{"id":596382,"date":"2026-04-18T18:57:21","date_gmt":"2026-04-18T16:57:21","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/jurisprudences\/the-father-v-the-mother\/"},"modified":"2026-04-18T18:57:21","modified_gmt":"2026-04-18T16:57:21","slug":"the-father-v-the-mother","status":"publish","type":"kji_decision","link":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/jurisprudences\/the-father-v-the-mother\/","title":{"rendered":"The Father v The Mother"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"kji-decision\">\n<div class=\"kji-full-text\">\n<p>RECORDER HOWE KC: The Parties and the Applications. 1. I\u00a0am concerned with applications relating to a small baby, who is now ten weeks old. As this judgment may be published on\u00a0the internet, it is necessary to protect the child\u2019s identity, so\u00a0I will call him Joe. I will refer\u00a0to his mother as the mother, and his father as the father. 2. On 4 July 2024 the father issued an application for a child arrangements order, seeking a determination by\u00a0the court about who Joe should live with and when he\u00a0should spend time with each parent. The father also applied for a prohibited steps order, preventing the mother from relocating the child. Under the \u201cWhy are you making this application\u201d section of\u00a0the C100 application form, the father said \u201cI\u00a0am making this application to prevent my son from being taken abroad without my consent, as he will most likely never be returned to the UK. I\u00a0have not seen my son for five days now, prior to which he\u00a0was living with me, and I was with him every day since his birth. My son\u2019s mother is refusing to communicate with\u00a0a third party family member to arrange child care. I would like the court to consider this application to prevent the unlawful abduction of my child, temporarily hold any passport which may have been obtained for my son, and to consider the childcare arrangements. I would like to see my son for half of the week, so that I can continue to be part of his life. His mother and I were never involved in an\u00a0ongoing relationship, and we had agreed that she would find her own place, as she\u00a0was temporarily staying at my house, and that I would have my son for three and a half days per week as we have shared parental responsibility. This was to continue throughout my son\u2019s childhood, as I own a home in a fantastic school catchment area, which is one\u00a0of\u00a0the best in\u00a0the UK. Following false allegations made against me, I feel that they have\u00a0been designed to try and affect the visa system, manipulate the benefit system, and\/or try to remove my son from the jurisdiction of England and Wales\u201d. 3. The father sought an urgent hearing, without notice of that hearing being given to the mother, because he said in\u00a0the form he fears his \u201cson will\u00a0be taken out of the jurisdiction of England and Wales without my consent, and I will probably never see him again\u201d. He also said in his application, \u201cMy son\u2019s mother is a French national, and as\u00a0far\u00a0as I know she has no visa to remain in\u00a0the UK. I\u00a0am afraid that my child will\u00a0be removed from the jurisdiction of England and Wales without my consent. I do not have the information as to the whereabouts of my son or his mother\u201d. The father described the mother as a flight risk, with there being an imminent risk of child abduction. He also described that he had concerns for Joe\u2019s safety. He alleged that \u201cMy child\u2019s mum sleeps with\u00a0the baby in the bed in dangerous positions. The bed was not located in a suitable position to prevent falling. The baby is placed on top of pillows during\u00a0the night, rather than a flat, clear surface, despite the fact that we have\u00a0a \u2018lay next to\u00a0me style crib\u2019 and a Moses basket. Every day I\u00a0am concerned about sudden infant death syndrome as a result of this\u201d. 4. On 4 July 2024 the father\u2019s application came before District\u00a0Judge Prest KC. His order records that he\u00a0was satisfied the court has jurisdiction because \u201cthe children\u2019s habitual place of residence is in England and Wales\u201d. The Judge made an order prohibiting the mother from removing Joe from England and Wales. A further hearing was listed on 11 July 2024, for\u00a0the mother to be heard and the order reviewed. 5. On 11 July 2024 the applications came before District\u00a0Judge Buck. The mother attended and she produced a position statement, in which she said \u201cI\u00a0am a French national, domiciled and habitually resident in France. Although\u00a0I travelled to\u00a0the UK temporarily on 29\u00a0April 2024 to give birth, so that the father could be part of this experience and time, my position is that Joe is habitually resident in France along with me. Accordingly, the English court does not have jurisdiction to\u00a0make orders or decisions in respect of Joe. He is the ward of\u00a0the French courts, and therefore the prohibited steps order and applications made by\u00a0the father must be dismissed\u201d. 6. In her position statement the mother also describes incidents of domestic abuse, that she says she suffered in\u00a0the brief time that she says she spent with\u00a0the father, allegations that led to\u00a0the father\u2019s arrest on 28 June 2024. The position statement describes how the mother then moved to an address in another city. 7. On\u00a0 11 July 2024, due to there being a dispute about whether\u00a0the court has jurisdiction to\u00a0make orders about Joe, District\u00a0Judge Buck transferred the case to be heard by me the next day, on\u00a0 12 July. The father attended, represented by counsel. The mother attended representing herself and was assisted by a French language interpreter. It\u00a0was not possible on\u00a0 12 July to determine the dispute concerning the jurisdiction of\u00a0the court, nor to consider the welfare issue of whether\u00a0the orders made by District\u00a0Judge Prest KC should be extended or discharged, as it\u00a0was clear there was an evidential dispute between\u00a0the parties. It\u00a0was necessary for\u00a0the parties to file evidence before the issues between them could be properly considered. I gave directions for\u00a0the parties to file evidence, and skeleton arguments, and listed the case for hearing on Friday 2\u00a0August. 8. On that date, having read the skeleton arguments submitted by counsel and the mother, she then being represented, the Family Division Liaison Judge for\u00a0the North Eastern Circuit, Poole J, granted permission for this case to be heard at High\u00a0Court level, and I have therefore heard this case sitting as a Deputy High\u00a0Court Judge. 9. The father is represented by Mrs Devall. The mother is represented by Mr Marnham. I have considered the skeleton arguments provided by both advocates. I have read all the documents contained in\u00a0the court bundle that was filed on 31 July 2024. An updated bundle with some additional police disclosure and messaging was provided late yesterday, and I was taken to some\u00a0of that evidence during the hearing today. I have heard oral evidence from the father and from the mother, and from the father\u2019s sister. I have also considered the written closing submissions of counsel. The Background and the Evidence 10. In describing the relevant factual history to these proceedings, it will be necessary for me to address the matters upon which\u00a0the parties are not agreed. When providing a chronological account of why it is these parents are now requiring this court to make decisions about Joe, that they find themselves unable to\u00a0make, I will make findings of fact on the matters that\u00a0are not agreed, where such a finding is necessary to decide the applications that require urgent determination today. 11. When making my findings I apply the following essential legal principles: A, the burden of proof rests on\u00a0the party making the allegation; B, the standard of proof is\u00a0the simple balance of probabilities; C, any findings I make must be based on evidence, including inferences that can properly be drawn from the evidence but not simply on suspicion or mere speculation; D, the evidence cannot be evaluated and assessed in separate compartments, I must have regard to\u00a0the relevance of each piece of evidence to other evidence and exercise an overview of the totality of the evidence in order to come to\u00a0my conclusions; and E, the evidence of the parents is of the utmost importance. It is essential I form a clear assessment of their credibility and reliability. They must have the fullest opportunity to take part in\u00a0the hearing, and the court must take into account any vulnerabilities that any witness may have, that will impact on their ability\u00a0to engage with\u00a0the hearing. The court should make such participation directions as are appropriate to assist the parties to give their best evidence. 