{"id":593351,"date":"2026-04-18T09:09:09","date_gmt":"2026-04-18T07:09:09","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/jurisprudences\/aviva-insurance-limited-v-atiquillar-nadeem-anor\/"},"modified":"2026-04-18T09:09:09","modified_gmt":"2026-04-18T07:09:09","slug":"aviva-insurance-limited-v-atiquillar-nadeem-anor","status":"publish","type":"kji_decision","link":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/jurisprudences\/aviva-insurance-limited-v-atiquillar-nadeem-anor\/","title":{"rendered":"Aviva Insurance Limited v Atiquillar Nadeem & Anor"},"content":{"rendered":"
\n
\n

HIS HONOUR JUDGE TINDAL. HHJ TINDAL: Introduction 1. This is an application for committal for alleged contempt of court after findings of fundamental dishonesty in\u00a0a\u00a0personal injury trial. It raises an interesting issue of the status of the findings in such\u00a0a\u00a0trial in subsequent contempt proceedings and how far those findings create an issue estoppel as between the parties. 2. The litigation arises out of\u00a0a\u00a0road traffic collision, now accepted to have taken place on 14\u00a0April 2018 between the Mercedes of the Second Defendant (whom I shall call Mr Sidiqi) and the Citroen of Ms\u00a0Hibbert, who is not a party but is a witness to these proceedings. Both cars sustained damage. There is no suggestion of any staged accident and Ms\u00a0Hibbert subsequently admitted liability for negligently causing the collision. 3. Mr Sidiqi did not bring\u00a0a\u00a0claim arising out of the collision. However, the First Defendant (whom I shall call Mr Nadeem) did do so, saying (as does Mr Sidiqi) that he was\u00a0a\u00a0passenger and sustained minor whiplash to his neck and back. Mr Nadeem saw\u00a0a\u00a0GP medical expert, Mr\u00a0Bansal (also a witness in the present trial) who prepared a medical report on 16\u00a0August 2019. Mr Nadeem issued\u00a0a personal injury claim on 19\u00a0June 2020. In support of that, Mr Sidiqi gave\u00a0a\u00a0witness statement on 24\u00a0March 2021, whilst Mr Nadeem gave his witness statement on 31\u00a0March 2021. 4. Only Mr Nadeem gave evidence at his personal injury claim before DDJ Goodman at Willesden County Court on 3\u00a0June 2021 and she found his claim fundamentally dishonest. Indeed, DDJ Goodman was persuaded to make findings to the criminal standard of proof following the practice in Aviva v Kovacic [2017] EWHC 2772\u00a0(QB). I will come back to Kovacic later. As\u00a0a\u00a0result, the present Claimant Ms\u00a0Hibbert's insurers, Aviva Insurance Limited (whom I shall call \u2018Aviva\u2019) issued these committal proceedings on 29\u00a0September 2023, which have continued with the permission under CPR 81.3 of Goss J given on 25\u00a0March 2024. 5. In Kovacic, Martin Spencer J held that findings of fundamental dishonesty at a personal injury trial, such as those made by DDJ Goodman in this case, could be taken into account in subsequent committal proceedings. However, Mr\u00a0Varnam for Mr Nadeem submits such findings do not create an issue estoppel, whether made on the civil or the criminal standard of proof at the original personal injury trial and their weight in the committal proceedings depends on the circumstances of the case. Mr\u00a0Christensen for Mr Sidiqi says DDJ Goodman\u2019s findings are not even admissible as against his client who was not a party to the personal injury claim. Mr\u00a0Kong for Aviva submits DDJ Goodman\u2019s findings are not binding in these committal proceedings, but are admissible and of substantial weight. However, he accepts DDJ Goodman\u2019s findings cannot be wholly determinative because she focused on the injuries (or lack of them) sustained by Mr Nadeem in the collision, whereas Aviva\u2019s case is more fundamentally that Mr Nadeem was not in the car at all. However, when I clarified at the start of trial, Mr\u00a0Kong confirmed that it is not Aviva\u2019s alternative case that, even if Mr Nadeem was in the car, that he was not injured in any event. It is also not suggested before me that it matters if he was in the car whether he was in the back or front seat at the time. I say that because that is briefly mentioned in the updated schedule of eleven grounds of contempt. I can summarise them in four groups. 6. Grounds 1\u00a0to 3\u00a0relate to alleged false statements by Mr Nadeem to Dr\u00a0Bansal on 16th August 2019 at the appointment for the preparation of his medical report. Firstly, that Mr Nadeem said that he was in the car at the time of the collision (Ground 1), secondly as to the extent of his injury (Ground 2), and thirdly that he had seven days off work due to it (Ground 3). 7. Grounds 4\u00a0to 5\u00a0relate to Mr Sidiqi and his witness statement of 24th March 2021. Ground 4\u00a0is that Mr Sidiqi made\u00a0a\u00a0false statement in saying Mr Nadeem was in the car, and Ground 5\u00a0is that he made\u00a0a\u00a0false statement in saying Mr Nadeem and himself were both injured as\u00a0a\u00a0result of the accident. 8. Grounds 6\u00a0to 8\u00a0alleges that there were three false statements in Mr Nadeem's witness statement for the personal injury proceedings on 31st March 2021. Ground 6\u00a0alleges that he made\u00a0a\u00a0false statement that he was in the car; Ground 7,\u00a0a\u00a0false statement about the extent of his injury; and Ground 8, that he was off work for seven days. 9. Grounds 9\u00a0to 11\u00a0relate to Mr Nadeem's oral evidence at the trial before DDJ Goodman on 3rd June 2021. Ground 9\u00a0again is that he said in evidence he was in Mr Sidiqi\u2019s car; Ground 10\u00a0that he said he was injured; and Ground 11\u00a0that he was off work for seven days as a result. 10. So, there is a\u00a0degree of repetition in the individual grounds and (save for a complication on Grounds 2, 7 and 10 which I will discuss at the end), they are suggested to stand or fall together against each defendant. It is not disputed that Mr Nadeem and Mr Sidiqi said these things (at least to some extent), the issue is whether those statements were knowingly false. Factual Background 11. I will go through the factual background and litigation history in some detail and in doing so I am assisted greatly by the statement of Aviva\u2019s solicitor, Ms\u00a0Barry, who put forward, as is consistent with Mr\u00a0Kong's presentation of the case,\u00a0a\u00a0scrupulously fair and balanced analysis of the documentation leading Aviva to initiate these contempt proceedings. If I have criticisms of anyone in relation to this case, it is not of Aviva. In making some of those background findings to the criminal standard of proof because these are committal proceedings (on legal principles discussed below), I have taken into account my views on the credibility of the witnesses, which it is more convenient to set out later before turning to my central conclusions as to whether Mr Nadeem was in Mr Sidiqi\u2019s car and was injured in the collision. 12. Mr Nadeem runs\u00a0two garages and works as\u00a0a\u00a0mechanic. Mr Sidiqi is\u00a0a\u00a0taxi driver. Both are friends originally from Afghanistan. Mr Sidiqi gave evidence in his first language of Dari, with the assistance of an interpreter. Mr Nadeem's English was strong enough to give evidence without an interpreter (to which I return later). 13. The accident location is most helpfully seen in an overhead \u2018Google Earth\u2019 photograph attached to Ms\u00a0Hibbert's most recent Affidavit. It is\u00a0a\u00a0roundabout with five roads coming off it. As a clockface, at 12\u00a0o'clock is Rayners Lane (or as it has been helpfully referred to Rayners Lane North). Clockwise east at 3 o\u2019clock is Suffolk Road. Then going directly south at 6 o\u2019clock is Rayners Lane South (as it has been called). Just next to that at around about seven o\u2019clock, is Church Avenue. At about ten o\u2019clock is Whittington Way. I set out that simple description from the start because at times Ms Hibbert\u2019s accounts have been rather muddled. 14. It is now agreed that the accident took place on 14\u00a0April 2018 and that Ms\u00a0Hibbert was travelling on Whittington Way and heading down what would have been her third exit south down Rayners Lane South. It is also agreed Mr Sidiqi was travelling towards Rayners Lane North. There is still\u00a0a\u00a0dispute between the parties whether he entered the roundabout from Rayners Lane South as he says, or Church Avenue as Ms\u00a0Hibbert says. 15. It is also agreed Mr Sidiqi was in his black Mercedes and when he was on the roundabout, his rear passenger side corner and back of the rear passenger door was scraped by the front passenger side corner of Ms Hibbert\u2019s silver Citroen. It is fair to say that the damage to Mr Sidiqi\u2019s car was relatively limited – it is just\u00a0scraping damage. That is also consistent with the scraping damage to the front passenger side corner of Ms\u00a0Hibbert's car, although there is some photographic evidence to the effect that the bumper was slightly displaced on that side. 16. The photographs I have referred to of Mr Sidiqi\u2019s black Mercedes were taken at the accident scene themselves and are significant because it is Mr Nadeem's case that he was sat in the front passenger seat, effectively directly in front of the location where the photograph was being taken. But it is Ms\u00a0Hibbert's case Mr Nadeem was not in the car: that the front seat passenger was a\u00a0bald white man who got out the car and went to urinate against\u00a0a\u00a0tree. Mr Nadeem was and remains bearded with a full head of hair and would not describe himself as \u2018white\u2019 but as Central Asian. He is totally different from Ms Hibbert\u2019s description of the passenger. 17. I will return at the end to my central findings whether Mr Nadeem was in Mr Sidiqi\u2019s car and injured in the collision. However, it is not disputed that Mr Nadeem did not attend his GP after the date of the collision. His first treatment appears to have been a fortnight later on 28\u00a0April 2018. Notably the physiotherapy notes that day refer to his solicitors. I shall not name those solicitors (who I immediately say are not his present solicitors) in this judgment. Both DDJ Goodman and myself have criticisms of those solicitors. As I will explain, it was\u00a0a\u00a0classic case of how a solicitor should not conduct personal injury litigation for a claimant. 18. Be that as it may, Mr Nadeem certainly had already instructed the solicitors concerned, as indeed it is clear Mr Sidiqi had done. Mr Sidiqi explained that he works for\u00a0a\u00a0taxi company and they deal with a\u00a0broker if there is an accident. Likewise, Mr Nadeem suggested that they were put in contact with the solicitors by someone Mr Sidiqi knows. So, this seems to be\u00a0a standard referral from an insurance broker to\u00a0a\u00a0firm of solicitors. Unfortunately, as is typical in my experience, one does not see the same level of preparation and care in that sort of high-volume County Court litigation as one sees in litigation in the High Court. 19. The physiotherapy notes on 28\u00a0April 2018 recorded Mr Nadeem as having \u2018pain in his back and\u00a0a\u00a0headache\u2019. There was no reference to neck pain. Moreover, on 25\u00a0July 2018, Mr Nadeem attended\u00a0a\u00a0walk-in centre where he referred to back pain for the last few days with no specific precipitant. It is notable that in both his statement in the original personal injury proceedings and in his evidence before DDJ Goodman, Mr Nadeem was clear that he was not suggesting that his back pain in July 2018\u00a0was still referrable to the accident. However, there is plainly some confusion, because Dr Bansal recorded Mr Nadeem as having said he had back pain referable to the accident which lasted four months. That would have been after the attendance at the walk-in centre. That is the complication I noted on Grounds 2, 7 and 10 that I address at the end of this judgment. 20. On 2\u00a0May 2018, the now-Defendants\u2019 then-solicitors put forward\u00a0a\u00a0Claims Notification Form (\u2018CNF\u2019) for Mr Sidiqi, describing him as having soft tissue injury and two days off work. However, it was not until 19\u00a0June 2018, six weeks after the CNF for Mr Sidiqi, that the same solicitors submitted\u00a0a\u00a0CNF for Mr Nadeem, which I note was well before his attendance at the walk-in centre on 25\u00a0July 2018. Mr Nadeem\u2019s CNF records him as having sustained\u00a0a\u00a0soft tissue injury but having had no time off work. That gives rise to a particular issue on Grounds 3, 8 and 11. Mr Nadeem says that that is wrong and in fact he did have\u00a0a\u00a0week off work in the garage itself, but, as I shall return to later, he says he still did some work from home in the sense that he made phone calls and conducted management responsibilities for the garage. 21. On 6\u00a0August 2019, well over\u00a0a\u00a0year after the accident,\u00a0a\u00a0questionnaire was filled out relating to Mr Nadeem as preparation for his appointment with Dr Bansal. The circumstances of the filling-out of that questionnaire are important. Mr Nadeem says that he did not fill it out and does not know who did. Dr\u00a0Bansal obviously did not know who filled out the questionnaire but said that it was understanding that this was done by claimants themselves rather than by solicitors. Whoever filled it out, the questionnaire for Mr Nadeem is at least confused, if not downright wrong. For example, it records on\u00a0a\u00a0series of what looked like dropdown boxes or fields on an electronic form that the first impact type was \u2018my vehicle was hit by another vehicle\u2019, which was\u00a0a\u00a0car, \u2018at low speed from the passenger side\u2019, and then a second impact as \u2018my vehicle was hit by another vehicle, car, at low speed\u2019 from the front. That suggests there were two impacts in the accident. No-one suggests that was the case, so that questionnaire is plainly incorrect. It is notable that later (as I will describe), Mr Nadeem told his then-solicitors that\u00a0a\u00a0suggestion about multiple impacts or vehicles in Dr Bansal\u2019s medical report was wrong. In my judgment, that is clear evidence that Mr Nadeem did not fill out this form. Whether or not he was in the car, he would not have filled out\u00a0a\u00a0form suggesting that there were two different impacts when he proactively told his own solicitors during the proceedings that there were not. 22. I am not able to find positively who filled in that questionnaire (although I strongly suspect it was Mr Nadeem\u2019s then-solicitors who did not distinguish themselves by their care in running his case). Certainly, I am satisfied that it was done on behalf of Mr Nadeem rather than by him personally given that in 2018\/19 his English was relatively limited. He was born in Afghanistan in 1985 and he arrived in this country when he was 16 in 2011. He suggests that his English has improved dramatically over the last few years as he has married\u00a0a\u00a0schoolteacher and had children. That, in my judgment, is evidence which is consistent with the other evidence and of importance when understanding the level of understanding and English Mr Nadeem had at the time of the medical report by Dr Balsal in 2019 and his witness statement and evidence at trial in 2021. 23. On a related point, Mr Sidiqi had the benefit of an interpreter when giving evidence and whilst he was taken to some emails which at first sight suggested that he had relatively good English, he explained that he had used\u00a0a\u00a0translation tool to write them. It is also clear from other evidence that Mr Sidiqi has recently been referred for\u00a0a\u00a0dyslexia assessment, which is of relevance when considering his witness statement. 24. In any event, Mr Nadeem then saw Dr\u00a0Bansal at an appointment on 16\u00a0August 2019. Dr\u00a0Bansal was candid that he had up to ten appointments\u00a0a\u00a0day, about 20\u00a0minutes each. The only way he was able to conduct assessments at that pace for medico-legal reports is because the medical report form was\u00a0a\u00a0standard form from the agency, Premier Medical, which was pre-populated with information from the questionnaire. Therefore, Dr Bansal confirmed that he had neither written, nor obtained from Mr Nadeem himself, the account in the report of \u2018the accident\u2019, which instead had been compiled by Premier Medical from the questionnaire. It said: "The accident occurred during the night. Mr\u00a0Atiquillah occupied the rear passenger seat in\u00a0a\u00a0car. He was wearing\u00a0a\u00a0seatbelt. A head restraint was fitted. An airbag was fitted but it did not deploy. At the moment of impact the Claimant's car was moving at\u00a0a\u00a0roundabout and the first impact the Claimant's vehicle was struck by another car at low speed. The impact came from the passenger side. In the second impact the Claimant's vehicle was struck by\u00a0a\u00a0third car at low speed. The impact came from the front. The combined force of the two impacts was sufficient to cause minor damage to the car. Mr\u00a0Atiquillah was thrown in all directions. He was able to get out of the vehicle unaided." Another indication of the fact that the questionnaire was done on Mr Nadeem\u2019s behalf and not by him personally, is that there was transposition of his full name and surname. His name is Atiquillah Nadeem, but he was described in this form as Nadeem Atiquillah (a similar error as in his later witness statement drafted by his solicitors, which again may support the suggestion that they completed the questionnaire for him). 25. It is entirely common for advocates and judges in personal injury cases to look at what a claimant has apparently \u2018told\u2019 a medical expert in the medical report: I commonly do it myself and DDJ Goodman understandably did so. However, her findings about \u2018what Mr Nadeem had told Dr\u00a0Bansal\u2019 transpire now to have been based upon an understandable but incorrect assumption. Indeed, it was not even clear until Dr\u00a0Bansal's own affidavit in the contempt proceedings \u2013 after DDJ Goodman\u2019s judgment – that the account of the accident circumstances was entirely pre-populated from a questionnaire. Whilst Dr Bansal suggested he \u2018would have\u2019 checked it with Mr Nadeem, naturally he has no specific recollection of doing so and for reasons I return to when considering the witnesses before me, I find that Dr Bansal did not check that account with Mr Nadeem, not least because it contained the suggestion that there were two separate collisions involving three vehicles which as I have said Mr Nadeem specifically told his solicitors was incorrect when he later saw the report. 