{"id":786461,"date":"2026-04-30T19:15:11","date_gmt":"2026-04-30T17:15:11","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/jurisprudences\/tate-r-on-the-application-of-v-leffers-smith\/"},"modified":"2026-04-30T19:15:11","modified_gmt":"2026-04-30T17:15:11","slug":"tate-r-on-the-application-of-v-leffers-smith","status":"publish","type":"kji_decision","link":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/jurisprudences\/tate-r-on-the-application-of-v-leffers-smith\/","title":{"rendered":"Tate, R (on the application of) v Leffers-Smith"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Lord Justice Lindblom: Introduction 1. Did a local planning authority, when granting planning permission for the construction of a dwelling-house in a village in the Green Belt, err in law in failing to provide reasons for its conclusion that the development would be \u201climited infilling\u201d, contrary to the view of an inspector in a previous appeal decision? That is the main question in this appeal. It does not raise any novel issue of law. 2. With permission granted by Sales L.J. on 3 October 2017, the appellant, Northumberland County Council, appeals against the order of H.H.J. Belcher, sitting as a deputy judge of the High Court, dated 4 April 2017, by which she allowed the claim for judicial review brought by the respondent, Dr David Tate, challenging its grant of outline planning permission, dated 6 July 2016, for the erection of a two-storey dwelling-house on land west of \u201cBramblings\u201d, in the village of Tranwell Woods, near Morpeth. Tranwell Woods is a village to the south-westof Morpeth, in the NorthumberlandGreen Belt. Dr Tate, who lives in \u201cWestwood Cottage\u201d \u2013 a dwelling to the west of \u201cBramblings\u201d \u2013 was an objector to the proposal. The applicant for planning permission was the interested party, Ms Susan Leffers-Smith. 3. In a decision letter dated 9 January 2009 an inspector had dismissed an appeal against the refusal by Castle Morpeth Borough Council of planning permission for similar development on the same site, finding that it was not \u201cinfill\u201d development. 4. Two previous grants of outline planning permission for this proposal had been successfully challenged by Dr Tate. We are concerned in this appeal with the third grant of planning permission, which followed the resolution of the county council\u2019s Strategic Planning Committee to approve the proposal at its meeting on 5 July 2016, in accordance with the recommendation of its Senior Planning Officer in his report. The officer had advised the committee that the proposal was not for \u201cinappropriate\u201d development in the Green Belt, because it fell under the exception for \u201climited infilling in villages\u201din paragraph 89 of the National Planning Policy Framework (\u201cthe NPPF\u201d). The issue in the appeal 5. Dr Tate\u2019s challenge to the county council\u2019s decision included grounds contending that the committee had misinterpreted the concepts of \u201cvillage\u201d and \u201climited infilling\u201d in paragraph 89 of the NPPF, that it was inconsistent with the inspector\u2019s decision of 9 January 2009, and that the reasons for the grant of planning permission, apparent in the planning officer\u2019s report, were inadequate. The judge accepted that, in the circumstances, reasons should have been given for the county council\u2019s conclusion that the proposal was for \u201climited infilling\u201d. 6. The county council sought permission to appeal on three grounds. Permission was granted by Sales L.J. only on the first, which states that the judge \u201cerred in law\u201d in \u201c[finding] that there was a need for express reasons to be given for the specific decision\/finding of the Appellant\u2019s Planning Committee that the Development amounted to \u201climited infilling\u201d [in a village] for the purposes of paragraph 89 of the NPPF, and (even if there was such a need), separately finding that the reasons given were inadequate in law\u201d, and that \u201c[the judge\u2019s] approach and finding discloses error and is irrational \u2026\u201d. The sole issue for us, therefore, is whether the county council erred in law by failing to provide reasons for its conclusion that the construction of a dwelling on this site would constitute \u201climited infilling\u201d, given the conclusion of the inspector in the 2009 appeal that such development was not \u201cinfill\u201d development. The 2009 appeal decision 7. The site has a surprisingly long planning history. Applications for planning permission for the erection of a dwelling-house were refused in 1989 and, twice, in 1999. An appeal against one of the refusals of planning permission in 1999 was dismissed by an inspector in 2000. Another application was refused in 2008, and that refusal was the subject of the January 2009 appeal decision. A subsequent application was refused in 2014. In November 2014 the county council granted planning permission for the proposal with which we are concerned. That planning permission was challenged by Dr Tate in a claim for judicial review and was quashed in March 2015 \u2013 because the county council had failed properly to apply relevant policy for Green Belt. On redetermination, planning permission was again granted, in December 2015. That planning permission was also challenged by Dr Tate and was quashed, by consent, in April 2016 \u2013 because the county council had failed properly to apply Policy H7 of the Castle Morpeth Local Plan. It is common ground in these proceedings that the errors in those two decisions were not repeated by the county council in this, its third grant of planning permission for the proposal. 