DE (A Child: Inward Return Order From India), Re

Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 1099 (Fam) IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICECase No. FD25P00682 FAMILY DIVISION THE SENIOR COURTS ACT 1981 THE CHILD: DE (aged 1) BETWEEN The Mother Applicant And The Father First Respondent And The Paternal Aunt Second Respondent Ms Rayner (counsel) for the Applicant, instructed by RWK Goodman Solicitors The First Respondent, a litigant in person, assisted by QLR Mr Ikechukwu (solicitor) The Second Respondent, a litigant in person, assisted by QLR Ms Dear(solicitor) Re DE (A Child: Inward Return Order From India) JUDGMENT Nicholas Stonor KC sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge Hearing dates: 27, 28, 29 April 2026 Judgment handed down: 29 April 2026 IMPORTANT NOTICE This judgment was delivered in private. Any published version of the judgment must strictly preserve the anonymity of the child and members of their family. All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of court.

1. Introduction

1. By an application dated 22 October 2025, the applicant (M) seeks an order that her daughter, DE (aged 1) should be made a ward of court and returned to live with her in this jurisdiction.

2. DE and her parents are all Indian nationals. DE was born in the UK in November 2024, her parents having moved to this country in January 2023. On 07 March 2025, DE and her parents arrived in India. In circumstances which are disputed, DE remained in India and began living with her father (F) and his parents. In April 2025, M returned to the UK. In June 2025, M gave her father power of attorney to commence proceedings in India with a view to securing the return of DE to her care. Those proceedings were commenced in India in July 2025.

3. Within these proceedings, DE was made a ward of court at the initial ex parte hearing before McKendrick J on 22 October 2025. Directions were subsequently given towards a two-day hearing before Morgan J on 17 February 2026 to consider whether this court had jurisdiction. At the conclusion of that hearing, at which oral evidence was given by M and F, Morgan J determined that (1) DE was habitually resident in the jurisdiction of England and Wales on 07 March 2025, 22 October 2025 and remains so now; and (2) the courts of England and Wales have jurisdiction in matters of parental responsibility relating to DE. Morgan J gave directions towards a hearing commencing 27 April 2026 to consider: (1) whether England and Wales is the correct forum to hear this matter; and (2) if so, whether there should be an order for the return of DE to this jurisdiction. Permission was given for the instruction of an expert in Indian law to advise on the progress of the Indian proceedings and the likely treatment in India of a return order if one were made by this court.

4. At a Pre-Trial Review before Ms Markham KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, on 17 April 2026, the time estimate for this hearing was increased from two to three days, and permission was given for the instruction of an expert in immigration law to consider the various issues arising including the likely prospects of M securing long term leave to remain in the UK and the implications for DE and F.

2. This Hearing

5. The case papers included: (1) Four statements from M. (2) One statement from F, with additional emails sent by him to the court on 17 April 2026. (3) One statement from F’s sister (FS) who had been joined as a party given that she had been implicated in M’s allegations that, whilst living in the UK, she had been the victim of domestic abuse and modern day slavery. (4) A report dated 27 March 2026 from Mr Waheb Hussaini, Advocate-on-Record, Supreme Court of India; expert in Indian law. (5) Reports dated 22 and 23 April 2026 from Ms Tamana Aziz, Immigration Solicitor; expert in immigration law.

6. It is of note that some of the factual issues before the court are also being considered in other contexts, but documentation relating to those other contexts is limited or non-existent: (1) There is an ongoing police investigation into M’s allegations of domestic abuse and modern day slavery; there has been no disclosure of documentation relating to that investigation. (2) The immigration expert reports that M has discretionary leave to remain (DLR) until July 2026 and has had a “positive conclusive grounds decision” which is likely to strengthen her pending Human Rights application, but I do not have any documentation relating to these matters. (3) I have some limited documentation from the Indian proceedings.

7. M was represented by Ms Rayner, counsel, who had prepared a helpful skeleton argument which referenced key authorities contained in a separate bundle. F and FS were litigants in person but assisted by QLRs, Mr Ikechukwu and Ms Dear respectively.

8. M and FS attended in person. F attended remotely from India. Given M’s allegations, screens were used to ensure that she could not see or be seen by F and FS. M gave evidence in English. F and FS were assisted by Hindi and Urdu interpreters, respectively. Over the first two days, I heard oral evidence from M, F and FS, and then concise submissions. I then took time to reflect and prepare this judgment which I delivered on the afternoon of day three.

