{"id":651895,"date":"2026-04-22T21:58:17","date_gmt":"2026-04-22T19:58:17","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/jurisprudences\/r-v-bhv\/"},"modified":"2026-04-22T21:58:17","modified_gmt":"2026-04-22T19:58:17","slug":"r-v-bhv","status":"publish","type":"kji_decision","link":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/jurisprudences\/r-v-bhv\/","title":{"rendered":"R v BHV"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"kji-decision\">\n<div class=\"kji-full-text\">\n<p>LORD JUSTICE EDIS: 1 Reporting restrictions apply to\u00a0the judgment we are about to\u00a0give. Reporting restrictions prohibit the publication of\u00a0the applicable information to\u00a0the public or any section of the public in writing, in a\u00a0broadcast or by means of\u00a0the internet including social media. Anyone who becomes aware of\u00a0the contents of\u00a0this judgment is responsible in law for making sure that applicable restrictions are not breached. A\u00a0person who breaches a\u00a0reporting restriction is liable to\u00a0a\u00a0fine and\/or imprisonment. The provisions of\u00a0section\u00a071 of\u00a0the Criminal Justice Act 2003 apply to\u00a0these proceedings. By\u00a0virtue of\u00a0those provisions no publication may include a\u00a0report of\u00a0these proceedings save for the specified basic facts until the conclusion of\u00a0the trial. In addition, there is in force a\u00a0crown court order under the Contempt of\u00a0Court Act 1981 restraining reporting of\u00a0these proceedings until the conclusion of\u00a0the trial. Finally, there is an\u00a0order under section\u00a045 of\u00a0the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 which protects the identities of\u00a0young people involved in these proceedings including BHV, who will reach his 18th birthday in\u00a0February of\u00a0next year. When the judgment is published after the conclusion of the trial, he should be anonymised unless the Crown Court has made a different order. NOTE: BHV was acquitted at his trial on 9 January 2023 and the only restriction which applies from that date is that under section\u00a045 of\u00a0the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999. 2 This is an\u00a0appeal by\u00a0the prosecution against a\u00a0terminating ruling made in the crown court. The appeal lies with leave under section\u00a058 of\u00a0the Criminal Justice Act 2003. It\u00a0is accepted that all procedural formalities have been complied with so that the appeal is properly before us for decision. We give leave. 3 The respondent, BHV, is currently standing trial at Newcastle Crown Court with two other young men who are co-accused with him. Mohammed Rabani is aged 19 and Robbie Batista\u00a0is 18. They are together indicted on Count\u00a01 on the indictment which alleges murder. The allegation is that they acting together murdered Nathaniel David Wardle on 20\u00a0June\u00a02022. Each of\u00a0them also faces an\u00a0allegation of\u00a0possession of\u00a0an\u00a0offensive weapon, contrary to\u00a0section\u00a01(1) of\u00a0the Prevention of\u00a0Crime Act 1953. In the case of\u00a0BHV that allegation finds itself in Count 4 on the indictment. It\u00a0is alleged that on 20\u00a0June\u00a02022 without lawful authority or reasonable excuse he\u00a0had with him in a\u00a0public place, namely Saint Hilda&#039;s Avenue, Wallsend, an\u00a0offensive weapon namely an\u00a0axe. This count arises out of\u00a0the same incident as\u00a0Count\u00a01 and the allegation is that BHV took an\u00a0axe with him to\u00a0the location where Nathaniel Wardle was fatally stabbed by\u00a0the co-defendants. He\u00a0has pleaded not guilty to\u00a0both the counts he\u00a0faces. Counts\u00a02 and 3 relate to\u00a0the two co-defendants taking knives to\u00a0the scene of the fatal stabbing. They have pleaded guilty to\u00a0those offences but not guilty to\u00a0murder. 4 The trial began on 15\u00a0November\u00a02022 before Mr\u00a0Justice\u00a0Andrew Baker. Shortly before the close of\u00a0the prosecution case, when all relevant evidence which required consideration for the purposes of\u00a0these submissions had been adduced, counsel for BHV submitted that there was no case to\u00a0answer on both of\u00a0the charges that he\u00a0faced. This included a\u00a0submission that there was also no evidence fit to\u00a0go\u00a0to\u00a0the jury in respect of\u00a0the alternative verdict of\u00a0manslaughter which technically would be open on Count\u00a01. 