8. The development proposed in 2008 was described by the inspector in his decision letter as \u201cone new dwelling and garage\u201d. He described Tranwell Woods as \u201cwithin an area of open countryside \u2026\u201d, adding that \u201c[its] wooded landscape includes dwellings at a low density set in extensive grounds \u2026\u201d (paragraph 6 of the decision letter). He rejected the contention that the appeal site was part of the garden of \u201cWestwood Cottage\u201d and therefore to be regarded as \u201cpreviously-developed land\u201d as defined in Annex B to Planning Policy Statement 3 (\u201cPPS3\u201d) (paragraph 9). He then turned to the suggestion that the proposal was for \u201cinfill development\u201d. On this question he said (in paragraph 10): \u201c10. The appellant considers the site to be an acceptable form of infill development. No specific definition of acceptable \u201cinfill\u201d development is included in the LP documentation before me. None appears in PPS3. The site is enclosed on three sides by dwellings with Belt Plantation to the south, and with an extended shared access from the C151. The development intended does not represent a gap in an otherwise [developed] frontage on the C151 through TW \u2013 this, in my view, [is] one reasonable test of infill development. To allow the Appeal would add an intrusive element to this sensitive area of countryside. While the dwelling would have limited visibility from public viewpoints, that cannot establish a convincing justification for the proposal. It would be able to be repeated too often, to the detriment of the countryside. Similarly, to grant planning permission would make it more difficult for the Council to resist similar proposals, undermining the clear intent of local planning policy. \u2026\u201d. 9. The inspector went on to conclude that \u201cthe proposal would adversely affect the character and appearance of the open countryside and Tranwell Woods in conflict with the Development Plan and national planning guidance\u201d (paragraph 15), and, having considered all other material considerations, that the appeal should be dismissed (paragraph 21). 10. The Northumberland Green Belt around Morpeth was subsequently extended to include Tranwell Woods. Paragraph 89 of the NPPF 11. In a section of the NPPF headed \u201cProtecting Green Belt land\u201d, paragraphs 86 and 87 state: \u201c86. If it is necessary to prevent development in a village primarily because of the important contribution which the open character of the village makes to the openness of the Green Belt, the village should be included in the Green Belt. \u2026 87. As with previous Green Belt policy, inappropriate development is, by definition, harmful to the Green Belt and should not be approved except in very special circumstances.\u201d 12. Paragraph 89 states: \u201c89. A local planning authority should regard the construction of new buildings as inappropriate in Green Belt. Exceptions to this are: \u2026 \u2022 limited infilling in villages, and limited affordable housing for local community needs under policies set out in the Local Plan \u2026 \u2026 .\u201d Dr Tate\u2019s objection 13. A draft of the planning officer\u2019s report for the committee meeting on 5 July 2016 was made available to interested partiesin early June 2016. Dr Tate\u2019s objection to the proposal at this stage, in a letter dated 5 June 2016, included this: \u201cInfill in a village The Planning [Officer\u2019s] only justification for recommending approval of this application is that it would represent limited infill within a village. The site is 2.5 acres in size[,] does not abound a public road and is situated within the open countryside in an area of housing that has no settlement boundary. Which of these factors does the Planning Officer feel would stand up in front of a High Court Judge? By their own documentation submitted as extra evidence the land owner is only allowing the applicant to own 1\/5 of the site. The application site is the existing 0.5 acre clearing in the developed part of Gubeon West. It does not include the 2 acres of external woodland surrounding it, and [is] not owned by the applicant, who therefore has no right of control over it. One would therefore rightly question how does the land owner intend to dispose of the rest of the land? Would this further area be classed as infill by the Planning Officer? The whole scenario is utter nonsense. I have previously highlighted a Planning Inspector\u2019s view on the site as infill and for completeness will repeat it below \u2026\u201d. Dr Tate then quoted in full paragraph 10 of the inspector\u2019s decision letter of 9 January 2009. Having done so, he continued: \u201cIt is clear within the report that no mention of this decision is made by the Planning Officer when it is materially relevant to the case. One would have to ask why not?\u201d The planning officer\u2019s report 14. In the report he prepared for the committee meeting on 5 July 2016 the planning officer presented a map of Tranwell Woods, showing the location of the site of the proposed development, with \u201cWestwood Cottage\u201d to its west, \u201cHavis House\u201d to its north-west, other dwellings to its north, east and south \u2013 including \u201cThreeways\u201d, \u201cThe Cottage\u201d, \u201cSkogen\u201d, \u201cSilver Birches\u201d, and \u201cWelhill\u201d, and \u201cBelt Plantation\u201d to its south. It was \u201canticipated that access to the site would be from the north, off the existing access track that already serves properties at Westwood Cottage and Havis House \u2026\u201d (paragraph 2.2). 