26. Linking Dr Bansal\u2019s 2019 medical report to the grounds of alleged contempt, Ground One is that Mr Nadeem told Dr Bansal that he was occupying the rear passenger seat of the car when it was involved in\u00a0the collision. Certainly, that is what the medical report records, but Dr Bansal confirmed that information came from the questionnaire. Yet again, that is consistent with Mr Nadeem not filling it out himself, because his case has always been that he was\u00a0a\u00a0front seat passenger, as has been Mr Sidiqi's case about Mr Nadeem. It is unlikely that Dr\u00a0Bansal double-checked the point about Mr Nadeem being in the rear passenger seat, because Mr Nadeem would have corrected him at the time. That is consistent with the point that the details of the accident and location were pre-populated from the questionnaire and in\u00a0a\u00a0hurried appointment Dr\u00a0Bansal probably did not double-check the accident circumstances with Mr Nadeem. After all, as Dr\u00a0Bansal told me, he undertook up to ten medico-legal appointments on days when he was conducting them, somewhere between 100\u00a0and 150\u00a0a\u00a0month and understandably could not possibly remember the details of individual consultations. 27. Ground Two is that Mr Nadeem told Dr\u00a0Bansal that he had severe neck pain which resolved after two months and severe low back pain which resolved after four months. Dr Bansal did confirm that when the medical report records Mr Nadeem reporting severe neck pain resolving after two months and severe low back pain resolving after four months, that information did indeed come from Mr Nadeem in the appointment. I accept that, because (unlike the details of the accident) the duration of symptoms is bound to have come up at appointment for the preparation of a medical report about them. However, as I will discuss later, that is not entirely easy to square with the fact Mr Nadeem went into\u00a0a\u00a0walk-in centre three months after the accident complaining of back pain which he accepts was not related to the accident. However, one would have thought that if if Mr Nadeem was being dishonest in a medical appointment a year after the accident, he would not have limited his symptoms to four months at most but at other times said three months. 28. Ground Three relates to what Mr Nadeem accepts telling Dr\u00a0Bansal and what it also says on the questionnaire, but not the CNF \u2013 that Mr Nadeem took\u00a0a\u00a0week off work. Again, I accept Dr\u00a0Bansal would have checked that information with Mr Nadeem who would have confirmed it. I return to the inconsistency with the CNF. 29. On 24\u00a0June 2020\u00a0a\u00a0personal injury claim relating to the collision was issued on behalf of Mr Nadeem. The Particulars of Claim on behalf of Mr Nadeem described him as being\u00a0a\u00a0passenger of Mr Sidiqi, their car being hit by Ms\u00a0Hibbert and him sustaining injury. Even though those contentions by Mr Nadeem form part of the contempt proceedings in relation to other grounds, the assertions in the Particulars of Claim themselves are not themselves alleged grounds of contempt. It may be Aviva thought they added nothing to the assertions in the witness statement and medical evidence. 30. Three months later, the Defence on behalf of Ms\u00a0Hibbert was submitted where liability was admitted on the basis that she accepted colliding with Mr Sidiqi\u2019s car on\u00a0the roundabout. However, whilst negligence is conceded, it is far from clear from the Defence why that is. Ms Hibbert\u2019s account in the Defence was that she looked carefully before she entered the roundabout when Mr Sidiqi entered the roundabout at speed. So, her account is more consistent with it being his fault rather than hers. This internal inconsistency within Ms Hibbert\u2019s position is\u00a0a\u00a0point Mr\u00a0Christensen emphasised on behalf of Mr Sidiqi. 31. More centrally, in her Defence Ms\u00a0Hibbert contended that Mr\u00a0Nadeem was not in the car. She described the driver, whom Aviva accepts was Mr\u00a0Sidiqi, as\u00a0a\u00a0middle-aged man in his 50s, tall with wavy hair (which as I shall explain, is not an accurate description of Mr Sidiqi who is plainly younger). She described the front seat passenger, as I have indicated, as\u00a0a\u00a0middle-aged white man with\u00a0a\u00a0bald head. There was no reference in the Defence to the passenger getting out the car and going to urinate. However, the Defence did say Ms\u00a0Hibbert had been shown\u00a0a\u00a0passport photograph of Mr Nadeem (which is plainly his passport and looks like him sat in front of me now) and she had contended he was not the passenger of the car. 32. Ms Hibbert\u2019s Defence also pointed out inconsistencies between the Particulars of Claim and medical report with some of the other documents I have already mentioned. The Defence itself refers to the case of Richards v Morris [2018] EWHC 1289\u00a0(QB) on the significance of CNF forms, the equally well-known judgment by Spencer J Molodi v Cambridge VMS [2018] RTR 25 on whiplash claims and the leading judgment of the Court of Appeal in Howlett v Davies [2018] 1\u00a0WLR 948. The Defence specifically pleaded fundamental dishonesty by Mr Nadeem. I come back to those authorities later. 33. On 18\u00a0February 2021, there is\u00a0a\u00a0file note from Mr Nadeem's then-solicitors which records that he was unable to recollect the incident other than that he was\u00a0a\u00a0front seat passenger not rear seat passenger in the Mercedes which was hit by Ms\u00a0Hibbert's Citroen. Mr Nadeem was asked by his solicitors about his medical report which refers to two impacts with three vehicles involved. He told his solicitors there were just the two involved and the medical report was incorrect. I noted this earlier in explaining my finding that Dr Bansal did not ask him about this at the appointment, otherwise he would have corrected it, as he did with his solicitors (although there is no evidence they went back to Dr Bansal to correct his report). Mr Nadeem also said that Ms\u00a0Hibbert was mistaken that he was not the passenger and he said that he had remained in the car throughout. 34. On 24\u00a0March 2021\u00a0the same solicitors received back from Mr Sidiqi\u00a0a\u00a0statement in support of Mr Nadeem's claim with an email in English approving it but explaining he was in Dubai en route to Afghanistan because there was\u00a0a\u00a0family emergency. Mr Sidiqi\u2019s statement is central to Grounds Four and Five on the contempt alleged against him because the statement was supported by the usual statement of truth which said: "I believe the facts stated in this witness statement are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes or causes to be made\u00a0a\u00a0false statement in\u00a0a\u00a0document verified by\u00a0a\u00a0statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth." However, I remind myself, as I have already said, that Mr\u00a0Sidiqui needed the benefit of an interpreter to give evidence. He explained that the email of 24\u00a0March about which he was cross-examined with care and skill by Mr\u00a0Kong had been drafted by him with the assistance of translation software on his phone. I also remind myself about the fact that he has been referred for\u00a0a\u00a0dyslexia assessment. 35. Mr Sidiqi said in evidence yesterday he remembered reading paragraph 7 of his witness statement saying he was the driver of the Mercedes and the front passenger seat was his friend Mr Nadeem and they were wearing their seatbelts, but he did not really read the rest of it. Aviva says Mr Sidiqi's statement saying Mr Nadeem was in the car with him was\u00a0a\u00a0false statement and so Mr Sidiqi is in contempt of court. That is Ground 4. 36. Ground 5\u00a0relies upon paragraph 18\u00a0of Mr Sidiqi\u2019s 2021 statement, which said: "As\u00a0a\u00a0result of the accident, we both sustained injury, Nadeem to his neck and lower back and I suffered travel anxiety, lower back and neck pain." And paragraph 19\u00a0which says: "I am aware that Nadeem visited his GP because of back pain and later had physiotherapy and\u00a0a\u00a0medical examination arranged by his solicitor." 37. I observe that these paragraphs in Mr Sidiqi\u2019s statement were plainly drafted not by him (with his limited English and suspected dyslexia), but by his solicitors. It perhaps shows how slapdash they were that they referred to Mr Nadeem as having visited the GP when they knew from Mr Nadeem that he never did so. As I said, Mr Nadeem visited\u00a0a\u00a0walk-in centre with back pain in July 2018, but did not suggest that was due to the road traffic collision. Be that as it may, Mr Sidiqi signed the statement as true and in particular, as he said himself, the part that mattered was that his friend Mr Nadeem was in the car. Perhaps given Mr Sidiqi\u2019s limited English, possible dyslexia and family emergency it is unsurprising that he did not read his statement carefully \u2013 after all, it was not his claim but that of Mr Nadeem. 38. I now turn to the 31st March 2021 statement of Mr Nadeem himself \u2013 now the First Defendant, but then a\u00a0personal injury claimant. It had the same statement of truth in it and I will quote at more length from it because it is obviously directly relevant to Grounds 6, 7\u00a0and 8. Mr Nadeem\u2019s statement said at the first paragraph that his name was Mr\u00a0Nadeem Atiquillah. But that is wrong: his name is Mr\u00a0Atiquillah Nadeem, which rather undermines the assertion at paragraph 2\u00a0he could read, write and give evidence in English because, as I have said, in 2021 Mr Nadeem's English was not as strong as it is now. The statement added at paragraph 7: "At all times relevant to this claim I was\u00a0a\u00a0front seat passenger in\u00a0a\u00a0Mercedes E class motor vehicle registration LT66\u00a0MKM which was being driven by my friend Mr\u00a0Masood Sidiqui. We were wearing our seatbelts." That paragraph constitutes the alleged false statement in Ground 6\u00a0of the grounds of contempt \u2013 that he said he was a passenger in the car when he was not (the significance of his position in the car is not pressed). 39. Mr Nadeem\u2019s 2021 statement has a number of errors in it. It said the collision took place at about 10.15\u00a0on 14\u00a0March 2018. Again, that date was wrong; it was in fact 14\u00a0April 2018. The statement gives\u00a0a\u00a0description of how the accident came to happen, which I can paraphrase, essentially saying that Mr Nadeem and Mr Sidiqi in the latter\u2019s car were going across the roundabout to take the exit on to Whittington Way (again wrong \u2013 no-one suggests that). It said that Ms Hibbert merged from Church Avenue (again no-one suggests that either), failed to give way to them and collided with the passenger rear of the car (which is agreed). The statement said that Mr Nadeem had been looking ahead at the time of the collision and not expecting Ms Hibbert to collide with them, so he did not have the opportunity to brace himself for the impact, a\u00a0point made by Mr Sidiqi in his evidence to me. It said at paragraph 21 said Ms\u00a0Hibbert hit them side-on, they were shunted sideways and he was thrown in all directions in his seat. 40. Mr Nadeem\u2019s statement continued that Mr Sidiqi pulled over the car and got out to speak to Ms\u00a0Hibbert, whereas he, Mr Nadeem, stayed in the car. Paragraphs 22\u00a0and 23\u00a0of Mr Nadeem\u2019s statement said that Ms\u00a0Hibbert was incorrect to say in her Defence he was not in the car when in fact he was. It went on at paragraphs 24\u00a0and 25\u00a0to say this: "The Defence mentions an attendance I made at the walk-in centre on 25\u00a0July 2018\u00a0which was after I sought legal advice and brought\u00a0a\u00a0claim for personal injury. My back was sore and I attended\u00a0a\u00a0walk-in centre. I did not mention it was accident-related as it was not accident-related. I have\u00a0a\u00a0long history of back issues which I think is due to my work." Therefore, it was not and never asserted by Mr Nadeem that his 25\u00a0July 2018 walk-in attendance was related to the accident. He was explicitly clear in his statement that it was not, as he was in his evidence, as I will come to in\u00a0a\u00a0moment. His statement went on at paragraphs 26\u00a0and 27\u00a0to refer to the fact that the CNF had been filled in by solicitors and not by him and was mistaken in saying he had no times off work because he took seven days off work. The statement also stated at paragraph 28\u00a0that the reference in the medical report to two impacts was wrong as well. 41. Mr Nadeem\u2019s statement gave\u00a0a\u00a0description of his injury at paragraph 30: "Immediately after collision I was in\u00a0a\u00a0state of shock. My hands were trembling, I felt unsteady and dazed. I have never been injured in\u00a0a\u00a0road traffic accident before and it really shook me up. Physically I suffered immediately from severe pain in my neck and lower back. I did not attend hospital or my GP as I felt my injuries were not serious and I would be able to deal with the symptoms by taking painkillers. I took ibuprofen and paracetamol at regular intervals and gradually over time my symptoms did improve so I did not seek medical attention. On 28\u00a0April I had\u00a0a\u00a0physiotherapy triage assessment followed by an initial assessment and one physiotherapy session. I feel this treatment was beneficial to my recovery. I did attend my local walk-in centre on 25\u00a0July due to back pain which I had experienced for\u00a0a\u00a0few days." However, that back pain was, as he had already said, not related to the accident. 42. Mr Nadeem\u2019s statement went on to say at paragraph 38\u00a0of the attendance with Dr\u00a0Bansal in August 2019: "At the time of the examination, I had fully recovered from my injuries and I informed Dr\u00a0Bansal my neck injury took two months and my back injury four months from the date of the accident." Paragraph 38\u00a0is the basis for Ground 7\u00a0of the alleged contempt: that Mr Nadeem informed Dr\u00a0Bansal that his neck injury took two months and his back injury four months to resolve and it certainly says that. However, in doing so, it is internally inconsistent with Mr Nadeem\u2019s statement at paragraphs 24 and 25 that back pain prompting him to visit the walk-in centre in July 2018 (three-months post-accident) was not accident-related. 43. Ground 8\u00a0of the alleged contempt is said to be constituted by the statement at paragraph 41\u00a0of Mr Nadeem\u2019s 2021 statement: "Due to my injuries I had to take seven days off work as I felt physically unable to do my job. For my work I have to bend, stretch, twist and lift heavy objects which at that time I was unable to do. When I returned to work I restricted my duties to lighter work for\u00a0a\u00a0further week then I would not aggravate my injuries." Mr Nadeem later said in his evidence to DDJ Goodman (and to me) that in fact for those seven days he had not gone into work in the garage but had worked at home with telephone calls and administration etc. 44. On 1\u00a0April 2021, which happened to be the day after Mr Nadeem\u2019s statement was signed, Ms\u00a0Hibbert prepared her witness statement for the personal injury proceedings. It too is now accepted to have been wrong in several respects. It described Ms Hibbert as driving along Rayners Lane before the roundabout when in fact she now says she was driving in Whittington Way. It said she intended to drive straight over the roundabout to Rayners Lane South, but that is not straight over the roundabout from Whittington Way. The statement also said there was\u00a0a\u00a0road to the right-hand side of Whittington Way and that her view of it was slightly blocked by street furniture. It transpired in cross-examination that what she meant was that she was on Whittington Way and there was\u00a0a\u00a0fence between it and Church Avenue to its right. However, Whittington Way in fact splits at its end onto the roundabout into two; the left-hand lane going north up Rayners Lane North, the right-hand lane going onto the roundabout. Mr Christensen suggested to Ms\u00a0Hibbert that in fact she was on the left-hand lane going left up Rayners Lane North, realised she had made\u00a0a\u00a0mistake and turned sharply right onto the roundabout which explains why the damage is to the passenger side of her car. She rejected that. 45. Ms Hibbert\u2019s 2021 statement went on to say at paragraph 14, "The claimant came from the right and turned left at Suffolk Road." However, Ms Hibbert in her evidence to me accepted Mr Sidiqi came from Church Avenue and turned left up Rayners Lane North. Ms Hibbert maintained her account in her statement that the contact was minor and not enough to shunt any vehicle in either direction. They pulled over to exchange details. She spoke with the driver of the vehicle which was a taxi. They inspected the vehicles for damage. She described the damage inaccurately, because she said her vehicle had\u00a0a\u00a0slight scuff to the front right-hand (i.e. driver\u2019s side) bumper. In fact, it is clear from the photographs it was the passenger side of her car, i.e. the left-hand side, as Ms Hibbert again later accepted in evidence to me. Her 2021 statement also described there being damage to Mr Sidiqi\u2019s vehicle,\u00a0a\u00a0scuff to the left-hand wheel arch, which is correct (although there was slightly more than that). 46. Crucially, Ms Hibbert\u2019s 2021 statement also said this: "While I was at the scene, I had\u00a0a\u00a0clear view of the Claimant's vehicle and while I was speaking with the driver of the taxi,\u00a0a\u00a0passenger got out the taxi and began to urinate behind\u00a0a\u00a0tree. I believe the passenger was\u00a0a\u00a0fare-paying passenger. Due to his behaviour I assumed he was drunk. He was\u00a0a\u00a0white man. He was bald." Ms Hibbert later said that she had seen\u00a0a\u00a0passport image of Mr Nadeem and confirmed that he was not the passenger that exited the taxi. As I have said, Mr Nadeem looks nothing like Ms Hibbert\u2019s description. 47. The case then came on for trial before DDJ Goodman at Willesden County Court on 3\u00a0June 2021. We must not overlook the fact that June 2021\u00a0was in the middle of the COVID Pandemic. Speaking as\u00a0a\u00a0former Designated Civil Judge, I remember vividly that it was an extremely challenging time for the Courts when there were significant backlogs and lists were often quite heavy. This might explain why, although listed for\u00a0a\u00a0trial, the matter did not start until just before 11\u00a0o'clock rather than at 10 and indeed, DDJ Goodman apologised for that at the start of the hearing. 48. Mr Nadeem (then the claimant) was represented by counsel whom he had only met shortly before the hearing (entirely consistently with my own experience at the junior personal injury bar). The barrister had just told him there were inconsistencies in the evidence, including some inaccuracies in his statement, as I have said. However, it would not have been apparent to anyone at Court that day what Dr Bansal has since clarified that large sections of the medical report had come from the questionnaire. Another problem which would have rattled Mr Nadeem at that trial was that Mr Sidiqi, his witness, was not there. This was something which obviously troubled DDJ Goodman, although the apparent explanation was, as he had explained to the solicitors in the email in March 2021, that he had to go to see family in Afghanistan. 