9. I am grateful to all three advocates, and to Ms Rayner’s instructing solicitors, for their assistance.

3. The Parties’ Positions

10. At the outset of the hearing, Ms Rayner submitted that, having regard to the legal framework (set out below), this was a case where I should hear the evidence before determining the forum issue. F confirmed that he agreed with that approach and that he wanted the court to hear his oral evidence. This seemed to me to be the correct approach, and I emphasised that it would remain open to me to conclude, after considering all the written and oral evidence, that India was in fact the appropriate forum and not this jurisdiction.

11. M asserts that: (1) Whilst living in the UK, she was the victim of domestic abuse and modern day slavery which was perpetrated principally by F and FS. (2) F pressurised her into travelling to India in March 2025, abducted DE and sought to exclude M from DE’s life. (3) It is in DE’s welfare interests to return to the UK to live with M.

12. F asserts that: (1) M’s allegations are fabricated in the hope that they will improve her immigration case. (2) M abandoned DE, and that is why he has been caring for her ever since, with the assistance of his parents. (3) It is in DE’s welfare interests to remain living in India. (4) If this court were to make a return order, he would comply with it. However, he would not be willing to bring DE back to the UK because of his work commitments. He would co-operate with authorities in India with a view to facilitating DE’s return provided everything is done lawfully. (He says that DE’s passport is currently being held by the Indian authorities).

13. FS asserts that M’s allegations against her are entirely fabricated. She leaves it to the court to decide what is best for DE and will comply with the court’s decision. She would travel to India to bring DE back to the UK if she could be reassured that she will not be arrested and that she and her children will not be put at any risk in any way.

4. Essential Background

14. I draw the following summary from the written and oral evidence.

15. M and F met in India in 2021. They married in India in 2022. Despite references in certain documents to this having been an arranged marriage, both M and F insist that it was not arranged and have described it as a “love marriage”.

16. In January 2023, M and F moved to the UK so that M could pursue a Masters degree at a University in the North East of England. They were eligible to enter the UK because M had obtained a student visa and F was registered as her dependent.

17. After a short while living close to the University where M was studying, M and F moved to the North West of England and lived very close to F’s sister (FS) and her family. M says that she did not want to make this move but was pressurised into doing so by F and FS. Both F and FS deny that, with F asserting that M was in fact the one who instigated the move.

18. M says that the first property that they lived in (Property A) was in a poor and unhygienic condition. She produced photos showing damp, mould and an infestation of cockroaches. M says that she was forced by F and FS to clean this property so that in due course it would be fit for habitation by FS and her family. M says that she developed urinary tract infections because of the unhygienic conditions and that the skin on her hands peeled because of the amount of cleaning she was required to undertake. M says that, after she became pregnant, she and F moved to another property nearby (Property B) because F and his family did not want the midwife to see the condition of Property A.

19. M says that F, FS and FS’s husband would denigrate her and her family. She says that F and FS would hit and slap her on occasions. She says that on one occasion, F hit her on the back and threatened her with a knife; and on another occasion, in September 2024, F hit her on the neck causing pain.

20. Whilst F and FS do not seriously dispute M’s description of the condition of Property A, they resolutely deny all of M’s allegations against them. They assert that M has fabricated these allegations “for immigration purposes”, that is to enhance her prospects of being allowed to remain in the UK beyond the expiry of her student visa.

21. DE was born in late 2024. M suffered post-natal depression.

22. M says that she did not report any of the alleged abuse to professionals in the UK for several reasons: there was a strong family and cultural expectation that she should try to make her marriage work; it took her time to understand fully that the alleged behaviour towards her was in fact abusive; and she was frightened of how F and his family would react. She says that she did try to call the Police on 25 December 2024 but was interrupted by F and put the phone down.

23. M says that F insisted that they should travel to India with DE. She says she did not want to go but did so because F had threatened further physical abuse and had said that he would take DE away and would divorce her if she refused to travel. M says that she had expected that they would be returning to the UK after approximately one month. F disputes M’s account and says that she was the one who was insisting on travelling to India. In his oral evidence, for the first time, F alleged that M had wanted a divorce because she had a boyfriend in the UK with whom she had been going out some nights until 0200, leaving DE in his care.