5 On Tuesday, 22\u00a0November\u00a02022 in a\u00a0careful written ruling, the trial judge decided that there was no case for BHV to\u00a0answer on the allegation of\u00a0murder. He\u00a0rejected the submission that there was no case to\u00a0answer on Count\u00a04. He\u00a0also ruled that contrary to\u00a0the submissions made on behalf of\u00a0BHV, it\u00a0was properly open to\u00a0the jury on the evidence then adduced to\u00a0return a\u00a0verdict of\u00a0guilty in respect of\u00a0manslaughter on Count\u00a01. The only issue before us on this prosecution appeal against a\u00a0terminating ruling relates to\u00a0the judge&#039;s determination that there was no case to\u00a0answer in respect of\u00a0murder. 6 The trial is currently paused and the jury is waiting to\u00a0return to\u00a0resume and conclude the case. This decision is therefore required now and it\u00a0is necessary for the court to\u00a0give its ruling and its reasons quickly. The judge will need to know the basis on which this court has reached its conclusion in order to\u00a0be\u00a0able to\u00a0sum the case up in accordance with our decision. 7 Our decision does not, in our judgment, establish any new law. It depends upon the decision of the Supreme Court in R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8. The facts 8 The prosecution alleges that in the afternoon of\u00a020\u00a0June\u00a02022 at about 20 past two in the afternoon Nathaniel Wardle was stabbed in the front garden of\u00a0his home address by\u00a0Mohammed Rabani and by\u00a0Robbie Batista. Each of\u00a0them had, as\u00a0they have admitted, taken a\u00a0knife to\u00a0that location. It\u00a0was the wound inflicted by\u00a0Mohammed Rabani which proved fatal. It penetrated Mr\u00a0Wardle&#039;s heart, causing his very rapid collapse and death. It appears that the wound inflicted by\u00a0Robbie Batista\u00a0was inflicted after that blow. The prosecution is able to\u00a0formulate this account of\u00a0what happened in the garden with such specific clarity because the incident was captured by\u00a0CCTV cameras and there is highly relevant video and audio footage of\u00a0it. This was played carefully to\u00a0the jury and we have each had the opportunity to\u00a0review all the CCTV footage in the same form as\u00a0that which was placed before the jury. It\u00a0is, therefore, possible to\u00a0give an\u00a0account of\u00a0the context in which that fatal stabbing occurred. There is CCTV footage showing the approach of\u00a0the three defendants to\u00a0the Wardle household. They made a specific journey together to\u00a0that place by bus and then walked for an\u00a0appreciable period of\u00a0time together towards their destination. When they arrived at it, all three of\u00a0them entered the garden. BHV spent some of\u00a0the time during what followed on the pavement but he\u00a0did himself enter the garden with the other two for a\u00a0period of\u00a0time. While they were in the garden, they challenged the occupants of\u00a0the house. There was clear evidence that their purpose was to\u00a0attack one of the sons of\u00a0Mr\u00a0Wardle, who was in the house. His name was Leon. It\u00a0is relevant to\u00a0observe that he is one of\u00a0four brothers. Mr\u00a0Wardle himself was not in the house at the time of\u00a0this confrontation, as\u00a0we shall explain. It went on for a significant period of\u00a0time. There is some audio recording of\u00a0things which were said and there is some witness evidence about what happened, to\u00a0which we shall shortly turn. 9 While all this was going on and at a\u00a0time when BHV was standing on the pavement outside the garden, Mr\u00a0Wardle was on his way home with a\u00a0small child. He can be seen approaching. From his behaviour it may be inferred that he\u00a0became aware of\u00a0what was happening at his front door, namely that at that point two young men armed with knives were threatening an\u00a0attack on at least one of\u00a0the occupants. He\u00a0ran quickly into the garden, no doubt to\u00a0intervene to\u00a0protect his family. He\u00a0was very rapidly stabbed, in the way that we have described, and killed. As\u00a0he\u00a0approached, BHV was walking away from the garden, but before long, he\u00a0returned to\u00a0the gate and then joined in with the other two, as\u00a0the three of\u00a0them ran away. They were pursued by\u00a0at least two young men who had been in the house, who from the CCTV footage, appeared by\u00a0then to have armed themselves with bladed weapons. No further violence ensued that afternoon and the pursuers were seen to\u00a0return shortly afterwards to\u00a0the house. 10 The prosecution\u2019s case was that these three defendants had attended at that house, each of\u00a0them armed with a\u00a0bladed weapon in order to\u00a0attack Leon Wardle who was then aged 17. 