{"id":794743,"date":"2026-05-01T03:29:39","date_gmt":"2026-05-01T01:29:39","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/jurisprudences\/kebbell-developments-ltd-v-leeds-city-council\/"},"modified":"2026-05-01T03:29:39","modified_gmt":"2026-05-01T01:29:39","slug":"kebbell-developments-ltd-v-leeds-city-council","status":"publish","type":"kji_decision","link":"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/jurisprudences\/kebbell-developments-ltd-v-leeds-city-council\/","title":{"rendered":"Kebbell Developments Ltd v Leeds City Council"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"kji-decision\">\n<div class=\"kji-full-text\">\n<p>Lord Justice Lindblom: Introduction 1. Was a neighbourhood plan unlawfully put to a referendum after modifications had been made to it by the local planning authority, differing in part from those recommended by the examiner? That is the basic question in this appeal. 2. In a claim for judicial review, the appellant, Kebbell Developments Ltd., challenged the decision of the respondent, Leeds City Council, to allow the Linton Neighbourhood Plan \u2013 prepared by the interested party, Collingham with Linton Parish Council \u2013 to proceed to a referendum under paragraph 12 of Schedule 4B to the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 before its adoption under section 38A(4) of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004. The claim was dismissed by Kerr J. on 28 October 2016. I granted permission to appeal on 21 June 2017. 3. The proceedings concern a piece of farmland known as \u201cThe Ridge\u201d, about 4.5 hectares in area, on the north-western edge of the village of Linton, near Wetherby. The site is owned by Mr Jeremy Lenighan, but Kebbell hold an interest in the access to it \u2013 with a view to developing it for housing. They have applied for outline planning permission for a development of 26 dwellings on the site, and have appealed to the Secretary of State against the city council\u2019s failure to determine that application. The site was once in the West Yorkshire Green Belt, but was taken out in 2001. In the Leeds Unitary Development Plan (Review 2006), adopted by the city council in 2006, it was identified as a Protected Area of Search, safeguarded under Policy N34. The parish council opposes its development and seeks its return to the Green Belt. 4. In 2014 the parish council began the preparation of the neighbourhood plan, which went to an examination in 2015. Although Kebbell did not make representations to the examiner, Mr Lenighan did. His concern was that Policy B2 in the draft plan, which related specifically to \u201cThe Ridge\u201d, would undermine the status of the site as a Protected Area of Search. In a report submitted to the city council in August 2015 the examiner concluded that, subject to the modifications he recommended, the neighbourhood plan met the \u201cbasic conditions\u201d in paragraph 8(2) of Schedule 4B to the 1990 Act. Among those modifications was the deletion of Policy B2 and \u201call associated text\u201d. In November 2015the city council decided to make a number of modifications to the plan, including the deletion of Policy B2 and its accompanying text. But it went further by adding some text to a surviving part of the plan, explaining why the parish council considered \u201cThe Ridge\u201d unsuitable for development. It decided to allow the plan, as modified, to proceed to a referendum. The referendum was held in December 2015, but the neighbourhood plan is yet to be made. The issues in the appeal 5. In rejecting Kebbell\u2019s challenge to the city council\u2019s decision to put the neighbourhood plan to a referendum, Kerr J. concluded that the city council had not dealt with the examiner\u2019s recommendations unlawfully. That conclusion is attacked in this appeal. Three main issues arise from the four live grounds of appeal \u2013 ground (iv) having been abandoned at the hearing \u2013 and the city council\u2019s respondent\u2019s notice: (1) Did the city council act outside its powers under paragraph 12(6)(a) of Schedule 4B to the 1990 Act in departing from the examiner\u2019s recommendations when modifying the provisions of the neighbourhood plan relating to \u201cThe Ridge\u201d? (2) Did the city council fail to give sufficient reasons for its modifications, as required under paragraph 12(11)(b) of Schedule 4B and regulation 18 of the Neighbourhood Planning (General) Regulations 2012? (3) In the light of the requirements in paragraph 13 of Schedule 4B and regulation 17A of the 2012 regulations, ought the city council to have consulted on the modifications? The statutory scheme for the preparation of neighbourhood plans 6. Section 38A(2) of the 2004 Act defines a \u201cneighbourhood development plan\u201d as \u201ca plan which sets out policies (however expressed) in relation to the development and use of land in the whole or any part of a particular neighbourhood area specified in the plan\u201d. Once made, a neighbourhood plan becomes part of the development plan (section 38(3)(c)), in accordance with which applications for planning permission must be determined unless material considerations indicate otherwise (section 38(6)). 7. Under paragraph 1(2) of Schedule 4B to the 1990 Act, the \u201cqualifying body\u201d intending to produce a neighbourhood plan \u2013 here the parish council \u2013 must prepare a draft \u201cneighbourhood development order\u201d. If satisfied that the draft order meets certain statutory requirements, the local planning authority \u2013 here the city council \u2013 must submit it for independent examination by an examiner (paragraph 7(2)). The examiner must consider whether the draft order meets \u201cthe basic conditions\u201d (paragraph 8(1)(a)). The requirements constituting the \u201cbasic conditions\u201d are set out in paragraph 8(2). The condition in paragraph 8(2)(a) is that it must be \u201cappropriate to make the order\u201d, having regard to national policies and guidance. The condition in paragraph 8(2)(e) is that the making of the order is \u201cin general conformity with the strategic policies contained in the development plan\u201d \u2013 here the relevant policies of the unitary development plan and the Leeds Core Strategy, adopted by the city council in November 2014. 8. The \u201cgeneral rule\u201d is that the examination will be conducted on the basis of a \u201cconsideration of written representations\u201d (paragraph 9(1)). But the examiner must hold a hearing to receive \u201coral representations about a particular issue at the hearing\u201d if, in his view, \u201cthe consideration of oral representations is necessary to ensure adequate examination of the issue or a person has a fair chance to put a case\u201d (paragraph 9(2)(a)). The hearing must be in public (paragraph 9(4)). The examiner must prepare a report on the draft order, recommending that it be submitted to a referendum, or submitted with modifications specified in his report, or that the proposal for the order is refused (paragraph 10(1) and (2)). The only modifications he may recommend include \u201cmodifications that [he] considers need to be made to secure that the draft [plan] meets the basic conditions mentioned in paragraph 8(2)\u201d (paragraph 10(3)(a)).His report may not recommend that the order is put to a referendum, whether with or without modifications, if he considers that it does not meet the \u201cbasic conditions\u201d (paragraph 10(4)(a)). 9. The local planning authority must consider the examiner\u2019s recommendations in his report and decide what action to take (paragraph 12(2)). If satisfied that the draft plan meets the \u201cbasic conditions\u201d, or that it would do so if modifications, \u201cwhether or not recommended by the examiner\u201d, were made to it, the authority must put it to a referendum (paragraph 12(4)(b)). Paragraph 12(6) provides, so far as is relevant in these proceedings: \u201c(6) The only modifications that the authority may make are \u2013 (a) modifications that the authority consider need to be made to secure that the draft order meets the basic conditions mentioned in paragraph 8(2), \u2026 (e) modifications for the purpose of correcting errors.\u201d 10. Paragraph 12(11) provides: \u201c(11) The authority must publish in such manner as may be prescribed \u2013 (a) the decisions they make under this paragraph, (b) their reasons for making those decisions, \u2026 \u2026 .