioner-3\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/zh-hans\\\/jurisprudences\\\/paul-nicholas-arthur-v-the-information-commissioner-3\\\/\",\"name\":\"Paul Nicholas Arthur v The Information Commissioner - Ma\u00eetre Hassan Kohen, avocat en droit p\u00e9nal \u00e0 Paris\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/zh-hans\\\/#website\"},\"datePublished\":\"2026-04-14T22:26:40+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/zh-hans\\\/jurisprudences\\\/paul-nicholas-arthur-v-the-information-commissioner-3\\\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"zh-Hans\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/zh-hans\\\/jurisprudences\\\/paul-nicholas-arthur-v-the-information-commissioner-3\\\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/zh-hans\\\/jurisprudences\\\/paul-nicholas-arthur-v-the-information-commissioner-3\\\/#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/zh-hans\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Jurisprudences\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/zh-hans\\\/jurisprudences\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":3,\"name\":\"Paul Nicholas Arthur v The Information Commissioner\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/zh-hans\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/zh-hans\\\/\",\"name\":\"Kohen Avocats\",\"description\":\"Ma\u00eetre Hassan Kohen, avocat p\u00e9naliste \u00e0 Paris, intervient exclusivement en droit p\u00e9nal pour la d\u00e9fense des particuliers, notamment en mati\u00e8re d\u2019accusations de viol. 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