11 In addition to\u00a0the CCTV and audio evidence, which is as\u00a0we have said extensive, there were two witnesses who gave evidence adding somewhat to\u00a0the overall picture. Catherine Wardle is Nathaniel Wardle&#039;s mother and Leon Wardle&#039;s grandmother. She was in the house at the time when the defendants arrived at it. The front door had been left open. She heard someone call out asking if anyone was in. It appears that Mohammed Rabani entered the property at that stage saying, &quot;Send Leon out for a\u00a0fair one on one fight.&quot; 12 Another witness, a\u00a0neighbour, gave evidence which was not challenged, saying that she had heard the three defendants speaking or shouting immediately before the stabbing and also heard things said as\u00a0they ran away. On their approach she overheard one of\u00a0the young men saying, &quot;I&#039;m in your street. Come out to your door.&quot; She then heard one of\u00a0them saying, &quot;Are you going to\u00a0record me doing it?&quot; She then heard the commotion in the garden and saw the three defendants running back away from the house, down the road past her. She then heard Rabani shouting, &quot;Fuck, I\u00a0have done it, I\u00a0have done it.&quot; 13 The prosecution relied on interviews in which BHV gave an\u00a0account of\u00a0what had happened. He\u00a0said that Rabani was to have a\u00a0one-on-one fight with Leon Wardle. He\u00a0said that until they produced their knives, he\u00a0had been unaware that Rabani and Batista\u00a0had been armed. He\u00a0did, however, accept that he\u00a0himself had had at\u00a0the material time an\u00a0axe. He\u00a0said that that had been given to\u00a0him by\u00a0Rabani for &quot;protection&quot;. It\u00a0was open to\u00a0the jury to\u00a0interpret this as\u00a0meaning that he\u00a0had the axe with him for use in any fracas which the defendants might cause by\u00a0their action in approaching the house and challenging Leon to\u00a0a\u00a0fight. If they did then this would be evidence that he\u00a0intended to\u00a0use a\u00a0lethal weapon if necessary, otherwise than in lawful self-defence. The judge&#039;s ruling 14 The judge rejected a\u00a0number of\u00a0defence submissions and ruled that there was a\u00a0case to\u00a0answer against BHV on manslaughter within Count\u00a01 and on Count\u00a04, possession of\u00a0an\u00a0offensive weapon. BHV has no right of\u00a0appeal against those decisions at this stage. 15 He\u00a0began his conclusions as follows: &quot;10. In my judgment the prosecution has led ample evidence from which the jury properly directed could sensibly find themselves sure that the defendants were engaged on 20\u00a0June\u00a02022 upon an\u00a0agreed plan to\u00a0threaten with knives and if possible to\u00a0inflict unlawful violence with them upon Leon, one of\u00a0Mr\u00a0Wardle&#039;s older sons. There are four Wardle boys in all. The prosecution case is that the target of\u00a0whatever the defendants were up to\u00a0that day is Leon, who is the second of\u00a0the four by\u00a0age. That he\u00a0was their target is indeed, I\u00a0think, the only conclusion that could sensibly be drawn from the evidence the prosecution have led.&quot; 16 In relation to Count\u00a04 the judge expressed his conclusions as follows: &quot;12. ,,,,,,,,,,It\u00a0was, therefore, an\u00a0offensive weapon on 20\u00a0June\u00a02022 only if in having it with him BHV intended it to\u00a0be\u00a0used for causing injury. The conclusion I\u00a0have just identified that the jury could properly reach would be a\u00a0conclusion that BHV had that intention. If that was his intention the jury could readily find that there was no lawful authority or reasonable excuse for having the axe with him even if that was for the prosecution to\u00a0prove.&quot; 17 The basis on which the judge held that there is a\u00a0case to\u00a0answer on manslaughter is as follows: &quot;13. Furthermore, directed as\u00a0to\u00a0the ingredients of\u00a0an\u00a0unlawful act manslaughter following Goodfellow (1986) 83\u00a0Cr App R 23, in my view, the jury could properly consider that Mr\u00a0Wardle&#039;s death was caused in the course of\u00a0carrying out an obviously dangerous and unlawful joint endeavour of\u00a0threatening Leon with blades and using them on him if the chance arose. That is sufficient for my rejection of\u00a0the argument that there is no case to\u00a0answer on manslaughter. As\u00a0the Supreme Court noted in Jogee [2016] UKSC 8 at [96] &#039;If a\u00a0person goes out with armed companions to\u00a0cause harm to\u00a0another any reasonable person would recognise that there is not only a\u00a0risk of\u00a0harm but a\u00a0risk of\u00a0violence escalating to\u00a0the point at which serious harm or death may result&#039;.