15. As the planning officer pointed out, the2009 appeal decision letter was appended to the report (paragraph 1.3). He referred to the criticism of the draft committee report in Dr Tate\u2019s letter of 5 June 2016 (paragraph 1.4), and a copy of that letter was also appended. 16. On the policy in paragraph 55 of the NPPF, which states that local planning authorities should avoid new isolated homes in the countryside unless there are special circumstances, he considered that \u201cdevelopment located within Tranwell Woods could not be classed as \u201cisolated\u201d given that there are a number of dwellings located relatively closely on three sides of the application site\u201d (paragraph 7.11). 17. Under the heading \u201cGreen Belt\u201d, he explained how the site had come to be in the Green Belt. The Northumberland County and National Park Joint Structure Plan had identified, in saved Policy S5, the general extent of the Green Belt extension around Morpeth. As he said, \u201c[this] site lies within the Green Belt boundary described by Policy S5 and the detailed boundary shown in the Northumberland Local Plan Pre-Submission Draft Core Strategy\u201d (paragraph 7.14). 18. He explained that \u201c[the] construction of a new building in the Green Belt will amount to inappropriate development unless such development falls within a prescribed exception under paragraph 89 of the NPPF\u201d, and that \u201c[if] the development does not fall within such a prescribed exception, \u2026 the application must demonstrate \u2018very special circumstances\u2019 \u2026\u201d (paragraph 7.17). He then gave this advice (in paragraphs 7.18 to 7.30): \u201c7.18 At [sic] paragraph 89 of the NPPF \u2018exception\u2019 is the development of a new building that constitutes limited infilling within a village. It is considered that the proposed development would indeed fall within this prescribed exception, thereby not constituting inappropriate development. It follows that very special circumstances need not be demonstrated in respect of the development. 7.19 For the above purposes, a \u201cvillage\u201d is not defined under the NPPF. Nor is a \u201cvillage\u201d specifically defined by the development plan, including the Neighbourhood Plan (which identifies some villages, but does not purport to provide any exhaustive list or definition). The same is true in respect of the phrase \u201cinfill development\u201d. Ultimately a judgment is required to be made as regards what does and does not amount to (limited) infill development within a village. \u2026 \u2026 7.22 Having regard to the above factors and to all relevant site and geographical location-specific factors, it is adjudged that Tranwell Woods constitutes a \u201cvillage\u201d for the purposes of applying the paragraph 89 NPPF \u2018exception\u2019 of limited infill development within a village that does not amount to inappropriate development in the Green Belt. This is so, also having considered previous decisions (including on appeal) made in respect of proposed residential development of the site, and the (appended) June 2016 correspondence received from Dr. Tate on this point. \u2026 7.24 Also, in visual impact terms, the application site is located adjacent to existing residential development and is materially enclosed by mature tree planting along its boundaries. The application site is not considered to be visually prominent. 7.25 The development proposal would not give rise to any material encroachment into the open countryside or urban sprawl, not least because the application site lies within an established settlement. The proposed development would not be in conflict with any other purpose for including land within the Green Belt. 7.26 \u2026 [It] is \u2026 noteworthy that the overall impact of the development in openness terms would be very modest, giving rise to less than material harm. 7.27 By virtue of the introduction of a new dwelling in relative proximity to existing dwellings, there is a potential (considered to be very modest) for a slight, adverse impact upon the character and appearance of the area. However, both from near and distant viewpoints of the application site, it is not considered that the proposed development would give rise to any change capable of causing any material harm to the character and appearance of this part of the Green Belt. 7.28 Overall, it is considered that the development proposal would provide a conspicuously low impact and discrete development that adequately maintains the integrity of the rural feel of intervening land. 7.29 It is considered that the proposed development would constitute (paragraph 89 \u2018exception\u2019) limited infilling in a village, so as not to amount to inappropriate development in the Green Belt. Separately, only a very modest impact on openness would arise, not giving rise to any material harm. The proposed development would also not conflict with any of the purposes for including land within the Green Belt. Separately, the development would not give rise to any material harm to the character and appearance of this part of the Green Belt. 7.30 In the overall planning balance \u2026 , it is considered that the less than material harm that would be caused by the proposed development to the Green Belt would be outweighed (and \u201cclearly\u201d so, albeit the application is not required to demonstrate \u2018very special circumstances\u2019) by other considerations that strongly militate in favour of the proposal.