24. M, F and DE left the UK on 06 March 2025 and landed at an airport in India on 07 March 2025. M says that they were met at the airport by members of F’s family. She says that F took DE out of the airport in order, she had thought, to put their luggage in cars. M says that F and DE did not return to the airport and she was left alone and confused. M says that she has not seen DE face-to-face since. M says that F also took all of M’s personal items including her SIM card, bank cards and passport. M says that she tried to engage the local Police in India but without success.

25. F disputes M’s account. In oral evidence, F asserted that M had taken DE from the airport to her parents’ home for about one month and then effectively abandoned her. F says he then had no choice but to care for DE at the home of his parents. FS says that she had received a call from M saying that she and DE were at the airport but could not find F. FS says she then called her parents and spoke to her mother who told her that M and DE had gone to M’s parents’ home. FS says that F then interrupted the call and told her to stay out of the matter. FS says that she has not spoken to M or F since.

26. On 10 April 2025, M signed a document headed ‘Memorandum of Understanding Cum Final Matrimonial Settlement Deed by way of Khula Divorce’. The document contains factual errors: it refers to the parents’ marriage having been an arranged marriage which, as I have already indicated, both of them dispute; it refers to DE as being six months old when she was only four months old at the time. The document includes the following by way of recitals and terms: (1) M and her family members had been “harassing, torturing and playing fraud” to F. (2) M agreed to hand over DE to F “forever due to not proper caring of her food, education, guiding etc, and in the future . . . shall not claim or meet with [DE]”. (3) M and F agreed that they would not contact each other or their respective families in the future. If M were to breach that agreement, F would have the right to “take the stern action against [M]”. There was no parallel provision in the event of breach by F. (4) F agreed to return M’s personal items including her SIM card, bank cards and passport. (5) M had “theft” from F and “also received huge amounts” from F, and F “agreed to forgive the entire amount”.

27. M says that the agreement was signed in a garage-type building in the presence of herself, her father, F, members of F’s family and “bouncers” who were there to intimidate her. M says that she had been the only female present. M says that she had received no legal advice and no lawyer was present at the signing. M says that she had been pressurised into signing the agreement and did so because she was frightened and because she had been promised that DE would in fact be returned to her.

28. F provides a starkly different account. He says that M had been the one who wanted the divorce; she had arranged for the document to be produced; she and her family were the ones intimidating him.

29. M’s passport was returned to her but, she says, nothing else. She returned to the UK on 14 April 2025. She says she did so because she was fearful of F and his family.

30. On 17 April 2025, M sought assistance from her University and was put in touch with support services. She was accommodated in a Women’s Refuge. Records from those support services, and M’s GP records, show that M told professionals that her husband had kidnapped their daughter in India and that his family had threatened to kill her if she did not return to the UK. M also described the alleged abuse perpetrated against her by F and his family in the UK.

31. M experienced poor mental health and says that there were three occasions when she attempted to take her own life. She received treatment including anti-depressants and NHS Talking Therapy, which she says has been effective.

32. M says that she reported the alleged abuse to the Police in the UK on 21 May 2025. As I have indicated, there is an ongoing police investigation.

33. Around the same time, M received advice through support services to the effect that she should focus on pursuing a remedy in India. Through her father acting as her power of attorney, M petitioned for a ‘Declaration of Guardian and custody of minor’ in India in early July 2025. The information contained in the petition reflects M’s account to support services, and her subsequent account to this court, about the alleged abuse perpetrated against her and the alleged kidnapping of DE. These proceedings are ongoing in India. F has not engaged with those proceedings in any meaningful way.

34. As I have described, these proceedings were commenced in October 2025. At an inter partes hearing on 19 November 2025, F was ordered to facilitate contact by way of short video call four times per week, and to provide M with a weekly email update as to DE’s welfare. Contact has been sporadic and was stopped entirely by F in mid-February 2026. M says that F has been deliberately obstructive. F says that problems were caused by connection difficulties and time difference. In his oral evidence, for the first time, he asserted that he had stopped contact because of M’s abusive behaviours during calls. The welfare updates provided by F have been brief and repetitive.

5. The Expert Evidence

35. Ms Aziz advises that: “M’s current immigration status is secure until July 2026, with good merits and likelihood of success in her pending Human Rights application. [DE]’s immigration status is dependent on [M]’s. [DE] requires a valid Indian passport to travel. If [M] regularises her status, [M] may apply as a dependant, and both [DE] and [F] may apply for entry clearance to return to the UK on short term visit visa however the chances of success for [F] depends on any pending police investigations as he may be refused on character/suitability grounds. Applications should be carefully prepared to meet the relevant Immigration Rules and procedural requirements.” Ms Aziz clarified that M can apply for DE to come to the UK as her dependant before her status is regularised and can do so on compassionate grounds as ‘A child of a parent with limited leave (Human Rights)’.