49. The trial before DDJ Goodman started with Mr Nadeem's evidence, without the benefit of an interpreter. Mr Nadeem explained to me in his evidence yesterday (also without an interpreter) that his English now is much better than his English in 2021. Having had the benefit of him give evidence in front of me in October 2024 and comparing that to the very detailed transcript of the evidence he gave to DDJ Goodman in June 2021, I entirely accept that. His answers to me were fluent and fluid, clear, cogent and measured, whereas his answers to DDJ Goodman were often muddled, short and confused. For example, Mr Nadeem was not sure even of the date of the accident. He initially suggested to DDJ Goodman it was in May 2018,\u00a0but then said it was in March 2018\u00a0when in fact it is agreed that it was in April 2018. He initially said that he went to see the GP, although it later transpired that he was talking about going to the walk-in centre with back pain, which as I said he was clear to the judge (as he had been clear in his witness statement) that was not accident-related. 50. Mr Nadeem then insisted in his evidence that he had taken seven days off work and was not sure why the CNF had not mentioned that. Notably his counsel made the point that the CNF was not even in the bundle when he was being asked about it, which cannot have helped. DDJ Goodman interrupted cross-examination to say to Mr Nadeem \u2018You said one thing in one statement and another in another\u2019, suggesting that even by that stage she was starting to get irritated with his evidence. Indeed, at pages 19\u00a0to 20\u00a0of the transcript, DDJ Goodman started questioning Mr Nadeem in relation to this issue and on what work he was or was not doing. 51. Mr Nadeem explained to DDJ Goodman that whilst he had not gone into the garage for seven days, he had been in telephone contact. Ms\u00a0Hibbert's counsel at the time suggested that was effectively like work so the CNF was correct and his evidence was wrong. However, it has consistently been Mr Nadeem's case that he took seven days away from the garage but not that he stopped work completely. He was making phone calls from home, as I said. That is the most likely explanation of the apparent inconsistency between what he was saying about seven days away from the garage and the fact that his solicitors put in the CNF that he had no time off work as such. As Ms Hibbert\u2019s counsel himself said, \u201cThat's like work" to which DDJ Goodman replied "I am saying nothing." Neither seems to have considered that straightforward explanation of the discrepancy between what Mr Nadeem was saying and the CNF. In my experience of road traffic fast-track claims, it is hardly the first CNF to be unhelpfully Delphic in the information that it provides. 52. Mr Nadeem was then cross-examined about Dr Bansal\u2019s medical report and by this stage it is apparent from the transcript that DDJ Goodman was getting more and more irritated with Mr Nadeem's evidence. She at one stage pressed him almost in the manner of cross-examination whether or not the seatbelt tightened. He was asked about head restraints and gave confused answers about that and about whether his symptoms had been immediate. What is apparent from the whole passage of evidence and indeed from DDJ Goodman's judgment (to which I will come in\u00a0a\u00a0moment) is that it was clearly assumed by everyone that the accident circumstances in Dr Bansal\u2019s medical report, had actually come from Mr\u00a0Nadeem (as the then-claimant). In fact, it is clear from Dr\u00a0Bansal's evidence that is not right; that information had come from the questionnaire which I have found was not filled out by Mr\u00a0Nadeem, for the reasons I have already explained. I have also found that contrary to Dr Bansal\u2019s usual practice, he had not checked the circumstances with Mr Nadeem. 53. I turn to the particular parts of evidence relied on for Grounds 9, 10\u00a0and 11 of the contempt. The first passage of the transcript is internal page 10, from supplementary questions from Mr Nadeem\u2019s barrister, where he stated the medical report was wrong and he was the front seat passenger. That, as I say, forms now part of Ground 9, although it alleges he made\u00a0a\u00a0false statement without an honest belief in its truth, that he was the front seat passenger of\u00a0a\u00a0car when it was involved in\u00a0a\u00a0road traffic accident on 14\u00a0April. However, as Mr\u00a0Kong has fairly said, the real point is Mr Nadeem\u2019 contention that he was a passenger in the car at all, not whether he was in the front or the rear. Nevertheless, it is obvious that Mr Nadeem said he was a passenger in the car. The only issue on Ground 9 is whether that was a lie. 54. Ground 10 alleges\u00a0a\u00a0false statement in evidence by Mr Nadeem to the effect that he had neck pain which started probably about three days after the accident. It is taken from page 19\u00a0of the transcript of the evidence and was again plainly said by Mr\u00a0Nadeem. Confusingly, he had said he had neck pain which started about three days after the accident and then immediately went on to say that his back pain started at five months after the accident which he then clarified to mean three months after the accident, which he then apparently suggested was related to the walk-in centre, which he had already said was not accident-related. In fairness to DDJ Goodman, one can perhaps see in the circumstances in fairness why DDJ Goodman had got rather irritated with Mr\u00a0Nadeem's evidence. It was, to use a colloquial expression, all over the show. 55. Ground 11\u00a0is the alleged false statement that Mr Nadeem took\u00a0a\u00a0week off work but worked from home, which again was something he clearly said in evidence at internal page 25\u00a0of the transcript. Again, the only issue is whether that was a lie. I will reach my conclusions about that below, but have already set out his explanation of the apparent inconsistency with the CNF which seems to me to be the most plausible explanation. 56. As I said, I well remember the stresses of\u00a0a\u00a0busy court list in the middle of\u00a0the Covid Pandemic. I am sure all judges who sat through that period can look back on hearings we could have handled better. However, even making allowances for that, it was unfortunate that part-way through Mr Nadeem\u2019s rather muddled evidence, albeit on a\u00a0fairly peripheral point whether Mr\u00a0Sidiqui had sustained an injury, DDJ Goodman expressed herself in a way I am sure she would prefer to have phrased differently. She said to Mr Nadeem: "You're just making this up, are you not?". (All judges have thought that, but it is hardly ideal to say it during evidence). 57. That may well have played a part after re-examination in Mr Nadeem's barrister asking for time with her client and opponent. It probably was fairly obvious to the lawyers in the room, including DDJ Goodman, that what she was really saying is that she was going to have\u00a0a\u00a0conversation about whether the claim should be discontinued. DDJ Goodman plainly wished to encourage that result, because she then said, "Well, that's good because I am going to consider my case management powers at this stage and we may not to hear evidence from the defendant." In other words, she was getting close to inviting,\u00a0a\u00a0half-time submission. 58. After the ten-minute break, Mr\u00a0Nadeem's barrister said that they had not made headway, in other words, they had not been able to agree some sort of basis of discontinuance. It is important to note that she invited DDJ Goodman to hear Ms Hibbert\u2019s evidence before deciding the case. However, Ms Hibbert\u2019s barrister (hardly surprisingly given the judge\u2019s earlier comments) simply said there was no case to answer. 59. Highly unusually DDJ Goodman did not then invite further submissions on the merits or credibility of Mr\u00a0Nadeem from his barrister. She simply began the judgment which forms one of the keys to this case. In other words, as Mr\u00a0Varnam quite rightly said, DDJ Goodman\u2019s judgment Aviva now relies on was given without hearing meaningful submissions from Mr\u00a0Nadeem's own counsel. That was extremely unfortunate. However, I do not doubt for a moment that at the height of an unprecedented time for the Courts, it was a passing aberration in DDJ Goodman\u2019s long judicial career (as she mentioned in her judgment, over 20 years). Against that factual background, I turn to DDJ Goodman\u2019s judgment itself, but also the consequential rulings, including her findings on the criminal standard of proof which are relied on by Aviva. DDJ Goodman\u2019s judgment and consequent rulings 60. It is fair to describe DDJ Goodman's judgment (where Mr Nadeem was obviously referred to as \u2018the Claimant\u2019) as trenchant. She started by saying: "I have rarely seen\u00a0a\u00a0case where the evidence is so inconsistent as that before me today. I have been hearing cases for over 20\u00a0years and this is one of the worst examples I have heard. I have only heard evidence from the Claimant this morning and I have no hesitation in saying that none of his evidence stacks up to anything near\u00a0a\u00a051\u00a0per cent burden of proof." At paragraph 2, she mentioned the confusion over the date of the accident. She said at paragraph 3 this: "His injuries, which form the subject of the claim today, have no bearing in fact whatsoever in my judgment. He did not go to the walk-in Pinn Medical Centre until 25\u00a0July 2018, some three months after the accident. He did not then say that he was suffering from an injury as\u00a0a\u00a0result of\u00a0a\u00a0road traffic accident, and he was at pains to tell the court today that he went there in relation to an injury to his lower back, which he was adamant was totally unrelated to the road traffic accident on 14\u00a0April. He said that the pain he complained about, which was related, started some few days after he had been to the Pinn Medical Centre and was on the left side of his back which he said was in the middle of the lower." DDJ Goodman then went on to say: "4. There is nothing in my judgment or even his to link any pain in his back with the index accident, none at all. There is no evidence he has provided that can possibly link any back pain with an accident in April 2018. He had pain unrelated to the accident in the middle and he himself said he did not know when the left side pain started, nor did he give any account at all as to why he thought it was linked to the road traffic accident in April. He said he had pain in his neck he told us, and he said he had seven days off work. 5. He said at the time he owned two garages, but he did not go to the doctor. He told the medical expert it had caused problems for two months and he told us today it was not severe. He did not need to go to the doctor. He took some painkillers, he said, but he was hazy about when he took them. He said he carried on working but from home making phone calls. I do not accept that at all. There is no evidence of any injury whatsoever, and this is\u00a0a\u00a0man who ran two garages. He said there were six of them altogether and he took part in not only the books and the administration but actually doing the servicing. 6. He has shown no evidence to this court that he took any time off work and I do not accept\u00a0a\u00a0man owning two small garages with\u00a0a\u00a0very small workforce would take any time off work. He is lying to me. He is lying to the court throughout." I pause there to interpose that it is not entirely clear to me from reading DDJ Goodman's judgment why it would necessarily be inconsistent with someone running\u00a0a\u00a0small garage if injured to carry on working from home if he was unfit to attend the garage and whether she bore that in mind in potentially explaining the inconsistency with the CNF. 61. DDJ Goodman went on to say at paragraphs 7 and 9 of her judgment: "7. He has so many discrepancies in what he told the doctor as against what he put in his witness statement and, indeed, what was in the CFA [I think that must mean CNF] and what he said today, but I will just mention\u00a0a\u00a0few but it is clear what he told the doctor is\u00a0a\u00a0tissue of lies. He told the doctor, for example, and I should say at this point the report was on 16\u00a0August 2019\u00a0which is some consider time after the accident, alleged accident I should say, that he was\u00a0a\u00a0rear passenger. He said today that is\u00a0a\u00a0mistake. He was\u00a0a\u00a0front passenger. He said he had head restraints. He said today that there weren't any head restraints and seemed not to understand what\u00a0a\u00a0head restraint was, which is\u00a0a\u00a0bit strange for someone that runs\u00a0a\u00a0garage. He told the doctor there was\u00a0a\u00a0second impact with\u00a0a\u00a0third vehicle. He said that that is not true, there was no second impact\u2026. 9. Those are just the discrepancies that came to mind immediately when I compared this evidence today in his witness statement and what he told the doctor. I fully accept the doctor was accurate in what he wrote down and of course the doctor did not examine him. The Claimant was hazy as to whether the doctor examined him or not. 10. He did not tell the doctor that he had lower back pain which was unrelated to the accident and the pain he was complaining about for the purpose of today and the court case was in the middle to left side." But all of that presupposes that Mr\u00a0Nadeem told the doctor the things that DDJ Goodman was saying that he told him. I can perfectly understand why DDJ Goodman thought that he had told him because that appeared to be what the medical report said. She could not be expected to know and I was surprised to learn that in fact much of that information, apart from the detail of the injury and pain itself, had been pre-populated from\u00a0a\u00a0questionnaire and, as I have already explained, I have found that questionnaire was not filled out by Mr\u00a0Nadeem. So, the assumptions upon which DDJ Goodman's judgment is based are in fact incorrect, albeit entirely understandable. 62. It is notable, however, that in her short judgment of only 15\u00a0paragraphs, DDJ Goodman reserved\u00a0a\u00a0paragraph of trenchant criticism for Mr Nadeem\u2019s then-solicitors: "I have to blame at some point the solicitors who clearly did not do\u00a0a\u00a0very good job of assessing this man's evidence at any stage whatsoever because it should never have come to trial. There are so many discrepancies I can't tell what is true at all and, quite rightly [Ms Hibbert\u2019s barrister] put to [Mr Nadeem] he was not even in this accident. I do not know that he was. I've got insufficient evidence to say he was connected with this accident. Certainly, his description does not tally with the defendant's evidence at all, and of course his witness, Mr Sidiqui, who also at some point has brought\u00a0a\u00a0claim or is still bringing\u00a0a\u00a0claim with the same solicitors I note is not here and has apparently gone to Azerbaijan [I think DDJ Goodman meant Afghanistan]." 63. DDJ Goodman went on to conclude at paragraphs 14 and 15 of her judgment: "14. [Mr Nadeem] is completely unreliable. The medical evidence he gave to the doctor is therefore unreliable. There is no other medical evidence. He did not get and see his doctor even though he took seven days off work allegedly with back pain and with neck pain. The evidence he has given is completely unreliable, inconsistent and untruthful. As far as I am concerned, it is rare to say that I say it in such strong terms. He actually admitted, 'After I had legal advice I went to the walk-in centre'. This is an attempt by the man to make money out of the legal system. That is all." "15. I have no difficulty in saying that there is no evidence at all upon which to base this claim. This is\u00a0a\u00a0man who is completely untruthful. This claim should never have got this far. It should never have been brought and the claim is dismissed." 64. I am sure I have expressed myself many times over the years badly and indeed got things wrong (as counsel have sometimes told me just after I have given an oral judgment and indeed counsel may well tell me just after this one). However, DDJ Goodman\u2019s observations were at times difficult to reconcile with the evidence she had heard. In saying "He actually admitted 'After I had legal advice I went to the walk-in centre' that's an attempt by this man to make money out the legal system. That is all\u201d. Yet DDJ Goodman had noted herself earlier in her judgment that Mr Nadeem had been at pains in his statement and evidence to make clear that he went to the walk-in centre with back pain which was unconnected to the accident. 65. Be that as it may, what is notable for present purposes is that however robust she was, DDJ Goodman did not actually go so far as to find Mr Nadeem was not in the car at all. I repeat what she actually said about that: \u201cQuite rightly [Ms Hibbert\u2019s barrister] put to [Mr Nadeem] he was not even in this accident. I do not know that he was. I've got insufficient evidence to say he was connected with this accident.\u201d I accept that is consistent with\u00a0a\u00a0finding on the balance of probabilities that Mr Nadeem had not proved he was in the car, because of course at that stage the burden of proof was upon him, but it is not\u00a0a\u00a0positive finding that he was not in the car. Indeed, in fairness to Mr\u00a0Kong, he does not suggest DDJ Goodman actually ever explicitly and positively found that Mr Nadeem was not in the car. 66. After DDJ Goodman gave judgment, she adjourned for lunch and then heard from Mr Hibbert\u2019s barrister who invited her to make\u00a0a\u00a0number of consequential findings given her ruling there was no case to answer. The first was\u00a0to invite her to find fundamental dishonesty. The second was to make such a finding to the criminal standard (as in Kovacic, discussed below). The third was\u00a0a\u00a0reference to the CPS. DDJ Goodman interrupted: "All right, well let me just consider these issues. One is for fundamental dishonesty which I have done. Number two, fundamental dishonesty to\u00a0a\u00a0criminal standard. Three is presumably what follows from\u00a0a\u00a0reference to the CPS? Yes. Then four, are we on notice to show cause as well?" Therefore, DDJ Goodman raised fourth the possibility of wasted costs against Mr Nadeem\u2019s solicitors, but Ms Hibbert\u2019s barrister confirmed that was not sought. However, I have italicised what DDJ Goodman said about having \u2018done\u2019 fundamental dishonesty at least to a civil standard. In other words, she considered (perhaps understandably) that she had already made such a finding. 