\u201d 19. Under the heading \u201cPlanning History\u201d, the planning officer said this (in paragraph 7.64): \u201c7.64 Full consideration has also been given to the planning history relating to this site and the proposed development, and also to the two subsequent appeals made against the decision of the local planning authority to refuse planning permission \u2026 (which were dismissed on 08\/02\/2000 and 09\/01\/2009).\u201d 20. In section 8 of the report, \u201cConclusion\u201d, he said (in paragraphs 8.1 and 8.2): \u201c8.1 \u2026 Material considerations, including the NPPF \u2026 , strongly indicate that the application should, in the circumstances of this case, be determined other than in accordance with Local Plan Policy H7, having regard to all relevant matters. 8.2 The proposed development does not constitute inappropriate development in the Green Belt given that it would constitute (paragraph 89 exception) limited infilling in a village. \u2026\u201d. 21. He recommended that planning permission be granted, subject to conditions (paragraph 9.1). The committee meeting 22. When the committee met on 5 July 2016, as the minutes record, the planning officer introduced the proposal to the members with the aid of a PowerPoint presentation. Dr Tate addressed the committee, explaining his objection. He referred to the conclusion of the inspector in the January 2009 decision letter that the site would not be \u201cinfill\u201d development, and asked why the planning officer was now \u201coverriding the precedent\u201d. Ms Leffers-Smith and her brother spoke in support of the proposal. The minutes of the meeting also state: \u201cIn response to questions from the Members of the Committee, the following information was noted: \u2013 \u2022 The Morpeth Neighbourhood Plan did not preclude other statements [sic], and Officers had taken the view that the NPPF allowed for infill in other villages. \u2022 The NPPF did not give a definition of a village. \u2022 There had been a sub-division of plots where planning had been approved, i.e., Juniper.\u201d 23. The committee resolved to grant planning permission, \u201csubject to the reasons in the report\u201d. 24. The county council\u2019s decision notice contains no reasons for the grant of planning permission, only reasons for the conditions imposed. Did the county council err in law? 25. It is well established that, in principle, previous appeal decisions are capable of being material considerations in planning decisions, given the importance of consistency in decision-making (see my judgment in DLA Delivery Ltd. v Baroness Cumberlege[2018] EWCA Civ 1305, at paragraphs 29 and 30). 26. In North Wiltshire District Council v Secretary of State for the Environment (1993) 65 P. & C.R. 137, which contains the classic statement of principle, the facts were not unlike those of the case before us. In that case, as here, the proposal was for a single dwelling-house on an undeveloped site in a village. There was a previous decision of an inspector on an appeal for a similar development on the same site. The inspector in that previous appeal had concluded that the development could not be regarded as infilling within the settlement, and dismissed the appeal. In the second appeal the inspector was made aware of the earlier decision. Without referring to it in his decision letter, he concluded that \u201cthough undoubtedly not infill in the usual sense of that word, \u2026 the addition of a further dwelling within this group need not in principle conflict with the council\u2019s policies\u201d. His decision was quashed in the High Court because he had failed to refer to the previous appeal decision and distinguish it, if he could, with clear reasons. The main point at issue in the second decision had been whether the development was infilling within the settlement \u2013 and on this question the inspector had failed to come to grips with the conclusions reached in the first decision. 27. In his judgment on the appeal to this court (with which Purchas L.J. and Sir Michael Kerr agreed), Mann L.J. said (at p.145): \u201c\u2026Where an inspector\u2019s reasons do not indicate whether he has had regard to a material consideration which was placed before him then there must usually be (in Lord Bridge\u2019s words [in Save Britain\u2019s Heritage v Number 1 Poultry Ltd. [1991] 1 W.L.R. 153, at p.167]) \u201csubstantial doubt whether the decision [was taken] within the powers of the Act[\u201d.] Accordingly the interests of an applicant will in that circumstance have been substantially prejudiced by the deficiency of reasons, for he is left in doubt as to empowerment and his ability to challenge on that ground. In this case the asserted material consideration is a previous appeal decision. It was not disputed in argument that a previous appeal decision is capable of being a material consideration. The proposition is in my judgment indisputable. One important reason why previous decisions are capable of being material is that like cases should be decided in a like manner so that there is consistency in the appellate process. Consistency is self-evidently important to both developers and development control authorities. But it is also important for the purpose of securing public confidence in the operation of the development control system. I do not suggest and it would be wrong to do so, that like cases must be decided alike. An inspector must always exercise his own judgment. He is therefore free upon consideration to disagree with the judgment of another but before doing so he ought to have regard to the importance of consistency and to give his reasons for departure from the previous decision. To state that like cases should be decided alike presupposes that the earlier case is