36. Mr Waheb advises that: “If the orders of the English court are placed before the [local Indian] Family Court, they are unlikely to have any practical effect, given the question of jurisdiction and the fact that the parties and the nature of the proceedings are the same in both jurisdictions, with both custody petitions having been initiated by the applicant mother. However, those orders are likely to assume greater significance if the guardianship petition is withdrawn and a writ of habeas corpus is instead filed before the High Court. In such proceedings, it may be asserted that the courts of England and Wales have exclusive jurisdiction in relation to the custody of the minor child, together with an explanation of the circumstances in which the guardianship petition came to be filed before the [local Indian] Family Court.”

6. Legal Framework 6.1 Forum

37. Whilst this court has jurisdiction, it is of course not bound to exercise it. Pursuant to Family Law Act 1986, section 5(2), the court can stay the proceedings if it appears that it would be more appropriate for the matters to which the application relates to be determined in proceedings which are continuing in another jurisdiction.

38. In V v M (A Child) (Stranding: Forum Conveniens: Anti-Suit Injunction) [2019] EWHC 466, after reviewing the legal framework in relation to stay applications and forum non-conveniens, Williams J summarised the correct approach (at [35]): “i) the burden is upon the applicant to establish that a stay of the English proceedings is appropriate; ii) the applicant must show not only that England is not the natural or appropriate forum but also that the other country is clearly the more appropriate forum; iii) in assessing the appropriateness of each forum, the court must discern the forum with which the case has the more real and substantial connection in terms of convenience, expense and availability of witnesses. In evaluating this limb the following will be relevant; a) the desirability of deciding questions as to a child's future upbringing in the state of his habitual residence and the child's and parties' connections with the competing forums in particular the jurisdictional foundation; b) the relative ability of each forum to determine the issues including the availability of investigating and reporting systems. In practice judges will be reluctant to assume that facilities for a fair trial are not available in the court of another jurisdiction but this may have to give way to the evidence in any particular case; c) the availability of witnesses and the convenience and expense to the parties of attending and participating in the hearing; d) the availability of legal representation; e) any earlier agreement as to where disputes should be litigated; f) the stage any proceedings have reached in either jurisdiction and the likely date of the substantive hearing; g) principles of international comity, insofar as they are relevant to the particular situation in the case in question. However public interest or public policy considerations not related to the private interests of the parties and the ends of justice in the particular case have no bearing on the decision which the court has to make; h) it has also been held that it is relevant to consider the prospects of success of the applications. iv) If the court were to conclude that the other forum was clearly more appropriate, it should grant a stay unless other more potent factors were to drive the opposite result; and v) In the exercise to be conducted above the welfare of the child is an important (possibly primary), but not a paramount, consideration. 6.2 Summary Return

39. India is not a signatory to the 1980 Hague Convention on International Child Abduction. Accordingly, this is a “non-Convention” case where, as clarified by Moylan LJ in Re A and B (Children) (Summary-Return: Non-Convention State) [2022] EWCA Civ 1664 (at [3]), an application for a “summary return order” is in fact shorthand for “a return order made after a summary welfare determination”.

40. The key guidance comes from the decisions of the House of Lords in Re J (Child Returned Abroad: Convention Rights) [2006] UKHL 40, and the Supreme Court in Re NY (A Child) [2019] UKSC

49. This was helpfully distilled by Cobb J (as he then was) in J v J (Return to Non-Hague Convention Country) [2021] EWHC 2412 at [34-38].

41. Whilst this is an application for an inward return order, it is well-established that the guidance in relation to outward return orders is equally applicable (see for example Mostyn J in Re N (A Child) (Abduction: Children Act or Hague Convention Proceedings) [2020] EWFC 35 at [3]).