&quot; 18 In expressing his conclusion rejecting the prosecution submissions in relation to Count 1, the judge addressed the prosecution case which was that although Leon Wardle was the target of\u00a0the joint enterprise, those involved in it also had a\u00a0conditional intent to inflict really serious harm on anyone who &quot;got in the way&quot;. The judge rejected that saying that to\u00a0impute any such conditional intention to\u00a0BHV on the evidence before the jury would involve an\u00a0exercise in speculation and that there was no evidence from which such an\u00a0intention could properly be inferred. Jogee [2016] UKSC 8 and Anwar [2016] EWCA Crim 551 19 In Jogee, as\u00a0the judge rightly recognised, the Supreme Court gave significant guidance to\u00a0courts dealing with cases such as\u00a0the present. At paragraph\u00a0[96] the Supreme Court identified the basis on which a\u00a0conviction for manslaughter may ensue where a\u00a0violent attack causes death where an\u00a0individual defendant does not have an\u00a0intention to\u00a0assist in causing death or really serious harm. In paragraph\u00a0[83] the Supreme Court identify the continuing relevance of\u00a0foresight of\u00a0what might happen in cases of\u00a0joint enterprise homicide. The court said this: &quot;83. Fourthly, in the common law foresight of what might happen is ordinarily no more than evidence from which a jury can infer the presence of a requisite intention. It may be strong evidence, but its adoption as a test for the mental element for murder in the case of a secondary party is a serious and anomalous departure from the basic rule, which results in over-extension of the law of murder and reduction of the law of manslaughter. Murder already has a relatively low mens rea threshold, because it includes an intention to cause serious injury, without intent to kill or to cause risk to life. The Chan Wing-Siu principle extends liability for murder to a secondary party on the basis of a still lesser degree of culpability, namely foresight only of the possibility that the principal may commit murder but without there being any need for intention to assist him to do so. It savours, as Professor Smith suggested, of constructive crime.&quot; 20 The court&#039;s analysis of\u00a0conditional intent is an\u00a0important part of\u00a0its reasoning and also an\u00a0important part of\u00a0the prosecution case in the case before us. This was set out in paragraphs\u00a0[92] to\u00a0[94]: &quot;92. In cases of secondary liability arising out of a prior joint criminal venture, it will also often be necessary to draw the jury\u2019s attention to the fact that the intention to assist, and indeed the intention that the crime should be committed, may be conditional. The bank robbers who attack the bank when one or more of them is armed no doubt hope that it will not be necessary to use the guns, but it may be a perfectly proper inference that all were intending that if they met resistance the weapons should be used with the intent to do grievous bodily harm at least. The group of young men which faces down a rival group may hope that the rivals will slink quietly away, but it may well be a perfectly proper inference that all were intending that if resistance were to be met, grievous bodily harm at least should be done. 93. Juries frequently have to decide questions of intent (including conditional intent) by a process of inference from the facts and circumstances proved. The same applies when the question is whether D2, who joined with others in a venture to commit crime A, shared a common purpose or common intent (the two are the same) which included, if things came to it, the commission of crime B, the offence or type of offence with which he is charged, and which was physically committed by D1. A time honoured way of inviting a jury to consider such a question is to ask the jury whether they are sure that D1\u2019s act was within the scope of the joint venture, that is, whether D2 expressly or tacitly agreed to a plan which included D1 going as far as he did, and committing crime B, if the occasion arose. 94. If the jury is satisfied that there was an agreed common purpose to commit crime A, and if it is satisfied also that D2 must have foreseen that, in the course of committing crime A, D1 might well commit crime B, it may in appropriate cases be justified in drawing the conclusion that D2 had the necessary conditional intent that crime B should be committed, if the occasion arose; or in other words that it was within the scope of the plan to which D2 gave his assent and intentional support. But that will be a question of fact for the jury in all the circumstances.