12. Dealing now with participation directions, the mother\u2019s first language is French. She has been assisted at the hearing on 2\u00a0August, and at this judgment hearing on\u00a0 6 August by a French interpreter. During\u00a0the course of the hearing on\u00a0 2\u00a0August screens were deployed in the court\u00a0room, to prevent each party being able\u00a0to see each other, given the allegations made by the mother of domestic abuse. 13. The first meeting. The father works as a music producer and a DJ. He has performed in many locations around the world so travels regularly. The mother works as a commercial animator for\u00a0a number\u00a0of alcohol brands and has also, according to\u00a0the father, worked as an actress. The parties met on social media in November 2022 but first met in person in August 2023 when\u00a0the father performed at a music festival in Southern France. The mother says that she travelled back to\u00a0the UK with\u00a0the father after the festival. The father says they travelled separately, but nothing in this case turns on those travel arrangements. The parties agree that they were together between 30 August and 3\u00a0September 2023. During that period Joe was conceived. In his evidence the father says he never expected to see\u00a0the mother again. For him they\u00a0had had a short encounter, that he did not expect to repeat. The mother returned to France and very quickly, and she says by 18\u00a0September 2023, she realised she\u00a0was pregnant. 14. The intentions of the parties during\u00a0the pregnancy. The father\u2019s evidence is that mother informed him that she\u00a0was pregnant on\u00a0 21 September 2023, and on 26 October sent him a copy of the scan dated 19 October. Mother\u2019s evidence is that she told father immediately, but she did not receive immediate response back from him. Mother also told me that, by 26 October, she had decided\u00a0to proceed with\u00a0the pregnancy. Father, she says, responded at this point, and told her he would like a paternity test. Father said mother offered to pay for the test but as he\u00a0had requested it he paid and mother travelled to England, between 6 and 8\u00a0November to take the test. Paternity was confirmed on\u00a0 17 November. 15. The father\u2019s statement dated 25 July 2024 describes that it\u00a0was during\u00a0the November 2023 visit that the parties had discussions about\u00a0the benefits of the mother giving birth in England. Father\u2019s statement says that it\u00a0was at this very early stage that the mother told him that\u00a0she wanted to move to England permanently and talked of her dislike of Paris, of\u00a0the French police, and of French politics, and of the racism within France. In mother\u2019s statement, dated 29 July 2024, she does not accept it\u00a0was during this November visit that there\u00a0was any discussion about where she would give birth. She denies that she complained to father about French politics within\u00a0the context of any conversation concerning her relocating permanently to England. Mother accepts that she is unhappy with\u00a0the current state of French politics, but she says she lives in a good area of Paris, loves her country and never intended\u00a0to relocate. 16. When father gave his oral evidence, and was asked by Mr Marnham about when he says the parties first discussed mum giving birth in the Father\u2019s home city, he told me it\u00a0was during the second visit in January 2024. The purpose of the mother\u2019s trip to England in November 2023 was to undertake paternity testing,\u00a0that\u00a0had\u00a0to be done here because the Mother told him it would require a court order to be undertaken in France. Father did\u00a0not receive the results until nine days after the mother had returned to Paris, and given\u00a0the father\u2019s initial doubts about being Joe\u2019s biological father, it seems to\u00a0me somewhat surprising for there to have\u00a0been conversations about the mother giving birth in the Father\u2019s home city during her November 2023 visit. Father also asserts in\u00a0the same statement that in November 2023 they spoke of the mother moving to\u00a0the city where father lives, and father accommodating her after the birth until she found her own place to live. Again, in my judgment, in circumstances in which it\u00a0was the father who was sceptical that he\u00a0was the baby\u2019s biological father, because he says mother had told him she\u00a0was five weeks pregnant when they had had sex just four weeks before, it is in my judgment somewhat unlikely that these conversations would have taken\u00a0place. 17. It is the mother\u2019s evidence that it\u00a0was not until after a visit between 5 and 12 January 2024, and specifically on 15\u00a0January 2024, that she decided she would have the baby in England. As the father accepted in his oral evidence that it\u00a0was not until January 2024 that there was any conversations about\u00a0the place where Joe would be born, I accept the mother\u2019s evidence about when it\u00a0was that she decided to give birth in England. 18. It is agreed that after the November 2023 visit the mother accessed midwifery services in France, and mother accepts that she kept father updated about those appointments. Mother then returned to England for an eight-day visit in January 2024, and she describes the relationship with father as amicable during that visit, hence her decision to give birth here. However, she says she soon reviewed that decision for reasons I will come on to. 19. It is the father\u2019s evidence that the mother had begun her maternity leave early, as her job requires her to visit premises that manufacture alcohol and this was not permissible due to the pregnancy. Father says that mother did not work after 19 December 2023. I\u00a0have seen\u00a0a letter from mother\u2019s employer that gives the date she is due back at work, 12 August 2024. The end of her maternity leave was\u00a0to be\u00a0a little earlier but this date was extended due to the Paris Olympics. In my judgment, it does not assist me when deciding the issues at this hearing to determine the dispute between\u00a0the parties as to when the mother\u2019s maternity leave might have started. What is clear is that it is very soon to come to\u00a0an end, so a decision has to be made at this hearing as to whether mother is to be prohibited from taking Joe to Paris. 20. In her statement, the mother describes returning to England for eight days on 29 January, as they had been successful registering with\u00a0the midwifery service using father\u2019s address and National Insurance number. In his statement father describes providing mother with the details of \u2018My pregnancynotes.com\u2019, and giving his address and National Insurance number to mother so she could complete the forms and register. He says mother was prepared to pay up to \u00a312,000 to give birth here, and he suggests she would not have done this had she not intended to remain in England permanently. However, I have not been provided with any evidence to show that mother had to pay any medical fees when Joe was born. 21. Mother\u2019s next visit\u00a0to England was on 25 February 2024. She came for three days to meet with\u00a0the midwife and to have\u00a0a diabetes test. It is clear from\u00a0the evidence of both parties this visit did not go well, and there\u00a0was\u00a0a significant dispute between them. Mother\u2019s complaint was about father\u2019s lack of support, practical and emotional, when she was alone in Paris. Mother expressed her frustrations with father\u2019s lack of support via WhatsApp messages. In one message mother describes how she\u00a0was \u201cshocked by your ignorance towards me and\u00a0the baby\u201d. She ends this message by saying \u201cdon&#039;t tell me everything is going\u00a0to be all\u00a0right\u201d. Despite this dispute mother lent father over \u00a35,000, that he says, as is confirmed in\u00a0the message, he would repay to her once he had returned from\u00a0a tour of Australia, that took\u00a0place between\u00a0the end of February and early April 2024. 