{"id":784666,"date":"2026-04-30T17:23:54","date_gmt":"2026-04-30T15:23:54","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/jurisprudences\/smart-planning-ltd-v-brentwood-borough-council\/"},"modified":"2026-04-30T17:23:54","modified_gmt":"2026-04-30T15:23:54","slug":"smart-planning-ltd-v-brentwood-borough-council","status":"publish","type":"kji_decision","link":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/jurisprudences\/smart-planning-ltd-v-brentwood-borough-council\/","title":{"rendered":"Smart Planning Ltd v Brentwood Borough Council"},"content":{"rendered":"
\n
\n

Lord Justice Leggatt: 1. On 23\u00a0November\u00a02017 the appellant, Smart\u00a0Planning\u00a0Limited, was convicted by the North\u00a0Essex magistrates of an\u00a0offence of wilfully obstructing a\u00a0person acting in the exercise of a\u00a0right of entry contrary to s.88B(3) of the Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas)\u00a0Act\u00a01990. This is an\u00a0appeal from that conviction by way of case stated. The respondent to the appeal is Brentwood Borough\u00a0Council, which brought the prosecution in the magistrates'\u00a0court. 2. The facts found by the magistrates are set out in the case which they have stated to this court, but can be summarised somewhat more shortly as follows. Mr\u00a0Mark\u00a0Bray, a\u00a0planning officer employed by the respondent council, investigated a\u00a0report that unauthorised works were being undertaken at a\u00a0property at Ingatestone in Essex, which is a\u00a0Grade\u00a0II listed building. The property is owned by Mr\u00a0and Mrs\u00a0Fisher and occupied by a\u00a0tenant called Mr\u00a0Johnson. The appellant company was the planning agent acting for Mr\u00a0and Mrs\u00a0Fisher. 3. Mr\u00a0Bray invited Mr\u00a0and Mrs\u00a0Fisher to attend an\u00a0interview about the matter, but they refused. Through solicitors acting on behalf of Mr\u00a0and Mrs\u00a0Fisher, Mr\u00a0Bray on 11\u00a0May\u00a02016 made arrangements for a\u00a0site inspection to take place on 27\u00a0May\u00a02016. The appellant was made aware of the proposed inspection and instructed an\u00a0employee, Mr\u00a0Paul\u00a0Clarke, to attend on that day. 4. As part of his investigation, Mr\u00a0Bray traced a\u00a0previous tenant of the property, a\u00a0Mr\u00a0Anthony\u00a0Collins, and asked Mr\u00a0Collins to attend the site visit. Mr\u00a0Collins agreed to do so. His attendance was necessary, as the magistrates found, to advise whether any work observed during the inspection had post-dated his own occupation of the property. Mr\u00a0Bray discussed the visit and who would be attending by telephone with the appellant's employee, Mr\u00a0Clarke, before the visit, but did not tell Mr\u00a0Clarke that Mr\u00a0Collins would be attending. 5. On the day, that is 27\u00a0May\u00a02016, Mr\u00a0Bray attended the premises as arranged along with Mr\u00a0Collins and two\u00a0other council employees. Mr\u00a0Clarke was present. He had been instructed by the appellant to attend the site inspection and, as the magistrates found, in so doing was acting in accordance with his duties as an\u00a0employee. 6. When Mr\u00a0Bray and Mr\u00a0Collins arrived, Mr\u00a0Clarke became aggressive. Mr\u00a0Clarke then made a\u00a0telephone call to the solicitors acting for Mr\u00a0and Mrs\u00a0Fisher, who advised him to tell Mr\u00a0Collins to leave the property. While Mr\u00a0Clarke was outside on the telephone, Mr\u00a0Bray and Mr\u00a0Collins, along with the two\u00a0other council employees, were admitted to the property by the tenant, Mr\u00a0Johnson, who confirmed that he was expecting them as he had been made aware by the owners of their intended visit. No demand for entry was made as access was afforded voluntarily by Mr\u00a0Johnson. 7. Shortly after the visitors had entered the property, Mr\u00a0Clarke also entered it and started shouting at Mr\u00a0Bray and Mr\u00a0Collins that Mr\u00a0Collins must leave. Mr\u00a0Collins went to leave. Mr\u00a0Clarke then stood in his way with his arms across the threshold of the door, preventing Mr\u00a0Collins from leaving. Mr\u00a0Collins tried to push past Mr\u00a0Clarke, at which point Mr\u00a0Clarke pushed him back. Mr\u00a0Bray asked what Mr\u00a0Clarke was doing. Mr\u00a0Clarke then let go of Mr\u00a0Collins, who left the premises and did not return. As a result of this incident, Mr\u00a0Collins told the council that he was no longer willing to assist them with their investigation. 8. It was on the basis of those findings that Mr\u00a0Clarke and the appellant were convicted by the magistrates of an\u00a0offence, as I\u00a0have mentioned, under s.88B(3) of the 1990\u00a0Act of wilfully obstructing a\u00a0local planning officer acting in the exercise of a\u00a0right of entry. The basis on which the appellant was convicted was that, so the magistrates held, it was liable for the actions of its employee vicariously irrespective of whether he was given specific instructions to obstruct the inspection. 