&quot; 21 The decision of the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) in Anwar is, in our judgment, of\u00a0some significance to\u00a0the outcome of\u00a0this appeal. In it Sir\u00a0Brian Leveson, President of\u00a0the Queen&#039;s Bench Division giving the judgment of\u00a0the court, explained that the decision in Jogee is unlikely to\u00a0affect the outcome of\u00a0submissions of\u00a0no case to\u00a0answer in cases of\u00a0this kind. Of course, it has a\u00a0significant impact on the way in which juries will be directed in cases where a\u00a0case to\u00a0answer is found. 22 He\u00a0expressed the conclusions of\u00a0the court in paragraphs\u00a020 to\u00a022 of\u00a0that decision: &quot;20. Before analysing the facts of this case, the recent seminal decision of the Supreme Court requires some consideration. In his judgment, the learned judge refers to Jogee on no fewer than four occasions, but it is important to underline that it was common ground before us that the decision did not advance the argument about whether or not there was a case to answer in respect of any of these respondents. Suffice to say, for our part, we find it difficult to foresee circumstances in which there might have been a case to answer under the law before Jogee but, because of the way in which the law is now articulated, there no longer is. In addition to sufficient proof of encouragement or assistance, what is required is an intention, perhaps conditional, to encourage the commission of the relevant offence: see [90]. It is clear that any defendant must have knowledge of existing facts necessary for the principal&#039;s intended conduct to be criminal and knowledge, if such there be, that any particular weapon is carried by the principal will be evidence going to the jury&#039;s assessment of the defendant&#039;s intention: see [9], [16], [26]. \u201c21. The jury will, of course, continue to look at the full picture or factual matrix in order to determine whether the relevant and necessary intent can be inferred. Thus, Lord Hughes and Lord Toulson emphasised (at [93]) that juries frequently decided questions of intent (and conditional intent) by a process of inference from facts and circumstances proved (using the notation of that case): &quot;whether they are sure that D1&#039;s act was within the scope of the joint venture, that is, whether D2 expressly or tacitly agreed to a plan which included D1 going as far as he did and committing crime B if the occasion arose. They went on (at [94]) in these terms: \u2018If the jury is satisfied that there was an agreed common purpose to commit crime A, and if it is satisfied also that D2 must have foreseen that, in the course of committing crime A, D1 might well commit crime B, it may in appropriate cases be justified in drawing the conclusion that D2 had the necessary conditional intent that crime B should be committed, if the occasion arose; or in other words that it was within the scope of the plan to which D gave his assent and intentional support. But that will be a question of fact for the jury in all the circumstances.\u2019 \u201c22. Thus, the same facts which would previously have been used to support the inference of mens rea before the decision in Jogee will equally be used now. What has changed is the articulation of the mens rea and the requirement that to prove (in the case of Jogee) the crime of murder it is not sufficient that D2 foresaw that D1 might intentionally cause grievous bodily harm or kill if the circumstances arose. What is now required is that D2 intended that D1 cause grievous bodily harm or kill if the circumstances arise. Thus, the evidential requirements justifying a decision that there is a case to answer are likely to be the same even if, applying the facts to the different directions in law, the jury might reach a different conclusion.\u201d 23 The judge, in giving his ruling, identified a\u00a0passage in the Crown Court Compendium under the section on joint enterprise liability. He\u00a0said that it correctly represents the law. 24 That passage is as follows: &quot;3. D is liable as an accessory (and not as a principal) if D assists or encourages or procures another person, P to commit the offence and D does not, by D\u2019s own conduct, perform the actus reus. The offence occurs where and when the principal offence occurs. It is not necessary that D\u2019s act of assistance or encouragement was contemporaneous with the commission of the offence by P. D\u2019s acts must have been performed before P\u2019s crime is completed. There is no requirement that D and P shared a common purpose or intent. It is immaterial that D joined in the offence without any prior agreement. D will not be liable for P\u2019s offence if D and P have agreed on a particular victim and P deliberately commits the offence against a different victim.