22. The dispute between\u00a0the parties about father\u2019s alleged lack of support continued. On 22 February father messages mother, denying that he had been ignorant toward her, he says \u201cThe baby is not here yet\u201d, something he says again in a message on\u00a0 25 February. In his message he tells the mother that she is being rude to him and not appreciating what he does for her, that includes providing her \u201cwith somewhere safe and comfortable when you are here\u201d. His message ends with \u201cYou\u00a0are rude, I do not need that at all, nor will I accept it\u201d. 23. Prior to mother coming to England on 25 February, the disagreement that had started on WhatsApp about father\u2019s treatment of mother continued. As the mother had made the decision to give birth in England, she sent the father a message saying she\u00a0was no longer registered at\u00a0the maternity hospital in Paris, and she needed the name of\u00a0the maternity hospital in England that she\u00a0was to attend. She sent a number\u00a0of messages seeking this information and expressed her shock at what she saw as the father\u2019s lack of support for her and the baby. The mother said that she needed\u00a0to book a hotel close to\u00a0the hospital that she\u00a0was due to\u00a0attend for her tests. The Father\u2019s response\u00a0to the mother\u2019s messages was\u00a0to tell her that she\u00a0was ignoring his feelings. He says in his message that he will\u00a0be \u201c100 per cent there for him\u201d, when\u00a0the baby is born, but accuses the mother of having \u201ctoxic negative energy\u201d, and of \u201cusing the unborn as a tool to try and manipulate my feelings\u201d. 24. It is the father\u2019s evidence that the mother wanted a romantic relationship with him and says her complaints about his treatment of her are as a result of him rejecting her. The mother\u2019s response\u00a0to the father\u2019s message, on\u00a0 25\u00a0February 2024, is not in my judgement supportive of her seeking a relationship, and the wording used is consistent with her wanting more support from him as the father of her unborn child. There\u00a0is no messaging that has\u00a0been brought to my attention in which the mother clearly expresses the desire for\u00a0a romantic relationship with\u00a0the father. She describes father being distant, but her message ends stating \u201cNo pride or resentment, I need to\u00a0make these appointments\u201d. The father does not reply to the mother\u2019s message and does not give her the name of the hospital that mother is to\u00a0attend, there being two different hospitals in\u00a0the city. 25. In her statement, and in her oral evidence, mother accepted that relocating to England was one\u00a0of\u00a0the options that she\u00a0was considering early on, but after father\u2019s conduct and her concerns about his lack of emotional support and his failure\u00a0to assist her in\u00a0a very simple way, by telling her the name of\u00a0the hospital she\u00a0was to attend, she told me she excluded the possibility of her relocating to England as an option for her. In her oral evidence mother told me that after all the messages on 25, 26 and 27 February, she drew a line under coming to live here \u201cdue to his behaviour leaving her out in\u00a0the street at nine pm in\u00a0the evening\u201d. 26. Mother said that on her return to Paris she re-registered with maternity services, and she then had two options to consider, giving birth in England or giving birth in Paris. Surprisingly, father does not mention this February 2024 dispute in his statement, or in his position statement that was put before\u00a0the District\u00a0Judge who made the without notice prohibited steps order. When it\u00a0was put to him in oral evidence, he accepted, to use his words, \u201cwe were not getting on\u201d, but again said this was because the mother wanted more from\u00a0the relationship. Mother sent a message to father on 27 February, stating \u201cI\u00a0have spent\u00a0a lot of money in\u00a0the last few weeks, I&#039;d like to get my things and my son\u2019s things back, along with\u00a0the money I lent you as\u00a0soon\u00a0as\u00a0possible\u201d. Father responded to this message, complaining that the mother had used the expression \u2018my son\u2019 rather than \u2018their son\u2019, and agreeing to bring her and the baby\u2019s items to her hotel if she gave him the name of the hotel. The Father failed to address this significant dispute in his statement. This was a material omission from his evidence, and his description of\u00a0the parties as \u201cjust not getting on\u201d was, in my judgement, a minimisation of what occurred. 27. On\u00a0 12 March 2024 the mother, who had returned to Paris, was messaging a friend. Within this messaging mother said she\u00a0was looking forward to \u201cstopping work and being able to rest\u201d, casting doubt on father\u2019s assertion that mother had not worked since December. Mother also says to her friend, \u201cI\u2019m looking for\u00a0a flat in\u00a0the South of France, from June to September. I don&#039;t want\u00a0to stay in Paris with my boy during the Olympic Games\u201d. This message was put to father, and his response was simply that these messages are inconsistent with what the mother was saying to him. 28. It is the father\u2019s case that the mother had a large number\u00a0of boxes delivered to his home, and he asserts that this\u00a0is evidence that she intended to stay permanently. Mother\u2019s evidence was that all that was sent were items that she would need for herself and the baby during\u00a0the period that she\u00a0was staying with\u00a0the father, before and after the birth. Mother said she had been buying these items since she became pregnant. It\u00a0was put to mother that if she had intended to return to Paris after the birth, she would\u00a0not have shipped these items over, and would have told father to purchase the items needed. Given the dispute evident in the messaging about mother\u2019s concern that father was not supportive, and when taken with father needing mother to lend him a considerable sum\u00a0of money, monies that have not at the date of this judgment been returned, I do not interpret mother bringing the items listed at page 185 of the bundle as inconsistent with an intention to visit temporarily. Father\u2019s evidence was that he thought mother had brought all of her belongings with her, but he has provided no evidence by way of photographs or even his own list of what she had delivered to support that assertion. The mother has provided shipping invoices and photographs of the items. 29. Despite the dispute that occurred between the parties, the mother travelled to England on 29 April. She had an appointment with\u00a0the midwife on 2 May 2024. The mother stayed at the father\u2019s home but they stayed in separate rooms. In her oral evidence the mother said she wanted father to be part of his son\u2019s life in\u00a0the first months, and to have that joy as a parent. She says she did\u00a0not want\u00a0to come over permanently and did\u00a0not put anything in place to be here permanently. 30. It appears that there\u00a0was a relative calm between\u00a0the parties for nearly three weeks, until there\u00a0was another dispute, this time concerning the name to be given to\u00a0the child when born. The mother wanted Joe to have her last name. The father wanted Joe to have his last name. In her oral evidence the mother said that the father had violently asked her to move out of the house, as she had told him she wanted her name next to his on\u00a0the birth certificate. She told me that he said that if she put her name on the birth certificate, she should get out. Mother told me she closed up the boxes that had been delivered and father took the boxes and threw them down the stairs. Mother said that she contacted the logistics company to collect them. She said she was nine months pregnant and that she could\u00a0not carry them. The mother described the father as being in such a terrible anger that she dare not answer him back. Mother said she made\u00a0a reservation at a hotel at Manchester\u00a0Airport, so that she could leave and travel back to Paris. 31. The parties messaged each other about this dispute on 22 May, and it is useful for me to read those messages in full into this judgment. The message on 22 May reads as follows. \u201cI am so disappointed that I have allowed all this to happen but I do realise that regardless of what I say to\u00a0you that you\u00a0will never accept your responsibility in what you have said to me, and how you have handled this. Yes, I get upset but I would not have been upset if you did not lie to\u00a0me and then go on to pack the baby\u2019s things just two days before you are due to give birth. Today you called me a bastard twice and told me that you don&#039;t trust me, you then threatened to call the police on me even! In the end you do not recognise about any of the things that you are responsible for. You have other agendas, and you have again shown me the true content of your character. I have actually tried my best and made sacrifices to\u00a0make you comfortable and share my life with you and the baby. I might be an idiot but I\u2019m not stupid\u201d. That is a message from the father. 