9. The legislation relevant for these purposes is contained in s.88, 88A and 88B of the 1990\u00a0Act. Section\u00a088(2) provides: "Any person duly authorised in writing by … a\u00a0local planning authority … may at any reasonable time enter any land for any of the following purposes \u2013 … (c) ascertaining whether an offence has been, or is being, committed with respect to any building on the land [under any of certain specified sections of the Act]" 10. It is common ground, although it may not have been expressly found by the magistrates, that Mr\u00a0Bray was a\u00a0person duly authorised in writing by the respondent council in accordance with that section and that his purpose in wishing to enter on the land on the day in question was in order to ascertain whether one of the offences specified in s.88(2)(c) had been or was being committed. 11. Section\u00a088A(1) provides: "If it is shown to the satisfaction of a\u00a0justice of the peace on sworn information in writing – (a) that there are reasonable grounds for entering any land for any of the purposes mentioned in section 88; and (b) that – (i) admission to the land has been refused, or a refusal is reasonably apprehended; or (ii) the case is one of urgency, the justice may issue a\u00a0warrant authorising any person duly authorised in writing by the appropriate authority to enter the land." 12. The appropriate authority is defined in subsection (2) and means the person who may authorise entry on the land under s.88 for the purpose in question. Subsection\u00a0(3) provides that, for these purposes, admission to land should be regarded as having been refused if no reply is received to a\u00a0request for admission within a\u00a0reasonable period. 13. Section\u00a088B provides as follows: "(1) A person authorised under section 88 to enter any land shall not demand admission as of right to any land which is occupied unless twenty-four\u00a0hours notice of the intended entry has been given to the occupier. (2) A person authorised to enter land in pursuance of a right of entry conferred under or by virtue of section\u00a088 or 88A (referred to in this section as "a\u00a0right of entry") – (a) shall, if so required, produce evidence of his authority and state the purpose of his entry before so entering; (b) may take with him such other persons as may be necessary; and (c) on leaving the land shall, if the owner or occupier is not then present, leave it as effectively secured against trespassers as he found it. (3) Any person who wilfully obstructs a person acting in the exercise of a right of entry shall be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level\u00a03 on the standard scale." 14. The case stated by the magistrates poses six\u00a0questions for the opinion of the High\u00a0Court. I\u00a0will not recite all of those questions as it does not seem to me necessary for us to answer them all in order to decide whether the conviction of the appellant had a\u00a0sound basis in law. 15. The two\u00a0critical questions raised by this appeal are, first, whether on the facts found by the magistrates Mr\u00a0Clarke was acting in the exercise of a\u00a0right of entry conferred by s.88 of the\u00a0Act when he told one of the persons present to leave and thereby, on the magistrates' findings, wilfully obstructed a\u00a0planning officer; and second,\u00a0whether there was a\u00a0basis in law for finding the appellant vicariously liable for an\u00a0offence committed by Mr\u00a0Clarke. 16. On the first\u00a0question, the essence of the argument made by Mr\u00a0Ham who represents the respondent is that, if a\u00a0planning officer has a\u00a0right to enter premises pursuant to s.88 of the\u00a0Act and if the officer enters on the premises having been admitted to them voluntarily, as happened in this case, the officer must necessarily be exercising a\u00a0right of entry under s.88. There is no need, Mr\u00a0Ham submitted, for an\u00a0officer positively to assert such a\u00a0right or make any reference to the power conferred by s.88. It is sufficient that he has that power and enters on the premises. 17. In support of that construction of the\u00a0Act, Mr\u00a0Ham relies on the fact that there is no requirement specified in any of the relevant statutory provisions which says that a\u00a0notice of any kind must be served in order to exercise a\u00a0right of entry, whether a\u00a0notice that refers to s.88 or otherwise. 