&quot; 25 The judge relied on the last sentence of\u00a0that extract. That is the only sentence in the extract for which no authority is cited in a\u00a0footnote. It appears to us that it\u00a0is an\u00a0attempt to\u00a0encapsulate in the Compendium the principle dealt with in Smith Hogan and Ormerod&#039;s Criminal Law Sixteenth Edition at page\u00a0217 that: &quot;D is not liable if P intentionally changes victim\/target of\u00a0crime X&quot;. 26 We will not set out the analysis with which the authors\u00a0establish that proposition. We observe, however, that it\u00a0is a\u00a0more nuanced proposition than the single sentence in the Compendium might suggest. The references in Jogee to\u00a0conditional intent, which we have already mentioned, plainly require some analysis in the context of\u00a0a\u00a0proposition of\u00a0the kind described in that sentence in the Compendium on which the judge relied. 27 It\u00a0is perhaps worth recording that at paragraph\u00a01.2 under the heading \u201cThe Purpose and Structure of\u00a0the Compendium\u201d, its authors say this: &quot;There is first a\u00a0section headed &#039;Legal Summary&#039;. These summaries are intended as\u00a0no more than brief introductions to\u00a0or reminders of\u00a0the areas of\u00a0law concerned. References will be found to\u00a0the\u00a0relevant passages in Archbold and Blackstone&#039;s and in any case of\u00a0complexity the law must be researched through these works.&quot; 28 That is a\u00a0helpful reminder from the authors of\u00a0the Compendium that the excellent legal summaries which they provide for the assistance of\u00a0trial judges are to\u00a0be\u00a0regarded as\u00a0just that: summaries. Discussion and decision 29 For our purposes the starting point is that this is a\u00a0prosecution appeal against the judge&#039;s decision that there is no case to\u00a0answer on murder. The question of\u00a0whether he\u00a0was right to\u00a0conclude that there was a\u00a0case to\u00a0answer on manslaughter and on Count\u00a04 is not subject to\u00a0any appeal at this stage. In the event of\u00a0conviction for either of\u00a0those offences, the respondent BHV will have a\u00a0right of\u00a0appeal in the usual way. Nothing we say here can bear on the merits of\u00a0any such appeal, but we start from the starting point that the judge&#039;s conclusions in respect of\u00a0those offences were correct. For our purposes, we are content to\u00a0do so. 30 This means that it\u00a0was open for the jury to\u00a0conclude (1) that BHV was a\u00a0party to\u00a0a joint enterprise which resulted in the death of\u00a0Mr\u00a0Wardle. The joint enterprise was intended to\u00a0result in the use of\u00a0bladed weapons on Leon &quot;if the chance arose&quot;. This was unlawful and obviously dangerous and caused the death of\u00a0Mr\u00a0Wardle. BHV was a\u00a0joint principal in the unlawful act which caused the death, namely the taking of\u00a0bladed weapons into the street intending to\u00a0use them on a\u00a0particular target. (2) That he\u00a0himself intended to\u00a0use the axe to\u00a0cause injury to Leon if the chance arose. 31 Starting from that basis, the contentious issue which the judge had to\u00a0resolve was, as\u00a0he\u00a0said in his ruling: &quot;Whether the jury could properly conclude that BHV intended anyone other than Leon in particular &#039;anyone who got in the way&#039; to\u00a0be\u00a0attacked with relevant intent and deliberately gave assistance to\u00a0any such attack.&quot; 32 The judge answered that question as follows: &quot;In my judgment the jury could not properly reach that conclusion on the evidence put before them by\u00a0the prosecution. To\u00a0ask the jury to\u00a0move from BHV intending Leon Wardle to\u00a0be\u00a0seriously injured to\u00a0a\u00a0conclusion that he\u00a0intended anyone else to\u00a0come to\u00a0harm, would be, I\u00a0think, in this case, an\u00a0invitation that they leap to\u00a0a\u00a0speculative conclusion rather than a request for them to\u00a0consider drawing an\u00a0inference that might reasonably be drawn. In Jogee at [92] the Supreme Court noted as\u00a0an\u00a0illustration of the\u00a0concept of\u00a0a conditional but sufficient intent that \u2018the group of\u00a0young men which faces down the rival group may hope that the rivals will slink quietly away, but it may well be a perfectly proper inference that all were intending that if resistance were to be met, grievous bodily harmat least should be done.