32. The mother replies as follows. \u201cI simply told you that I wanted to add my surname and do\u00a0the French paperwork, so that it would be the same name as mine, like yours, and not ask you every time for a piece of paper authorising me to travel with baby. You started telling me that you can go back to Paris if you put your surname on, and it\u2019s not the first time you\u2019ve said that to\u00a0me. It\u2019s putting me under a lot of stress because I don&#039;t have anyone here, you call me a liar, a manipulator, a player, a narcissist, and that I\u00a0am pretending to cry. I am not the girl you describe and that hurts me. That&#039;s who you\u2019re making me out to be. I came all the way here so the three of us could be with baby. I\u00a0am not manipulating anyone. Yes, yesterday I did the baby cards, too much is much for me, I take responsibility for my words. I never called you a bastard, I didn\u2019t allow myself. Yes,\u00a0I said I didn&#039;t trust you, but that was because of what\u00a0happened in February. You scared me with your words and your anger, I hate that, I&#039;d rather leave because I have too much stress before my delivery. I\u00a0am lonely in [this City], and it\u2019s not easy every day, so excuse me for being pregnant and lonely without family and friends. Your words have\u00a0been hard on baby and me. You tell me that he&#039;s not your son and that I\u2019m staying alone with him because you don&#039;t want anything more. It hurts the baby, he didn&#039;t ask for anything. I just want to go back to Paris and give birth in a clinic, rather than stay alone in [this city] with my son\u201d. 33. There\u00a0was further messaging, in which\u00a0the father says \u201cIt\u00a0was your choice to pack up the baby\u2019s things yesterday and continue with your plan this morning, and so now you\u2019re alone and I am too. I don&#039;t know who you speak to about immigration issues but nothing you say is correct. All of this is crazy and unnecessary\u201d. On\u00a0 23 May the father sends further messages saying \u201cGood morning. Where are you. I\u2019m coming to get you. I tried\u00a0to call you, I\u2019m going to start work now\u201d. Mother then replies saying \u201cI\u2019m at Manchester Airport\u201d. Father\u2019s response is \u201cWow, OK, crazy, so after all you have robbed me of my boy two days before he is being born, all because of\u00a0a visa\u201d. On\u00a0 23 May mother replies in the following terms, \u201cAir France refused to let me on\u00a0the plane, I\u2019m not allowed to travel because of my advanced pregnancy, I\u2019m in a hotel. I didn&#039;t come to England to get\u00a0a visa, I don&#039;t care about a visa, your words hurt me yesterday. I didn&#039;t manipulate you to get\u00a0a visa, I\u2019ve been doing everything for baby for nine months and I mean everything. Yesterday you told me he&#039;s not your son anymore and that I should leave with him, that really hurt. I\u2019m due in two days, I don&#039;t need this before the birth\u201d. That was at 10.44. Shortly after 11 o\u2019clock the mother messages father saying, \u201cI\u00a0am taking an Uber back to [Father\u2019s home city], are you home?\u201d The mother then returns to\u00a0the father\u2019s home but it is clear from the messaging that mother had with her friend, and with her own mother, on 21 and 22 May, that\u00a0is produced in the bundle, that mother then intended to return to Paris prior\u00a0to Joe\u2019s birth. 34. When asked about this dispute in his oral evidence, father said that mother was trying to hurt his feelings and manipulate him. When I asked him what she\u00a0was manipulating him for, he said \u201cfor sympathy\u201d. Father told me that there\u00a0was \u201cNo indication from my point\u00a0of view that she wanted to go back to Paris to give birth\u201d. When cross-examined the father was shown a message sent to maternity services by\u00a0the mother on 22 May, asking the French hospital to keep open the appointment mother had there on 29 May. Father\u2019s response was that he does not believe that mother ever intended to go back to France. 35. As I will explain shortly, on 28 June 2024 mother made a report to\u00a0the police about father being controlling and coercive. Mother made a statement to\u00a0the police that has\u00a0been disclosed into these proceedings. Father relies on the police disclosure as it contains records such as \u201cOn\u00a0 29 April 2024 the victim has come to England to live with the suspect as she wanted her son to have his father in his life\u201d. In the mother\u2019s police statement it says \u201cWe discussed the possibility of me moving to [Father\u2019s home city and I decided to\u00a0make\u00a0the move on 29 April 2024, one month before\u00a0the baby\u2019s due date\u201d. In a document prepared by the interpreter, who assisted mother over the phone or via video call (it is not clear which as this document is not dated), it is recorded that mother said \u201cOn 29 April 2024 I moved to\u00a0the UK full-time and moved in with father as I wanted my son to be around his father\u201d. These entries were put to the mother as it\u00a0was suggested they demonstrate that mother intended to live in England with Joe on a long-term basis. Mother denied that she said she\u00a0was moving on a full-time basis and said the translation must be wrong. 36. During\u00a0the hearing before me, mother was assisted by an interpreter. I accept that the mother understands some English, but, as was described by the father\u2019s sister when she gave oral evidence, she\u00a0was able\u00a0to speak with her, and mother does understand some English. However, I accept that mother\u2019s English is not good enough to\u00a0know if what she said in French is accurately translated. I also accept that a French language version of her statement was not prepared by\u00a0the police, so mother had no way of checking whether what she had said was accurately recorded in her statement. In my judgement, the language used in the police documentation does not assist me in determining whether mother had, before Joe\u2019s birth, intended\u00a0to relocate to England on a permanent basis. 37. When considering all the evidence I have heard and read, and when looking at the messages that passed between the parties, I find that the mother had, at the end of February 2024, excluded living in England as a long term option for her, and for Joe, due to what she perceived to be the father\u2019s lack of support. I also find that although mother had remained of the view that father being present at the birth would be a good thing for Joe\u2019s relationship with father, the disagreement that then occurred about what Joe\u2019s registered name should be caused the mother to change her mind, and she tried to leave England and return to Paris. In his oral evidence the father would\u00a0not accept that the mother had been to\u00a0the airport, or tried to purchase a flight. He clearly believed it at\u00a0the\u00a0time he accused the mother of taking his baby away from him, just two days before the birth. In my judgement father was not being honest with the Court when he said he did not believe mother was attempting to leave, because he knew, at least by this time prior to\u00a0the birth, the mother had no intention to remain in England permanently. 38. The Birth and Intentions Post Birth. As mother said in her messaging to father, she\u00a0was unable to board a flight to Paris from Manchester Airport. She was, in cross-examination, asked why she did\u00a0not attempt\u00a0to return to France by ferry or by Eurostar. She said her pregnancy was too advanced for her to be able\u00a0to carry any of her luggage. It is accepted by both parties that mother returned to father\u2019s home and Joe was born on 25 May. It\u00a0was father\u2019s evidence that the parties got on well following the birth, and that mother gave no indication that she intended\u00a0to return to Paris. Mother said in her evidence that she took no action at any time to obtain a UK visa or to even seek advice about obtaining a visa. Mother sent one message to father about visa applications in the very early stages of the pregnancy but there\u00a0is no evidence before me that any applications were made. 39. Mother\u2019s evidence was that she has a job to return to in Paris, has a home in Paris and since discounting the option of relocating to England, has had no intention to remain here. Father suggests that mother has\u00a0been sofa surfing and has no fixed address in Paris, as the address she has provided to the court is owned by someone other than the mother. Mother says the property is in\u00a0the name of a friend of hers and he now lives in\u00a0the South of France. She said that her friend left the flat for her to use and she has produced the utility bill that is in\u00a0the joint names of her and her friend. Mother has also produced the letter from the caretaker of the building, confirming that she lives at that address. Mother has also produced a letter from her employer, setting out how she is not expected to return to\u00a0the office to work until after the Paris Olympics have concluded. 