67. Mr\u00a0Nadeem's counsel then intervened and said: "Madam, could I just raise one point. I understand the judgment was very powerful in terms of what was said about the Claimant. I understand you have indicated you have indeed made\u00a0a\u00a0finding of fundamental dishonesty. Ordinarily I would have responded to any application but I appreciate what was noted in your judgment. Just so I have said it on behalf of the Claimant, madam, I do not know if you are willing to change your mind about the finding at all. JUDGE GOODMAN: No." Mr\u00a0Nadeem's counsel persisted in what I must say in the best traditions of the Bar when faced with a trenchant judicial stance: "But all I will say, ma'am, is that the Claimant — there is\u00a0a\u00a0two-stage approach to the finding of this, there is the subjective and objective element. Subjectively I say the Claimant in terms of his evidence genuinely and honestly believe what his evidence was, but I understand objectively you may judge it to be unreasonable in terms of the filing. All I say, madam, is that in terms of the finding of fundamental dishonesty, I did not get an opportunity to respond to any application so I simply make that — JUDGE GOODMAN: No, I am going to make — you will have an opportunity, the finding of fundamental dishonesty stands." DDJ Goodman must have said \u2018you will have no opportunity\u2019 or \u2018you've had your opportunity\u2019, because she went on immediately to say, \u2018The finding of fundamental dishonesty stands\u2019. In other words, DDJ Goodman, having made\u00a0a\u00a0finding of no case to answer without calling on Mr\u00a0Nadeem's then counsel in any detail, then confirmed her finding of fundamental dishonesty without giving her\u00a0any opportunity to make submissions. 68. In explanation of that, DDJ Goodman went on to say: "I did not specifically mention it in the judgment, I should have done as part of the judgment, so it should effectively be for the purpose of the record the last point of the judgment itself that it is obviously implicit if not explicit, and I make it explicitly so, fundamental dishonesty is part of the judgment." In fairness to DDJ Goodman, she then did acknowledge that Mr\u00a0Nadeem's barrister was trying to do her job and was under\u00a0a\u00a0duty to her client. 69. DDJ Goodman then invited submissions from Ms Hibbert\u2019s barrister about making the finding of fundamental dishonesty to\u00a0a\u00a0criminal standard of proof, in other words, the Kovacic approach, and there was some discussion of Kovacic. In fairness on this particular point, which DDJ Goodman, like many County Court judges, was perhaps less familiar with, she did call on Mr\u00a0Nadeem's barrister to make submissions to her. Indeed, the barrister made submissions in detail seeking to distinguish the present case from Kovacic, which was\u00a0a\u00a0case based upon surveillance evidence. DDJ Goodman, having heard from both counsel, then said: "I said in my judgment that I had rarely come across\u00a0a\u00a0case of such dishonesty, but there are so many discrepancies that it was impossible even to place the Claimant at the scene of the accident, let alone that he had any injury whatsoever as\u00a0a\u00a0result. I was unable to find anything in his favour. It seemed to me, and I said so in my judgment, he lied from beginning to end. If I did not say that explicitly, which I say to you he very much did, I say that now. I referred to the defendant's witness statement and of course we did not hear from the defendant, but her evidence did not even place him there in terms of the identification and lack of coherence of any points of his evidence, whether it is in his claims notification form, which must have been his initial instructions to his solicitor, to the doctor that he went to see in August 2019\u00a0to his witness statement today, four points, none of them coincided at all. In my judgment,\u00a0a\u00a0complete lack of transparency, coherent evidence, honesty at all, leads me inexorably to the conclusion that the fundamental dishonesty which I have found is not only to the civil standard. He did not get to the 50\u00a0per cent, he did not get anywhere at all. Now, the standard of proof on\u00a0a\u00a0criminal basis is beyond reasonable doubt as opposed to the balance of probabilities, but I could not find any doubt to give him at all. It certainly was, in my judgment, the situation today that he failed to convince me on any basis at allas I am invited to do by [Ms Hibbert\u2019s barrister], I have to find that the criminal standard of fundamental dishonesty is met. I do find that this is an unusual case, but in\u00a0a\u00a0case where he lied on every single point, even where his witness was let alone medical evidence, the facts, everything, there is not\u00a0a\u00a0single point in his favour. Yes, I have considered it as we have been speaking. I have looked at the case of Kovacic and I find I am able to make\u00a0a\u00a0finding of fundamental dishonesty which is so exaggerated that it is to the criminal standard." (my italics). 70. There are three points I would make immediately about that ruling. The first is that DDJ Goodman rightly differentiated the civil and criminal standards of proof. Secondly, she did express a finding that the Mr Nadeem was in the car, as she said: \u2018there are so many discrepancies that it was impossible even to place the Claimant at the scene of the accident, let alone that he had any injury whatsoever as\u00a0a\u00a0result\u2019. Yet, Mr Knong rightly did not rely on that as an explicit finding that the Claimant was not in the car. In any event, as I have explained many of the \u2018inconsistencies\u2019 DDJ Goodman referred to arose through her (understandable but inaccurate) misapprehensions as to how the medical report was prepared. Thirdly, DDJ Goodman she appears to have reversed the burden of proof in saying: \u2018He did not get to the 50\u00a0per cent, he did not get anywhere at all. Now, the standard of proof on\u00a0a\u00a0criminal basis is beyond reasonable doubt as opposed to the balance of probabilities, but I could not find any doubt to give him at all. It certainly was, in my judgment, the situation today that he failed to convince me on any basis at all.\u2019 It is clear from that passage that DDJ Goodman was talking about Mr\u00a0Nadeem \u2018having failed to convince her on any basis at all\u2019, in other words, that she was still placing the burden of proof on Mr\u00a0Nadeem and simply saying not only did he fail to prove his case on the balance of probabilities, he had failed to establish any doubt at all, as opposed to Ms Hibbert having proven to the criminal standard that Mr Nadeem had lied. That might seem a\u00a0fairly pedantic distinction, but anyone who has practised in the criminal courts understands the incidence of the burden of proof is\u00a0a\u00a0fundamental guarantee of fairness in our law. In any event, as\u00a0a\u00a0result of that, DDJ Goodman made not only\u00a0a\u00a0declaration that the claim was dismissed, that QOCS was disapplied for fundamental dishonesty but also\u00a0a\u00a0specific declaration that \u2018upon the court making\u00a0a\u00a0finding the Claimant has been fundamentally dishonest to the criminal standard\u2019. The contempt proceedings 71. DDJ Goodman\u2019s robust finding of fundamental dishonesty of Mr Nadeem to the criminal standard of proof obviously encouraged Aviva to pursue these contempt proceedings. Nevertheless, they have rightly thought carefully about them and they have been the subject of extremely careful presentation and preparation by Ms\u00a0Barry. She diligently collected affidavits, both from Dr\u00a0Bansal and from Ms\u00a0Hibbert in August 2022, but did not issue the contempt proceedings until September 2023. 72. Dr\u00a0Bansal's affidavit goes into the context of the preparation of the medical report and in particular the role of the questionnaire. Dr Bansal said in that affidavit, as he did in his evidence, that he \u2018would have\u2019 checked the accident circumstances and he would have also in particular checked pain and the consequences of the accident before reaching his conclusion and talking through the report. However, whilst I have found he would have checked the symptoms and their duration and the time off work with Mr Nadeem, he cannot have checked the accident circumstances, because they were plainly incorrect as Mr Nadeem later told his solicitors. I will elaborate on some those points about Dr Bansal\u2019s evidence in the next section of this judgment. 73. Ms\u00a0Hibbert's affidavit was much more detailed than her initial statement in the personal injury proceedings. In particular, she corrected some mistakes. However, she did not correct the details of her route over the junction. In her affidavit, she was still saying that she was going along Rayners Lane, which she now accepts is wrong, and she was still saying that she was going straight over the roundabout down Rayners Lane, when that is not straight over the roundabout from Whittington Way where she actually had come from. She gave\u00a0a\u00a0description of the accident in these terms: "11. I brought my vehicle to\u00a0a\u00a0complete stop at the entrance to the roundabout. The view to my right was compromised\u00a0a\u00a0little owing to street furniture and the presence of another lane to my right. However, there were no other vehicles or pedestrians around as I was waiting. After waiting\u00a0a\u00a0few moments, I formed the view the roundabout was clear and therefore entered the roundabout. 12. As I entered the roundabout,\u00a0a\u00a0Mercedes, which I believe was being driven by Mr Sidiqi, suddenly appeared to my right from Whittington Way. I was surprised as I had not seen this vehicle when I had been waiting at the roundabout. I remember thinking that it must have been travelling very quickly. The Mercedes vehicle continued forwards towards the Suffolk Road exist which would have been my first exit. Whilst in the process of passing my vehicle, the scraping contact occurred between the two vehicles. At the point of contact, my vehicle was travelling at approximately 5\u00a0miles per hour. I had just set off. I cannot say for certain that the Mercedes was travelling but I remember thinking that given we were travelling through\u00a0a\u00a0residential area he was driving far too fast. The point of contact was between the lower section of my front bumper on the left-hand side \u2026[i.e. the passenger side – a correction from her earlier statement in the personal injury claim]\u2026\u2026 and the left-hand of the Mercedes. Then Mercedes appeared from my right. He came into contact with my vehicle as it was passing across my front bumper as it was veering left to take the Suffolk Road exit travelling at speed. It just so happened that it caught and scuffed my front bumper on the left-hand side. The contact was very minor and did not shunt my vehicle. I very much doubt it shunted the Mercedes either." 74. On that more detailed account, it is even more difficult to understand why Ms\u00a0Hibbert ever accepted liability for the accident. That is\u00a0a\u00a0description of her making proper observations before she entered the roundabout and Mr\u00a0Sidiqui, the now Second Defendant, effectively travelling over the roundabout when she was already on it far too fast, veering in front of her and then making contact with the passenger side front corner of her car. It is\u00a0also\u00a0good illustration of how Ms\u00a0Hibbert has, to\u00a0a\u00a0certain extent, reconstructed the circumstances of the accident in her mind four years afterwards. Much of that detail was not in her original statement prepared a year earlier and closer to the accident. Some of the detail was actually different, for example, the fact that the impact was on the left-hand side of the front rather than the right-hand side of the front. 75. In her 2022 affidavit Ms Hibbert described pulling up alongside the grass verge and speaking to Mr Sidiqi who had exited the Mercedes. She said there were no other cars or pedestrians when they first pulled over. She said that the car driver was very tall and slim. He had dark wavy hair and was Asian appearance. She said: "I do not recall the clothes he was wearing but they were smart." She made no reference to\u00a0a\u00a0beard. 76. Ms Hibbert went on to say in her affidavit that they began to inspect the vehicles but recalled that: "The street lighting was not particularly bright. It was more orange than yellow in colour. As such, any assistance with visibility offered by the street lighting was limited." She said she could see her vehicle had damage to it, as did the Mercedes. She corrected her earlier statement in the personal injury proceedings that the damage was on the driver\u2019s side of her car. Ms Hibbert confirmed it was the passenger\u2019s side of the car and she also exhibited the photographs she had taken at the time. She said\u00a0a\u00a0passer-by had stopped to assist her by lighting the car with\u00a0her\u00a0phone so that Ms\u00a0Hibbert could take the photographs. One of the photographs was obviously taken by Ms\u00a0Hibbert standing on the verge with the car parked\u00a0a\u00a0foot or so away from the kerb. The helpful passerby can be seen partly in shot lighting the damage to the Mercedes for Ms\u00a0Hibbert to take the photograph. The rear window of the Mercedes can be clearly seen in that photograph, but it is plainly black. One cannot see through to the inside very easily. There is what appears to be\u00a0a\u00a0shape in the triangle back window, but Ms\u00a0Hibbert accepted in evidence that that appears to have been\u00a0a\u00a0reflection. The photographs from that point in time are obviously focussed on the damage, not the occupancy of the car. 77. The photographs do not show the front passenger seat window, which is where Mr\u00a0Nadeem says he was sat and from where Ms\u00a0Hibbert says the bald white man emerged. She went on to give a description in her affidavit. She said an individual got out the vehicle. He was quite short: roughly 5'6" but he was taller than her, she is only 5'1". He was of chubby build,\u00a0a\u00a0white man with\u00a0a\u00a0bald head. She estimated he was in his late 50s. He could not remember the clothes he was wearing. As he got out, she could remember him looking at her, walking across the grass verge next to where the Mercedes had pulled up towards\u00a0a\u00a0tree and then he was staggering. She thought he was drunk. She added: "As he was walking off, he said something along the lines of 'You just stay with the driver. I want to go home'", which led her to believe that he was\u00a0a\u00a0taxi customer. She did not respond and he proceeded to urinate on the tree. The passenger was only gone\u00a0a\u00a0few moments when he returned to the Mercedes and got into the vehicle using the same front passenger door. She added "He did not speak to me again when getting back in." While he did so, she was still speaking to Mr Sidiqi. In other words, the only description of the passenger's face in the poor lighting conditions that Ms\u00a0Hibbert could give in her affidavit was when he turned towards her and spoke to her as he was walking off towards the tree. However, her evidence to me was that the passenger spoke to her on the way back from the tree. So there is an inconsistency between her oral evidence and her affidavit. Ms Hibbert went on in her affidavit to confirm the passenger was not Mr\u00a0Nadeem and indeed it is not suggested that he (as a younger Afghan man with hair and a beard) could have been mistaken for\u00a0a\u00a0middle aged bald white man. 78. Having obtained those affidavits and obtained other evidence (such as the transcripts of DDJ Goodman\u2019s judgment and the trial), the Claimant initiated contempt proceedings on 29\u00a0September 2023, including the 11\u00a0Grounds that I have already summarised. On 26th June 2024, Goss J gave permission to bring proceedings on all eleven grounds against both defendants. 79. As\u00a0a\u00a0consequence, both Defendants prepared detailed affidavits themselves, Mr Nadeem on 4\u00a0July 2024, Mr Sidiqi on 9\u00a0July 2024. I have already dealt with much of the details of those: for example, the question of Mr Nadeem's English. On 6th October \u2013 only the week before this trial – Mr Sidiqi prepared\u00a0a\u00a0second affidavit, firstly exhibiting photographs of himself at the time as having had\u00a0a\u00a0beard and looking essentially the same as he looks now, which of course was relevant then because at that stage Ms\u00a0Hibbert did not describe the driver of the car (accepted to be Mr Sidiqi) as having a beard. He also raised points of correction in relation to Ms\u00a0Hibbert's description of the junction and her route across it, which she accepted in\u00a0a\u00a0last-minute affidavit on 8th October. The matter then has come on before me for trial this week and I have had the benefit of hearing evidence from Dr\u00a0Bansal, Ms\u00a0Hibbert and the First and Second Defendants and, as I say, detailed and learned submissions from their barristers. Witnesses 80. It follows from that that I am in\u00a0a\u00a0very different position from DDJ Goodman, who only had the benefit of hearing Mr\u00a0Nadeem\u2019s evidence. I also have much more information than she had, in particular the evidence of Dr\u00a0Bansal. In his evidence, he confirmed in this case the part of the medical report headed \u2018Accident circumstances\u2019 had already been pre-populated. It is clear from the questionnaire and Dr\u00a0Bansal's evidence that someone at Premier Medical had effectively taken those one-or-two-word answers and turned them in to the paragraph concerned. For example, the questionnaire says, "Position in car: back passenger. Car location: roundabout. Car movement: moving. Number of collisions: 2. First impact type: my vehicle was hit by another vehicle. First impact source: car. First impact speed: low speed. First impact direction: passenger side. Second impact type: my vehicle was hit by another vehicle. Second impact source: car. Second impact speed: low speed. Second impact direction: the front. Damage to vehicle: minor. Body motion: in all directions. Helped out of vehicle: no." That was turned into by someone at Premier Medical, not Dr\u00a0Bansal and certainly not Mr\u00a0Nadeem, into the following text: "Mr\u00a0Atiquillah occupied the rear passenger seat in the car. He was wearing\u00a0a\u00a0seatbelt. The head restraint was fitted. An airbag was fitted but it didn't deploy. At the moment of impact, the Claimant's car was moving at\u00a0a\u00a0roundabout. At the first impact the Claimant's vehicle was struck by another car at low speed. The impact came from the passenger side. In the second impact, the Claimant's vehicle was struck by\u00a0a\u00a0third car at low speed. The impact came from the front. The combined force of the two impacts was sufficient to cause minor damage to the car. Mr\u00a0Atiquillah was thrown in all directions. He was able to get out the vehicle unaided." Therefore, for example the phrase, "The combined force of the two impacts was sufficient to cause", are words which come entirely from Premier Medical, rather than even from the questionnaire, even though I accept it is\u00a0a\u00a0natural inference from it. The potential for misunderstanding (including in subsequent litigation) as to who said what to whom is obvious. 