\u201d The arrangements to be made for the \u201cPublication of the examiner\u2019s report and plan proposal decisions\u201d are in regulation 18 of the 2012 regulations, which provides: \u201c(1) Paragraph (2) applies where a local planning authority decide \u2013 \u2026 (c) what action to take in response to the recommendations of an examiner made in a report under paragraph 10 of Schedule 4B to the 1990 Act \u2026 in relation to a neighbourhood development plan; (d) what modifications, if any, they are to make to the draft plan under paragraph 12(6) of Schedule 4B to the 1990 Act \u2026 ; \u2026 (2) As soon as possible after making a decision referred to in paragraph (1), a local planning authority must publish \u2013 (a) the decision and their reasons for it (\u201cthe decision statement\u201d), (b) details of where and when the decision statement may be inspected; and (c) in the case of a decision mentioned in paragraph (1)(c), the report made by the examiner under paragraph 10 of Schedule 4B to the 1990 Act \u2026 , on their website and in such other manner as they consider is likely to bring the decision statement and, as the case may be, the report to the attention of people who live, work or carry on business in the neighbourhood area.\u201d 11. Paragraph 13 of Schedule 4B provides: \u201c(1) If \u2013 (a) the local planning authority propose to make a decision which differs from that recommended by the examiner, and (b) the reason for the difference is (wholly or partly) as a result of new evidence or a new fact or a different view taken by the authority as to a particular fact, the authority must notify prescribed persons of their proposed decision (and the reason for it) and invite representations. (2) If the authority consider it appropriate to do so, they may refer the issue to independent examination. (3) Regulations may make provision about examinations under this paragraph (and the regulations may include any provision of a kind mentioned in paragraph 11(2)). (4) This paragraph does not apply in relation to recommendations in relation to the area in which a referendum is to take place.\u201d Persons were \u201cprescribed\u201d for this purpose by regulation 17A of the 2012 regulations, with effect from 1 October 2016. Paragraph 17A(2)(b) provides that the \u201cpersons prescribed for the purposes of paragraph 13(1)\u201d include \u201cany person whose representation was submitted to the examiner of the plan proposal in accordance with regulation 17(d)\u201d. Policy N34 of the unitary development plan 12. Paragraph 5.4.9 of the unitary development plan, introducing Policy N34, states: \u201cTo ensure the necessary long-term endurance of the Green Belt, definition of its boundaries was accompanied by designation of Protected Areas of Search to provide land for longer-term development needs. Given the emphasis in the UDP on providing for new development within urban areas it is not currently envisaged that there will be a need to use any such safeguarded land during the Review period. However, it is retained both to maintain the permanence of Green Belt boundaries and to provide some flexibility for the City\u2019s long-term development. The suitability of the protected sites for development will be comprehensively reviewed as part of the preparation of the Local Development Framework, and in the light of the next Regional Spatial Strategy. Meanwhile, it is intended that no development should be permitted on this land that would prejudice the possibility of longer-term development, and any proposals for such development will be treated as departures from the Plan.\u201d Policy N34 states: \u201cWithin those areas shown on the proposals map under this policy, development will be restricted to that which is necessary for the operation of existing uses together with such temporary uses as would not prejudice the possibility of long term development.\u201d \u201cThe Ridge\u201d was one of 34 sites protected under that policy. 13. When the city council\u2019s core strategy was adopted in November 2014, the site retained its status as a Protected Area of Search in the unitary development plan. In the draft Leeds Site Allocations Plan published in September 2015 it was one of the areas of \u201cSafeguarded Land\u201d proposed to be identified under Policy HG3 to give effect to Spatial Policy 10 of the core strategy, as a site \u201csafeguarded from development for the plan period (to 2028) to provide a reserve of potential sites for longer term development post 2028 and protect the Green Belt\u201d. The March 2015 draft neighbourhood plan 14. The history of the preparation of the Linton Neighbourhood Plan is very clearly set out in Kerr J.\u2019s judgment (in paragraphs 13 to 35), and I gratefully adopt his narrative. 15. In the draft neighbourhood plan published in March 2015, section 12 dealt with \u201cCategory B: New Housing Development\u201d. In sub-section 12.1, \u201cB1: Small Scale Development\u201d, Policy B1, \u201cSmall Scale Development\u201d, supported only development of three kinds: \u201cwindfall development within the village built area by the addition of a number of smaller dwellings on an existing plot\u201d, development \u201con land allocated for housing by [the city council]\u201d, and \u201csmall scale [development] with 10 or less dwellings\u201d. The text preceding that policy said that \u201c[it] is \u2026 important to be mindful that the PAS site (SHLAA 2136 The Ridge), or other sites currently designated Green Belt, may be allocated for housing\u201d (paragraph 105). Under the heading \u201cFeedback from the Community\u201d, paragraph 106 said that \u201c[notwithstanding] the fact that Linton is not considered to be a sustainable location for significant development, the [Drafting Committee] undertook a thorough evaluation of all the possible sites\u201d. Paragraph 107 said: \u201c107. Taking all the information and comments into account, it was felt that none of the sites that were put forward were suitable for development; the principal reason being their allocation as Green Belt. The other reasons are tabulated below \u2026\u201d. In the table beneath that text the entry for \u201cThe Ridge\u201d, in the column headed \u201cSummary of Main Reasons\u201d, said, simply: \u201cSee section B2\u201d. This was a reference to subsection 12.3, \u201cB2: Protected Area of Search Site (The Ridge)\u201d, in which paragraphs 111 and 112, under the heading \u201cJustification and Evidence\u201d, said: \u201c111. The one significant area of land in Linton not in the Green Belt (known as the The Ridge site) was designated as a Protected Area of Search (PAS) in the LCC\u2019s UDP, which means this land has been identified for possible future development. LCC have been considering the consultation responses to the SA Issues and Options Report, and have decided to retain this site as PAS. This decision has been recorded in the report presented to the Development Plans Panel on 13th January 2015. The schedule accompanying the report states: \u201cSite allocated as PAS (safeguarded land) in the UDP and not situated within land defined as the Green Belt. Site is well related to the existing settlement; however Linton is not within the settlement hierarchy. Access to the site is difficult to achieve. Site not required to meet the housing numbers due to local preference for an alternative strategic option and should therefore be retained as PAS.\u201d 112. In addition, site-specific problems make The Ridge unsuitable for development. These include: \u2022 The site occupies a prominent ridgeline and extends beyond the village built area. \u2022 If developed it would impact upon open countryside views and would be an unacceptable extension into the countryside. \u2022 There is opportunity to return this land to agricultural use and possibly also to Green Belt. \u2022 Vehicular access is via Tibgarth, off Northgate Lane. This access is very steep and would require significant excavation works which would impact on the natural ridge line. This is part of a key view to be protected, and it is likely the excavation works would extend beyond the existing built area. The completed access would remain steep and could have highway safety concerns. \u2022 Northgate Lane is unsuitable for extra traffic flow having unsafe junctions and single car width sections to the East and the West. The footpath is discontinuous. \u2022 The distance to the nearest bus stop and services is significantly greater than the accessibility thresholds included in Leeds Core Strategy, and it seems inevitable that the vast majority of journeys created would be by car. \u2022 The site fulfils the requirements for Green Belt status as set out in the NPPF and the Local Plan (CS10).\u201d Under the heading \u201cFeedback from the Community\u201d, paragraph 113 said: \u201c113. Feedback from the Open Weekend in June 2013 confirmed the residents of Linton do not think this site is suitable for development for the reasons outlined above. The subsequent SG meeting confirmed this opinion and agreed to investigate returning the whole of the site to Green Belt.