42. I have all of the guidance well in mind. For the purposes of this judgment, I highlight: (1) DE’s welfare is my paramount consideration and I am likely to find it appropriate to consider the first six aspects of the welfare checklist in s.1(3) of the Children Act 1989. (2) It is for the court to determine the extent to which it may be necessary to inquire into aspects of the welfare checklist or other disputed matters. (3) In a case like this where domestic abuse is alleged, I must consider whether in light of Practice Direction 12J (of the Family Procedure Rules 2010), an inquiry should be conducted into the disputed allegations and, if so, how extensive that inquiry should be. (4) Issues of habitual residence and wrongful removal will feed into my welfare evaluation but are by no means determinative of outcome. 6.3 Domestic Abuse

43. In Re H-N and Others (children) (domestic abuse: Finding of fact hearings) [2021] EWCA Civ 448, the Court of Appeal (Sir Andrew McFarlane PFD; King LJ and Holroyde LJ) said: “31. The circumstances encompassed by the definition of ‘domestic abuse’ in PD12J fully recognise that coercive and/or controlling behaviour by one party may cause serious emotional and psychological harm to the other members of the family unit, whether or not there has been any actual episode of violence or sexual abuse. In short, a pattern of coercive and/or controlling behaviour can be as abusive as or more abusive than any particular factual incident that might be written down and included in a schedule in court proceedings (see ‘Scott Schedules’ at paragraph 42 -50). It follows that the harm to a child in an abusive household is not limited to cases of actual violence to the child or to the parent. A pattern of abusive behaviour is as relevant to the child as to the adult victim. The child can be harmed in any one or a combination of ways for example where the abusive behaviour: i) Is directed against, or witnessed by, the child; ii) Causes the victim of the abuse to be so frightened of provoking an outburst or reaction from the perpetrator that she/he is unable to give priority to the needs of her/his child; iii) Creates an atmosphere of fear and anxiety in the home which is inimical to the welfare of the child; iv) Risks inculcating, particularly in boys, a set of values which involve treating women as being inferior to men.

32. It is equally important to be clear that not all directive, assertive, stubborn or selfish behaviour, will be ‘abuse’ in the context of proceedings concerning the welfare of a child; much will turn on the intention of the perpetrator of the alleged abuse and on the harmful impact of the behaviour. We would endorse the approach taken by Peter Jackson LJ in Re L (Relocation: Second Appeal) [2017] EWCA Civ 2121 (paragraph 61): “Few relationships lack instances of bad behaviour on the part of one or both parties at some time and it is a rare family case that does not contain complaints by one party against the other, and often complaints are made by both. Yet not all such behaviour will amount to ‘domestic abuse’, where ‘coercive behaviour’ is defined as behaviour that is ‘used to harm, punish, or frighten the victim…’ and ‘controlling behaviour’ as behaviour ‘designed to make a person subordinate…’ In cases where the alleged behaviour does not have this character it is likely to be unnecessary and disproportionate for detailed findings of fact to be made about the complaints; indeed, in such cases it will not be in the interests of the child or of justice for the court to allow itself to become another battleground for adult conflict.”

44. In Re S (Children: Transnational Marriage Abandonment) [2025] EWCA Civ 1058, Peter Jackson LJ observed (at [78]) that: “. . . prolonged child abduction is not only a criminal offence but also a pernicious form of child abuse”. He went on to make comments which, in my judgment, are equally applicable to the circumstances of this case: “79. Child abduction of this kind may also be an extreme form of domestic abuse. Domestic abuse is defined in the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 as consisting of physical or sexual abuse, violent or threatening behaviour, controlling or coercive behaviour, economic abuse, and psychological, emotional or other abuse. PD12J (titled ‘Domestic Abuse and Harm’) applies this definition to family proceedings at paragraph 2A. Depending on the facts, abduction may amount to controlling behaviour, and it is clearly capable of amounting to psychological, emotional or other abuse.” 6.4 Fact-Finding (including Lucas direction)

45. In Re S (Children: Transnational Marriage Abandonment) [2025] EWCA Civ 1058, Peter Jackson LJ observed (at [74]): “The purpose of fact-finding in a case about children is therefore to provide a fair and sufficient factual foundation for the court’s welfare decisions. . .”.

46. Insofar as it is necessary for me to resolve disputed facts, I keep well in mind the well-established principles relating to fact-finding. These include: the burden is on the party asserting that any particular fact is true; the standard of proof is the balance of probabilities; I must consider all of the evidence in the round, whatever the nature of the evidence; in relation to oral evidence, I must be cautious when drawing any inferences from a witness’s demeanour and must make allowance for the fallibility of memory; people tell lies for all sorts of reasons; just because a person has lied about one matter, it does not mean that they have lied about other matters.