81. Whilst Dr\u00a0Bansal suggested he \u2018would have\u2019 checked the accident circumstances with Mr\u00a0Nadeem, as he admitted himself, it was five years ago and one of ten appointments of no more than 20\u00a0minutes on that day out of 100-150\u00a0a\u00a0month, so thousands over the course of\u00a0a\u00a0year. He was clearly doing his best to help me but, understandably, had no clear recollection of that precise appointment on that precise day and would have had absolutely no reason to remember it. However, when he produced his report, Mr Nadeem himself raised with his solicitors the details of the accident circumstances were wrong: for example, the suggestion of two impacts. Such was the time pressure Dr Bansal was under, I do not accept it was checked by him with Mr\u00a0Nadeem, who certainly would have pointed out there were not two impacts. For those reasons it is certainly not clear to me that Dr\u00a0Bansal checked with Mr Nadeem any of the information about the accident circumstance as such (as opposed to injuries and symptoms), including the rear seat passenger part, which again Mr\u00a0Nadeem was clear with his solicitors was wrong. I do not blame Dr Bansal for that, but it does rather undermine much of the force of DDJ Goodman's findings about the medical report because she was assuming this information had come from Mr\u00a0Nadeem. In my judgment, I have found it probably came from the solicitors and was not checked by them or Dr Bansal with Mr\u00a0Nadeem. By contrast, what I do accept did come from Mr Nadeem and was checked with him by Dr Bansal was that he had two months of severe neck pain and four months of severe back pain. I accept Dr Bansal checked that because it was clearly was relevant to his diagnosis and prognosis. It can also only have come one way or another from Mr\u00a0Nadeem. Likewise, I accept Mr Nadeem confirmed to Dr Bansal that he had seven days off work as well, which was not only in the questionnaire, but is consistent with Mr Nadeem\u2019s evidence (in the context I have described that he worked from home for a week). 82. Turning to Ms\u00a0Hibbert's evidence, Mr\u00a0Kong commended it to me as honest and independent and I do not doubt that for\u00a0a\u00a0moment. The real question is the reliability of her recollection in evidence six years after the event, and I say that because, of course, she did not give evidence to DDJ Goodman. She did say to me when giving evidence this week that she remembered the accident like it was yesterday. However, I am afraid that smacks more of misplaced confidence in the power of her memory than it does of reliable evidence, for the following three reasons. 83. Firstly, Ms Hibbert accepted that until\u00a0a\u00a0week ago she had been getting the road wrong from which she had entered the roundabout. But notably and more importantly, she also maintained in cross-examination that she was adamant that Mr Sidiqi had entered from the next lane round, namely Church Avenue, rather than entering from Rayners Lane South as he said. But it was apparent in cross-examination that Ms\u00a0Hibbert accepted that she had not actually seen Mr\u00a0Sidiqui's car until it was already on the roundabout and consequently cannot have known what road he entered the roundabout from. Therefore, her adamance in the face of\u00a0a\u00a0lack of knowledge is relevant to how much weight I can give the rest of her evidence, even though she corrected herself on numerous other mistakes she had made. 84. Secondly, Ms Hibbert\u2019s account of the accident was not entirely consistent with her admission of liability, whether in the Defence, in her 2021 statement in the personal injury proceedings, or in the 2022 affidavit in these proceedings. Nor was it consistent with her oral evidence, where yet again she maintained that she had undertaken proper observations and then Mr\u00a0Siddiqui had entered the roundabout too quickly, again suggesting that it was his fault not hers. In Ms Hibbert\u2019s first committal affidavit, she came up with an explanation for the damage which in turn corrected itself from her personal injury statement where she had got the damage on the wrong side of her own car. Her theory (and it is no more than that) was that she was already on the roundabout and that Mr\u00a0Siddiqui had veered across the front of her and clipped the passenger side of her car, which is completely inconsistent with her having accepted liability, as she unquestionably did. In my judgment, this is\u00a0a\u00a0classic case of someone mis-remembering the details of an accident having convinced herself that she was not at fault when in fact she had admitted nearer the time that she was. In any event, her account cannot explain properly for the impact to the left-hand side of her car unless the accident was effectively entirely Mr\u00a0Siddiqui's fault, which she has accepted it was not. I agree with Mr Christensen that the damage to the passenger-side of both cars and Ms Hibbert\u2019s admission that she entered the roundabout from Whittington Way (which splits left up Rayners Lane North and right onto the roundabout) is consistent with her taking the wrong lane left then correcting herself turning back onto the roundabout, exposing the passenger-side of her car to Mr Sidiqi\u2019s oncoming vehicle and causing the collision \u2013 which is also consistent with her admission of liability. 85. Thirdly, Ms Hibbert\u2019s description of Mr\u00a0Sidiqui was totally wrong. She described the driver, whom Aviva accept was Mr Sidiqi, as in his 50s (which Mr Sidiqi plainly is not) and with wavy hair (which he did not have at the time, nor does he have now). Nor did she mention in any of the various accounts she has given the driver having a beard despite Mr Sidiqi having one then (from the photograph from 2018 he recently exhibited) and now. Indeed, it is remarkable that in cross-examination before me, when the photograph of Mr Sidiqi at the time was shown to her with him now sat only\u00a0a\u00a0few feet from her in this courtroom, Ms Hibbert accepted the driver had a beard but she was still adamant it was not Mr\u00a0Sidiqui, even though it had been agreed that he was. That, in my judgment, is totally fatal to Ms\u00a0Hibbert\u2019s reliability: she even disputes agreed facts. 86. Given that Ms Hibbert is plainly incorrect about Mr\u00a0Sidiqui, that calls into question the reliability of her non-identification of Mr\u00a0Nadeem. I certainly accept that her description of\u00a0a\u00a0bald, middle aged man cannot have been Mr\u00a0Nadeem. However, the point is not whether I am sure that there was\u00a0a\u00a0bald, white middle aged man urinating against\u00a0a\u00a0tree which, in the early hours of\u00a0a\u00a0weekend morning there may well have been. The question is whether I am sure that that bald, middle aged man urinating against\u00a0a\u00a0tree got out of Mr Sidiqi\u2019s car. That is, in my judgment, the crucial weak point in Ms\u00a0Hibbert's evidence about the passenger. 87. By contrast, Mr\u00a0Nadeem gave evidence in\u00a0a\u00a0completely different way than he had done before DDJ Goodman. He was clear, calm, measured and careful with fluent and cautious English. Indeed, as I have already said, he explained his English has improved dramatically since he got married in 2019\u00a0and has had children. It seems obvious from comparison of his evidence then and now that his English is probably\u00a0a\u00a0lot better than it was three years ago when he gave evidence to DDJ Goodman. Certainly, one point that she made herself about him appearing not to understand what\u00a0a\u00a0head restraint was when he ran\u00a0a\u00a0garage might, it might be thought, be more attributable to his understanding of English than his understanding of head restraints, but that was not something that she bore in mind when making that observation. Certainly, however, it is indicative of the fact that his English has improved, as is the fact that the fluency and the detail of his answers in evidence to me were very different than his short and sometimes confused answers to DDJ Goodman. Yet Mr Nadeem\u2019s account was internally consistent \u2013 he has always said he was a passenger in the car, was injured and took seven days off work albeit at home and that his symptoms resolved within a few months, even if he tied himself up in knots before DDJ Goodman (without the benefit of an interpreter when his English was much less strong) about when those injuries resolved. He made fair and reasonable concessions, not least about the inadequacies of his statement and evidence in the original personal injury proceedings. Yet given that he brought errors to the attention of his former solicitors which they did not address and made other errors even as basic as getting his name wrong, in my judgement the essential inconsistencies in his evidence back in 2021 are probably down to misunderstandings and his previous solicitors\u2019 failings, not dishonesty by him. 88. Mr\u00a0Kong suggested that it was implausible for Mr Nadeem to have been picked up by Mr\u00a0Sidiqui in\u00a0a\u00a0taxi and then taken to his girlfriend's house when the questionnaire suggested he had been given\u00a0a\u00a0lift home. I consider it is entirely plausible, indeed entirely natural, for a taxi driver to give a friend a lift if he did not have another fare, which Mr Sidiqi clearly did not. It is also an entirely plausible thing to happen that they were travelling to Mr Nadeem\u2019s-then girlfriend\u2019s address. The fact that the questionnaire suggested he got\u00a0a\u00a0lift home, in my judgment, really does not mean anything. I am not satisfied that Mr\u00a0Nadeem filled in that questionnaire because it spoke of two impacts when there plainly were not and besides, \u2018giving\u00a0a\u00a0lift home\u2019 is rather ambiguous in any event. It may well be at that stage he was with his girlfriend and saw that as home. Whilst he did not call evidence from his then-girlfriend, but they have since separated in not entirely amicable circumstances. In those circumstances it is perfectly natural that she has not come to give evidence. 89. Finally, Mr\u00a0Siddiqui gave evidence through an interpreter as I have said. Whilst at times we got\u00a0a\u00a0little bit bogged down in some of the details in relation to the circumstances of the making of his statement, he was crystal clear and has been consistent throughout that Mr Nadeem was in the car. Mr Sidiqi also explained he believed that Mr Nadeem was injured because he had told him so and he would have had no reason to doubt it. Mr Sidiqi was also correct about the junction details. It was his affidavit last week which prompted Ms\u00a0Hibbert's second affidavit correcting her evidence. I found Mr Sidiqi broadly reliable. Legal Principles Combatting dishonest personal injury claims 90. In the well-known case of Summers v Fairclough [2012] 1\u00a0WLR 2004\u00a0(SC) at [32], Lord Clarke noted that Toulson LJ (as he then was) in the Court of Appeal had described dishonest road traffic claims as an \u2018epidemic\u2019. In Summers the Supreme Court grappled with how to address that epidemic, finding that it was open to the High Court in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction to strike out a claim for an abuse of process even up to trial, although it would only do so in exceptional circumstances. Quite aside from that, Lord Clarke referred to the adverse costs consequences should\u00a0a\u00a0dishonest claim fail and indeed, contempt proceedings as he endorsed observations in an earlier case that "those who make false claims can expect to go to prison". 91. Howlett v Davies [2018] 1\u00a0WLR 948\u00a0CA, referred to in Ms\u00a0Hibbert's Defence, was concerned with the preservation of\u00a0a\u00a0costs sanction for dishonest claims, following the introduction of qualified one-way costs shifting (\u2018QOCS\u2019) in 2013 after the Summers judgment. As explained in Howlett, CPR 44.16\u00a0disapplies qualified one-way costs shifting in personal injury cases if\u00a0a\u00a0defendant proves on balance of probabilities that a claim is fundamentally dishonest, which did not need to be pleaded but did need to be fairly raised and squarely put to the claimant. 92. In Molodi v Cambridge [2018] RTR 25, Martin Spencer J noted that the Civil Liability Act 2018\u00a0had introduced tariffs for whiplash (as since discussed in Rabot v Hassam [2024] 2\u00a0WLR 949 (SC)). He added that whilst CPR 44.16 only gave defendants benefit of disapplication of QOCS if\u00a0a\u00a0claimant lost, s.57\u00a0Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 now provided that a claimant who would otherwise succeed can be deprived of their damages if they have been found to be fundamentally dishonest on the balance of probabilities. That is\u00a0a\u00a0wider jurisdiction than the very limited exceptional circumstances jurisdiction recognised at common law in Summers. In well-known guidance quoted up and down the County Courts of this country in road traffic cases and with which DDJ Goodman said that she was familiar, in Molodi Martin Spencer J added: "The problem of fraudulent and exaggerated whiplash claims is well recognised and should, in my judgment, cause judges in the County Court to approach such claims with\u00a0a\u00a0degree of caution, if not suspicion. Of course, where\u00a0a\u00a0vehicle is shunted from the rear at\u00a0a\u00a0sufficient speed to cause the heads of those in the motorcar to move forwards and backwards in such\u00a0a\u00a0way as to be liable to cause 'whiplash' injury, then genuine Claimants should recover for genuine injuries sustained. The court would normally expect such Claimants to have sought medical assistance from their GP or by attending A & E, to have returned in the event of non-recovery, to have sought appropriate treatment in the form of physiotherapy (without the prompting or intervention of solicitors) and to have given relatively consistent accounts of their injuries, the progression of symptoms and the timescale of recovery when questioned about it for the purposes of litigation, whether to their own solicitors or to an examining medical expert or for the purposes of witness statements. Of course, I recognise that Claimants will sometimes make errors or forget relevant matters and that 100% consistency and recall cannot reasonably be expected. However, the courts are entitled to expect\u00a0a\u00a0measure of consistency and certainly, in any case where\u00a0a\u00a0Claimant can be demonstrated to have been untruthful or where\u00a0a\u00a0Claimant's account has been so hopelessly inconsistent or contradictory or demonstrably untrue that their evidence cannot be promoted as having been reliable, the court should be reluctant to accept that the claim is genuine or, at least, deserving of an award of damages." 93. The Defence in this case also referred to Richards v Morris [2018] EWHC 1289\u00a0where again Martin Spencer J emphasised the importance of claims notification forms (CNFs). He suggested the signature of\u00a0a\u00a0solicitor to such\u00a0a\u00a0form was taken to be authorised by the Claimant under CPR 22 and it was therefore not enough for\u00a0a\u00a0claimant to say that an inconsistency in the CNF is down to\u00a0a\u00a0solicitor. 94. In my experience, Summers, Howlett, Molodi and Morris are sometimes inappropriately deployed in the County Court on behalf of defendants to suggest that any departure by claimants from paradigmatic behaviour standards is in some way \u2018diagnostic\u2019 of\u00a0a\u00a0fundamentally dishonest claim or claimant. However, in those cases, the Supreme Court, Court of Appeal and Martin Spencer J never said anything of the kind. In Molodi, Martin Spencer J to give general guidance about what Courts would \u2018normally expect\u2019 from honest claimants but stressed that sometimes claimants would innocently make errors. All cases must turn on their facts. Contempt of Court in respect of dishonest personal injury claims 95. The observations in Summers in relation to the availability of contempt back in 2011\/2012\u00a0are unaffected by the subsequent introduction of QOCS, s.57 of the 2015 Act or the 2018 Act. For example, in Zurich Insurance plc v Romaine [2019] 1\u00a0WLR 522\u00a0CA, where\u00a0a\u00a0personal injury claim made in 2015\u00a0was discontinued in 2017 (in other words, after all those changes except the 2018 Act), the Court of Appeal reversed a High Court Judge\u2019s refusal of permission to bring contempt proceedings under CPR 81.18(3), despite the absence of\u00a0a\u00a0warning of contempt in the personal injury claim and its discontinuance. There was no suggestion in the Court of Appeal that there is no longer any risk of contempt proceedings because those other measures since Summers such as QOCS and s.57 of the 2015 Act offered sufficient protection. As emphasised by the Court of Appeal in Romaine,\u00a0a\u00a0case of contempt turns on\u00a0a\u00a0strong prima facie case of dishonesty and whether it is in the public interest to bring contempt proceedings, which can be the case even in\u00a0a\u00a0low-value claim. Although I have not seen the judgment of Goss J in this case, but doubtless that is consistent with what he found, not least given DDJ Goodman\u2019s trenchant findings. 96. The present context does not involve contempt of court in the sense of breach of a Court Order (which traditionally is called \u2018civil contempt\u2019), but rather interference with the administration of justice (traditionally called \u2018criminal contempt\u2019: see ADM International v Grain House [2024] EWCA Civ 33 at [52]-[53]). In turn, two types of criminal contempt are relevant here, the elements of which were both helpfully summarised by HHJ Gosnell in Aviva Insurance v Nazir [2018] EWHC 1296 (QB). The first type of contempt is deliberate deception with intention to interfere with administration of justice, which he set out at [5]: \u201c(i) the defendants deliberately set out to deceive the Claimant by falsely claiming that they were injured in a genuine accident\u2026.; (ii) the defendants must have intended thereby to interfere with the administration of justice; (iii) the conduct complained of must have had a tendency to interfere with the administration of justice.\u201d Grounds 1\u00a0to 3\u00a0and 9\u00a0to 11\u00a0here allege Mr Nadeem deliberately falsely claimed to Dr Bansal he had been involved in an accident and suffered injury (Grounds 1\u00a0to 3) and in evidence at trial before DDJ Goodman (Grounds 9\u00a0to 11). Aviva must prove so that I am sure in relation to each of those grounds that: firstly, Mr Nadeem deliberately made\u00a0a\u00a0false statement; secondly, that he intended thereby to interfere with the course of justice; and third, his conduct had\u00a0a\u00a0tendency to interfere with the course of justice. On that third limb, Advantage Insurance v Harris [2024] EWHC 626\u00a0KB shows it is unnecessary for Aviva to prove deliberately false statements actually succeeded in interfering with the course of justice. That is why someone can lose their personal injury trial \u2013 even spectacularly as did Mr Nadeem in this case – and yet still face contempt proceedings. 