\u201d Policy B2, \u201cPAS Site (The Ridge)\u201d, in sub-section 12.4, stated: \u201cSHLAA 2136, The Ridge, Linton will continue to be protected from development until its longer term allocation has been determined via the Local Plan Sites Allocation Plan, following a Green Belt review, housing needs and sites assessments.\u201d Sub-section 12.5 describes the \u201cProject to Help Deliver Our Vision\u201d as being to \u201c[examine] returning all or part of The Ridge to Green Belt\u201d. 16. In section 18, \u201cProjects for Linton\u201d, the part of the \u201cProjects Priority List\u201d headed \u201cHigh Priority\u201d includes, as project 2, \u201cExamine returning all or part of The Ridge to Green Belt and agricultural use\u201d, and a reference to Policy B2. The examiner\u2019s report 17. In section 6 of his report to the city council, the examiner recommended that Policy B1, \u201cSmall Scale Development\u201d, be changed, to state that \u201c[developments] of less than ten dwellings will be allowed within the built-up part of Linton, outside the Green Belt, subject to respecting and where possible, enhancing local character and maintaining residential amenity\u201d. 18. Under the heading \u201cPolicy B2: PAS Site (The Ridge)\u201d he concluded: \u201cPolicy B2 seeks to protect a site named in Leeds City Council\u2019s Strategic Housing Land Availability Assessment (SHLAA), The Ridge, from development, until its longer term allocation has been determined via the Local Plan Sites Allocation Plan and following a Green Belt review. Policy B2 clearly relates to matters under the consideration of Leeds City Council. The Local Plan Sites Allocation Plan does not form part of the Neighbourhood Plan and Green Belt Review is a strategic matter, rather than a neighbourhood planning matter. In addition, The Ridge is already subject to Leeds UDP saved policy N34. It is not the role of neighbourhood plans to simply repeat existing policy.\u201d and he made this recommendation: \u201c \u2022 Delete Policy B2 and all associated text\u201d. 19. As for the \u201cProjects Priority List\u201d in section 18 of the plan, the examiner\u2019s conclusions and recommendation, in section 6 of his report, were: \u201cThe High, Medium and Low Priority Lists simply set out the aspirations of Collingham with Linton Parish Council. These are not Policy matters. I recommend: \u2022 Delete the Policy Number column of each table I note that the changes to the Neighbourhood Plan need not impact on the Priority Lists, as the Lists simply reflect actions that Collingham with Linton Parish Council would like to progress.\u201d 20. In section 8 of his report, \u201cSummary\u201d, the examiner confirmed that, subject to the modifications he had recommended, the neighbourhood plan, among other things, \u201c\u2026 is in general conformity with the strategic policies of the development plan for the area \u2026\u201d. He concluded that \u201c[taking] the above into account\u201d, the neighbourhood plan \u201cmeets the basic conditions\u201d. The city council\u2019s decision statement 21. The city council\u2019s decision statement on the neighbourhood plan was published on 4 November 2015.In section 3, \u201cDecisions and Reasons\u201d, paragraph 3.2 said that the city council accepted \u201cthe majority of the modifications and the reasons put forward by the Examiner for them\u201d, but that some of them it \u201cpartially or fully [rejected]\u201d. One of these was \u201c[proposed] modification M23 (Policy B2)\u201d. In the schedule of modifications recommended in the examiner\u2019s report, in Table 1 of the decision statement, blue highlighting indicated \u201cwhere the examiner\u2019s proposed modifications are partially or fully rejected\u201d. The city council also stated that it \u201cconsiders the Plan (as amended) will meet the Basic Conditions\u201d (ibid.). 22. In Table 1 the city council indicated that it accepted the examiner\u2019s recommended modification to Policy B1. This was modification M22. 23. The modification relating to \u201cPolicy B2: Protected Area of Search Site (The Ridge)\u201d was modification M23. The entry for that modification was highlighted in blue. In the column headed \u201cPage\/Part of the Plan\u201d, the relevant provisions in the neighbourhood plan were identified as \u201cPolicy B2, page 28, section 12.4\u201d. In the column headed \u201cExaminer\u2019s recommended changes\u201d, the relevant change was described as \u201cDelete Policy and all associated text\u201d. In the column headed \u201cReason\u201d, which contained a summary of the examiner\u2019s relevant conclusions, it was stated: \u201cThis relates to (strategic) matters under the consideration of Leeds City Council and does not form part of the Neighbourhood Plan. The Ridge is already subject to Leeds UDP saved policy N34, neighbourhood plans should not simply repeat existing policy.\u201d and in the column headed \u201cLeeds City Council\u2019s decision and reason\u201d: \u201cModify the text as indicated to comply with examiner\u2019s recommendations and remove strategic matters dealt with by [the city council]. Delete \u201cSee section B2\u201d in the table in para 107 [i.e. section B1] to reflect the deletion of Section B2 and insert \u201cPAS site. Elevated site on ridgeline with risk of visual impact; vehicular access is steep. Traffic issues same as SHLAA 1252. Distance to bus stop outside Core Strategy threshold\u201d to correct a resulting error in cross-referencing.\u201d 24. The modification relating to the \u201cProjects for Linton\u201d in section 18 of the plan was modification M39. The entry for this modification was not highlighted in blue. The relevant part of the plan was identified as the \u201cProjects list\u201d. The \u201cExaminer\u2019s recommended changes\u201d weredescribed as \u201cDelete the Policy Number column of each table\u201d, and the \u201cReason\u201d was stated to be that \u201c[the] Priority Lists are aspirations of Linton Parish Council and are not Policy matters\u201d. The city council\u2019s \u201cdecision and reason\u201d were to \u201c[modify] text as indicated to comply with examiner\u2019s recommendations and to clarify the status of the projects\u201d. The neighbourhood plan as modified 25. In the neighbourhood plan as modified, the text introducing Policy B1, under the heading \u201cJustification and Evidence\u201d, replicates that in the March 2015 draft. Paragraph 82 repeats paragraph 105 of that draft. Under the heading \u201cFeedback from the Community\u201d, paragraph 83 repeats paragraph 106 of the March 2015 draft. In paragraph 84 the text above the table replicates the text above the table in paragraph 107 in that draft, word for word (see paragraph 15 above). In the table, in the entry for \u201cThe Ridge\u201d under the heading \u201cSummary of Main Reasons\u201d, the words \u201cSee section B2\u201d are replaced by this note: \u201cPAS site. Elevated site on ridgeline with a risk of visual impact; vehicular access is steep. Traffic issues are the same as SHLAA 1252. Distance to bus stop outside Core Strategy threshold.\u201d \u201cSHLAA 1252\u201d is a site at Northgate Lane, for which the corresponding note states: \u201cNorthgate Lane is narrow with a substandard junction at Main Street and discontinuous footpath to Linton centre\u201d. Policy B1 is in the terms recommended by the examiner. Sub-section 12.3 of the May 2015 draft plan, comprising the text that had introduced Policy B2 in paragraphs 111 to 113, the policy itself in sub-section 12.4, and sub-section 12.5 were all deleted in their entirety (again, see paragraph 15 above). 26. In section 18, \u201cProjects for Linton\u201d, the part of the \u201cProjects Priority List\u201d headed \u201cHigh Priority\u201d retains, as project 2, \u201cExamine returning all or part of The Ridge to Green Belt and agricultural use\u201d. Now, however, in accordance with the examiner\u2019s recommendation and the city council\u2019s modification M39, there is no reference to Policy B2, or to any other policy. Issue (1) \u2013 did the city council act outside its powersunder paragraph 12(6) of Schedule 4B? 27. Mr Christopher Young, for Kebbell, did not submit to us that the city council\u2019s modifications M23 and M39 rendered the neighbourhood plan \u201cas a whole\u201d out of \u201cgeneral conformity with the strategic policies contained in the development plan\u201d, or contrary to any of the other \u201cbasic conditions\u201d in paragraph 8(2) of Schedule 4B. He was right not to make that submission. It would clearly have been unsustainable in the light of the decisions of this court in Persimmon Homes (Thames Valley) Ltd. v Stevenage Borough Council [2005] EWCA Civ 1365 (see paragraphs 24 to 31 in the judgment of Laws L.J.) and R. (on the application of DLA Delivery Ltd.) v Lewes District Council [2017] EWCA Civ 58 (see paragraphs 23 to 26 of my judgment), and the first instance decision ofHolgate J. in R. (on the application of Crownhall Estates Ltd.) v Chichester District Council [2016] EWHC 73 (Admin) (see paragraph 29 of his judgment). 