7. The Oral Evidence

47. M gave evidence in a straightforward manner. Her answers were measured and lacked embellishment. They were consistent with the accounts she has given previously in these proceedings, and in the Indian proceedings, and in the records of those agencies who supported her following her return to the UK. I kept in mind the fact that, through no fault of her own, M suffered poor mental health following DE’s birth and following the events in India in March 2025, and there is the potential for this to impact on the accuracy of her recollection. I nonetheless considered M to be an essentially honest witness. The distress which she is experiencing was evident not just when she gave evidence but throughout the hearing, and it seemed to be to be entirely genuine.

48. When considering F’s evidence, I was mindful that he was giving evidence remotely and with the assistance of an interpreter. Making every reasonable allowance, I nonetheless found him to be a wholly unreliable witness. Whereas M’s accounts had impressive consistency, F was quick to distance himself from the account contained in his one and only statement. He made a number of serious allegations which he had never mentioned before, for example: that M had wanted the divorce (because she had a boyfriend in the UK) and had prepared the paperwork; that M had been abusive during indirect contact. F’s evidence was at times simply implausible, for example his assertion that M had been responsible for drawing up the khula divorce which, as set out above, was expressed in terms which were entirely favourable to F. In tone and content, F’s evidence was often dismissive. When asked about M being isolated following the move to the North West, he said “If she makes friends or not, what’s it got to do with me?” When asked about hitting M on the back and threatening her with a knife, he said: “I go to work for ten to twelve hours a day, I don’t have the energy or time to beat or do this sort of thing”. Towards the end of his evidence, he told me that DE thinks that his own mother (PGM) is her mother, and she calls her an equivalent of “mummy”. F said that he had done nothing to correct DE. It seemed to me that it had simply not occurred to F that this might be emotionally harmful to DE.

49. When considering FS’s evidence, I was similarly mindful that she was giving evidence through an interpreter. She was at pains to distance herself from having had any meaningful involvement in the lives of M, F and DE. Given the geographical proximity between the families, FS’s own assertion that she would offer financial and practical support to M and F (including towards their taxi to the airport on 06 March 2025), and the photos in the bundle which show seemingly happy family gatherings, I found this evidence very difficult to accept. I did not sense that FS was trying to assist the court by giving a full and truthful account.

8. Discussion 8.1 Forum

50. I can deal with this shortly. The forum point was not in fact seriously pressed by F. In any event, after hearing the oral evidence and submissions, it was clear to me that this court was the appropriate forum: (1) I had been able to consider a substantial body of written and oral evidence, which was sufficient to allow me to determine those factual disputes which required determination, and to make an appropriately informed welfare evaluation. (2) All parties had engaged in the proceedings and had participated fully in the hearing, with the assistance of counsel (for M) and QLRs (for F and FS), and interpreters (for F and FS). (3) By contrast, and with the respect to the local family court in India, F has not engaged in any meaningful way in the proceedings in that court and I had no confidence that he would do so in the future. 8.2 Scope of Fact-Finding

51. Given the police investigation and immigration application(s) which are ongoing (or pending), and in respect of which I have limited information, it seems to me that I should not express any views in respect of the allegations relating to modern day slavery. I am mindful also of the fact that I have not read or heard evidence from other members of the paternal family based in the UK who are implicated in M’s allegations.

52. In any event, it is not necessary or proportionate for me to consider those allegations in order to inform my overall welfare evaluation. 8.3 Findings of Fact

53. Not unusually, there is limited third party information in support of M’s allegations. I need to consider what information there is alongside the oral evidence that I have heard and take an overall view having regard, where appropriate, to the inherent probabilities and improbabilities.

54. It is inherently unlikely that M would want to move a considerable distance from her University town, necessitating lengthy journeys in order to continue the studies which were clearly so important to her.

55. There are some photos showing unhygienic home conditions at Property A. There is evidence that M suffered a urinary tract infection: it is noted in her GP records, and FS said she was aware of it. FS also said that M had told her that the skin on her hands was peeling. M’s GP records show that in September 2024 she complained of neck pain. There is no independent evidence as to what caused the infection, skin peeling or neck pain.

56. It is of note that FS and her family did ultimately move into Property A.

57. It is inherently unlikely that M would abandon DE in India and would then pressurise F into a divorce on terms which were so unfavourable to M.