97. Grounds 4\u00a0to 8 concern the second type of relevant \u2018criminal contempt\u2019. They allege the making of false statements by both defendants in witness statements verified by the statement of truth in the terms I will requote: "I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt may be brought against anyone who makes or causes to be made\u00a0a\u00a0false statement in\u00a0a\u00a0document verified by\u00a0a\u00a0statement of truth without an honest belief it was truth." That is effectively an encapsulation of CPR 32.14(1) which confirms that proceedings for contempt of court can be made for\u00a0a\u00a0false statement verified by\u00a0a\u00a0statement of truth without honest belief in its truth. 98. In relation to this different form of contempt, as Judge Gosnell also said in Nazir at [8],\u00a0a\u00a0claimant must prove: \u201c\u2026(i) the statement in question was false; (ii) the statement has, or if persisted in would be likely to have, interfered with the course of justice in some material respect; (iii) at the time it was made the maker of the statement (a) had no honest belief in the truth of the statement; and (b) knew of its likelihood to interfere with the course of justice 99. I move on to the procedural requirements of\u00a0a\u00a0contempt application in CPR 81.4(2): "A contempt application must include statements of all the following \u2026 (a) the nature of the alleged contempt \u2026" [I need not quote (b) through (g) because it relates to civil contempt for breach of\u00a0a\u00a0court order which does not arise in this case]: (h) a\u00a0brief summary of the facts alleged to constitute the contempt, set out numerically in chronological order; (i) that the defendant has the right to be legally represented in the contempt proceedings; (j) that the defendant is entitled to\u00a0a\u00a0reasonable opportunity to obtain legal representation and to apply for legal aid which may be available without any means test; (k) that the defendant may be entitled to the services of an interpreter; (l) that the defendant is entitled to\u00a0a\u00a0reasonable time to prepare for the hearing; (m) that the defendant is entitled but not obliged to give written and oral evidence in their defence; (n) that the defendant has the right to remain silent and to decline to answer any question the answer to which may incriminate the defendant, but that the court may draw adverse inferences if this right is exercised; (o) that the court may proceed in the defendant\u2019s absence if they do not attend but (whether or not they attend) will only find the defendant in contempt if satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the facts constituting contempt and that they do constitute contempt; (p) that if the court is satisfied that the defendant has committed\u00a0a\u00a0contempt, the court may punish the defendant by\u00a0a\u00a0fine, imprisonment, confiscation of assets or other punishment under the law; (q) that if the defendant admits the contempt and wishes to apologise to the court, that is likely to reduce the seriousness of any punishment by the court; (r) that the court's findings will be provided in writing as soon as practicable after the hearing; and (s) that the court will sit in public, unless and to the extent that the court orders otherwise, and that its findings will be made public." 100. Therefore, committal proceedings for contempt are quasi-criminal (confusingly whether they are \u2018civil contempt\u2019 or \u2018criminal contempt\u2019 \u2013 see ADM) for the purposes of Article 6\u00a0of the European Convention of Human Rights. Consequently, there is a very high standard of procedural fairness. In Re Oddin [2016] EWCA Civ 173, Vos LJ (as he then was, the current Master of the Rolls), said at [73] and [74]: "\u2026 The alleged contemnor is entitled to know precisely the particulars of the charge he faces; put in layman's terms, he is entitled to know what precisely he is said to have done wrong. It is simply not fair to proceed with\u00a0a\u00a0hearing that leads to\u00a0a\u00a0finding that\u00a0a\u00a0person has committed\u00a0a\u00a0contempt of court by which they are punishable by imprisonment without identifying precisely the allegation which the evidence to be relied upon is directed at proving against him. \u2026The process of committal for contempt is\u00a0a\u00a0highly technical one as this case shows. But it is highly technical for\u00a0a\u00a0very good reason, namely the importance of protecting the rights of those charged \u2026" 101. Most importantly, the criminal standard of proof is different, namely that the Court must not just be persuaded there was a contempt on the civil standard of the balance of probabilities but must be \u2018sure\u2019 of contempt (in the old-fashioned language, beyond reasonable doubt). That is axiomatic, but it was explained\u00a0a\u00a0little further by Collins Rice J in the recent case of Tesco v Mouradi [2024] EWHC 1466\u00a0at [43] to [44]: "This fact-finding exercise must be conducted according to the criminal standard of proof. I may not make any disputed finding of fact unless I am\u00a0sure\u00a0of it, beyond reasonable doubt. The burden is squarely on Tesco to make me sure of what it alleges against [the defendant]. The judge in the personal injury proceedings had herself made\u00a0a\u00a0series of findings of fact in relation to the matters in dispute before me. Her findings were made to the civil standard only \u2013 the balance of probabilities \u2013 and accordingly do not bind me. \u2026 But her task and mine are fundamentally different. She was hearing an undefended civil counterclaim in the absence of the defendant or his representative. I am engaged on\u00a0a\u00a0disputed fact-finding exercise for the purpose of considering committal for contempt of court. I approach that task entirely afresh, with the criminal standard firmly in mind." 102. Likewise, as Wall J said in Re B (Contempt of Court) [1996] 1\u00a0WLR 627\u00a0at page 639: "Whilst the analogy with criminal proceedings should not be taken too far and criminal procedure is not 'imported wholesale indiscriminately', in civil proceedings for contempt the court will introduce those safeguards necessary for the protection of the contemnors." So, for example, Collins Rice J in Mouradi on the question of identification from a photograph said it was unnecessary to apply the elaborate requirements of the Code of Practice D to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 as would be applied in a criminal trial. As she put it at [66]: "Had this ID exercise been conducted by the police in the course of\u00a0a\u00a0criminal investigation, it would no doubt have been done differently. The guidance which would have applied to such circumstances is not directly applicable to my task, but I have nevertheless borne in mind the nature of that guidance and, more importantly, the reasons why care is needed before weight is placed on this kind of evidence." 103. Therefore, Mr\u00a0Kong agreed with Mr\u00a0Varnam's suggestion that I should give myself in this case\u00a0a\u00a0Turnbull direction in relation to Ms\u00a0Hibbert's identification (or should I say \u2018non-identification\u2019) of Mr Nadeem. A Turnbull direction is derived from the criminal Court of Appeal case of R v Turnbull [1977] 1\u00a0QB 224,\u00a0a\u00a0case known to all criminal law practitioners. Lord Widgery CJ said at page 228: "First, whenever the case against an accused depends wholly or substantially on the correctness of one or more identifications of the accused which the defence alleges to be mistaken, the judge should warn the jury of the special need for caution before convicting the accused in reliance on the correctness of the identification or identifications. In addition, he should instruct them as to the reasonable need for such\u00a0a\u00a0warning and should make some reference to the possibility that\u00a0a\u00a0mistaken witness can be\u00a0a\u00a0convincing one and that\u00a0a\u00a0number of such witnesses can all be mistaken. Provided this is done in clear terms, the judge need not use any particular form of words. Secondly, the judge should direct the jury to examine closely the circumstances in which the identification by each witness came to be made. How long did the witness have the accused under observation? At what distance? In what light? Was the observation impeded in any way as, for example, by passing traffic or\u00a0a\u00a0press of people? Had the witness ever seen the accused before? How often? If only occasionally, had he any special reason for remembering the accused? How long elapsed between the original observation and the subsequent identification to the police? Was there any material discrepancy between the description of the accused given to the police by the witness when first seen by them and his appearance." 104. Just as\u00a0a\u00a0mistaken witness can be convincing,\u00a0a\u00a0truth known to judges for the last 50\u00a0years, so too they can convince themselves when they are mistaken,\u00a0a\u00a0truth which Lord Leggatt (as he now is) famously recognised in Gestmin v Credit Suisse [2013] EWHC 3560\u00a0(Comm) but which had been acknowledged for years, not least by Lord Bingham in his seminal article \u2018The Judge as Juror\u2019 in \u2018The Business of Judging\u2019 (2000). That is particularly apposite in the case of Ms Hibbert, but also applies to Dr Bansal\u2019s assertions of what he \u2018would have\u2019 checked with Mr Nadeem. The status of DDJ Goodman's judgment 105. The reason why Collins Rice J in Mouradi said that she was not in High Court contempt proceedings bound by the findings of dishonesty made by the County Court was because they were made on\u00a0a\u00a0different standard – the civil standard of proof of the balance of probabilities of proof. As she said, in contempt proceedings, she was determining allegations of\u00a0a\u00a0criminal standard of proof so that she was \u2018sure\u2019. Indeed, it is typical in committal cases, such as Mouradi, Nazir, Harris and many other cases, for the High Court to make its own findings of fact on the criminal standard, not simply adopt County Court findings on the civil standard. 106. However, what if\u00a0a\u00a0County Court makes findings, highly unusually, on the criminal standard of proof ? That practice has been deprecated in relation to fact-finding in family cases by Knowles J in Re Z (Care proceedings: reopening of fact-finding) [2024] 1\u00a0FLR 433. However, as discussed in Re Z, the civil concept of issue estoppel does not apply in family cases. Indeed, in Aviva Insurance v Kovacic [2017] EWHC 2772\u00a0QB,\u00a0a\u00a0personal injury trial judge, HHJ Bidder QC although sitting in the High Court not the County Court, made findings of fundamental dishonesty in the extent of an injury in an admitted liability road traffic collision due to surveillance evidence. At the conclusion of his judgment, the then-counsel for the insurers, who I should say was not Mr\u00a0Kong, invited Judge Bidder to indicate whether he was satisfied to the criminal standard in respect of his findings of fundamental dishonesty and Judge Bidder did so. In granting permission to bring contempt proceedings in that case, Sir David Eady declared Judge Bidder's findings would be admitted as evidence in committal proceedings but said no more than that. In those committal proceedings, Mr Kovacic was still unrepresented. Counsel for the insurer in that case then submitted to Martin Spencer J at the committal hearing itself that he was bound by Judge Bidder's findings. However, as Martin Spencer J pointed out, that is not how issue estoppel works: "36. It is unnecessary for me to explore the legal principles in any detail. The basic principle, for present purposes, is that\u00a0a\u00a0domestic judgment of\u00a0a\u00a0court of competent jurisdiction which includes\u00a0a\u00a0decision on\u00a0a\u00a0particular issue forming\u00a0a\u00a0necessary ingredient in the cause of action being litigated will be binding as to that issue in subsequent proceedings where that issue is relevant, but there is an exception where there has become available further material relevant to the correct determination of the point: see\u00a0Phipson on Evidence\u00a0(18th\u00a0ed. 2013)\u00a0at paragraph 43-15. [I interpose to say that is\u00a0a\u00a0reference to issue estoppel in Phipson. Martin Spencer J continued]: "37. For the purposes of this application I proceed on the basis (1) that the judge's findings are evidence of the facts found, including adverse findings as to the defendant's credibility and the deliberate exaggeration of his continuing disability, and (2) that I am entitled to treat them as conclusive evidence on those matters unless there is now further material to show that the finding in question was not justified. I bear in mind that these are, in effect, criminal proceedings. The defendant cannot be shut out from putting forward material which may cast doubt on\u00a0a\u00a0particular finding. On the other hand, as I made clear to the defendant at the outset of this evidence, he is not entitled to reopen all the matters upon which the judge found against him. 38. [Counsel] accepted, very properly, that in addition to considering the findings of the judge, which naturally carry very great weight, I have to consider all the evidence, including the defendant's evidence in these proceedings, in order to decide whether any given allegation of contempt is proved to the criminal standard in accordance with the principles already identified." 107. So, even if issue estoppel applies, it does not prevent the reopening of that particular issue if there is relevant further material. That is consistent with the leading case on issue estoppel of Arnold v National Westminster Bank [1991] 2\u00a0AC 93\u00a0where Lord Keith also approved the statement by Lord Diplock (as he became) in Thoday v Thoday [1964] P 181, 198,\u00a0to which Mr\u00a0Varnam referred at the permission hearing in this case: "Issue estoppel is an extension of the same rule of public policy as res judicata. There are many causes of action which can only be established by proving that two or more different conditions are fulfilled. Such causes of action involve as many separate issues between the parties as there are conditions to be fulfilled by the plaintiff to establish his cause of action; and there may be cases where the fulfilment of an identical condition is\u00a0a\u00a0requirement common to two or more different causes of action. If in litigation upon one such cause of action any of such separate issues as to whether or not\u00a0a\u00a0particular condition has been fulfilled is determined by\u00a0a\u00a0court of competent jurisdiction, either upon evidence or upon admission by\u00a0a\u00a0party to the litigation, neither party can, in subsequent litigation between one another upon any cause of action which depends upon the fulfilment of the identical condition, assert that the condition was fulfilled if the court has in the first litigation determined that it was not, or deny that it was fulfilled if the court in the first litigation determined that it was." 108. Therefore, in relation to Mr Nadeem, issue estoppel can only bite where the issue is a \u2018requirement\u2019 that is determined as either fulfilled or not, as it is sometimes put \u2018fundamental\u2019 (see Barnes, The Law of Estoppel, paragraph 9-100) for the first court or, as Martin Spencer J put it in Kovacic, if it \u2018forms\u00a0a\u00a0necessary ingredient in the cause of action being litigated\u2019. Yet, because Martin Spencer J did not have the benefit of bilateral argument in Kovacic, it was not suggested to him that Judge Bidder's findings on dishonesty to the criminal standard were unnecessary for\u00a0a\u00a0finding of fundamental dishonesty to engage either s.57 of the 2015 Act\u00a0or CPR 44.16. So, it was not argued before Spencer J that in fact issue estoppel did not apply to Judge Bidder's criminal standard findings because it was not necessary for him to make them to adjudicate the civil trial. 109. However, Mr\u00a0Varnam does make that submission in relation to DDJ Goodman's findings here and I accept he is entitled to do so, because whatever the position in Kovacic, here it was entirely unnecessary for DDJ Goodman to make findings on the criminal standard of proof in order to determine fundamental dishonesty so as to disapply QOCS under CPR 44.16 which was a finding that was necessary to her decision \u2013 indeed one which she had already made (and reaffirmed refusing further submissions on it) before she even heard submissions on the criminal standard of proof. To all intents and purposes, DDJ Goodman\u2019s finding of dishonesty by Mr Nadeem to the criminal standard was obiter dicta and so does not give rise to any issue estoppel, nor is it even conclusive in the absence of further material. 110. I am satisfied there is no issue estoppel even against Mr\u00a0Nadeem, and in fairness to Mr\u00a0Kong, he did not press for that in the way in which described at paragraph 37\u00a0of Kovacic. Instead, he pressed for only what was described at paragraph 38\u00a0of Kovacic, namely that I should give weight to the findings, but assess them in the light of all the evidence to decide whether the contempt is proved to the criminal standard of proof. 