28. Kerr J. identified the \u201coverarching question\u201d in the case as being whether the city council was entitled to be \u201csatisfied\u201d that it was \u201cappropriate\u201d to adopt the neighbourhood plan, having regard to national planning policy and guidance, and that the making of the plan was in \u201cgeneral conformity\u201d with the strategic policies in the development plan(paragraph 40 of the judgment). That question required the court to \u201cassess whether the designation of [\u201cThe Ridge\u201d] as a PAS site in the Leeds Local Plan precluded the city council from accepting [the neighbourhood plan] in its final form\u201d. As the judge acknowledged (in paragraph 45), having referred to what Laws L.J. said in Persimmon Homes (in paragraph 28 of his judgment), the question of whether one plan is in general conformity with another is \u201ca matter of planning judgment for the decision maker\u201d, and the court\u2019s role here is \u201csupervisory, applying the usual public law standard and not any enhanced standard: per Laws [L.J.] \u2026 at paragraphs 29-30\u201d. The appropriate planning judgment was exercised in this case, and, in my view, it was exercised lawfully. 29. There is no criticism of the examiner\u2019s relevant conclusions, or of the modifications he recommended. He was entitled to conclude that the change he recommended to Policy B1, his recommended deletion of Policy B2 and \u201call associated text\u201d and of the policy numbers in the \u201cProjects Priority List\u201d were necessary to bring the neighbourhood plan into general conformity with the strategic policies of the development plan. And where the city council faithfully reflected those recommendations in its modifications, there is \u2013 and can be \u2013 no criticism of what it did. 30. The focus of Mr Young\u2019s argument here was on the city council\u2019s modification M23 in so far as it went beyond simply giving effect to the examiner\u2019s recommendation to \u201c[delete] Policy B2 and all associated text\u201d. He submitted that the city council had gone too far by inserting into the table in paragraph 84 of the neighbourhood plan, as modified, a summary of the text it had deleted in the March 2015 draft plan, in particular paragraph 112 \u2013 so far, in fact, as to be acting outside its powers in paragraph 12(6) of Schedule 4B to the 1990 Act. 31. Kerr J. rejected that argument. The city council had not been obliged to limit itself to the modifications recommended by the examiner, and it had not done so. It had put into the table in paragraph 84 text explaining the parish council\u2019s reasons for regarding \u201cThe Ridge\u201d as unsuitable for housing development \u201cof its own volition, consciously departing from the examiner\u2019s proposal\u201d (paragraph 55 of the judgment). The result was \u201ca degree of tension\u201d between the neighbourhood plan and the unitary development plan. The neighbourhood plan includes text suggesting that \u201cThe Ridge\u201d should not have dwellings built on it and should be returned to the Green Belt, while the unitary development plan leaves open the possibility of there being dwellings on it and says nothing about its being returned to the Green Belt. But this was \u201cnot of itself sufficient to compel a finding of general disconformity between the two plans\u201d (paragraph 56). Policy B1 says nothing about \u201cThe Ridge\u201d, and \u201ca description of some sort was necessary against the table entry mentioning [\u201cThe Ridge\u201d] as among the sites which the parish council regarded as unsuitable for development\u201d. The parish council was \u201cnot bound to keep silence on the subject of [the site]\u201d merely because it is a Protected Area of Search (paragraph 57). The new text in the table in paragraph 84 acknowledged the status of the site and, implicitly, that it might one day be developed. No mention was made of development being an unacceptable extension into the countryside, or of the opportunity to return the site to agricultural use and, possibly, the Green Belt (paragraph 58). This possibility was relegated \u201cto the level of a mere aspiration\u201d in section 18, \u201cProjects for Linton\u201d, and was \u201cneither a policy nor part of the explanatory material accompanying a policy\u201d (paragraph 59). Although the plan mentioned the parish council\u2019s opposition to \u201cThe Ridge\u201d, this did not mean that planning permission for housing development \u201cwould necessarily have to be refused\u201d (paragraphs 60 and 61). It had been \u201copen to the city council to make the modifications which it made, and to profess itself satisfied that the basic conditions were met\u201d. Once it had reached that conclusion, it was \u201cbound to accept [the neighbourhood plan] and submit it to a referendum\u201d (paragraph 62). 32. Mr Young attacked those conclusions of the judge. Modification M23 was not a modification permitted under the statutory scheme. Not only was it a clear departure from the examiner\u2019s recommendations; it was unnecessary for the purposes of meeting the \u201cbasic conditions\u201d in paragraph 8(2) of Schedule 4B, and thus outside the scope of paragraph 12(6)(a). As the judge had accepted (in paragraph 63 of his judgment), it \u201cwent well beyond merely correcting a cross-referencing error\u201d, and was also, therefore, outside the scope of paragraph 12(6)(e). The city council itself seemed unsure of the statutory power under which it acted, and the judge had not answered that question. The result, however, was plain. In its final form the neighbourhood plan contains text that should not have been there. This, submitted Mr Young, is a serious flaw. Supporting text in a development plan document does not have the same force as the policies themselves (see the judgment of Richards L.J. in R. (on the application of Cherkley Campaign Ltd.) v Mole Valley District Council [2014] EWCA Civ 567, at paragraphs 16 to 21), but it will nevertheless be taken into account in a development control decision (see my judgment in Crane v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2015] EWHC 425 (Admin), at paragraphs 40 to 45). 33. I cannot accept that argument. 34. One must not adopt too narrow an understanding of the local planning authority\u2019s statutory power to make modifications in paragraph 12(6) of Schedule 4B. The power in paragraph 12(6)(a) allows the authority a broad discretion in considering whether a particular modification is necessary for the purposes of satisfying the \u201cbasic conditions\u201d in paragraph 8(2): whether the modification \u201c[needs] to be made to secure that the draft order meets the basic conditions \u2026\u201d. The question of whether such a modification is necessary, and, if so, what form it should take, requires the exercise of planning judgment. And so does the ultimate question of the \u201cbasic conditions\u201d being met or not, regardless of whether it has been necessary to make modifications to the plan to ensure that they are. To the extent that these are matters of planning judgment, they are for the local planning authority to resolve, subject to review by the court in accordance with the principles of public law. But the broad ambit of a legitimate planning judgment on the question inherent in paragraph 12(6)(a) suggests a generous view of the local planning authority\u2019s statutory power, and that the court should be cautious before accepting an argument that the power has been exceeded. 35. A realistic view must also be taken of the power in paragraph 12(6)(e) to make modifications \u201cfor the purpose of correcting errors\u201d. This power is not, I think, confined to the correction of typographical mistakes and other minor infelicities. It embraces amendments necessary to achieve accuracy and consistency in the wording of policies and their supporting text. The local planning authority has a wide discretion in judging what errors need correcting, and how. And again, therefore, the court should not be quick to hold that an authority has gone further than the statutory power permits. 