58. I accept M’s evidence as to why she did not tell anyone of the alleged abuse whilst the family were living in the UK. I found M to be an essentially honest witness. I found F to be a wholly unreliable witness. I did not consider that FS was giving a full and truthful account.

59. Considering all of the evidence in the round, I am satisfied that I can and should make the following findings on the balance of probabilities: (1) On 07 March 2025, F abducted DE by taking her from M at the airport in India without M’s consent. (2) On 10 April 2025, M signed the khula divorce papers because she was coerced into doing so, principally by F. (3) From 07 March 2025 to date, F has denied meaningful contact between DE and M; F has done so despite court orders being in place from 19 November 2025; F has allowed DE to grow up believing that her paternal grandmother is in fact her mother. (4) F’s conduct towards M and DE should be seen as further examples of domestic abuse perpetrated by him. Other examples of domestic abuse perpetrated by F include: a. Coercing M into moving from the North East to the North West. b. Leaving M isolated in the North West. c. Physically abusing M, including (i) regularly slapping and hitting her; (ii) an occasion when F hit M on the back and threatened her with a knife; (iii) an occasion in September 2024 when F hit M on the neck causing neck pain. d. Threatening physical abuse and the removal of DE from her care. e. Denigrating M and her family.

60. For reasons already given, and mindful in particular of the ongoing police investigation, I do not consider it necessary or appropriate to resolve the disputed allegations insofar as they relate directly to FS. I have set out my observations in relation to FS’s evidence generally. As I will come to, FS will have the opportunity of demonstrating that she does in fact respect the court and want to do what is best for DE.

9. Welfare Evaluation

61. DE’s welfare is my paramount consideration. She is too young to express her wishes and feelings, though I readily assume that, if it were possible, she would want to be able to enjoy a positive and meaningful relationship with both of her parents.

62. DE has all the needs of a child of her age, but in light of the fraught background to her short life so far, she has a profound and urgent need to be able to restore her relationship with her mother.

63. A return order would involve serious short-term disruption for DE. She has lived in India, with F and her paternal grandparents, for over one year. She will have no memory of any other life. Her removal from India will cause her upset as she will be leaving the adult figures to whom she is most closely attached.

64. DE has suffered serious emotional harm as a result of her abduction and the subsequent obstruction of her relationship with her mother. F is principally responsible for that harm. DE is also at risk of harm for so long as she remains in F’s care given (1) my findings that he is a perpetrator of serious domestic abuse and (2) his lack of insight into DE’s emotional needs, as reflected by his failure to take any steps to correct DE from her growing belief that her paternal grandmother is in fact her mother.

65. There is no cogent evidence to support an assertion that DE would be at risk of harm in M’s care. Whilst F has made complaints about the care which M previously gave to DE, they are not supported by any independent evidence and I did not find F to be a credible witness. Whilst M has had mental health difficulties, through no fault of her own, she has taken steps to address them and she will continue to receive support from those agencies who have been helping her since her return to the UK.

66. F may be capable of meeting DE’s physical needs but, in light of my findings and my overall assessment, he is quite incapable of meeting her emotional needs. On the evidence available, M was meeting DE’s physical and emotional needs prior to March 2025 and there is nothing to suggest that she would not be able to do so were DE returned to her care now. M told me, and I accept, that if DE is returned to her care she will be moved to accommodation which would be suitably equipped. M’s immigration application(s) will take their course. Whilst there is no guarantee that M will be allowed to remain in the UK, the unchallenged expert evidence is to the effect that the prospects are good. In any event, the uncertainty in relation to M’s immigration status does not mean that it would be contrary to DE’s welfare for her to be returned to M’s care in the UK. I accept M’s evidence when she says that she would promote DE’s relationship with F through indirect and, if possible, direct contact, provided safe arrangements can be made and F gives appropriate assurances as to his conduct.

67. Taking all matters into account, I am entirely satisfied that it is in DE’s welfare interests that she should remain a ward of this court and that I should make an order for her to be returned urgently to this jurisdiction. I direct that she should be returned within six weeks and that FS should travel to India to bring her back to the UK and return her to M’s care. I will list the matter soon after the six weeks have expired to consider whether DE should remain a ward of the court and otherwise what, if any, orders may be required.

68. This court respectfully requests the Indian authorities to liaise with M, F and FS and such other authorities as may be appropriate with a view to implementing the return order. I give permission for this judgment to be disclosed to the relevant authorities in India and in the UK. *********