111. However, in my judgement, the weight I can give to DDJ Goodman\u2019s findings is limited for three reasons. Firstly, I have a much fuller evidential picture than she had (for example as to the preparation of the medical report given Dr Bansal\u2019s evidence). Secondly, DDJ Goodman made those findings of dishonesty without Mr\u00a0Nadeem's barrister having an opportunity to make proper submissions on either no case to answer or fundamental dishonesty under CPR 44.16, even if she could make submissions on the criminal standard of proof, by which time the horse had very much bolted. Thirdly, DDJ Goodman's judgment did not clearly square the fact that she was satisfied on the criminal standard of proof that the Claimant was dishonest on one hand, whilst on the other hand describing Mr Nadeem\u2019s claim in her no case to answer judgment as \u2018not stacking up to anything near\u00a0a\u00a051\u00a0per cent burden of proof\u2019. As I said, she seems to have reversed the burden of proof on the criminal standard, which was not something that Judge Bidder did in Kovacic. So, for those reasons, in addition to the other reasons pressed upon DDJ Goodman by Mr\u00a0Nadeem's then counsel to the effect that Kovacic was\u00a0a\u00a0quite different case on the facts, Kovacic is readily distinguishable from this case. 112. As against Mr Sidiqi, the position is even clearer that DDJ Goodman\u2019s findings are not binding. As is clear from both Thoday and Arnold, issue estoppel only applies as between the same \u2018parties\u2019, here only Mr Nadeem, or their \u2018privies\u2019, for example Aviva, to Ms\u00a0Hibbert. It cannot even apply in principle to Mr Sidiqi who was not\u00a0a\u00a0party or privy to the original proceedings. That was clear from the case of Hollington v Hewthorne [1943] KB 587. In Rogers v Hoyle [2015] QB 265\u00a0CA,\u00a0Christopher Clarke LJ noted criticism of Hollington but justified the rule on the following basis at [39] and [40]: "As the judge rightly recognised the foundation on which the rule must now rest is that findings of fact made by another decision maker are not to be admitted in\u00a0a\u00a0subsequent trial because the decision at that trial is to be made by the judge appointed to hear it ('the trial judge'), and not another. The trial judge must decide the case for himself on the evidence that he receives, and in the light of the submissions on that evidence made to him. To admit evidence of the findings of fact of another person, however distinguished, and however thorough and competent his examination of the issues may have been, risks the decision being made, at least in part, on evidence other than that which the trial judge has heard and in reliance on the opinion of someone who is neither the relevant decision maker nor an expert in any relevant discipline, of which decision making is not one. The opinion of someone who is not the trial judge is, therefore, as\u00a0a\u00a0matter of law, irrelevant and not one to which he ought to have regard. In essence \u2026 the foundation of the rule must now be the preservation of the fairness of\u00a0a\u00a0trial in which the decision is entrusted to the trial judge alone." That is the position that applies to\u00a0a\u00a0non-party in original proceedings, such as Mr\u00a0Siddiqui. It obviously does not apply to\u00a0a\u00a0party in original proceedings because the finding does generate an issue estoppel but, as I have explained, not an issue estoppel as to findings on the criminal standard of proof in a civil trial where such findings are not a necessary ingredient in the civil court\u2019s task. 113. Indeed, another case referred to in Mr\u00a0Varnam's pre-permission skeleton argument was Hunter v Chief Constable of West Midlands Police [1982] AC 529,\u00a0where the House of Lords were considering whether\u00a0a\u00a0claim by those imprisoned for the Birmingham Six bombings (over\u00a0a\u00a0decade before they were subsequently cleared I hasten to add) could not bring\u00a0a\u00a0civil claim in relation to it because it would be\u00a0a\u00a0collateral attack on\u00a0a\u00a0criminal conviction. The principle in Hunter was summarised in Allsop v Banner Jones [2021] 3\u00a0WLR 1317\u00a0(CA) by Marcus Smith J at [45]: "If the parties to the later civil proceedings were not parties to or privies of those who were parties to the earlier proceedings then it will only be an abuse of the process of the court to challenge the factual findings and conclusions of the judge in the earlier action if\u00a0(a)\u00a0it would be manifestly unfair to\u00a0a\u00a0party to the later proceedings that the same issues should be re-litigated or\u00a0(b)\u00a0to permit such relitigation would bring the administration of justice into disrepute." (I did not take Counsel in this case to Allsop because it is not suggested that DDJ Goodman's findings bind Mr Sidiqi or indeed even affect his position on Grounds 4\u00a0and 5\u00a0which are the allegations that he faces). 114. I would summarise the position in this way. The status of\u00a0a\u00a0personal injury trial judge's findings of fundamental dishonesty against\u00a0a\u00a0personal injury claimant in later committal proceedings is in my judgment as follows: (1) The personal injury judgment is certainly admissible against the party found to be dishonest in it: Kovacic. On whatever standard findings are made that a personal injury claimant was fundamentally dishonest, those findings will plainly be relevant to the grant of permission for committal proceedings and whether there is\u00a0a\u00a0strong prima facie case of dishonesty. That is particularly true if the findings are expressed in\u00a0a\u00a0criminal basis as they were in Kovacic, which doubtless that is why the insurers asked for it in that and other cases, including this one. (2) However, even if findings are expressed on the criminal basis, they do not bind third parties (as I shall describe non-party privy or non-privies), and indeed may not even be admissible against them, as is clear from Hollington and Rogers. Even if those findings are admissible, for example as background, it is certainly not an abuse of process by\u00a0a\u00a0third party in subsequent litigation to seek to reopen those findings made by\u00a0a\u00a0judge in litigation to which he was not\u00a0a\u00a0party, unless it is \u2018manifestly unfair to the claimant or would bring justice into disrepute\u2019: Allsop. (3) If fundamental dishonesty findings in the original personal injury judgment simply do not cover a particular issue at all (e.g. a finding of dishonest exaggeration of symptoms but not one that an accident was staged where the latter is the issue in contempt proceedings), even in respect of\u00a0a\u00a0party to the previous proceedings, it cannot give rise to an issue estoppel on that issue and is therefore entirely\u00a0a\u00a0matter for the committal court. (4) If findings do cover an issue, for example whether or not a claimant was injured, if they are expressed on the civil standard of proof as would be normal, they do create an issue estoppel against\u00a0a\u00a0personal injury claimant like Mr Nadeem in relation to subsequent ordinary civil proceedings arising out of the same accident. One situation would be a\u00a0further personal injury claim arising out the same accident by\u00a0a\u00a0third party, which involves both of the original parties; where between the original parties but not the third party, there is an issue estoppel (an example of this not uncommon situation is Sellen v Bailey [1999] RTR 63\u00a0(CA)). However, in contempt proceedings, findings on the civil standard of proof obviously do not create an issue estoppel binding the committal court making findings on the criminal standard of proof as Collins Rice J said in Mouradi. (5) Even if the personal injury trial judge, as in this case, unusually expresses findings on the criminal standard of proof, they still do not bind the committal court, either because they are not necessary for the civil personal injury judge to making findings on the criminal standard of proof, so no issue estoppel arises at all, or even if it was necessary (as assumed but not argued in Kovacic) because further evidence before the committal Court may suggest those findings are wrong. Even then, that approach should be careful not to reverse the burden of proof in committal proceedings, which always remains fairly and squarely on the claimant. Conclusions 115. Since the burden of proof is on Aviva, to succeed it must satisfy me so that I am sure that Mr Nadeem was not in Mr Sidiqi\u2019s car, rather than Mr Nadeem having to prove on the balance of probabilities that he was in the car. In fairness to DDJ Goodman, that was a difference that she pointed out in her judgment. Yet ironically, just as DDJ Goodman made findings which were unnecessary to her determination, I am driven to the conclusion that it would be preferable for me also to do so. This is because not only am I not sure Mr Nadeem was not in the car (a\u00a0potentially confusing double negative), whilst unnecessary for me to do so, I can go further. It is better for me to say loud and clear that I would find on the balance of probabilities that Mr Nadeem was in fact in Mr Sidiqi\u2019s car. It follows, therefore, that the committal proceedings must fail, as Mr\u00a0Kong fairly accepted were I to reach that conclusion. However, I will explain my reasons and go on to deal briefly with the individual grounds in the Contempt Notice. 116. As Mr\u00a0Kong fairly accepted, the central allegation that Mr Nadeem was not in Mr Sidiqi's car stands or falls on Ms\u00a0Hibbert's evidence. Mr Nadeem says he was in the car, Mr Sidiqi says he was in the car, Dr\u00a0Bansal cannot say one way or the other and DDJ Goodman did not make\u00a0a\u00a0clear and positive finding that Mr Nadeem was not in the car. In any event, even if she did (and she came closest in her ruling on the criminal standard of proof by saying that \u2018it is impossible even to place the Claimant at the scene\u2019) I have heard quite different evidence from Mr Nadeem and DDJ Goodman did not have the benefit of hearing Ms\u00a0Hibbert being cross-examined, as I have done. Whilst Ms\u00a0Hibbert was clearly an honest witness doing her best to assist me, I do not accept that she was independent because she was the defendant in the personal injury proceedings and whilst she formally admitted liability, she also minimised the extent of her liability as I have explained. That does not mean that she was deliberately lying; it simply gives her\u00a0a\u00a0reason to convince herself that the person suing her was not in the car. As I have already said, Ms Hibbert was muddled about what junction she was entering the roundabout from and where she was going. She was muddled about the accident circumstances, which were difficult to reconcile with her admission of liability. Most obviously, in my judgment, she claimed Mr\u00a0Sidiqi, who is accepted to have been the driver of the other car, was not the driver of the other car. 117. In those circumstances I really do not think I can place an awful lot of weight on Ms Hibbert\u2019s \u2018non-identification\u2019 of Mr Nadeem. It is entirely possible there was\u00a0a\u00a0bald white man running around in the early hours of the weekend who was urinating against\u00a0a\u00a0tree who was not Mr\u00a0Nadeem, but that does not mean Mr\u00a0Nadeem was not in Mr Sidiqi\u2019s car. His and Mr Sidiqi\u2019s evidence was that he was in the car and Ms\u00a0Hibbert's evidence on this point was so confused as to when the passenger got out, when he spoke to her, which direction he was facing and so on, that even to the extent that this is not\u00a0a\u00a0case of identification, her evidence is hopelessly muddled and cannot possibly get anywhere near discharging the criminal standard of proof. Ms Hibbert\u2019s mistake is explained by the circumstances of her identification. It was night-time, there was very little street lighting which she described herself as more orange than yellow. She had to enlist the support of\u00a0a\u00a0passer-by to light the car to enable her to take photographs. Her focus was on the damage and on her conversations with Mr\u00a0Sidiqi. Although Ms Hibbert described\u00a0a\u00a0passenger getting out the car, running to the tree and urinating, and I accept Mr\u00a0Kong's point that in ordinary circumstances that would be memorable, in fairness it did not emerge until over two years after the accident. The first account we have from Ms\u00a0Hibbert is her Defence in September 2020 which did not mention the passenger getting out to urinate against a tree. So, her account has grown in the telling. That is not\u00a0a\u00a0suggestion that she is being dishonest, but rather\u00a0a\u00a0suggestion that she has convinced herself: she has put two and two together and made five. 118. In those circumstances, if Ms Hibbert saw\u00a0a\u00a0white man near the scene urinating, and if she is faced with\u00a0a\u00a0claim from someone not matching that description saying he stayed in the car, it is understandable that she has convinced herself that that cannot be right. She remembers a\u00a0white man urinating and she has decided he must have got out the car, just as she has now decided that Mr\u00a0Siddiqui clipped the passenger side of her car when he was driving unsafely in front of her, even though that was not an account she had previously given and she had previously admitted liability. This is\u00a0a\u00a0classic example of how\u00a0a\u00a0memory can be distorted over time, as Lord Leggatt said in Gestmin, but the Court of Appeal were live to it in Turnbull 50\u00a0years ago. Giving myself\u00a0a\u00a0Turnbull warning, if Ms Hibbert saw any passenger or driver, he only would have been visible to her for\u00a0a\u00a0very brief period of time. It would have been difficult to see into the windows of the car, as is clear from the photographs that Ms\u00a0Hibbert herself took, certainly she would not have been able to see his face if he was facing the other way, or indeed facing her way, unless he was immediately next to the car and in such light as there was. Therefore, the only time Ms Hibbert would have had\u00a0a\u00a0clear view of the passenger if he had got out the car, was when he was getting out of and getting back into the car. Even on her own case, she has muddled the description of that because in her affidavit she says that the passenger spoke to her as he got out, and in her oral evidence she said that he spoke to her as he got in. In those circumstances I cannot, I am afraid, come to any other conclusion than Ms\u00a0Hibbert's evidence on this point was unreliable. 119. By contrast, Mr Nadeem's evidence, whilst not perfect, was, in my judgment, reliable. Whilst of course I approach his evidence with some caution given he has been found to have been fundamentally dishonest by\u00a0a\u00a0judge previously, the circumstances of that finding are sufficiently unusual and unfortunate for the reasons I have already given for me not to be able to place very much weight on them. Not only were DDJ Goodman\u2019s findings about Mr Nadeem not the subject of proper argument by his barrister, they were based upon Mr Nadeem\u2019s answers when giving evidence in his second language at\u00a0a\u00a0time when his English was less strong than it is now, and at\u00a0a\u00a0time where he clearly got himself into\u00a0a\u00a0muddle. Mr Nadeem was\u00a0a\u00a0poor witness in front of DDJ Goodman, but\u00a0a\u00a0poor witness is not necessarily\u00a0a\u00a0dishonest one. The conclusion that DDJ Goodman reached to the contrary was based upon misunderstandings, in particular in relation to the status of the medical report and where the information in it had come from. In short, I actively prefer to the evidence of Ms Hibbert the evidence of Mr\u00a0Nadeem and Mr\u00a0Sidiqui who gave evidence on the core issues clearly and straightforwardly. I find on the balance of probabilities that Mr Nadeem was in Mr Sidiqi\u2019s car. 120. On the individual grounds of alleged contempt, I turn first to Grounds 4 and 5 alleged against Mr Sidiqui. I found him to be an honest and straightforward witness. I accept that Mr\u00a0Nadeem was in the car, as he said, and I accept that Mr\u00a0Nadeem told him he was injured, which is really the point of Ground Five. For that matter I accept, if it is necessary to do so, that Mr Sidiqi was himself the subject of\u00a0a\u00a0minor injury. Whilst, as Mr\u00a0Kong said, there was\u00a0a\u00a0slight impact, it was an impact which Mr Sidiqi properly explained is one which was unexpected and in which he and Mr\u00a0Nadeem had no time to tense. In those circumstances, very minor whiplash injuries – and these were very minor whiplash injuries indeed – can be expected. It is not necessary for me to make a\u00a0positive finding to that effect, still less to encourage personal injury proceedings by Mr\u00a0Sidiqui which would be out of time in any event. I am simply making the observation that for those reasons I dismiss Grounds 4\u00a0and 5 and the case against Mr Sidiqi. 121. So far as Mr\u00a0Nadeem is concerned, turning back to the point about Dr\u00a0Bansal, in the grounds of contempt, Ground 1 alleges: "Atiquillah Nadeem on the 16th day of August 2019\u00a0with intent to interfere with the administration of justice did an act which tended to interfere with the administration of justice in that during\u00a0a\u00a0consultation for\u00a0a\u00a0medical report he made\u00a0a\u00a0false statement to Mr\u00a0Sanjiv Bansal without an honest belief in its truth, namely that he, the said Atiquillah Nadeem, was occupying the rear passenger seat of\u00a0a\u00a0car when it was involved in\u00a0a\u00a0road traffic accident on 14\u00a0April 2018." My findings in relation to that point are that: Mr Nadeem did not make a false statement because in my judgment on the balance of probabilities, he was in Mr Sidiqi\u2019s car and, in any event, I am certainly not sure that he was not in the car. DDJ Goodman made no clear and explicit finding that he was not and to the extent that she came close to doing so, it does not bind me and is of little weight for the reasons I have given. The question of whether Mr Nadeem was\u00a0a\u00a0rear seat passenger or front seat passenger is effectively moot. In those circumstances, I dismiss Ground 1. 122. I deal next with Ground 3\u00a0next. It is in similar form: that Mr\u00a0Nadeem made\u00a0a\u00a0false statement to Dr\u00a0Bansal without an honest belief in its truth, namely that he took\u00a0a\u00a0week off work as\u00a0a\u00a0result of\u00a0a\u00a0road traffic accident on 14\u00a0April 2018. However, for the reasons explained, I am not sure that was\u00a0a\u00a0false statement. Indeed, on the balance of probabilities, I find that Mr\u00a0Nadeem did take\u00a0a\u00a0week off working in his garage after the accident, but he was still working at home. In short, he took\u00a0a\u00a0week off the garage but not off work. That explains the apparent inconsistency between Mr\u00a0Nadeem\u2019s evidence and the CNF completed on his behalf which suggests he took no time off work at all. I find Mr Nadeem probably did not work in\u00a0a\u00a0garage for\u00a0a\u00a0week and to that extent I am certainly not sure that Ground 3\u00a0is proven. Whilst DDJ Goodman found Mr Nadeem was not injured at all, I have already explained why I cannot give her findings much weight and I find they are outweighed by the much wider range of evidence that I have and accept, including Mr Nadeem\u2019s evidence. 