alike and is not distinguishable in some relevant respect. If it is distinguishable then it usually will lack materiality by reference to consistency although it may be material in some other way. Where it is indistinguishable then ordinarily it must be a material consideration. A practical test for the inspector is to ask himself whether, if I decide this case in a particular way am I necessarily agreeing or disagreeing with some critical aspect of the decision in the previous case? The areas for possible agreement or disagreement cannot be defined but they would include interpretation of policies, aesthetic judgments and assessment of need. Where there is disagreement then the inspector must weigh the previous decision and give his reasons for departure from it. These can on occasion be short, for example in the case of disagreement on aesthetics. On other occasions they may have to be elaborate.\u201d 28. In Mansell v Tonbridge and Malling Borough Council [2017] EWCA Civ 1314 (at paragraphs 41, 42 and 63)this court has recently emphasized, as it has consistently done before, that planning officers\u2019 reports to committee ought to be read with reasonable benevolence, and not in an overly-legalistic way. The question for the court will always be whether, on a fair reading of the report as a whole, the officer has significantly misled the members on a matter that bears on their decision, and the error has gone uncorrected before the decision was made. An officer\u2019s advice may be significantly misleading where the officer has failed to address a matter on which the committee ought to receive explicit advice if the local planning authority is to be seen to have performed its decision-making duties in accordance with the law (see, for example, R. (on the application of Williams) v Powys County Council [2017] EWCA Civ 427). 29. Those familiar principles may now be seen in the light of recent authority on the giving of reasons for planning decisions \u2013 in this court in R. (on the application of Oakley) v South Cambridgeshire District Council [2017] 1 W.L.R. 3765, and in the Supreme Court in R. (on the application of CPRE Kent) v Dover District Council [2018] 1 W.L.R. 108. 30. In Oakley Elias L.J. said (in paragraph 26 of his judgment): \u201c26. There are powerful reasons why it is desirable for administrative bodies to give reasons for their decisions. They include improving the quality of decisions by focusing the mind of the decision-making body and thereby increasing the likelihood that the decision will be lawfully made; promoting public confidence in the decision-making process; providing, or at least facilitating, the opportunity for those affected to consider whether the decision was lawfully reached, thereby facilitating the process of judicial review or the exercise of any right of appeal; and respecting the individual\u2019s interest in understanding \u2013 and perhaps thereby more readily accepting \u2013 why a decision affecting him has been made. This last consideration is reinforced where an interested third party has taken an active part in the decision making-process, for example by making representations in the course of consultations. Indeed, the process of consultation is arguably undermined if potential consultees are left in the dark as to what influence, if any, their representations had.\u201d 31. In CPRE Kent Lord Carnwath (in paragraph 42 of his judgment, with which Lady Hale, Lord Wilson, Lady Black and Lord Lloyd-Jones agreed) observed that a decision letter of the Secretary of State or his inspector on an appeal was \u201cdesigned as a stand-alone document setting out all the relevant background material and policies, before reaching a reasoned conclusion\u201d. In a decision of a local planning authority this task \u201cwill normally be performed in the planning officers\u2019 report\u201d. He saw the common law principle of \u201cfairness\u201d as providing \u201cthe link between the common law duty to give reasons for an administrative decision, and the right of the individual affected to bring proceedings to challenge the legality of that decision\u201d. There was also, he said (in paragraph 55), a further common law principle in play \u2013 as Lord Bridge of Harwich had described it in Save Britain\u2019s Heritage (at p.170H), that \u201cjustice should not only be done, but also be seen to be done\u201d. And he added: \u201c55. \u2026 In the application of the principle to planning decisions, I see no reason to distinguish between a ministerial inquiry, and the less formal, but equally public, decision-making process of a local planning authority such as in this case.\u201d 32. Before H.H.J. Belcher it was argued on behalf of Dr Tate that the planning officer\u2019s report contained no reasoning on the question of whether the proposed development was for \u201climited infilling\u201d and showed no attempt to confront the obvious inconsistency with the inspector\u2019s view in the decision letter of 9 January 2009, to which Dr Tate had drawn attention in his letter of objection. The inspector\u2019s decision, it was submitted, was clearly a material consideration. The planning officer had also failed to explain how the development could be \u201cclassed as \u2018infill\u2019 given the low density development, the extensive grounds, and the fact that the site is surrounded by woodland\u201d (paragraph 18 of the statement of facts and grounds). 