40. When addressing what evidence there\u00a0is that mother had, following the birth, formed the intention to remain permanently in England, father relies on a conversation that took place in which it\u00a0was agreed that during December 2024 the father would provide care for Joe. Mother\u2019s evidence was that\u00a0she is very busy at work during December, and it would assist her if father was able\u00a0to care for Joe during this period. She accepts that she had a discussion about this with father. She said that father asked her if he could have the baby during December, and she agreed. She denied that this agreement was reached on\u00a0the basis that she would be living in England. When father\u2019s sister gave evidence, she said there were discussions about December 2024, and about her helping father with childcare. The sister accepted that mother had no direct conversations with her about\u00a0the mother\u2019s intentions, be they to remain permanently or to return to France, but the aunt did tell me that her other brother, not the father, had told her that there had\u00a0been conversation about mother being able to obtain employment in England, but it is not clear from her evidence when it\u00a0was that she said these conversations took\u00a0place. I found the father\u2019s sister to be\u00a0a witness who was trying her best to assist the court but her evidence did not assist me to understand if mother\u2019s intentions to return to France had changed in the period when she remained in\u00a0father\u2019s home after the birth. 41. On\u00a0 16 June 2024 mother took a flight to Paris, leaving Joe in the care of father. Mother said she had to return to Paris to collect her work laptop, as her employer had asked her to undertake some remote work and to cover other colleagues who were on summer leave. Mother flew on the 16 June, and returned on\u00a0the 17 June. I asked mother why, if she intended to return to France with Joe, she did\u00a0not take him with her on\u00a0 16 June and have her belongings sent later. Mother\u2019s response was immediate and in my judgement reliable. She said that she does not yet have any travel documents for Joe so she cannot yet leave the country with him. Joe\u2019s birth was registered on 18 June 2024 and to apply for\u00a0a French travel document mother had to provide a French translation of the birth certificate that was, she said, sent to\u00a0the French embassy on 15 July. Mother told me that the embassy have assured her they will provide her with a document enabling her to travel to France with Joe when she attends the embassy, should this court lift the restrictions imposed by\u00a0the prohibited steps order. 42. It is submitted on behalf of father that mother is a person who has\u00a0been shown to be dishonest, as when examining her telephone the police formed the view that there\u00a0was nothing supporting her allegation that father had controlled her access to appointments. I have not heard any evidence about\u00a0the allegations of domestic abuse, those\u00a0allegations can be determined by the court that\u00a0is to\u00a0make\u00a0the final welfare decisions for Joe, should the parents be\u00a0unable to\u00a0agree what those arrangements should be in whatever country Joe will reside. 43. I have already described father\u2019s failure in February to inform mother of the hospital she needed to\u00a0attend for her tests, despite her repeated requests, so in my judgement there\u00a0is some support in\u00a0the digital evidence of mother\u2019s allegations. I\u00a0am not in any way bound by the views reached by\u00a0the police concerning the mother\u2019s reliability. When asked directly, father is unable to identify any evidence that supports his assertion that mother intended to remain in England so they could co-parent. He says the intention was that mother would live in England, would find her own accommodation, and travel to France for half of each week to work, leaving Joe in father\u2019s care. Despite the extensive messaging passing between these parents, there\u00a0is no message, email or letter that supports such an arrangement having been agreed. 44. Mother says that when she came back from Paris on 17 June father\u2019s behaviour towards her deteriorated. In his oral evidence father said the conversations after the discussions after the birth were around child care when\u00a0the mother went\u00a0to work, but he went on to say that towards the end of this time he thought\u00a0it was not healthy for them to be around the baby together as \u201cIt got shouty\u201d when she came back from Paris with her laptop. 45. Mother left father\u2019s home on 28 June and moved into an Airbnb property. Prior to her leaving, mother says there\u00a0was never any discussion with father about\u00a0the time he would spend with Joe after mother moved back to France. It is submitted on behalf of father that the absence of such discussions is evidence supportive of mother having an intention to remain permanently. I agree it is unusual that these conversations did\u00a0not take place, but given\u00a0the disputes that had occurred and the father\u2019s own evidence that things had become \u2018shouty\u2019, I do not agree that the absence of an agreement about father\u2019s time with Joe in the longer term is evidence supportive of mother having an intention to remain in this jurisdiction. Discussion and findings on\u00a0the dispute concerning the mother\u2019s intentions. 46. Whether this court has jurisdiction to\u00a0make welfare decisions for Joe, or whether that jurisdiction sits with\u00a0the courts of France, does not rest solely on\u00a0the intentions of the parties, but as father relies on mother intending to remain in England and co-parent with him, it is necessary to make a finding on this\u00a0issue. I found both parties were understandably eager to persuade the court that their account of the history was\u00a0the correct one, but I found father\u2019s refusal to accept the content of various WhatsApp messages, as conveying the truly held views of mother, concerning. In my judgement, if mother was considering in the early stages of her pregnancy all the possible options, including one\u00a0of relocating to England, I accept that she had discounted that possibility by\u00a0the end of February. Her evidence in court is supported by the content of the messaging. I also accept her evidence that had she been able\u00a0to take\u00a0a flight on 22 May 2024, she would have given birth to Joe in France. 47. Having reached the view that\u00a0she wanted\u00a0to return with Joe to France, in the period after the birth there\u00a0is no evidence before me from which I can conclude that mother then changed her view and intended\u00a0to remain. I accept that father wanted his son to remain close to him, but I do not accept father\u2019s evidence that it\u00a0was an agreement that mother would commute to Paris from the city where father lives. I accept the submissions made on behalf of mother that such an arrangement would be unworkable, given\u00a0the costs and the travel time involved. I also accept the submission that father\u2019s own working pattern would make a shared care arrangement very difficult. Father\u2019s work has required him to travel for extended periods. He worked in Australia, for\u00a0example, earlier this year. Father says his DJ work is now far less frequent, and he is able\u00a0to undertake his music production from home, so\u00a0I accept mother\u2019s evidence that she was happy for father to have Joe during December 2024, as father was due to be travelling in Australia for several months in January 2025. Him having Joe in December assisted mother and allowed father to have time with Joe before he was away. 48. I have come to\u00a0the conclusion that there\u00a0was no settled intention by mother to relocate to England prior to or following Joe\u2019s birth. Does this court have jurisdiction under the Hague Convention 1996? 