Claudio de Giovanni v Cormac Kehoe & Ors

Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 1136 (KB) Case No: KB-2025-003851 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE KING'S BENCH DIVISION MEDIA AND COMMUNICATIONS LIST Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL Date: 13/05/2026 Before : THE HON. MRS JUSTICE STEYN DBE – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – Between : CLAUDIO DE GIOVANNI Claimant – and – (1) CORMAC KEHOE (2) JOSHI HERRMANN (3) THE MILLERS PUBLISHING COMPANY LIMITED (described as MILL MEDIA LIMITED) Defendants – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – the Claimant appeared in person Claire Overman (instructed by Lewis Silkin LLP) for the Defendants Hearing dates: 21 April 2026 – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – Judgment Approved by the courtfor handing down(subject to editorial corrections) If this Judgment has been emailed to you it is to be treated as ‘read-only’.You should send any suggested amendments as a separate Word document. Mrs Justice Steyn :

1. The claimant has brought two claims for defamation in respect of an article published in The Londoner on 2 August 2025, bearing the headline “‘Claudio is Scamming’” (‘the Article’). The first claim was issued in the county court (M4QZ5K0Z) on 8 August 2025, and brought against the first defendant only, claiming damages of £5,000 and the court fee. The claimant sought and obtained default judgment in the sum of £10,250 on 29 August 2025. Although that claim has subsequently been transferred to the Media and Communications List of the High Court (KB-2026-000877), I shall refer to it as ‘the County Court claim’. The second claim was issued in the High Court on 20 October 2025, as a Part 8 claim (KB-2025-003851) against all three defendants, in which the claimant seeks damages of £250,000 (‘the High Court claim’).

2. This judgment determines the following applications made by the defendants: i) An application to set aside the default judgment given in the County Court claim (‘the Set Aside Application’); ii) An application to strike out the County Court claim pursuant to CPR 3.4(2)(b) (‘the Strike Out Application’); iii) An application to dismiss the High Court claim for failure to comply with a notice under CPR 7.7(1) (‘the CPR 7.7 Application’); and iv) An application for an extension of time for the defendants to make a jurisdictional challenge and, if granted, an application for an order that the Court has no jurisdiction in respect of the High Court claim and setting the claim form aside (‘the Jurisdiction Application’).

3. I received post-hearing submissions from the defendants on 24 April 2026 and from the claimant on 1 May 2026. The Set Aside Application

4. There are two limbs to the Set Aside Application. The defendants rely on CPR 13.2(a) and, in the alternative, on 13.3.(1)(b)(i).

5. CPR 13.2(a) provides: “The court must set aside a judgment entered under Part 12 if judgment was wrongly entered because – (a) in the case of a judgment in default of an acknowledgment of service, any of the conditions in rule 12.3(1) and 12.3(3) was not satisfied”.

6. Pursuant to CPR 12.3(1), a claimant may obtain judgment in default of an acknowledgment of service only if at the date on which judgment is entered (a) the defendant has not filed an acknowledgment of service or a defence to the claim (or any part of the claim) and (b) the relevant time for doing so has expired.

7. Morris J derived the following principles from the relevant authorities in Saadati v Dastghaib [2024] EWHC 3336 (KB) at [45]: “(1) CPR 13.2 provides for mandatory setting aside of judgment in default. It applies not only where there has been service, but no compliance with the conditions in CPR 12.3, but also where there has been no valid service at all. Failure to file an acknowledgment of service in CPR 12.3(1) means failure to file when under a duty to file, and if there has been no valid service, there is no duty to acknowledge service. A default judgment entered in those circumstances is one which can be set aside under CPR 13.2. (In my judgment, the same must apply for judgment in default of service of defence – if there has been no valid service of claim form, then there is no time limit for filing a defence and therefore no duty to serve a defence.) (2) Even where defective service can be retrospectively validated (pursuant to CPR 6.15 and/or CPR 6.16), that would not retrospectively impose on the defendant a duty to acknowledge service/serve a defence. It does not retrospectively start time to run. Thus retrospective validation of service cannot found a basis for obtaining, or retrospectively validating, a judgment in default of acknowledgment of service or of defence. Where service is validated retrospectively, there has to be a new time allowed for acknowledgment of service. Where there is no such time limit provided for a new acknowledgment of service, judgment in default of acknowledgment of service cannot be granted. Moreover, any prior default judgment will have been entered at a point where time for acknowledgment of service had not expired. (3) In Olafsson [v Gissurarson [2006] EWHC 3162 (QB)], judgment in default was set aside under CPR 13.2 even where the defendant knew all along of the proceedings and deliberately chose not to take part in the proceedings and only applied to set aside judgment in default over a year later. In that case, delay, knowledge and silence did not displace the mandatory rule.”