18. Furthermore, Mr\u00a0Ham places particular reliance on s.88B(1), which says that a\u00a0person authorised under s.88 to enter any land shall not demand admission as of right to any land which is occupied unless twenty-four\u00a0hours' notice of the intended entry has been given to the occupier. That, Mr\u00a0Ham submits, indicates that the intention is that any request or demand to enter property in order to carry out one of the purposes specified in s.88(2) will be an\u00a0exercise of a\u00a0right of entry or admission to land and that there is a\u00a0requirement then in s.88B(1) that twenty-four\u00a0hours' notice must be given. There is then a\u00a0machinery provided for in s.88A which operates if admission to the land is refused whereby a\u00a0warrant can be obtained. 19. All that indicates, Mr\u00a0Ham argues, that by whichever route a\u00a0planning officer authorised under s.88 gains entry to a\u00a0property for the purpose of carrying out a\u00a0relevant inspection, he is exercising a right of entry conferred either by s.88 or under s.88A. 20. For my part, I\u00a0am unable to accept that, as a\u00a0matter of interpretation of the statute, the rights of entry conferred by s.88 and s.88A are exhaustive in the sense that they preclude any other means by which a\u00a0planning officer may lawfully enter premises in order to ascertain whether an\u00a0offence has been committed. It seems to me perfectly possible in principle for a\u00a0planning officer to ask if the owner or occupier will allow him to enter premises in order to ascertain whether an\u00a0offence has been committed without demanding entry as of right or even requesting entry as of right. If entry is to be requested or demanded as of right, then it is necessary for some communication to take place in order to assert that right and make it clear that it is on that basis that entry is sought by the officer. 21. That, in my view, is reinforced as the correct interpretation of the statutory scheme by the fact that where a\u00a0right of entry is being exercised, it may result, where obstruction ensues, in a\u00a0person being charged and convicted of a\u00a0criminal offence. In other words, as it seems to me, there are two\u00a0ways in which an\u00a0officer may enter on the property: by an\u00a0informal agreement which does not assert any right of entry, in which case prima\u00a0facie the owner can simply ask the officer to leave at any time and, if he does so, there will be no offence of obstruction committed. Alternatively, the officer can go down the formal route, which requires a\u00a0communication which positively asserts the right to enter premises under s.88 of the Act. The occupier is then on notice that, if he refuses admission, a\u00a0warrant may be sought and also that, if entry takes place and, for example, a\u00a0person is asked to leave as occurred in this case, an\u00a0offence is liable to be committed. 22. On the facts found by the magistrates, there was no finding of any assertion or communication of a\u00a0request or demand by Mr Bray or any other council officer to enter the premises in this case as of right. It follows, in my view, that when Mr\u00a0Clarke ordered or demanded that one of those present, namely Mr\u00a0Collins, should leave, he was not guilty of an\u00a0offence under s.88B(3) because none of those present on the property was acting in the exercise of a\u00a0right of entry. 23. That is sufficient to justify quashing the conviction of the appellant, but it is right that I\u00a0should also deal, as it has been argued, with the second\u00a0key question raised on this appeal \u2013 namely, whether a\u00a0company can be convicted of an\u00a0offence under this provision on the basis that it is vicariously liable for the act of its employee. 24. The contention that an\u00a0offence can be established on the basis of vicarious liability under this provision is, in my view, an\u00a0untenable one. The general principle is that in criminal law, in contrast to the law of tort, there is no doctrine of vicarious liability. In other words, the fact that an\u00a0employee acting in the course of his employment commits a\u00a0criminal offence does not render the employer liable for that offence vicariously. 25. There are circumstances in which a\u00a0company can be guilty of a criminal offence without that liability depending on any doctrine of vicarious liability. As Moses\u00a0LJ explained in the case of St\u00a0Regis Paper\u00a0Company\u00a0Ltd v\u00a0R [2011]\u00a0EWCA\u00a0Crim\u00a02527, to which we were referred, the conventional approach to attributing liability to a\u00a0corporate body for a criminal offence which requires proof of mens\u00a0rea, as does an offence under s. 88B of the 1990\u00a0Act, is that the company can only be held liable where it is proved that a\u00a0controlling officer of the company performed the relevant conduct with the relevant guilty intention. 