49. France and the United\u00a0Kingdom have ratified the 1996 Hague Convention and, under Article 5, primary jurisdiction is accorded to\u00a0the state in which\u00a0the child is habitually resident. As described in London Borough of Hackney v P (Jurisdiction, Hague Child Protection Convention [2023] EWCA Civ 1213, the court must consider jurisdiction on\u00a0the date when proceedings were commenced, and be satisfied that it retains jurisdiction at\u00a0the\u00a0time of the final hearing. Whether a child is habitually resident in England and Wales is a question of fact, and that factual assessment is one that focuses on\u00a0the situation of the child. I have been referred to a number\u00a0of authorities concerning how the court should approach this assessment of habitual residence, including A v A (Children, Habitual Residence) [2014] AC 1, Re B (A Minor, Habitual Residence) [2016] EWHC 2174, and Re B (A Child, Abduction, Habitual Residence) [2020] EWCA Civ 1187. 50. From the authorities, Mrs Devall draws the following list of considerations in her opening skeleton argument: (a) The concept of habitual residence corresponds to the place which reflects some degree of integration by\u00a0the child in a social and family environment. To that end, in particular the duration, regularity, conditions, and reasons for\u00a0the stay on the territory of Member\u00a0State, and the family\u2019s move to that state, the child\u2019s nationality, the place and conditions and attendance at school, linguistic knowledge, and the family and social relationships for\u00a0the child in that state must be taken into consideration. (b) In addition to the physical presence of a child in a Member State, other factors must\u00a0be present, which are capable of showing that the presence is not in any way temporary or intermittent. (c) The test is essentially a factual one, which should\u00a0not be overlain with legal sub rules or glosses. The factual inquiry must be centred throughout on\u00a0the circumstances of the child\u2019s life, as that most likely to illuminate his habitual residence. (d) The criterion does not require the child\u2019s full integration in the environment of the new state but only a degree of it. (e) In certain circumstances, the requisite degree of integration can occur quickly. (f) The younger the child, the more their social and family environment will be shared with those on whom the child is dependent, giving increased significance to the degree of integration of that person or persons. However, this\u00a0is not\u00a0to eclipse the fact that\u00a0the investigation is child focused, it is\u00a0the child\u2019s habitual residence which is in question and it follows the child\u2019s integration which is under consideration. (g) The focus is on\u00a0the child\u2019s situation with\u00a0the purposes and intentions of the parties being merely among the relevant factors. (h) There\u00a0is no requirement that the child should have\u00a0been resident in the country in question for a particular period of time, nor is there any requirement there should be an intention on\u00a0the part of one or both parents to reside there permanently or indefinitely. (i) It is\u00a0the stability of the child\u2019s residence as opposed to its permanence which is relevant but this\u00a0is qualitative and not quantitative, in the sense that it is\u00a0the integration of\u00a0the child into the environment rather than a mere measure of time a child spends there. (j) It would be highly unlikely for a child to have no habitual residence. If interpretation of the concept of habitual residence can reasonably yield both the conclusion that the child has a habitual residence and alternatively a conclusion that he lacks habitual residence, the court should adopt the former. (k) It is possible for\u00a0a parent unilaterally to cause a child to change habitual residence by removing the child to another jurisdiction without the consent of the other parent. 51. In addition to\u00a0the authorities referred to above it is necessary for\u00a0the court to consider the decision of the CJEU in UD v XB Case C393\/18PPU, reported at [2019] 1 FLR 289. In its judgment, the CJEU decided that physical presence in a country was essential to establish habitual residence. At paragraph 53, the court stated \u201cIt follows from\u00a0the considerations set out above that physical presence in a Member State in which\u00a0the child is allegedly integrated is the condition which necessarily must be satisfied before assessing the stability of that presence and\u00a0that habitual residence\u201d. At paragraph 62 the court held, \u201cin the absence of the child\u2019s physical presence in the Member\u00a0State concerned, it is not possible, when\u00a0interpreting the concept of habitual residence, to give greater weight to circumstances such as the intention of the parent who, in practice, has custody of the child, or the possible habitual residence of one or other parent in that Member\u00a0State at the expense of objective geographical considerations without disregarding the EU legislature\u2019s intention\u201d. 52. I invited the advocates to\u00a0make submissions addressing the decision of the CJEU, as mother submits that as she had no intention to remain in England, she says she remains habitually resident in France, and as a very young child entirely dependent on her, Joe\u2019s habitual residence will largely be determined by her own. It is submitted that Joe\u2019s presence in England was temporary. 53. Mr Marnham submitted in his document, filed at the commencement of this hearing, that: (a) Given Joe\u2019s very young age and dependence on the mother as his primary care giver, the court will need to carefully scrutinise mother\u2019s habitual residence. (b) Mother is a French citizen, and resides permanently in France. She has no connection to England, save that father is English. Saliently, he submits, her address is recorded as her Paris address on Joe\u2019s birth certificate. (c) Mum\u2019s entire family and friends support system is in France. (d) Mother did\u00a0not intend to settle in England, either in\u00a0the period before or after Joe\u2019s birth, although she accepts that she had limited discussions with father about her potential options after Joe was born, there was never an agreement that she would stay permanently in this country. (e) Plainly, it is submitted, that mother never took any steps to move to England permanently. She did not pack up her flat or move over any of her personal possessions. She did not take any steps to register for a visa or seek welfare payments in this country. She did not search for or obtain any rental properties. (f) As the relationship became more and more strained with father, it\u00a0is submitted that mother\u2019s plan was only to stay here for\u00a0the birth and the immediate period after, so that father could be present at birth and support her in\u00a0the weeks afterwards. (g) After 22 May 2024, mother no longer intended even to give birth in England due to father\u2019s behaviour. She fled his property, and attempted to board a flight back to Paris, also contacting her French midwife and friends, informing them of\u00a0the change of plan. (h) Mother\u2019s life is rooted in France. She retains her flat and her car in Paris, her car keys, flat keys and work laptop were held by father for\u00a0a period of time, with other items, only returned on police intervention. She is expected back at work in Paris on 12 August 2024. Mother continues to meet a number\u00a0of bills and outgoings on her flat. (i) The father appears to accept that mother\u2019s stay was temporary as she was only temporarily staying with him. It is said he now understood that he seeks to retain the bulk of the \u00a35,000 lent to him by way of rental costs for mother staying in his house. (j) Father\u2019s unrealistic proposal for him and his family, when he is travelling, to look after Joe at such young age on a shared care arrangement, alternating twice a week, is further evidence that his proposal is clearly not in Joe\u2019s best interests and would\u00a0not have been agreed by mother. Father travels a lot for work and is able\u00a0to travel to Paris to spend time with Joe. (k) Following the birth, Joe\u2019s stay in England has\u00a0been very unstable. Mother\u2019s account of her stay post birth at father\u2019s is very concerning. She alleges that father was controlling, verbally abusive and would lock himself in his room with Joe. Even if the court takes these accounts at their lowest, they led to mum reporting father to the police, and feeling forced to leave his property for\u00a0the second time. It was submitted that the home situation has\u00a0been very uncertain, with mother having to move between hotels and short term rental apartments in different cities. Father\u2019s actions have, it was said, effectively left mother and Joe stranded and isolated in England, and at a very vulnerable time in both of their lives with no support and away from mother\u2019s home and family and friends. 