36. Four things may be said about the city council\u2019s modification M23. First, it must be seen in the light of the examiner\u2019s relevant conclusions and recommendations and the city council\u2019s response. The examiner was concentrating on the mischief of the neighbourhood plan clashing with the strategic policies of the development plan. This is plain from his reference to the inclusion of \u201cThe Ridge\u201d in the city council\u2019s \u201cStrategic Housing Land Availability Assessment\u201d, and to the process in which the question of \u201cits longer term allocation \u2026 via the Local Plan Sites Allocation Plan and following a Green Belt review\u201d would be considered. The Green Belt review was, as he said, \u201ca strategic matter, rather than a neighbourhood planning matter\u201d. The source of the mischief, as he recognized, was Policy B2. It was Policy B2 that offended the\u201cbasic condition\u201d in paragraph 8(2)(e) of Schedule 4B, by intruding on strategic matters affecting the whole of the city council\u2019s area, which the neighbourhood plan had no business to deal with \u2013 including the review of Green Belt boundaries and the fate of this site, given its status as a Protected Area of Search under Policy N34 of the unitary development plan. The examiner did not, however, conclude that the neighbourhood plan should avoid referring to the parish council\u2019s opinion on the development potential of the sites listed in the table in paragraph 107 of the March 2015 draft plan, including \u201cThe Ridge\u201d. 37. Secondly, the modification recommended by the examiner was succinctly expressed: \u201cDelete Policy B2 and all associated text\u201d. What was required, in substance, was the deletion of the offending policy and the text explaining and justifying it. The examiner did not say that the text \u201cassociated\u201d with Policy B2 ought to be removed from the neighbourhood plan because it expressed the parish council\u2019s opposition to development on \u201cThe Ridge\u201d.The deletion of the text was necessary because it was \u201cassociated\u201d with Policy B2, because it explained and justified that policy, and because it would no longer be doing that when the policy itself was removed from the plan. If it were retained, however, it would not be wholly redundant. It would still explain why the parish council was opposed to the development of \u201cThe Ridge\u201d, without in any sense pre-empting or prejudicing the strategic decisions that lay in the future \u2013 decisions that were for the city council to make. 38. Thirdly, the city council\u2019s modification M23 was faithful to the examiner\u2019s conclusions and recommendation. It completely removed both Policy B2 and \u201call associated text\u201d. It did not replace the policy with another to similar effect, nor did it retain the explanation and justification given for the policy in the text. It stopped well short of generating any new policy or new explanation of any policy that had survived. It deliberately went further than the examiner in one respect, which was to replace the words \u201cSee section B2\u201d in the table in paragraph 107 of the March 2015 draft plan \u2013 which was now to be paragraph 84 \u2013 with a short summary of the reasons why \u201cit was felt\u201d that this site, as well as the Green Belt sites included in the table, was not \u201csuitable for development\u201d. This was not part of the modification recommended by the examiner. But it was not at odds with what he had recommended, and his relevant conclusions, both on Policy B2 and on the \u201cProjects Priority List\u201d. 39. Fourthly, modification M23 did not go further than it properly could. It did not reproduce the mischief in the deleted Policy B2 and its \u201cassociated\u201d text. But, as Mr Alan Evans submitted on behalf of the city council, a consequence of deleting that policy and the text \u201cassociated\u201d with it was that the modification also had to put right what would otherwise have been an error in the table in paragraph 84 \u2013 an unexplained cross-reference to a policy no longer in the plan. Modification M23 did that. As Mr Evans submitted, \u201cthe limit of the error correction was self-defining\u201d. The modification avoided leaving the table incomplete, which would have been so if the reference to \u201cThe Ridge\u201d or to the parish council\u2019s reasons for opposing development on the site had simply been taken out. It recorded the relevant reasons accurately, and without replicating the deleted text \u201cassociated\u201d with Policy B2. It amended the table in simple, factual terms, which acknowledged the land\u2019s status as a \u201cPAS site\u201d. It reduced the explanation of the parish council\u2019s view about development on \u201cThe Ridge\u201d from the deleted text to note form in the retained table.And it was also consistent with modification M39, which removed the reference to Policy B2 from the \u201cProjects Priority List\u201d but left in place the reference to the parish council\u2019s aspiration to \u201cexamine\u201d returning the site to the Green Belt. It can therefore be seen as the least change that would give effect to the examiner\u2019s concerns without removing more from the plan than was necessary. 40. Can it be said that modification M23 was a modification the city council was unable to make in exercising its statutory powers in paragraph 12 of Schedule 4B? In my view it cannot. The modification was comfortably withinthe ambit of the local planning authority\u2019s statutory power to modify a neighbourhood plan before putting it to a referendum. Taken as a whole, it was, I think, both a modification under paragraph 12(6)(a), to secure compliance with the \u201cbasic conditions\u201d in paragraph 8(2), in particular the \u201cgeneral conformity\u201d requirement in paragraph 8(2)(e), and a modification under paragraph 12(6)(e), for the correction of an error that would otherwise have resulted from confining the modification to the strict terms of the examiner\u2019s recommendation. It achieved the required \u201cgeneral conformity\u201d. As Mr Evans submitted, the insertion made in the table in paragraph 84 was \u201cwithin acceptable bounds\u201d in that it significantly modified the reasoning in the text \u201cassociated\u201d with the deleted Policy B2, without offending the requirement that the \u201cbasic conditions\u201d be met. The city council was entitled to conclude that the modification was effective both in securing compliance with the \u201cbasic conditions\u201d and in achieving internal consistency in the neighbourhood plan. There was no breach of the statutory procedure. The approach required under paragraph 12 was lawfully followed. The city council did not exceed its statutory powers. 41. Mr Young complained that the parish council\u2019s opposition to development on \u201cThe Ridge\u201d will now be recorded in the development plan, and will have that status for the purposes of section 38(6) of the 2004 Actwhen any application or appeal for development on the site is determined \u2013 though, of course, the note in the table in paragraph 84 is neither a policy nor the explanation for a policy, and its significance will have to be judged accordingly. That is so, I accept. But it does not upset the conclusion that the city council acted within its power under paragraph 12(6). 42. In my view, therefore, the judge\u2019s analysis was essentially correct, and it follows that this ground of the appeal must fail. Issue (2) \u2013 reasons 43. Mr Young succeeded in persuading Kerr J. that the city council\u2019s reasons for amending the table in paragraph 84 of the neighbourhood plan in the way it did were \u201cless than complete and decidedly economical\u201d (paragraph 63 of the judgment). The judge said that the changes \u201cwent well beyond merely correcting a cross-referencing error\u201d, and that \u201cthat brief reason, as given, fell short of what was required under regulation 18(2) of the 2012 [regulations]\u201d. But he concluded that this \u201crelatively minor deficiency in the city council\u2019s decision making process is nowhere [near] enough in itself to condemn the [neighbourhood plan] and the referendum result approving it, or to impugn the decision challenged in this application\u201d (paragraph 64). 