26. I\u00a0would accept that in principle the appellant could have been convicted of an\u00a0offence here on that basis, but only if those requirements were satisfied. That is to say, it would have been necessary for the magistrates to find that a\u00a0controlling officer of the appellant had done an\u00a0act of obstruction or had aided and abetted such an\u00a0act with the requisite intention, i.e. knowing or intending that the consequence of the\u00a0act would be to make it difficult or more difficult for the planning officer to perform his duty. 27. That was not, however, the basis on which the appellant was prosecuted and convicted. The basis of the prosecution and conviction, as is clear from the case stated to us, was simply a\u00a0supposed principle of vicarious liability. There is nothing in the wording of the 1990 Act which suggests that, by way of very rare exception to the general rule, some principle of vicarious liability is intended to be sufficient to result in a\u00a0conviction. In particular, there is no reason why the purpose of the statute would otherwise be defeated. 28. The answer to the submission to that\u00a0effect made by Mr\u00a0Ham, who argued that it must be possible for the company to be liable if it operates a\u00a0policy of obstructing officers, is that the company can indeed be liable. However, the company cannot simply be liable on the basis that it is vicariously responsible for whatever its employee does acting in the course of his employment. It can only be liable if it is demonstrated that a\u00a0controlling officer of the appellant committed an\u00a0act capable of giving rise to the offence with the necessary intention. 29. That interpretation is, furthermore, reinforced by s.331 of the Town and Country Planning\u00a0Act\u00a01990 and s.89(1) of the Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas)\u00a0Act\u00a01990, to which Mr\u00a0Ham referred, which are consistent with the understanding that the circumstances in which a\u00a0body corporate may commit a\u00a0relevant offence coincide with those in which a\u00a0director, manager, secretary or other similar officer of the body corporate has committed such an\u00a0offence. 30. For those reasons, I\u00a0would answer the questions posed by the magistrates, so far as we need to answer them in order to dispose of this appeal, by indicating in answer to question\u00a01 that, in order to exercise a\u00a0right of entry under s.88(1) of the\u00a0Act, it is necessary to assert such a\u00a0right, which, on the findings of the magistrates, did not occur here. In answer to question\u00a06, the magistrates were not entitled to find the appellant vicariously liable for the actions of Mr\u00a0Clarke on the facts found. I\u00a0do not consider it necessary for us to answer the other questions. 31. If my Lord agrees with those answers, it must follow that the appellant's conviction should be quashed. MR JUSTICE WILLIAM DAVIS: 32. I\u00a0agree. I\u00a0add only this. In deference to the reliance by Mr\u00a0Ham on the decision of the Privy\u00a0Council in Meridian\u00a0Global Funds\u00a0Management Asia\u00a0Ltd v The\u00a0Securities\u00a0Commission [1995]\u00a02\u00a0AC\u00a0500, Mr\u00a0Ham relied particularly on a\u00a0passage in Lord\u00a0Hoffmann's opinion at p.507E as follows: "There will be many cases in which neither of these solutions is satisfactory; in which the court considers that the law was intended to apply to companies and that, although it excludes ordinary vicarious liability, insistence on the primary rules of attribution would in practice defeat that intention. In such a case, the court must fashion a\u00a0special rule of attribution for the particular substantive rule." 33. I\u00a0make these observations. First, it is perfectly plain that Lord\u00a0Hoffmann identified the essential principle that vicarious liability does not apply in criminal law. 34. Second, the special rule of attribution that he identified would be necessary only if the ordinary rules of attribution would defeat the intention of Parliament. For the reasons my\u00a0Lord has identified, that does not apply in this case. 35. Third, the decision in Meridian was entirely concerned with the doctrine of attribution, namely attributing the state of mind of a\u00a0particular party within the company as the state of mind of the company as opposed to vicarious liability, which may in general terms be described as a\u00a0doctrine of delegation. 36. I\u00a0entirely agree with my\u00a0Lord that vicarious liability has no place in criminal law, particularly in this context.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

Sources officielles :<\/strong> consulter la page source<\/a><\/p>\n

Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).<\/em><\/p>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Lord Justice Leggatt: 1. On 23 November 2017 the appellant, Smart Planning Limited, was convicted by the North Essex magistrates of an offence of wilfully obstructing a person acting in the exercise of a right of entry contrary to s.88B(3) of the Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990. This is an appeal from that conviction by way of…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":0,"template":"","meta":{"_crdt_document":""},"kji_country":[7608],"kji_court":[7649],"kji_chamber":[],"kji_year":[47917],"kji_subject":[7650],"kji_keyword":[22631,18721,7925,8264,8345],"kji_language":[7611],"class_list":["post-784666","kji_decision","type-kji_decision","status-publish","hentry","kji_country-royaume-uni","kji_court-high-court-administrative-court","kji_year-47917","kji_subject-administratif","kji_keyword-clarke","kji_keyword-entry","kji_keyword-offence","kji_keyword-officer","kji_keyword-right","kji_language-anglais"],"yoast_head":"\nSmart Planning Ltd v Brentwood Borough Council - Ma\u00eetre Hassan Kohen, avocat en droit p\u00e9nal \u00e0 Paris<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/jurisprudences\/smart-planning-ltd-v-brentwood-borough-council\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"zh_CN\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Smart Planning Ltd v Brentwood Borough Council\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Lord Justice Leggatt: 1. On 23 November 2017 the appellant, Smart Planning Limited, was convicted by the North Essex magistrates of an offence of wilfully obstructing a person acting in the exercise of a right of entry contrary to s.88B(3) of the Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990. This is an appeal from that conviction by way of...\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/jurisprudences\/smart-planning-ltd-v-brentwood-borough-council\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Ma\u00eetre Hassan Kohen, avocat en droit p\u00e9nal \u00e0 Paris\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"\u9884\u8ba1\u9605\u8bfb\u65f6\u95f4\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"15 \u5206\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/zh-hans\\\/jurisprudences\\\/smart-planning-ltd-v-brentwood-borough-council\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/zh-hans\\\/jurisprudences\\\/smart-planning-ltd-v-brentwood-borough-council\\\/\",\"name\":\"Smart Planning Ltd v Brentwood Borough Council - Ma\u00eetre Hassan Kohen, avocat en droit p\u00e9nal \u00e0 Paris\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/zh-hans\\\/#website\"},\"datePublished\":\"2026-04-30T15:23:54+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/zh-hans\\\/jurisprudences\\\/smart-planning-ltd-v-brentwood-borough-council\\\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"zh-Hans\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/zh-hans\\\/jurisprudences\\\/smart-planning-ltd-v-brentwood-borough-council\\\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/zh-hans\\\/jurisprudences\\\/smart-planning-ltd-v-brentwood-borough-council\\\/#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/zh-hans\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Jurisprudences\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/zh-hans\\\/jurisprudences\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":3,\"name\":\"Smart Planning Ltd v Brentwood Borough Council\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/zh-hans\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/zh-hans\\\/\",\"name\":\"Kohen Avocats\",\"description\":\"Ma\u00eetre Hassan Kohen, avocat p\u00e9naliste \u00e0 Paris, intervient exclusivement en droit p\u00e9nal pour la d\u00e9fense des particuliers, notamment en mati\u00e8re d\u2019accusations de viol. Il assure un accompagnement rigoureux d\u00e8s la garde \u00e0 vue jusqu\u2019\u00e0 la Cour d\u2019assises, veillant au strict respect des garanties proc\u00e9durales.