33. The judge recognized that \u201c[the] issues of both \u201cvillage\u201d and \u201climited infill\u201d are plainly material considerations, critical to the finding that the exception to inappropriate development in the Green Belt applies\u201d (paragraph 44 of the judgment). In her view \u201c[the] fact that individuals (including a Planning Inspector considering this site) may have different views as to what does or does not amount to infill, suggests that the conclusion is not necessarily an obvious one, and the reasoning for it ought to be explained\u201d, and the county council\u2019s reasoning would be \u201ca matter of importance in the context of any future planning applications for other development within Tranwell Woods\u201d. The approach contended for by the county council was contrary to the principles recognized by Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood in South Bucks District Council v Porter (No.2) [2004] 1 W.L.R. 1953 (in paragraph 36 of his speech). Its \u201creasoning will be a matter of importance in the context of any future applications for other development within Tranwell Woods\u201d (paragraph 45). She concluded (in paragraphs 46 and 47): \u201c46. I accept Mr [Juan] Lopez\u2019s submissions [on behalf of the county council] that the strategic planning committee was in no way bound by the Planning Inspector\u2019s earlier decision that development on this site did not amount to infill development. I also accept that it was open to the strategic planning committee to reach a decision which was different to that of the Planning Inspector on this issue. However, given that this was a material consideration and central to the ultimate grant of planning permission, I am satisfied that some reasons should have been given to support the conclusion reached. 47. I have come to the conclusion that, although they need only be limited, reasons should have been given for concluding that the development amounted to limited infill, particularly in the light of the earlier Planning Inspector\u2019s decision to the contrary.\u201d 34. Mr Lopez sought to persuade us that those conclusions of the judge were wrong. He seemed to accept that the 2009 appeal decision was a material consideration here. He did not suggest that, either in his report or at the committee meeting, the planning officer had grappled with the inspector\u2019s conclusion on the question of whether the proposed development was \u201climited infilling\u201d. But he submitted that the county council did not have to provide reasons for what was, in truth, a simple planning judgment on that question. The decision to grant planning permission here did not have to be distinguished from the inspector\u2019s decision. The inspector had not sought to prescribe the approach to be taken to the concept of \u201cinfill\u201d development. He had merely applied, as Mr Lopez put it, \u201cone reasonable test of infill development\u201d. In North Wiltshire District Council the inspector in the second appeal had not referred at all to the previous decision. In this case, however, the previous decision was appended to the planning officer\u2019s report and referred to at the committee meeting. The committee was not \u201csignificantly\u201d misled by the advice it was given. The judge had failed to see that this was an excessively legalistic challenge. And she had also overlooked the question of \u201csubstantial prejudice\u201d to Dr Tate. There was none. It was clear why the committee had decided as it did. There was no need to quash the planning permission. 35. On behalf of Dr Tate, Ms Annabel Graham Paul defended the judge\u2019s conclusions as impeccable and in accordance with well-established principles on consistency in planning decision-making, the court\u2019s approach to challenges based on criticism of a planning officer\u2019s report to committee, and the giving of reasons for planning decisions. 36. The case law on consistency in planning decision-making was not referred to in argument in the court below. In my view, however, the judge\u2019s approach was congruent with it, and her conclusions correct. 37. The question of whether a particular proposed development is to be regarded as \u201climited infilling\u201d in a village for the purposes of the policy in paragraph 89 of the NPPF will always be essentially a question of fact and planning judgmentfor the planning decision-maker. There is no definition of \u201cinfilling\u201d or \u201climited infilling\u201d in the NPPF, nor any guidance there, to assist that exercise of planning judgment. It is left to the decision-maker to form a view, in the light of the specific facts. Can this proposed development be regarded as \u201climited infilling\u201d, or not, having regard to the nature and size of the development itself, the location of the application site and its relationship to other, existing development adjoining it, and adjacent to it? That is not the kind of question to which the court should put forward an answer of its own. Nor will it readily interfere with the decision-maker\u2019s own view. I agree with the observations to the same effect made by Sullivan L.J. in Wood v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2015] EWCA Civ 195 (in paragraph 12 of his judgment): \u201c12. Before this court it was common ground that whether or not a proposed development constituted limited infilling in a village for the purpose of paragraph 89 [of the NPPF] was a question of planning judgment for the inspector and the inspector\u2019s answer to that question would depend upon his assessment of the position on the ground. It was also common ground that while a village boundary as defined in a Local Plan would be a relevant consideration, it would not necessarily be determinative, particularly in circumstances where the boundary as defined