8. For the purposes of the application pursuant to CPR 13.2, the question is whether the defendant to the County Court claim, Mr Kehoe, had been validly served with the claim form, such that the obligation to serve an acknowledgment of service had arisen, and the time had expired, when default judgment was given on 29 August 2025.

9. The evidence of Mr Kehoe and Ms Anne Mannion, solicitor for the defendants, supported by the exhibited documents, shows that the claimant sent Mr Kehoe an email on 7 August 2025 in which he wrote, “You are now being sued. The particulars of claim and the issued Money Claim (Claim No. M4QZ5K0Z) are attached to this email for your reference.” The claimant attached an unsealed claim form watermarked “Reference” and particulars of claim.

10. That did not amount to effective service of the claim on Mr Kehoe by email for two reasons. First, the claim was issued on 8 August 2025. The claim form emailed to Mr Kehoe a day earlier had not been issued. Secondly, Mr Kehoe had provided no indication that he was willing to accept service by email. Accordingly, by operation of CPR 6.3(1)(d) read with paragraph 4.1(1) of PD6A, such service was not valid.

11. The claimant sent the issued claim form to an address, 29 Claverdale Road, at which Mr Kehoe had not lived for more than two years. In accordance with CPR 6.9(2), Mr Kehoe was required to be served at his “usual or last known residence”. The address at which he was served was not his usual residence. Valid service depends on the claimant establishing a good arguable case that the address at which service was effected was Mr Kehoe’s last known resistance. This means that, on the evidence available, the claimant has the better of the argument on this issue than the defendant. Knowledge of the defendant’s residence in this context refers to the claimant’s actual or constructive knowledge, i.e. knowledge which the claimant could have acquired exercising reasonable diligence. See Boettcher v Xio (UK) LLP (in liquidation) [2023] EWHC 801 (Comm) at [49].

12. The claimant submits that the proceedings were served at what was reasonably understood to be the defendant’s last known address based on the information available at the time.

13. While 29 Claverdale Road is an address at which Mr Kehoe once resided, the difficulty for the claimant is that he has adduced no evidence as to his state of knowledge. If, as he has submitted, he understood it to be Mr Kehoe’s last known address that may suggest he had reason to believe the defendant no longer resided there, in which case he would have been required to take the reasonable steps required pursuant to CPR 6.9(4). The claimant has been aware of this issue since Mr Kehoe made an application to set aside default judgment on 3 September 2025 in the County Court, reinforced by the defendants’ application of 2 December 2025, supported by Ms Mannion’s statement, and the defendants’ skeleton argument which was provided to the claimant on 3 March 2026 (i.e. seven weeks before the hearing). Nevertheless, he has adduced no evidence as to his state of knowledge regarding Mr Kehoe’s address. (Nor is there any evidence as to the date on which the claim form was sent to 29 Claverdale Road or what method of service was adopted.)

14. In the absence of any evidence from the claimant, I conclude that he has not established a good arguable case that 29 Claverdale Road was Mr Kehoe’s last known residence. It follows that default judgment must be set aside pursuant to CPR 13.2.

15. In the alternative, by an application notice filed on 16 January 2026, the defendant sought permission to amend to rely also on CPR 13.3(1)(b)(i). I granted the application to amend for the reasons given in my ex tempore judgment. CPR 13.3(1)(b)(i) provides: “In any other case, the court may set aside or vary a judgment entered under Part 12 if – … (b) it appears to the court that there is some other good reason why – (i) the judgment should be set aside or varied.”

16. If contrary to the conclusion that I have reached, service was validly effected on Mr Kehoe at his last known residence, I would in any event have exercised the power under CPR 13.3(1)(b) to set aside the default judgment for “some other good reason”. The three-part test applicable to relief from sanctions in Denton v TH Whitte Ltd [2014] 1 WLR 3926 applies to an application to set aside under CPR 13.3: FXF v English Karate Federation Ltd (Practice Note) [2023] EWCA Civ 891, [2024] 1 WLR 1097, [63].