54. In his closing submissions, Mr Marnham argues that this court is no longer bound by the decision of\u00a0the CJEU, since the UK left the European Union, and the transition period ended on\u00a0the 31\u00a0December 2020. Neither Mr Marnham nor Mrs Devall were able\u00a0to identify any domestic case law that had considered UD v XB either prior to or after the transition period had ended. It is submitted that this court is not bound by\u00a0the decision of\u00a0the CJEU and Mr Marnham points out that, in\u00a0that case, the UK government argued against habitual residence being dependent on a physical presence. He also identifies the judgment of the Court\u00a0of Appeal in London Borough of Hackney v P (Jurisdiction, 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention) [2023] EWCA Civ 1213, as an example of case law developing in this area and the court having to depart from EU regulations, given that the 1996 Hague Convention has now replaced Brussels 2A, although\u00a0the issue in that appeal concerned the dates when\u00a0the court had\u00a0to be satisfied that it had jurisdiction due to the child\u2019s habitual residence. 55. On behalf of father, Mrs Devall submits that Articles 86 and 89 of the Withdrawal Act, as implemented by section 7A of the Withdrawal Act 2018, renders the CJEU\u2019s pre exit judgments binding on UK courts. Mrs Devall submits that section\u00a06.3 provides that EU law and case precedent \u201cso far as unmodified\u201d and \u201cso far as they are relevant\u201d is binding on\u00a0the UK courts, in that they are expected to determine cases concerning retained EU law \u201cin accordance with\u201d pre-exit case law, and \u201cretained general principles of EU law\u201d, as they existed pre exit. Mrs Devall then submits, even if the court is of the view that the CJEU decision set out above is not binding, it is argued that in\u00a0situations of dispute, as a matter\u00a0of common sense and in accordance with\u00a0the principles enshrined in the UK case law \u201cderived from the many international cases considered by\u00a0the higher courts\u201d, in respect of habitual residence the physical presence of a child in a country must be the starting point for determining habitual residence, and in this case Joe has known no other country. 56. In the CJEU case referred to, it is clear that a child who had lived in one country did not obtain habitual residence in another country as a result of mutual intention that he or she was to return to\u00a0the other country with at least one\u00a0of the parents, even if that intention was a mutual one. In this instance, Mrs Devall submits the intention that the mother would return to Paris with Joe was most definitely not mutual, and it was absolutely not understood by father that mother would be returning to France with\u00a0the child. 57. I have considered the\u00a0decision of the Court\u00a0of\u00a0Appeal in Re A (A Child Habitual Residence 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention) [2023] EWCA Civ 659, in which\u00a0the court considered the meaning of habitual residence under the 1996 Hague Convention, in addition to making a determination of when habitual residence needed to be established for\u00a0the court to have jurisdiction. The advocates are correct when they submit that physical presence has not been considered in a reported authority of English courts under the terms of the 1996 convention since Brexit. However, the authorities addressing habitual residence under EU law are relied upon in cases concerning habitual residence under the 1996 Convention. 58. During the course of submissions, the opinion of Baroness Hale in Re A (Children) [2013] UKSC60 was considered, and specifically paragraph 55, in which Baroness Hale was of the view that physical presence at some point in the child\u2019s life was likely to be required to acquire habitual residence but, at paragraphs 56, 57 and 58, she explained why she concluded that a referral to the CJEU would be required to determine the issue. 59. In my judgment, Mrs Devall\u2019s submission that physical presence of a child in a country must be the starting point is persuasive. The test is habitual residence, and as set out in UD v XB, the court\u2019s task is to assess the stability of that residence to determine if it has become habitual. Joe has had no residence in France, let alone any period of stable residence there. He has no integration with any family, friends or services in France. The\u00a0only residence he has known is in England. I have found that mother had no intention to remain in England, but father is named on Joe\u2019s birth certificate, and I can discern no reason why mother\u2019s intentions concerning her own place of residence should\u00a0be seen to trump the intentions of father. I find, as father said this in a number\u00a0of messages, that he intended that he would be the best father he could be, after the DNA test proved him to be Joe\u2019s biological father. 60. Whilst the mother\u2019s ties to this country have\u00a0been only in place for a short period between 29 April and now, father\u2019s ties to this country have been life long. Joe has been in the primary care of mother, and Joe has only seen father on two occasions since mother left father\u2019s home on 28 June 2024. However, in my judgement, relying on mother\u2019s intention to prescribe habitual residence to Joe in a country he has never visited does, in my judgement, ignore the simple meaning of the words that\u00a0are used in the treaty. 61. In my judgement, a physical presence in a country is required before a child can be found to be habitually resident there. I have considered whether this is a case in which Joe has no habitual residence, but as he has\u00a0been in England now for some ten weeks, in my judgement he has habitual residence here. It is\u00a0the most stable and indeed the only residence that he has. It is to this jurisdiction, by reason of his presence, his integration here and use of services in this country, and also by reason of the relationship he\u00a0had and has with his father that he has the greatest connection. 62. I therefore find that I have jurisdiction to\u00a0make welfare decisions for this child. Should the without notice prohibited steps order be extended? 63. The application before me is father\u2019s application for\u00a0a prohibited steps order. In deciding whether that order should be extended, I must take Joe\u2019s welfare as my paramount consideration, and I must assess his welfare through the prism of the welfare checklist. The welfare checklist requires me to consider Joe\u2019s ascertainable wishes and feelings in light of his age and understanding. Clearly, at ten weeks of age, Joe is unable to express any wishes or feelings. He is dependent on his care givers to meet all\u00a0of his needs. I recognise the principle relied upon by Mrs\u00a0Devall, that there\u00a0is an assumption that Joe\u2019s welfare will\u00a0be enhanced by having involvement with both of his parents. 64. I have\u00a0to consider Joe\u2019s physical, emotional and educational needs. I have no evidence before me to suggest that Joe\u2019s needs cannot be met by his mother, she is clearly meeting them at the current time. The mother makes allegations of coercive or controlling behaviour about\u00a0the father. She did allow two periods of supervised contact, and I am told and I accept, that her solicitors wrote to the father offering further contact to take place at a contact centre, but those offers were not responded to by him. 65. I have no evidence before me that father was not meeting Joe\u2019s physical or emotional needs prior to\u00a0the mother leaving the home on\u00a0the 28 June. Clearly, mother was content that father was able\u00a0to meet Joe\u2019s needs, as she left Joe in his sole care on 16 and 17 June, when she travelled to France. 66. What is the likely effect on him of any change in circumstances? Joe has\u00a0been in the sole care of his mother since 28 June. For a baby of ten weeks of age, that five week period is significant. He will\u00a0be well bonded with his mother, and fully reliant upon her. For him to be removed from her care would, in my judgement, be harmful for him. Of\u00a0course he is entitled to a relationship with his father, if that relationship can be a safe one, but the current circumstances are that he has had no relationship with his father, save for the two short periods of contact following two court hearings. 