did not accord with the inspector\u2019s assessment of the extent of the village on the ground. \u2026\u201d. 38. In his decision letter of 9 January 2009 the inspector acknowledged (in paragraph 10) the absence of a relevant definition of \u201cinfill\u201d development, either in the development plan or in government planning policy. But he favoured, as \u201cone reasonable test of infill development\u201d, the question of whether the development would occupy \u201ca gap in an otherwise [developed] frontage \u2026\u201d. That is the test he adopted. And, when he applied that test, he found \u2013 as was a matter of fact \u2013 that the proposal before him was not \u201cinfill\u201d development. The site was, as he acknowledged, \u201cenclosed on three sides by dwellings\u201d, with the plantation to the south. But it did \u201cnot represent a gap in an otherwise [developed] frontage on the C151 through [the village]\u201d. It was not a vacant site in a line of buildings along a street or lane, and the proposed development would not be filling an obvious gap of that kind. It would, in fact, be a distinctly different form of development \u2013 the erection of a building behind the dwellings on the lane, on a plot created between \u201cBramblings\u201d and \u201cWestwood Cottage\u201d, with access along the track leading to \u201cWestwood Cottage\u201d and \u201cHavis House\u201d.And, the inspector concluded, it would \u201cadd an intrusive element to this sensitive area of countryside\u201d, setting a precedent for further development of the same kind. 39. The planning officer was obviously aware of the inspector\u2019s decision. He referred to it in his report and appended it. He must have been aware, therefore, of the inspector\u2019s approach to the question of whether the construction of a dwelling-house on this site should be regarded as \u201cinfill\u201d development, and the approach the inspector had adopted to that question. Yet in his assessment of the proposal on its planning merits, he said nothing about the inspector\u2019s approach, plainly adopted a different approach, and reached a different conclusion. 40. There was no attempt to distinguish the previous decision on its facts, and I cannot see how that would have been possible. The situation on the ground \u2013 the site and its surroundings \u2013 had not materially changed since the inspector\u2019s decision. And the proposal itself was, effectively, the same. 41. The policy context had changed, but not to become less restrictive \u2013 because the site was now in the Green Belt. This change in policy had only increased the importance of establishing whether the development was \u201cinfill\u201d development or \u201climited infilling\u201d. This was now a crucial question. The answer to it would determine whether or not the proposal was within one of the defined exceptions in paragraph 89 of the NPPF and thus not \u201cinappropriate\u201d development in the Green Belt, and, therefore, whether or not it had to be justified by \u201cvery special circumstances\u201d if planning permission was to be granted. 42. In the circumstances, it seems to me, the officer ought to have recognized that the county council was now dealing with a \u201clike\u201d case, in the sense to which Mann L.J. referred in North Wiltshire District Council. The committee was not, of course, bound to adopt the same approach as the inspector. It could properly take a different approach. But this was a case in which, if that was to be done, the decision-maker had to acknowledge that the approach now being adopted was materially different from that taken in the previous decision, and to provide some explanation, brief as that might be, for the inconsistency. This was a case in which the status of the site and development \u2013 whether \u201climited infilling\u201d or not \u2013 was, in Mann L.J.\u2019s words, a \u201ccritical aspect of the decision\u201d being made, and, in the interests of consistency, it was necessary for reasons to be given for \u201cdeparture from the previous decision\u201d. Although this point was very firmly made by Dr Tate in his letter of objection, the officer did not tackle it, either in the advice he gave the members in his report or in the course of discussion at the committee meeting. 43. This is not to endorse, or encourage, an excessively legalistic approach, nor to subject the planning officer\u2019s report to undue scrutiny. It is simply the court asking itself whether the planning decision-maker has proceeded as the law requires, having regard to material considerations and providing adequate reasons to show that this has been done. 44. I accept that the principle of consistency goes, in this case, to a matter of fact and planning judgment, and one on which detailed reasons will generally not be required. And the question is not whether any of the planning officer\u2019s conclusions was irrational. The fact remains, however, though he did not acknowledge it, that his approach and conclusion were starkly at odds with the inspector\u2019s on a critical point, namely whether the proposal was for \u201cinfill\u201d development \u2013 or \u201climited infilling\u201d, and thus, under national planning policy, not \u201cinappropriate\u201d development in the Green Belt. It is not entirely clear what approach, in principle, the planning officer adopted to this issue. But it is clear that his approach to it and conclusion on it were different from the inspector\u2019s. As the circumstances in North Wiltshire District Council show, the need for reasons to be given to explain such inconsistency is not removed by the fact that the planning judgment involved is relatively straightforward. In adopting a different \u201ctest\u201d from the inspector\u2019s, whatever that \u201ctest\u201d actually was, the planning officer and committee were, in Mann L.J.