17. The reasons that I give below for striking out the County Court claim amount to good reason to set aside the default judgment. Mr Kehoe acted promptly in applying to set aside the default judgment. The claimant brought his defamation claim in the wrong court, without first complying with the pre-action protocol. Mr Kehoe’s application to set aside the default judgment was made within 3 working days of it being granted, in circumstances where the issued claim form was not served on him at his home address, the draft claim form emailed to him indicated the claim was in the National Civic Business Centre whereas the particulars of claim gave the court as Wandsworth County Court, and Mr Kehoe had made many attempts to contact both courts to ascertain whether the draft claim form that had been emailed to him had been issued, only to be informed by CNBC on 1 September 2025 that he had missed the deadline.

18. Applying the Denton factors, if (contrary to my conclusion) the claim form was validly served and time for service of an acknowledgment of service had expired, Mr Kehoe failed to comply with CPR 10.3 which provides that in a case, such as this, where the claim form did not state particulars of claim are to follow, the period for filing an acknowledgment of service is 14 days after service of the claim form. A failure to file an acknowledgment of service in time is, by its nature, serious and significant. There is good reason for the default, namely that the claim form was not served on Mr Kehoe at his current address and he did not obtain a copy of the issued claim form until 3 September, despite the steps he took to contact the court in response to the draft claim form he received by email. The claimant has brought parallel defamation claims in the County Court and the High Court against Mr Kehoe in respect of the same publication. That is an abuse of process and, in any event, the prejudice to the claimant arising from default judgment being set aside is outweighed by the prejudice to Mr Kehoe if he is deprived of a meritorious strike out application.

19. Accordingly, the default judgment given in respect of the County Court claim is set aside. The Strike Out Application

20. The defendants apply to strike out the default judgment pursuant to CPR 3.4(2)(b), that is, on the ground that the claim form in the County Court claim is “an abuse of process or is otherwise likely to obstruct the just disposal of the proceedings”.

21. Abusing the court’s process means using that process for a purpose or in a way significantly different from its ordinary and proper use. Individuals are entitled not to be vexed by duplicative litigation and there is a public interest in not having issues repeatedly litigated. It accords with the proper and proportionate use of judicial and court resources to treat duplicative proceedings as an abuse of process. See Tewari v Khetarpal [2022] EWHC 2066 (QB) at [11], [75].

22. The defendants submit that the County Court claim should be struck out as an abuse of process because the claimant has impermissibly issued concurrent proceedings in the County Court and the High Court in respect of the same subject matter; he has impermissibly used the County Court claim as a vehicle to obtain a settlement of High Court proceedings; and he arbitrarily added a further £5,000 to the sum claimed in his request for default judgment.

23. In the claim form in the County Court claim, the claimant stated: “I am formally claiming £250,000 in damages for defamation, aggravated harm, and loss of business. However, if the Defendant removes the defamatory article in full by Monday, 11 August, I am willing to limit my claim to £5,000, and no further High Court action will be pursued. This claim stands as the final opportunity to resolve this matter before we escalate proceedings to the High Court.”

24. In the particulars of claim in the County Court claim, the claimant made a similar statement that he was “formally claiming £250,000 in damages, which I fully intend to pursue in the High Court”. He again asserted: “as a final opportunity to resolve this dispute swiftly, I am willing to accept a £5,000 settlement” on three specified conditions.

25. It is plainly an abuse of process to bring duplicate defamation claims in respect of the Article in both the County Court and the High Court. Ordinarily, the abuse would be in bringing the second set of proceedings. Here, I am concerned with whether the County Court claim was an abuse of process. Although it was first in time, the claimant brought it – although a claim for defamation should not have been brought in the County Court (see s.15(1)(c) County Courts Act 1984 and para 2.9(1) of PD7A) – for the express purpose of imposing pressure in respect of the (then threatened) High Court claim. Bringing duplicate proceedings in parallel and for such a purpose is plainly an abuse of process. Moreover, having parallel proceedings running in tandem would be obstructive of justice. For these reasons, the Strike Out Application succeeds.