44. Mr Young submitted that the judge was in error because he did not confront the city council\u2019s lack of clear and adequate reasons to explain why it had come to a different view from the examiner on the re-insertion of text previously \u201cassociated\u201d with Policy B2 \u2013 indeed, a view directly contrary to his. This failure to give reasons was, Mr Young contended, a distinct legal flaw in the preparation of the neighbourhood plan. The city council had failed to comply both with the requirement in paragraph 12(11) of Schedule 4B to publish its reasons for the decisions it had made under paragraph 12, and also the parallel requirement in regulation 18(2). This was not, Mr Young submitted, an excusable error on the part of the city council. The judge was wrong to regard it as a \u201cminor deficiency\u201d in the process of plan preparation. 45. I disagree. In the first place, I do not accept that in the circumstances here the city council\u2019s reasons, succinct as they were, can be regarded as unclear or inadequate. It is true that the examiner did not positively recommend the amendment of the table in paragraph 107 of the March 2015 draft neighbourhood plan, which was to become paragraph 84 of the plan once modified. It is also true that in the city council\u2019s decision statement of 4 November 2015 the amendment to the table was explained simply as the correction of an \u201cerror in cross-referencing\u201d resulting from the deletion of the words \u201cSee section B2\u201d in the table. The substitution for those words of the note explaining the reasons for the parish council\u2019s opposition to development on \u201cThe Ridge\u201d was not specifically explained. But I cannot see why that particular change should have required a specific explanation of its own. It was plain in the examiner\u2019s relevant conclusions and recommendations that he did not criticize the inclusion of an explanation for the parish council\u2019s opposition to development on \u201cThe Ridge\u201d, and that this was not, in itself, the basis for his recommendation that Policy B2 and its \u201cassociated\u201d text be deleted. The city council might have amplified its reasons by stating as much. But it did not need to do so to comply with the statutory requirements for the giving of reasons in paragraph 12(11) and regulation 18(2). Its reasons were lawful as they stood. They did not fall below the requisite standard. Read fairly as a whole, they provided \u201can adequate explanation of the [city council\u2019s] ultimate decision\u201d, and did not \u201c[leave] room for genuine as opposed to forensic doubt as to what [it had] decided and why\u201d (see the general discussion of the duty to give reasons for planning decision-making in the judgment of Lord Carnwath in Dover District Council v CPRE Kent [2017] UKSC 79 \u2013 in particular, his observations on the \u201cStandard of Reasons\u201d in paragraphs 35 to 42). 46. Secondly, however, if I were wrong about that, and the judge\u2019s misgivings about the city council\u2019s reasons were justified, I would have concluded, as he did, that the city council\u2019s decision to submit the neighbourhood plan to a referendum was not vitiated by that deficiency. Certainly, if it came to a question of the court exercising its discretion as to any appropriate relief, I would have had no hesitation in withholding a remedy, because it is, in my view, perfectly plain that the city council\u2019s decision would have been no different if its amendment to the table in paragraph 84 had been expressly clarified in its decision statement. As I have already explained, the amendment to the table was not unlawful in itself, was not inconsistent with any modification recommended by the examiner, and was, in the circumstances, both justified and necessary. In effect, therefore, I agree with the judge\u2019s ultimate conclusion on this part of the challenge. Issue (3) \u2013 consultation 47. In abandoning ground (iv) of the appeal, Mr Young accepted that in this case there was no breach of the requirements in paragraph 13 of Schedule 4B, because, at the relevant time, no persons had been \u201cprescribed\u201d under paragraph 13(1). This was only done by the insertion of regulation 17A into the 2012 regulations,with effect from 1 October 2016. As Kerr J. said (in paragraph 12(17) of his judgment), this was \u201cnearly a year after the decision challenged in this case\u201d. Before us, Mr Young submitted in effect that, even before regulation 17A came into force, paragraph 13 indicated the existence of a common law duty to consult, at least in the particular circumstances envisaged by that provision. The city council\u2019s decision to proceed to a referendum had been at variance with the examiner\u2019s conclusions and recommendations on Policy B2 and its \u201cassociated\u201d text, and was the \u201cresult of new evidence or a new fact or a different view taken by [it] as to a particular fact\u201d, namely the examiner\u2019s conclusions and recommendation themselves. 48. I consider that argument mistaken \u2013 for two reasons. 49. First, and fatally, the premise for it is wrong. The procedure provided for under paragraph 13 of Schedule 4B is additional to the provisions in paragraph 9 for the consideration of written and oral representations in the course of the examination of a neighbourhood plan. The scope of this further, post-examination procedure is tightly defined. The circumstances in which a local planning authority will be required to consult in accordance with it are limited to the particular circumstances referred to. It is, in my view, a misreading of paragraph 13(1) to construe the words \u201cnew evidence or a new fact or a different view \u2026 as to a particular fact\u201d as embracing an examiner\u2019s conclusions and recommendations, representing his exercise of planning judgment, as if they were matters of fact in themselves, or an expression of his \u201cview \u2026 as to a particular fact\u201d. 50. Rather, it seems to me, paragraph 13 is concerned with giving participants in a neighbourhood plan process who qualify as \u201cprescribed persons\u201d a fair opportunity to address \u201cnew evidence\u201d or \u201ca new fact\u201d that has emerged after the examination, or a \u201cdifferent view\u201d taken by the local planning authority \u201cas to a particular fact\u201d from that expressed by the examiner in his report \u2013 when the local planning authority proposes to make a different decision from that recommended by him. It does not generate for participants in the process a general entitlement to consultation after the examination has taken place. Nor was it enacted to give parties a second opportunity to advance a case already heard and considered by the examiner, simply because the local planning authority is minded to depart from a recommendation he has made. Had Parliament intended to give participants in a neighbourhood plan process the chance to make further representations whenever a local planning authority proposed, in the light of the examiner\u2019s report, to take a different course from that recommended by him, or to promote modifications he did not recommend, it would have done so in different terms from those of paragraph 13. It would not have included the second stipulation, as to \u201cthe reason for the difference\u201d in paragraph 13(1)(b). Only the first stipulation, in paragraph 13(1)(a) would have been necessary. 51. This case is not one in which it could sensibly be said that the circumstances were, in any respect, within the scope of paragraph 13(1). There was, in truth, no \u201cnew evidence\u201d. There was no \u201cnew fact\u201d. And the city council did not take a \u201cdifferent view\u201d from the examiner\u2019s view \u201cas to [any] particular fact\u201d. What it did was to promote a modification to the neighbourhood plan that went further than the modification he had recommended but was wholly consistent with it. That does not engage the requirement for post-examination consultation under paragraph 13. 52. Secondly, I cannot accept that, pending the coming into force of regulation 17A to prescribe the persons to whom the provisions of paragraph 13(1) of Schedule 4B would apply, the city council was under a duty to consult at common law that was not merely commensurate with the scope of the duty in paragraph 13(1) but whose scope was even broader. 