\u2019s words, \u201cnecessarily \u2026 disagreeing with [a] critical aspect of the decision in the previous case\u201d. Why was the approach adopted and applied by the inspector unsuitable \u2013 if it was \u2013 in January 2009? And if it was suitable in January 2009, why was it no longer so in July 2016? In short, why was the construction of a dwelling on this site \u201climited infilling\u201d in July 2016 when it was not \u201cinfill\u201d development in January 2009? Some reasons were required to show that these questions had been faced and resolved by the county council in making its decision. None were given, either in the officer\u2019s report, or in the minutes of the committee meeting \u2013 or in the county council\u2019s decision notice itself. 45. In my view the county council\u2019s decision to grant planning permission was vitiated by that failure, in much the same way as the second inspector\u2019s decision was invalidated by a similar failure in North Wiltshire District Council. It was, plainly, an error of law. 46. Inherent in that error of law there was \u201csubstantial prejudice\u201d to Dr Tate. He was left without an explanation of the county council\u2019s approach and its reasons for differing from the previous decision. So too were other members of the public affected by the grant of planning permission. This is a case in which the interests of the claimant have been \u2013 as usually they will be \u2013 substantially prejudiced by a deficiency of reasons to indicate whether the decision-maker has had regard to a material consideration. It is substantial prejudice of the kind referred to by Lord Bridge in Save Britain\u2019s Heritage (at p.167F) \u2013 \u201cto an opponent of development when permission has been granted where the reasons for the decision are so inadequately or obscurely expressed as to raise a substantial doubt whether the decision was taken within the powers of the Act\u201d. As Ms Graham Paul submitted, the court could not, in these circumstances, withhold an order to quash the planning permission. To do so it would have to speculate on the outcome of a lawful consideration of the proposal in the light of the 2009 appeal decision. It is of course unfortunate that this will be the third time the court has had to sustain a challenge to the county council\u2019s decision on this application for planning permission. 47. That, in effect, was the conclusion reached by the judge, and I think she was right. Conclusion 48. For the reasons I have given, I would dismiss this appeal. Lord Justice Peter Jackson 49. I agree. The issue of whether this proposed development represented limited infill was a straightforward planning judgment, but it was taken against the background of a depressingly protracted planning history. It is, to say the least, surprising that the planning officer and the committee did not explain, as they might have done in a very few sentences, why they were departing from the previous appeal decision, particularly as Dr Tate had presented the issue to them on a plate. But they did not do so in the smallest way, and the judge was right to quash their decision for lack of reasons, notwithstanding the continuing waste of public and private time and money caused by these repeated failures to reach a lawful decision in relation to this site.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

Sources officielles :<\/strong> consulter la page source<\/a><\/p>\n

Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).<\/em><\/p>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Lord Justice Lindblom: Introduction 1. Did a local planning authority, when granting planning permission for the construction of a dwelling-house in a village in the Green Belt, err in law in failing to provide reasons for its conclusion that the development would be \u201climited infilling\u201d, contrary to the view of an inspector in a previous appeal decision? That is the…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":0,"template":"","meta":{"_crdt_document":""},"kji_country":[7608],"kji_court":[7943],"kji_chamber":[],"kji_year":[47917],"kji_subject":[7612],"kji_keyword":[7692,9070,11227,7975,7696],"kji_language":[7611],"class_list":["post-786461","kji_decision","type-kji_decision","status-publish","hentry","kji_country-royaume-uni","kji_court-court-of-appeal-civil-division","kji_year-47917","kji_subject-fiscal","kji_keyword-council","kji_keyword-development","kji_keyword-inspector","kji_keyword-paragraph","kji_keyword-planning","kji_language-anglais"],"yoast_head":"\nTate, R (on the application of) v Leffers-Smith - Ma\u00eetre Hassan Kohen, avocat en droit p\u00e9nal \u00e0 Paris<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/jurisprudences\/tate-r-on-the-application-of-v-leffers-smith\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"zh_CN\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Tate, R (on the application of) v Leffers-Smith\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Lord Justice Lindblom: Introduction 1. Did a local planning authority, when granting planning permission for the construction of a dwelling-house in a village in the Green Belt, err in law in failing to provide reasons for its conclusion that the development would be \u201climited infilling\u201d, contrary to the view of an inspector in a previous appeal decision? 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