26. The third factor relied on by the defendants is that, whereas in his claim form the claimant sought damages of £5,000 and the court fee of £205, in his request for default judgment he added a further £5,000, resulting in a default judgment in the sum of £10,205. I agree that was an abuse. There was no justification for adding £5,000 in his request, purportedly as “interest”. However, on its own that provides an additional reason for setting aside the default judgment rather than a reason to strike out the claim. The CPR 7.7. Application

27. CPR 7.7 provides: “(1) Where a claim form has been issued against a defendant, but has not yet been served on him, the defendant may serve a notice on the claimant requiring him to serve the claim form or discontinue the claim within a period specified in the notice. (2) The period specified in a notice served under paragraph (1) must be at least 14 days after service of the notice. (3) If the claimant fails to comply with the notice, the court may, on the application of the defendant – (a) dismiss the claim; or (b) make any other order it thinks just.”

28. The defendants served a notice pursuant to CPR 7.7 on the claimant on 14 November 2025 requiring service of the claim form or discontinuance of the claim by 28 November 2025. The evidence establishes that the claimant has not complied with the notice and has not subsequently served the claim form. The four month period for service of the claim form expired on 20 February 2026.

29. In Brightside Group Ltd v RSM UK Audit LLP [2017] EWHC 6 (Comm), Andrew Baker J considered the power to dismiss the claim where the claimant has failed to comply with a CPR 7.7 notice. He observed at [34]: “CPR 7.7 neither says, nor in my judgment does it imply, that the temporal validity of a claim form is truncated by service of a notice. It is not necessary to hold that it has that consequence to give CPR 7.7 a clear and useful purpose … The function of CPR 7.7, as it seems to me, is to enable defendants to flush out early whether a claim that has been issued against them is going to be pursued and to get early sight of it, if it is. That does not involve or require putting the temporal validity of the claim form, that is to say the length of time within which the claimants’ invocation of the court’s jurisdiction will be valid, into the defendants’ hands (through service of a CPR 7.7 notice). I do not read the express reference to dismissal of the claim in CPR 7.7(3) as indicating a presumption as to the result of non-compliance with a CPR 7.7 notice. In my judgment, it is there merely to make clear that non-compliance is to carry with it a power to dismiss in an appropriate case (and not only lesser, procedural, sanctions). An example would be where the defendant, on his application under CPR 7.7(3), persuades the court by evidence that the claimant has no real intention of pursuing the claim. The court could then, and would expect to, put the claim out of its misery by an order for dismissal even though ex hypothesi the claim had not done so himself by discontinuing.”

30. The defendants submit that the claimant has no real intention to pursue the claim. In support of this submission Ms Overman relies first, on the fact that the claimant has not acknowledged or, at any stage, attempted to comply with the notice. There was a period of approximately five months from 10 November 2025 when the claimant failed to respond to any communications from the defendants’ solicitors. Ms Overman submits that there is no proper explanation for those five months of silence, in circumstances where the defendants had not only sent the CPR 7.7. notice but were corresponding with him about the hearing listed on 9 March 2026 (which was subsequently adjourned). She submits that the claimant’s reliance on his medical circumstances is woefully inadequate. She acknowledges that the claimant has asserted his intention to pursue the claim, including in his written and oral submissions for this hearing, but submits that the court should be wary in light of his conduct to date.

31. The claimant submits that he has every intention of pursuing the claim. He has been accused of being a fraudster. That has a real and ongoing impact on his ability to work as an entrepreneur in the UK. He wishes to clear his name and has brought defamation proceedings for that purpose. He contends, in effect, that the submission that he does not intend to pursue the claim, in circumstances where – whatever procedural errors he may have made – he has issued it and acted in good faith to ensure it was brought to the defendants’ attention, and he is here representing himself today, is unreal. He asks the court to retrospectively validate service by email pursuant to CPR 6.15 and/or for an extension under CPR 7.6.

32. On balance, I am not persuaded that this is a case in which I should dismiss the High Court claim pursuant to CPR 7.7(3). There is no presumption in favour of dismissal. Although the claimant has not complied with the notice, he had attempted to serve the claim form on the defendants on 22 October 2025, albeit he did so by email in circumstances where they had not indicated their willingness to accept service by such means (see CPR 6.3(1)(d) and para 4.1(1) of PD6A). Although his reasons for not responding to correspondence or the CPR 7.7 Notice are unsatisfactory, and the medical evidence only explains a small proportion of the five month period of non-communication, it seems to me that he does intend to pursue this claim.