123. Ground 2\u00a0is rather more problematic. It says: "Atiquillah Nadeem on 16\u00a0August 2019\u00a0with intent to interfere with the administration of justice did an act which tended to interfere with the administration of justice in that during\u00a0a\u00a0consultation for\u00a0a\u00a0medical report he made\u00a0a\u00a0false statement to Mr\u00a0Bansal without an honest belief in its truth, namely that he, the said Atiquillah Nadeem, suffered as\u00a0a\u00a0result of\u00a0a\u00a0road traffic accident on 14\u00a0April 'severe neck pain which resolved after two months and severe lower back pain which resolved after four months'." Given the difficulties with Mr\u00a0Nadeem's evidence before DDJ Goodman, it seems to me unwise for me to make\u00a0a\u00a0positive finding, even on the balance of probabilities, that what Mr Nadeem said was totally correct. However, I am certainly not persuaded to the criminal standard that I am sure that what he said was knowingly false. Mr\u00a0Nadeem has been consistent in his account that he did sustain neck pain as\u00a0a\u00a0result of the accident which resolved after\u00a0a\u00a0relatively short period of time. I find on the balance of probabilities that he did sustain minor both neck and back injuries in the collision which explains his time \u2018off work\u2019. That is not actually inconsistent with any of the other evidence in the case and indeed even the physiotherapy records. Whilst Martin Spencer J in Molodi did say that\u00a0a\u00a0court would normally expect\u00a0a\u00a0claimant to see\u00a0a\u00a0physiotherapist without the instigation of solicitors, he did not say that if\u00a0a\u00a0claimant sees\u00a0a\u00a0physiotherapist on the instigation of solicitors, then the Claimant is inevitably dishonest and in my judgment Mr\u00a0Nadeem is not. 124. Mr Nadeem\u2019s contention that he suffered severe lower back pain which resolved after four months is the most problematic aspect because it does not seem to me to be entirely consistent with what he said in relation to the walk-in centre only after three months after the accident when he reported back pain unrelated to the accident. However, the very fact that Mr\u00a0Nadeem was so consistent in saying that the back pain after three months was not attributable to the accident is in my judgment, the best evidence that he was not lying to Dr\u00a0Bansal when he was talking about severe lower back pain resolving within four months. In short, I find there was a misunderstanding between Dr Bansal under time pressure and Mr\u00a0Nadeem, whose English at the time was not good and who had no interpreter. I find Mr\u00a0Nadeem was talking about two different types of back pain which is what he was trying to describe in his evidence to DDJ Goodman, but Dr\u00a0Bansal rolled those two things together and considered \u2018back pain related to the accident\u2019 lasted about four months, because that was consistent with what Mr\u00a0Nadeem had told him, namely that his (non-accident-related) back pain resolved about\u00a0a\u00a0month after the walk-in clinic. That seems to have been\u00a0a\u00a0simple misunderstanding between Mr\u00a0Nadeem and Dr\u00a0Bansal as opposed to\u00a0a\u00a0deliberate lie by the former to the latter. Even if I am wrong about that, I am not sure Mr\u00a0Nadeem lied by saying he had severe neck pain which resolved after two months or severe lower back pain which resolved after four months. As he said himself in his evidence, severe is\u00a0a\u00a0word he is unlikely to have used with the state of English that he had in 2019. I dismiss Grounds 1, 2\u00a0and 3. 125. For the reasons I have already given, I dismiss Grounds 4\u00a0and 5\u00a0against Mr\u00a0Siddiqui on the basis that he was correct, in my judgment, to say that Mr\u00a0Nadeem was the front passenger seat in his car and believed that as\u00a0a\u00a0result of the accident, he sustained injury and Mr\u00a0Nadeem sustained injury. Indeed, whilst unnecessary for Ground 5, I have made a positive finding that Mr Nadeem was injured as was Mr Sidiqi. Even if I am wrong, I am certainly not satisfied to the criminal standard of proof that Mr Sidiqi was lying. I specifically exonerate Mr Sidiqi from any allegation of contempt of court. 126. As I said at the start, Grounds 6, 7\u00a0and 8\u00a0are essentially\u00a0a\u00a0reiteration of Grounds 1, 2 and 3 made in terms of Mr Nadeem\u2019s witness statement as opposed to what he said to Dr\u00a0Bansal. Technically, as discussed in Nazir, it is\u00a0a\u00a0slightly different form of contempt, but the elements at least in this case, are basically the same. I have found on the balance of probabilities that Mr\u00a0Nadeem was\u00a0indeed a\u00a0front seat passenger in\u00a0a\u00a0Mercedes driven by Mr\u00a0Siddiqui, that he suffered immediately from severe neck and lower back pain and took seven days off work as he felt physically unable to do his job. Even if I am more comfortable making those findings than I am about the precise extent and duration of his accident-related symptoms, for the reasons I have already given, I do not find (still less am I sure) there were any lies in his statement and I dismiss Grounds 6, 7\u00a0and 8. 127. Finally, Grounds 9, 10\u00a0and 11. I find myself in the difficult judicial situation of making\u00a0a\u00a0finding about whether evidence to another judge was\u00a0a\u00a0lie when that other judge found that it was\u00a0a\u00a0lie. However, DDJ Goodman\u2019s findings, even on the criminal standard of proof, are not conclusive, for the reasons I have explained. Nevertheless, even though Mr King has not asked me to, in fairness to Aviva, I am prepared to apply the approach in Kovacic. Out of respect for DDJ Goodman\u2019s advantage in seeing Mr Nadeem\u2019s evidence to her, I therefore accept her findings should stand unless there is good reason to depart from them on the basis of new material not available to her. Indeed, I go even further. Following the approach in Arnold, as clarified by the Supreme Court in Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd v Zodiac [2013] 3 WLR 299 (SC), I am content that I should only take into account that further evidence as reopening those findings if it could not have been available to Mr\u00a0Nadeem with reasonable diligence at the time. 128. I can reach that conclusion because the further evidence not available to DDJ Goodman is extensive, not reasonably available to Mr Nadeem at the time and shows Mr Nadeem\u2019s evidence to DDJ Goodman in a completely different light to that which she saw. Firstly, there is the oral evidence of Ms\u00a0Hibbert which DDJ Goodman did not have because she found no case to answer, when Mr Nadeem\u2019s barrister specifically asked DDJ Goodman to hear from Ms Hibbert. DDJ Goodman was not aware that there were multiple errors and inconsistencies in Ms Hibbert\u2019s evidence, because she did not permit that evidence to be tested in cross-examination. Secondly, there is the evidence of Dr\u00a0Bansal which was not clear to Mr Nadeem at the time of the trial before DDJ Goodman, in particular about the preparation of his report and the questionnaire. As I said that evidence undermines some of the assumptions that DDJ Goodman made. Therefore, even leaving aside the unfortunate circumstances in which DDJ Goodman made her findings, even on the strict issue estoppel approach taken in Kovacic, I am entitled to reopen the findings that DDJ Goodman made and to substitute my own conclusions even about the evidence Mr Nadeem gave to her. Even appeal courts are entitled to re-open findings of trial judges based only on written evidence and a transcript, let alone courts which have heard subsequent oral evidence from witnesses not heard by the original court. I am satisfied, for the reasons I have already given, that on the balance of probabilities Mr\u00a0Nadeem was in Mr Sidiqi\u2019s car at the time of the accident. Even if I am wrong about that, I am certainly not sure that he was lying to DDJ Goodman in saying that he was in the car. I therefore dismiss Ground 9. Likewise, I find on the balance of probabilities Mr Nadeem did sustain some sort of injury and even if I am wrong about that, I am not sure that he was lying to DDJ Goodman in saying that he did (including for the reasons I gave when dismissing Ground 2). I therefore dismiss Ground 10. Finally, I find on the balance of probabilities that Mr Nadeem took\u00a0a\u00a0week off because of the accident and in any event, I am certainly not sure that he was lying to DDJ Goodman in saying that he did. In those circumstances, I dismiss Grounds 11 and hold Mr Nadeem is also not in contempt. 129. Judges sometimes say that\u00a0a\u00a0particular case does not present personal injury litigation in\u00a0a\u00a0very good light. What they normally mean is that either\u00a0a\u00a0personal injury claim has been presented in\u00a0a\u00a0dishonest way, or it has been presented in\u00a0a\u00a0shamblingly incoherent way. In this particular case, the former is not true. Mr Nadeem did not present a dishonest personal injury claim and certainly I am not sure that he or Mr Sidiqi committed contempt of court. But I am sure (as in fairness was DDJ Goodman) that Mr Nadeem\u2019s personal injury claim was presented with something close to incompetence on behalf of his previous solicitors. Likewise, DDJ Goodman approached her task, doubtless under\u00a0a\u00a0busy list, in\u00a0a\u00a0way which I am sure she in retrospect would recognise was far from ideal. Certainly, if Kovacic sets\u00a0a\u00a0precedent for the making of\u00a0a\u00a0finding to the criminal standard of fundamental dishonesty, it should not be done in the way that it was done in the present case. For that Aviva are not responsible, nor indeed their barrister before DDJ Goodman. As I started by saying, they brought this claim quite properly because of the trenchant and clear findings that DDJ Goodman had made. They were her findings on the evidence she heard; they are not the same as my findings on the evidence that I have heard. Be all that as it may, this case was not\u00a0a\u00a0good illustration of how to conduct personal injury litigation. 130. On the contrary, this case has been an extremely good illustration of how to conduct contempt proceedings, on the defence side fully and fairly and with conspicuous skill, by Mr\u00a0Varnam for Mr Nadeem and Mr\u00a0Christensen for Mr Sidiqi and those that instruct them. However I pay particular tribute to the Claimant's side, with fairness, clarity and\u00a0assistance to the Court from Mr\u00a0Kong and from Ms\u00a0Barry sitting behind him and I am extremely grateful to them. Nevertheless, for the reasons I have given, I dismiss these proceedings for contempt. Epiq Europe Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof. Lower Ground, 46\u00a0Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JE Email: civil@epiqglobal.co.uk<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

Sources officielles :<\/strong> consulter la page source<\/a><\/p>\n

Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).<\/em><\/p>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

HIS HONOUR JUDGE TINDAL. HHJ TINDAL: Introduction 1. This is an application for committal for alleged contempt of court after findings of fundamental dishonesty in a personal injury trial. It raises an interesting issue of the status of the findings in such a trial in subsequent contempt proceedings and how far those findings create an issue estoppel as between the…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":0,"template":"","meta":{"_crdt_document":""},"kji_country":[7608],"kji_court":[7909],"kji_chamber":[],"kji_year":[8677],"kji_subject":[7612],"kji_keyword":[7622,21686,18162,21685,11149],"kji_language":[7611],"class_list":["post-593351","kji_decision","type-kji_decision","status-publish","hentry","kji_country-royaume-uni","kji_court-high-court-kings-bench-division","kji_year-8677","kji_subject-fiscal","kji_keyword-evidence","kji_keyword-goodman","kji_keyword-hibbert","kji_keyword-nadeem","kji_keyword-statement","kji_language-anglais"],"yoast_head":"\nAviva Insurance Limited v Atiquillar Nadeem & Anor - Ma\u00eetre Hassan Kohen, avocat en droit p\u00e9nal \u00e0 Paris<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/jurisprudences\/aviva-insurance-limited-v-atiquillar-nadeem-anor\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"zh_CN\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Aviva Insurance Limited v Atiquillar Nadeem & Anor\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"HIS HONOUR JUDGE TINDAL. HHJ TINDAL: Introduction 1. This is an application for committal for alleged contempt of court after findings of fundamental dishonesty in a personal injury trial. It raises an interesting issue of the status of the findings in such a trial in subsequent contempt proceedings and how far those findings create an issue estoppel as between the...\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/jurisprudences\/aviva-insurance-limited-v-atiquillar-nadeem-anor\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Ma\u00eetre Hassan Kohen, avocat en droit p\u00e9nal \u00e0 Paris\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"\u9884\u8ba1\u9605\u8bfb\u65f6\u95f4\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"120 \u5206\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/zh-hans\\\/jurisprudences\\\/aviva-insurance-limited-v-atiquillar-nadeem-anor\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/zh-hans\\\/jurisprudences\\\/aviva-insurance-limited-v-atiquillar-nadeem-anor\\\/\",\"name\":\"Aviva Insurance Limited v Atiquillar Nadeem & Anor - Ma\u00eetre Hassan Kohen, avocat en droit p\u00e9nal \u00e0 Paris\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/zh-hans\\\/#website\"},\"datePublished\":\"2026-04-18T07:09:09+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/zh-hans\\\/jurisprudences\\\/aviva-insurance-limited-v-atiquillar-nadeem-anor\\\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"zh-Hans\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/zh-hans\\\/jurisprudences\\\/aviva-insurance-limited-v-atiquillar-nadeem-anor\\\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/zh-hans\\\/jurisprudences\\\/aviva-insurance-limited-v-atiquillar-nadeem-anor\\\/#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/zh-hans\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Jurisprudences\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/zh-hans\\\/jurisprudences\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":3,\"name\":\"Aviva Insurance Limited v Atiquillar Nadeem & Anor\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/zh-hans\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/zh-hans\\\/\",\"name\":\"Kohen Avocats\",\"description\":\"Ma\u00eetre Hassan Kohen, avocat p\u00e9naliste \u00e0 Paris, intervient exclusivement en droit p\u00e9nal pour la d\u00e9fense des particuliers, notamment en mati\u00e8re d\u2019accusations de viol. Il assure un accompagnement rigoureux d\u00e8s la garde \u00e0 vue jusqu\u2019\u00e0 la Cour d\u2019assises, veillant au strict respect des garanties proc\u00e9durales.\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/zh-hans\\\/#organization\"},\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/zh-hans\\\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"zh-Hans\"},{\"@type\":\"Organization\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/zh-hans\\\/#organization\",\"name\":\"Kohen Avocats\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/zh-hans\\\/\",\"logo\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"zh-Hans\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/zh-hans\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2026\\\/01\\\/Logo-2-1.webp\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2026\\\/01\\\/Logo-2-1.webp\",\"width\":2114,\"height\":1253,\"caption\":\"Kohen Avocats\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/zh-hans\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\"}}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO Premium plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Aviva Insurance Limited v Atiquillar Nadeem & Anor - Ma\u00eetre Hassan Kohen, avocat en droit p\u00e9nal \u00e0 Paris","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/jurisprudences\/aviva-insurance-limited-v-atiquillar-nadeem-anor\/","og_locale":"zh_CN","og_type":"article","og_title":"Aviva Insurance Limited v Atiquillar Nadeem & Anor","og_description":"HIS HONOUR JUDGE TINDAL. HHJ TINDAL: Introduction 1. This is an application for committal for alleged contempt of court after findings of fundamental dishonesty in a personal injury trial. It raises an interesting issue of the status of the findings in such a trial in subsequent contempt proceedings and how far those findings create an issue estoppel as between the...","og_url":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/jurisprudences\/aviva-insurance-limited-v-atiquillar-nadeem-anor\/","og_site_name":"Ma\u00eetre Hassan Kohen, avocat en droit p\u00e9nal \u00e0 Paris","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_misc":{"\u9884\u8ba1\u9605\u8bfb\u65f6\u95f4":"120 \u5206"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/jurisprudences\/aviva-insurance-limited-v-atiquillar-nadeem-anor\/","url":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/jurisprudences\/aviva-insurance-limited-v-atiquillar-nadeem-anor\/","name":"Aviva Insurance Limited v Atiquillar Nadeem & Anor - Ma\u00eetre Hassan Kohen, avocat en droit p\u00e9nal \u00e0 Paris","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/#website"},"datePublished":"2026-04-18T07:09:09+00:00","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/jurisprudences\/aviva-insurance-limited-v-atiquillar-nadeem-anor\/#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"zh-Hans","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/jurisprudences\/aviva-insurance-limited-v-atiquillar-nadeem-anor\/"]}]},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/jurisprudences\/aviva-insurance-limited-v-atiquillar-nadeem-anor\/#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"Jurisprudences","item":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/jurisprudences\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":3,"name":"Aviva Insurance Limited v Atiquillar Nadeem & Anor"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/#website","url":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/","name":"Kohen Avocats","description":"Ma\u00eetre Hassan Kohen, avocat p\u00e9naliste \u00e0 Paris, intervient exclusivement en droit p\u00e9nal pour la d\u00e9fense des particuliers, notamment en mati\u00e8re d\u2019accusations de viol. Il assure un accompagnement rigoureux d\u00e8s la garde \u00e0 vue jusqu\u2019\u00e0 la Cour d\u2019assises, veillant au strict respect des garanties proc\u00e9durales.","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/#organization"},"potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"zh-Hans"},{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/#organization","name":"Kohen Avocats","url":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"zh-Hans","@id":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/01\/Logo-2-1.webp","contentUrl":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/01\/Logo-2-1.webp","width":2114,"height":1253,"caption":"Kohen Avocats"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/"}}]}},"jetpack_likes_enabled":false,"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/kji_decision\/593351","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/kji_decision"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/kji_decision"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=593351"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"kji_country","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/kji_country?post=593351"},{"taxonomy":"kji_court","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/kji_court?post=593351"},{"taxonomy":"kji_chamber","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/kji_chamber?post=593351"},{"taxonomy":"kji_year","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/kji_year?post=593351"},{"taxonomy":"kji_subject","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/kji_subject?post=593351"},{"taxonomy":"kji_keyword","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/kji_keyword?post=593351"},{"taxonomy":"kji_language","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/kji_language?post=593351"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}