67. His age, sex, background and any characteristics of which\u00a0the court considers relevant. Joe is very young, he is dependent on his care givers to meet all\u00a0of his needs, and he has, at this time, his primary bond with his mother. 68. Any harm which he has suffered or it is at risk of suffering. As Joe\u2019s primary bond is with his mother, in my judgement he will suffer harm if that bond is broken. Similarly, if Joe is not given\u00a0the opportunity to develop a relationship with his father, he will also suffer harm. In his application to\u00a0the court, the father asserted that if the mother was permitted to leave the jurisdiction with Joe, that he would never see Joe again. No evidence has been adduced before me that such a threat has\u00a0been made. There\u00a0is mention in\u00a0the police document of the mother expressing a concern about future contact but I do not take what was said at\u00a0that\u00a0time by\u00a0the mother as being a real expression of her intention. When she gave her evidence, she explained how distressed she\u00a0was at\u00a0the\u00a0time that she spoke to\u00a0the police, and I accept that she said or used words that now, with\u00a0the passage of time, should\u00a0not be seen to be reliable, or a statement of her intention for her son\u2019s relationship with the father. 69. How capable are each of his parents, and any other person in relation to\u00a0whom the court considers the question to be relevant, is of meeting his needs. As I have said, the mother is capable of meeting Joe\u2019s needs. On 16 and 17 June the father was capable of meeting Joe\u2019s needs. Allegations of domestic abuse have been made, and they need to be determined, but the mother is agreeable to supervised contact at this time, so it is not her case that the father\u2019s conduct towards her is an impediment to him developing a relationship with his child. 70. The range of powers available to\u00a0the court under this act in the proceedings in question. What would be the effect of extending the prohibited steps order? The mother is quite understandably wishing to return to France. I accept the list of factors set out by Mr\u00a0Marnham, that I have read into this judgment. The mother\u2019s connection is, save for her involvement with\u00a0the father, entirely with France. If she\u00a0was to remain here her employment would be in peril, and that would be harmful for Joe. Joe is a child of two parents, who reside in different jurisdictions. Therefore, the need to travel by one parent or the other, in my judgement, has always been a factor that these parents needed\u00a0to consider. I have already rejected father\u2019s evidence that there had been an agreement that the mother would live in England, and commute to Paris for half of each week. I accepted the submission that that was unworkable, and I accepted the mother\u2019s evidence that no such agreement was made. Therefore, Joe would always be living in one jurisdiction, with a parent living in another, unless that parent chose to relocate. 71. If the court requires the mother to remain here she has no form of accommodation, save for\u00a0the Airbnb accommodation she has\u00a0been paying for as a temporary measure. She is expected back in Paris on 12\u00a0August, in just six days\u2019 time, to continue her employment following the end of her maternity leave. All her support network is in France. As I said, Joe is primarily bonded to his mother. Any harm that befalls the mother in my judgement also falls on Joe. The court has to\u00a0make a difficult decision but that decision has\u00a0to be made now, it cannot wait until further down the line to a different hearing. 72. I have carefully considered all the submissions made on behalf of the father against this court making a welfare decision now, but I see no alternative. The nettle has\u00a0to be grasped, because these are two parents from different countries. I have found that I have jurisdiction to\u00a0make welfare decisions for Joe, and in my judgement, when considering all\u00a0of the factors in\u00a0the welfare checklist, the balance falls in favour of the prohibited steps order being discharged. 73. The father is a man who\u00a0is used to travelling, in the same way that he said the mother should travel between England and Paris, leaving Joe here and going to Paris to work. In my judgement, the same arrangement can apply to\u00a0the father. The father told me he is able\u00a0to work anywhere for his music production business. He does not have\u00a0to travel for that; it is something that he can do at home. The welfare considerations really come down to whether, or not, it is in Joe\u2019s interests to have his mother deprived of her home and her employment and all the stability that brings for her and to Joe. In my judgement, keeping the mother in this jurisdiction where she feels she has\u00a0been kept captive by\u00a0the making of the prohibited steps order is not in Joe\u2019s interests. The father is able\u00a0to seek assistance with establishing a relationship with Joe in the courts in France. I recognise that is not ideal, but in my judgement the mother has to return to France, and Joe should go with her, given his primary bond with his mother. I discharge the prohibited steps order that was made by District Judge Prest KC, which will enable\u00a0the mother to obtain a travel document and return to Paris with Joe. 74. I recognise that my decision will come as a blow to\u00a0the father. Despite his initial scepticism that he\u00a0was Joe\u2019s biological father, I accept that he is delighted to be\u00a0a father and wants to be part of Joe\u2019s life. In my judgement, the father will need\u00a0to pursue an application, if contact cannot be agreed, in France as when Joe leaves this jurisdiction, and has a physical presence in France, in my judgement his habitual residence will change to France, because his mother\u2019s connections are all there, and the physical presence criteria, if it is such, will then be met. 75. Consequently, I have also considered and I determine that the provisions of Article 8 of the 1996 Hague Convention are met, namely that Joe has a substantial connection with France and the courts of France are best placed to assess his best interests, and invite the relevant French court to accept a transfer of jurisdiction pursuant to Article 8. 76. That\u00a0is my judgment. &#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8211;<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<hr class=\"kji-sep\" \/>\n<p class=\"kji-source-links\"><strong>Sources officielles :<\/strong> <a class=\"kji-source-link\" href=\"https:\/\/caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk\/ewfc\/2024\/423\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">consulter la page source<\/a><\/p>\n<p class=\"kji-license-note\"><em>Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).<\/em><\/p>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>RECORDER HOWE KC: The Parties and the Applications. 1. I am concerned with applications relating to a small baby, who is now ten weeks old. As this judgment may be published on the internet, it is necessary to protect the child\u2019s identity, so I will call him Joe. I will refer to his mother as the mother, and his father&#8230;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":0,"template":"","meta":{"_crdt_document":""},"kji_country":[7608],"kji_court":[8241],"kji_chamber":[],"kji_year":[8677],"kji_subject":[7638],"kji_keyword":[8265,9699,7622,8048,8047],"kji_language":[7611],"class_list":["post-596382","kji_decision","type-kji_decision","status-publish","hentry","kji_country-royaume-uni","kji_court-family-court","kji_year-8677","kji_subject-famille","kji_keyword-child","kji_keyword-england","kji_keyword-evidence","kji_keyword-father","kji_keyword-mother","kji_language-anglais"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO Premium plugin v27.5 (Yoast SEO v27.5) - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-premium-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>The Father v The Mother - Ma\u00eetre Hassan Kohen, avocat en droit p\u00e9nal \u00e0 Paris<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/jurisprudences\/the-father-v-the-mother\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"zh_CN\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"The Father v The Mother\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"RECORDER HOWE KC: The Parties and the Applications. 1. I am concerned with applications relating to a small baby, who is now ten weeks old. As this judgment may be published on the internet, it is necessary to protect the child\u2019s identity, so I will call him Joe. 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