53. No elaborate discussion of the law is necessary. The relevant principles seem reasonably well established. In R. (on the application of Moseley) v Haringey London Borough Council [2014] 1 W.L.R. 3947, Lord Wilson said (in paragraph 23 of his judgment) that \u201c[a] public authority\u2019s duty to consult those interested before taking a decision can arise in a variety of ways\u201d, that \u201c[most] commonly \u2026 the duty is generated by statute\u201d, but that \u201c[not] infrequently \u2026 it is generated by the duty cast by the common law upon a public authority to act fairly\u201d. Lord Reed said (in paragraph 35): \u201c35. The common law imposes a general duty of procedural fairness upon public authorities exercising a wide range of functions which affect the interests of individuals, but the content of that duty varies almost infinitely depending upon the circumstances. There is however no general common law duty to consult persons who may be affected by a measure before it is adopted. The reasons for the absence of such a duty were explained by Sedley LJ in R (BAPIO Action Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] EWCA Civ 1139 \u2026 . A duty of consultation will however exist in circumstances where there is a legitimate expectation of such consultation, usually arising from an interest which is held to be sufficient to found such an expectation, or from some promise or practice of consultation. The general approach of the common law is illustrated by the cases of R v Devon County Council, Ex p Baker [1995] 1 All ER 73 and R v North and East Devon Health Authority, Ex p Coughlan [2001] QB 213 \u2026, with which the BAPIO case might be contrasted.\u201d In that case, as Lord Reed said (in paragraph 38), there was a \u201cparticular statutory duty to consult\u201d whose purpose must be \u201cto ensure public participation in the local authority\u2019s decision-making process\u201d. 54. The same is so in this case. Parliament has made specific provision for participationin the process of neighbourhood plan-making, including the provisions in paragraph 9 of Schedule 4B for the consideration of written and oral representations in the course of the examination, and those in paragraph 13 for the making of post-examination representations in the particular circumstances specified in paragraph 13(1). I do not see how, in view of those carefully framed provisions in the legislation, it can be submitted that there was, at common law, a further and more general duty to consult. Any common law duty corresponding to the statutory duty to \u201cnotify \u2026 and invite representations\u201d in paragraph 13 would not have been engaged in this case. And I cannot see how any wider duty can be said to have existed. The common law did not superimpose on the statutory scheme more demanding requirements for participation and consultation than Parliament had provided in Schedule 4B (see the judgment of Sedley L.J. in BAPIO Action Ltd., in paragraphs 41 to 47 of his judgment, and the further observations of Maurice Kay L.J. in paragraph 58 of his). 55. There can be no argument here based on the general requirements of \u201cprocedural fairness\u201d. No breach of those requirements occurred. Nor can it be said that there was any \u201clegitimate expectation\u201d to be consulted. None has been shown. 56. The landowner, Mr Lenighan, availed himself of the opportunity under paragraph 9 to make representations to the examiner, and his objection to the draft neighbourhood plan was heard at that stage of the process, in the normal way. He therefore had, in the words of paragraph 9(2)(a), \u201ca fair chance to put a case\u201d. He was not entitled, either under paragraph 13 or at common law, to be consulted again on the city council\u2019s decision to proceed as it did in the light of the examiner\u2019s recommendations. 57. In my view, therefore, Mr Young\u2019s argument does not demonstrate any unlawful failure by the city council to consult on modification M23. No relevant statutory requirement was ignored or misapplied, and there was no breach of any duty at common law. Conclusion 58. For the reasons I have given I would dismiss this appeal. Lord Justice Singh 59. I agree that this appeal should be dismissed for the reasons given by Lindblom LJ. I would like to add something of my own only in relation to the Appellant\u2019s argument on Issue (3), which concerns an alleged duty of consultation at common law. 60. In support of that argument at the hearing before this Court Mr Young cited the following passage from the judgment of Lord Wilson JSC in Moseley at para. 23: \u201cA public authority\u2019s duty to consult those interested before taking a decision can arise in a variety of ways. Most commonly, as here, the duty is generated by statute. Not infrequently, however, it is generated by the duty cast by the common law upon a public authority to act fairly. The search for the demands of fairness in this context is often illumined by the doctrine of legitimate expectation; such was the source, for example, of its duty to consult the residents of a care home for the elderly before deciding whether to close it in R v Devon County Council, ex parte Baker [1995] 1 All ER 73. But irrespective of how the duty to consult has been generated, that same common law duty of procedural fairness will inform the manner in which the consultation should be conducted.\u201d 61. It is clear from that passage that, on its facts, Moseley concerned a situation in which there was a statutory duty of consultation. There was therefore no issue in that case about the existence of a duty of consultation. 62. In my respectful view, it is important to be careful to distinguish between different senses of the word \u201cconsultation\u201d which can sometimes be found in the authorities on this subject. First, there may be cases in which there is no dispute about the existence of an obligation to consult which is imposed upon a public authority. Very often the source of that obligation will be legislation, so there will be a statutory duty of consultation. In such cases the context will usually be not an individual decision which affects a particular person or persons but rather the formulation of general policy or draft legislation. 63. The issue which may then arise is what the exact content of that duty of consultation requires. That was considered in the well known case of R v Brent LBC, ex p. Gunning (1985) 84 LGR 168, at 189, where Hodgson J cited with approval the following submissions of counsel, Mr Stephen Sedley QC (as he then was): \u201cMr Sedley submits that these basic requirements are essential if the consultation process is to have a sensible content. First, that consultation must be at a time when proposals are still at a formative stage. Second, that the proposer must give sufficient reasons for any proposal to permit of intelligent consideration and response. Third \u2026 that adequate time must be given for consideration and response and, finally, fourth, that the product of consultation must be conscientiously taken into account in finalising any statutory proposals.\u201d 64. In Moseley, at para. 25, Lord Wilson cited that passage in Gunning with approval. He said: \u201cIt is hard to see how any of his four suggested requirements could be rejected or indeed improved.\u201d As Lord Wilson noted, this Court has expressly endorsed them, first in R v Devon County Council, ex p. Baker and then in R v North and East Devon Health Authority, ex p. Coughlan [2001] QB 213, para. 108. Lord Wilson added: \u201cThe time has come for this Court also to endorse the Sedley criteria. They are \u2026 \u2018a prescription for fairness\u2019.\u201d 65. Nevertheless, all of that goes to the content of the duty of consultation where it arises. In the present case, the issue is whether a duty of consultation arises at all. That is a logically prior question and requires the Court to consider what is said to be the source of such a duty if it is to be found to exist. 66. The word \u201cconsultation\u201d may be used in a second sense, where, I would respectfully suggest, it may be preferable to speak of \u201cprocedural fairness.\u201d This is because what is under consideration is not consultation of the general public or a section of the public; but rather whether the duty to act fairly arises in relation to a particular person who is affected by a public authority\u2019s decision. 67. That is, as I understand it, the burden of what was said by Lord Reed JSC in Moseley, at paras. 34-38. The broad distinction between the two concepts was expressed as follows by Lord Reed, at para. 38: \u201cSuch wide-ranging consultation, in respect of the exercise of a local authority\u2019s exercise of a general power in relation to finance, is far removed in context and scope from the situations in which the common law has recognised a duty of procedural fairness. The purpose of public consultation in that context is in my opinion not to ensure procedural fairness in the treatment of persons whose legally protected interests may be adversely affected, as the common law seeks to do. The purpose of this particular statutory duty to consult must, in my opinion, be to ensure public participation in the local authority\u2019s decision-making process.