33. This is a serious claim. The Article was published in an online local newspaper with significant circulation, and whatever the precise meaning of the Article it is obvious that the imputation was serious. The claimant has not filed an application pursuant to CPR 6.15 or 7.6, and the rules make clear that an application under either provision must be supported by evidence, so raising such applications in his skeleton argument and orally is insufficient. But the impact of the lack of such an application depends on whether the defendants are to be treated as having accepted the court’s jurisdiction to try the claim pursuant to CPR 11.1(5). In the circumstances, I consider that the future of this claim should rest on the Jurisdiction Application rather than it falling for dismissal pursuant to CPR 7.7. The Jurisdiction Application

34. By an application notice dated 2 December 2025, the defendants retrospectively sought an extension of time to file an application under CPR 11(4)(a), relief from sanctions under CPR 3.9, and a declaration that the court has no jurisdiction and an order setting aside the claim form on the ground that the claimant has failed to serve it and time to do so has expired.

35. CPR rule 11 provides so far as material: “(1) A defendant who wishes to— (a) dispute the court’s jurisdiction to try the claim; or (b) argue that the court should not exercise its jurisdiction, may apply to the court for an order declaring that it has no such jurisdiction or should not exercise any jurisdiction which it may have. (2) A defendant who wishes to make such an application must first file an acknowledgment of service in accordance with Part

10. (3) A defendant who files an acknowledgment of service does not, by doing so, lose any right that he may have to dispute the court’s jurisdiction. (4) An application under this rule must— (a) be made within 14 days after filing an acknowledgment of service; and (b) be supported by evidence. (5) If the defendant— (a) files an acknowledgment of service; and (b) does not make such an application within the period specified in paragraph (4), he is to be treated as having accepted that the court has jurisdiction to try the claim. (6) An order containing a declaration that the court has no jurisdiction or will not exercise its jurisdiction may also make further provision including— (a) setting aside the claim form; (b) setting aside service of the claim form; (c) discharging any order made before the claim was commenced or before the claim form was served; and (d) staying the proceedings.”

36. For the reasons given above, the claimant did not validly serve the High Court claim form on the defendants when he emailed it to them on 22 October 2025. As the claim was not served on the defendants, they were under no obligation to serve an acknowledgment of service: Bellway Homes Ltd v Occupiers of Samuel Garside House [2025] EWCA Civ 1347,[51(3)]. However, they did so on 5 November 2025. In Section C of the acknowledgment of service the defendants ticked the box “I intend to dispute the court’s jurisdiction”. In Section B of the acknowledgment of service the defendants ticked the box “I intend to contest this claim” and in Sections B and D noted, among other matters, that the claim had not yet been validly served on the defendants.

37. In their letter of 5 November 2025, the defendants’ solicitors explained to the claimant that he had failed to validly serve the claim. They informed him that he was required to do so by midnight on the calendar day four months after the date of issue of your claim form, citing and providing a link to CPR 7.5(1). They stated “we are instructed to accept service of the claim form and other documents on behalf of our clients by email … or by post…”, and they provided the claimant with the email and postal addresses at which the claim form and other documents could be served.

38. Although the defendants had signalled their intent to dispute the court’s jurisdiction in the acknowledgment of service, they did not make an application pursuant to CPR 11(4)(a) by 19 November 2025 (i.e. within 14 days of serving the acknowledgment of service). The defendants’ application was made 12 days late, and so was accompanied by an application for an extension of time and relief from sanctions.

39. At that stage, the claimant still had more than two months in which to effect valid service of the claim form, so the jurisdiction application was contingent on whether he did so. The deadline to serve the High Court claim form expired at midnight on 20 February 2026. Despite the clarity of the information provided by the defendants’ solicitors, the claimant made no effort to serve them after receiving their letter of 5 November 2025, the acknowledgment of service, the CPR 7.7 notice, or the 2 December 2025 application.

40. The three stage test identified in Denton applies to the application for an extension of time. First, the defendant failed to comply with the requirement in the rules to file an application disputing jurisdiction within 14 days of filing an acknowledgment of service (CPR rule 11(4)(a)). In assessing the seriousness and significance of the defendants’ 12-day delay, it is of some relevance, in my view, that the defendants were not obliged to file an acknowledgment of service when they did (or at all), albeit having chosen to do so the 14-day time limit for making an application to dispute jurisdiction applied. It is also of some relevance that they had made clear their intention to dispute jurisdiction if the claimant failed to effect valid service (albeit that was an insufficient step on its own) and, when the application was made, the claimant still had more than two months within which he could have effected valid service. I also bear in mind that the delay has had no impact on the procedural timetable.