\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/zh-hans\\\/#organization\"},\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/zh-hans\\\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"zh-Hans\"},{\"@type\":\"Organization\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/zh-hans\\\/#organization\",\"name\":\"Kohen Avocats\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/zh-hans\\\/\",\"logo\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"zh-Hans\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/zh-hans\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2026\\\/01\\\/Logo-2-1.webp\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2026\\\/01\\\/Logo-2-1.webp\",\"width\":2114,\"height\":1253,\"caption\":\"Kohen Avocats\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/kohenavocats.com\\\/zh-hans\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\"}}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO Premium plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Smart Planning Ltd v Brentwood Borough Council - Ma\u00eetre Hassan Kohen, avocat en droit p\u00e9nal \u00e0 Paris","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/jurisprudences\/smart-planning-ltd-v-brentwood-borough-council\/","og_locale":"zh_CN","og_type":"article","og_title":"Smart Planning Ltd v Brentwood Borough Council","og_description":"Lord Justice Leggatt: 1. On 23 November 2017 the appellant, Smart Planning Limited, was convicted by the North Essex magistrates of an offence of wilfully obstructing a person acting in the exercise of a right of entry contrary to s.88B(3) of the Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990. This is an appeal from that conviction by way of...","og_url":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/jurisprudences\/smart-planning-ltd-v-brentwood-borough-council\/","og_site_name":"Ma\u00eetre Hassan Kohen, avocat en droit p\u00e9nal \u00e0 Paris","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_misc":{"\u9884\u8ba1\u9605\u8bfb\u65f6\u95f4":"15 \u5206"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/jurisprudences\/smart-planning-ltd-v-brentwood-borough-council\/","url":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/jurisprudences\/smart-planning-ltd-v-brentwood-borough-council\/","name":"Smart Planning Ltd v Brentwood Borough Council - Ma\u00eetre Hassan Kohen, avocat en droit p\u00e9nal \u00e0 Paris","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/#website"},"datePublished":"2026-04-30T15:23:54+00:00","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/jurisprudences\/smart-planning-ltd-v-brentwood-borough-council\/#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"zh-Hans","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/jurisprudences\/smart-planning-ltd-v-brentwood-borough-council\/"]}]},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/jurisprudences\/smart-planning-ltd-v-brentwood-borough-council\/#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"Jurisprudences","item":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/jurisprudences\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":3,"name":"Smart Planning Ltd v Brentwood Borough Council"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/#website","url":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/","name":"Kohen Avocats","description":"Ma\u00eetre Hassan Kohen, avocat p\u00e9naliste \u00e0 Paris, intervient exclusivement en droit p\u00e9nal pour la d\u00e9fense des particuliers, notamment en mati\u00e8re d\u2019accusations de viol. Il assure un accompagnement rigoureux d\u00e8s la garde \u00e0 vue jusqu\u2019\u00e0 la Cour d\u2019assises, veillant au strict respect des garanties proc\u00e9durales.","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/#organization"},"potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"zh-Hans"},{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/#organization","name":"Kohen Avocats","url":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"zh-Hans","@id":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/01\/Logo-2-1.webp","contentUrl":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/01\/Logo-2-1.webp","width":2114,"height":1253,"caption":"Kohen Avocats"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/"}}]}},"jetpack_likes_enabled":false,"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/kji_decision\/784666","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/kji_decision"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/kji_decision"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=784666"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"kji_country","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/kji_country?post=784666"},{"taxonomy":"kji_court","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/kji_court?post=784666"},{"taxonomy":"kji_chamber","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/kji_chamber?post=784666"},{"taxonomy":"kji_year","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/kji_year?post=784666"},{"taxonomy":"kji_subject","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/kji_subject?post=784666"},{"taxonomy":"kji_keyword","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/kji_keyword?post=784666"},{"taxonomy":"kji_language","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/kji_language?post=784666"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}