\u201d 68. In my view, that passage sets out an important distinction, between (i) procedural fairness in the treatment of persons whose legally protected interests may be adversely affected and (ii) public participation in a public authority\u2019s decision-making process. It seems to me that, although the word \u201cconsultation\u201d is often and understandably used in the former context, it would be preferable to reserve it for use in the latter context, to the extent that the word is said to have legal significance. 69. Procedural fairness in the former context is really the modern term for what used to be called \u201cnatural justice\u201d, in particular the limb of it which used to be called audi alteram partem (\u201chear the other side\u201d). Public law no longer talks of \u201cjudicial\u201d or \u201cquasi-judicial\u201d disputes and so even the notion of a \u201chearing\u201d seems inapt now but the fundamental requirement of procedural fairness is to give an opportunity to a person whose legally protected interests may be affected by a public authority\u2019s decision to make representations to that authority before (or at least usually before) the decision is taken. To refer to \u201cconsultation\u201d in that context is not wrong as a matter of language but I think it would be better to avoid using it in that context, so as to avoid confusion with the sense in which it is used in the context of public participation in a public authority\u2019s processes for making policy or perhaps some form of legislation such as rules. 70. In the present case, Mr Young, on behalf of the Appellant, is unable to rely on either a statutory duty of consultation or the common law duty to act fairly in the first sense I have outlined above. What Mr Young submits is that there arose in the present case a duty of consultation, in the second sense I have outlined above, as a matter of common law. This is despite the fact that the legislature (in its widest sense) had chosen not to bring in the relevant regulations before 1 October 2016. He now accepts that he cannot rely on a statutory duty of consultation, since the relevant regulations were not in force before that date. 71. In addressing that submission, it is important to begin with what Lord Reed said in Moseley, at para. 35: \u201c\u2026 There is however no general common law duty to consult persons who may be affected by a measure before it is adopted. The reasons for the absence of such a duty were explained by Sedley LJ in R (BAPIO Action Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] EWCA Civ 1139; [2008] ACD 20, paras. 43-47. \u2026\u201d 72. I will return to what Lord Reed then said about the circumstances in which a duty of consultation may arise where there is a \u201clegitimate expectation\u201d. However, at this juncture I will go to the decision of this Court in BAPIO. That case later went to the House of Lords but not on the point about consultation: [2008] UKHL 27; [2008] AC 1003. I would note in particular what Sedley LJ said in that case, at para. 45: \u201cThe proposed duty is, as I have said, not unthinkable \u2013 indeed many people might consider it very desirable \u2013 but thinking about it makes it rapidly plain that if it is to be introduced it should be by Parliament and not by the courts. Parliament has the option, which the courts do not have, of extending and configuring an obligation to consult function by function. It can also abandon or modify obligations to consult which experience shows to be unnecessary or unworkable and extend those which seem to work well. The courts, which act on larger principles, can do none of these things.\u201d 73. Later, at para. 47, in similar vein, Sedley LJ said: \u201c\u2026 I do not seek to elevate this to a general rule that fairness can never require consultation as a condition of the exercise of a statutory function; but in the present context it seems to me that a duty to consult would require a specificity which the courts, concerned as they are with developing principles, cannot furnish without assuming the role of a legislator. \u2026\u201d 74. In response to some of the difficulties identified by Sedley LJ at paras. 43-47, which were cited with approval by Lord Reed in Moseley, Mr Young submits that this Court need not have the sort of concerns that it clearly did have in BAPIO. This is because, he submits, the class of \u201cprescribed persons\u201d has already been defined by the legislature itself. He submits therefore that there would be no impermissible intrusion by the Court into the province of legislation. 75. The fundamental difficulty with that submission, in my view, is that the very legislation which sets out the definition of \u201cprescribed persons\u201d was not in force at the material time. It only came into force on 1 October 2016. That was the policy choice which the legislature decided to make. Rather than being a point in the Appellant\u2019s favour, it seems to me that it is a point against it. What it indicates very clearly is that the policy of the legislature was not to impose a duty of consultation in the relevant context at the material time. In those circumstances, in my view, it would be wrong as a matter of principle for the courts to intrude and impose a duty of the same kind at common law. 76. As I have said, the only passage in the authorities on which Mr Young relied in support of his argument at the hearing before this Court is to be found in the judgment of Lord Wilson JSC in Moseley at para. 23, which I have cited earlier. 77. In the present case I did not understand Mr Young to contend for a duty of consultation whose source was any suggested legitimate expectation of consultation. The difficulty with any reliance on the doctrine of legitimate expectation to generate a duty of consultation in the present case is that there was neither any promise of consultation nor any past practice of it. Either a promise or a practice of consultation is required, in accordance with the authorities in this field, before there will be a legitimate expectation of such consultation: see Moseley, at para. 35 in the judgment of Lord Reed. 78. The insuperable difficulty for Mr Young\u2019s submissions is that, if there is neither a statutory duty of consultation nor can he identify any legitimate expectation which would be the source of such a duty, it is impossible to see how such a duty could arise in the present context. I would therefore reject the Appellant\u2019s argument that there was a duty of consultation in the present case. Lord Justice Underhill 79. I agree with both judgments.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<hr class=\"kji-sep\" \/>\n<p class=\"kji-source-links\"><strong>Sources officielles :<\/strong> <a class=\"kji-source-link\" href=\"https:\/\/caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk\/ewca\/civ\/2018\/450\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">consulter la page source<\/a><\/p>\n<p class=\"kji-license-note\"><em>Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).<\/em><\/p>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Lord Justice Lindblom: Introduction 1. Was a neighbourhood plan unlawfully put to a referendum after modifications had been made to it by the local planning authority, differing in part from those recommended by the examiner? That is the basic question in this appeal. 2. In a claim for judicial review, the appellant, Kebbell Developments Ltd., challenged the decision of the&#8230;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":0,"template":"","meta":{"_crdt_document":""},"kji_country":[7608],"kji_court":[7943],"kji_chamber":[],"kji_year":[47917],"kji_subject":[7612],"kji_keyword":[7692,9070,41667,7975,9071],"kji_language":[7611],"class_list":["post-794743","kji_decision","type-kji_decision","status-publish","hentry","kji_country-royaume-uni","kji_court-court-of-appeal-civil-division","kji_year-47917","kji_subject-fiscal","kji_keyword-council","kji_keyword-development","kji_keyword-examiner","kji_keyword-paragraph","kji_keyword-policy","kji_language-anglais"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO Premium plugin v27.5 (Yoast SEO v27.5) - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-premium-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>Kebbell Developments Ltd v Leeds City Council - Ma\u00eetre Hassan Kohen, avocat en droit p\u00e9nal \u00e0 Paris<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/kohenavocats.com\/zh-hans\/jurisprudences\/kebbell-developments-ltd-v-leeds-city-council\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"zh_CN\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Kebbell Developments Ltd v Leeds City Council\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Lord Justice Lindblom: Introduction 1. 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