\u2019 That does not mean that as a\u00a0matter of law there is necessarily a\u00a0case to\u00a0answer of\u00a0conditional intent to\u00a0do really serious harm if resistance is met any or every time a\u00a0young man involves himself in some plan to use violence. On the evidence presented to the jury in the present case, I do not think that there is a case forBHV to\u00a0answer of\u00a0such an intent.&quot; 33 We do not agree. We consider that the judge may have been misled by\u00a0his reliance on the last sentence of\u00a0the first extract from the Compendium set out above. The fact that the principal target of\u00a0a\u00a0joint enterprise attack is clearly identified does not mean that the joint enterprise cannot also include a\u00a0conditional intention to\u00a0attack anyone who gets in the way. There is no such legal principle. It is a\u00a0matter for the jury to say whether that intention is proved or not. That is a\u00a0question which, of course, has to\u00a0be\u00a0considered by\u00a0carefully evaluating the evidence on which the prosecution relies. 34 In this case the jury will have to consider the following factors, among others: (1) There were three attackers. (2) They are attacking the house which contained an\u00a0unknown number of\u00a0other people, and like most houses, contained knives and other items which could be used as\u00a0weapons. The risk of encountering serious violent resistance was high. If they were not prepared to\u00a0subdue it with serious violence of\u00a0their own if the circumstances required, they would themselves be exposed to\u00a0serious risk and their plan would be rapidly doomed. (3) Any sensible plan would therefore include a\u00a0plan for dealing with a\u00a0refusal of\u00a0the occupiers to\u00a0yield up Leon to\u00a0his attackers and with the use of\u00a0violence to\u00a0repel them. These three defendants had been together for a\u00a0long time on their way to\u00a0the attack and had plenty of\u00a0opportunity to\u00a0consider what that plan should be. (4) The preparation for this attack included the provision of\u00a0an\u00a0axe to\u00a0BHV &quot;for protection&quot;. We consider that the jury may conclude that this is an\u00a0important piece of\u00a0evidence from which BHV&#039;s intention and his knowledge of\u00a0his co-defendants&#039; intentions may be inferred. (5) The nature of\u00a0the weapons carried was such that it may readily be inferred that any unlawful use of\u00a0them would be accompanied by\u00a0an\u00a0intention to\u00a0cause at least really serious harm. 35 For these reasons we consider that the judge was wrong to\u00a0reject the application of\u00a0the line of\u00a0reasoning to\u00a0which he\u00a0referred left open by\u00a0the Supreme Court in Jogee at paragraph\u00a0[92]. We do not consider that this involves a\u00a0speculative leap. The proposition he\u00a0rejected, namely that &quot;As a\u00a0matter of law there is necessarily a\u00a0case to\u00a0answer of\u00a0conditional intent to\u00a0do really serious harm if resistance is met any or every time a young man involves himself in some if or plan to\u00a0use violence\u201d is not one which must be accepted in order to\u00a0find a\u00a0case to\u00a0answer against BHV. 36 The question is whether the prosecution evidence could properly justify a conclusion that a\u00a0conditional intent of\u00a0the kind alleged was proved against him. That of course requires a\u00a0careful examination of\u00a0the evidence, and for the reasons we have given, we conclude that the evidence does afford a\u00a0proper basis on which the jury properly directed could find the alleged conditional intent to\u00a0be\u00a0proved. 37 Accordingly, we allow this appeal by\u00a0the prosecution and we direct that the proceedings in the crown court should be resumed on Count\u00a01 and continued in relation to Count\u00a04 again BHV.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<hr class=\"kji-sep\" \/>\n<p class=\"kji-source-links\"><strong>Sources officielles :<\/strong> <a class=\"kji-source-link\" href=\"https:\/\/caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk\/ewca\/crim\/2022\/1690\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">consulter la page source<\/a><\/p>\n<p class=\"kji-license-note\"><em>Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).<\/em><\/p>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>LORD JUSTICE EDIS: 1 Reporting restrictions apply to the judgment we are about to give. 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