41. However, it is also important to bear in mind the nature of the default. A defendant who files an acknowledgment of service and does not make an application within 14 days to dispute jurisdiction, or argue that the court should not exercise its jurisdiction, will be treated as having accepted the court’s jurisdiction to try the claim (Hoddinott v Persimmon Homes (Wessex) Limited [2008] 1 WLR 80), subject to any application for extension of time. In the circumstances, although I would not characterise the default as serious, I consider that the 12-day delay was not insignificant.

42. Secondly, the defendants do not seek to advance a good reason for the delay, which was the result of an oversight, although the circumstances in which that occurred are relevant to the third stage.

43. The key issue is whether it is just, having regard to the need for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost and to the need to enforce compliance with rules, and to all the circumstances of the case, to grant the extension of time sought. In my judgment, it is for the following reasons: i) Not having been validly served, the defendants were not obliged to file an acknowledgment of service when they did (or at all). ii) The defendants made clear from the outset their intention to dispute jurisdiction if the claimant failed to effect valid service. iii) The oversight occurred in circumstances where the defendants were preparing substantial applications in respect of two parallel sets of proceedings in different courts. iv) The application for an extension of time was made promptly on discovery of the default. v) The delay has had no effect on the procedural timetable. vi) When the application was served, the claimant still had plenty of time to effect valid service of the claim. He had been informed in clear terms how and by when he needed to do so. He could easily have done so by serving the defendants’ solicitors by email at the addresses they provided. He has given no explanation for his failure. vii) Although, at this point in time, the effect of granting the extension of time is that the claim form will fall to be set aside, in my judgment that consequence is properly attributable to the claimant’s own continuing failure to serve the claim form after he was served with the Jurisdiction Application. If he had served the claim form at any time within the four months after it was issued, the defendants’ jurisdictional challenge would have fallen away. viii) In addition, the claimant has not at any stage applied for an extension of time in which to serve the claim form, other than informally and defectively in his skeleton argument, without filing any evidence in support. ix) Even if the prejudice to the claimant were to be viewed as the setting aside of the claim form, it is potentially open to him to bring a further claim as the limitation period has not expired (albeit there may be other grounds on which the defendants would challenge a fresh claim). The prejudice to the claimant from beginning afresh is limited in circumstances where he has wrongly brought the claim pursuant to Part 8, he has not served particulars that comply with Practice Direction 53, and he has paid £10,000 less than the correct court fee for a claim that he has valued at £250,000. x) On the other hand, the prejudice to the defendants if an extension is refused is that they lose a clear-cut jurisdictional challenge in circumstances where the claim has never been validly served.

44. Accordingly, I grant the application for an extension of time.

45. It also follows that I should make a declaration that the court has no jurisdiction or will not exercise its jurisdiction and set aside the claim form, pursuant to CPR rule 11(6), as the claim form was not validly served within four months of being issued. No formal application to retrospectively validate service by email pursuant to CPR 6.15 has been made, nor has any evidence in support of the claimant’s informal application been made (as required by CPR 6.15(3)(a)). In any event, it is plain that there is no “good reason” to authorise an alternative method of service, as the claimant could easily have served the claim by email or post on the defendants’ solicitors at the email addresses or postal address they provided. Nor has the defendant made any formal application for an extension under CPR 7.6, or filed evidence in support as required by 7.6(4)(a). In any event, it would be impossible for the claimant to show that “the court has failed to serve the claim form” or that he “has taken all reasonable steps to comply with rule 7.5 but has been unable to do so” or that he “has acted promptly in making the application” (CPR 7.6), and so there is no basis for an extension. Conclusion

46. For the reasons I have given: i) In respect of the County Court claim, default judgment is set aside and the claim is struck out as an abuse of process pursuant to CPR 3.4(2)(b); and ii) In respect of the High Court claim, the defendants’ application for an extension of time, relief from sanctions, a declaration that the court has no jurisdiction, and an order setting the claim form aside, is granted; the application dismiss the claim for failure to comply with a notice under CPR 7.7(1) is refused.