Dr Malay Haldar & Anor v Dawn Crook & Ors

Neutral Citation Number [2026] EWHC 1091 (KB) Ref. KB-2022-003534 and KB-2024-000065 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE KING’S BENCH DIVISION Royal Courts of Justice Strand London Before MASTER DAGNALL IN THE MATTER OF DR MALAY HALDAR & DR SREELA HALDER Claimants – v – Ms DAWN CROOK, Mr GAVIN BROWN (KB-2022-003534) CASE PROGRESSION OFFICE, TAMESIDE HOSPITAL NHS TRUST, GENERAL MEDICAL COUNCIL AND MEDICAL PRACTITIONERS’ TRIBUNAL SERVICE (KB-2024-000065) Defendants THE CLAIMANTS did not attend and were not represented THE DEFENDANTS did not attend and were not represented APPROVED JUDGMENT TRANSCRIPT (Judgment delivered orally on 25th FEBRUARY 2026( (FOR APPROVAL) __________________ WARNING: Reporting restrictions may apply to the contents transcribed in this document, particularly if the case concerned a sexual offence or involved a child. Reporting restrictions prohibit the publication of the applicable information to the public or any section of the public, in writing, in a broadcast or by means of the internet, including social media. Anyone who receives a copy of this transcript is responsible in law for making sure that applicable restrictions are not breached. A person who breaches a reporting restriction is liable to a fine and/or imprisonment. For guidance on whether reporting restrictions apply, and to what information, ask at the court office or take legal advice. This Transcript is Crown Copyright. It may not be reproduced in whole or in part other than in accordance with relevant licence or with the express consent of the Authority. All rights are reserved. MASTER DAGNALL:

1. There are no parties present, before me. That is in circumstances which I will deal with in the judgment which I am now giving. However, I have determined that I should proceed with this matter today, notwithstanding, that, in particular, there are neither of the Claimants present.

2. These two claims KB-2022-003534 (“matter 3534) and KB-2024-000065 (“matter 0065”) were brought by the Claimants and have been struck out by the court in 2023 and 2024 owing to the Claimants’ failures to comply with orders made within them.

3. There are before me a number of applications.

4. The Claimants by Application Notices of 19 August 2025 and 8 September 2025 have applied to have the claims restored. Those applications were listed to be heard before me on 10 November 2025, and a hearing took place then, at which the Claimants, who attended in person, gave me the impression that they did not understand my directions made in previous orders. I therefore adjourned the matter to 17 December 2025 in order to give the Claimants a further chance to provide further documents, and at which hearing orally, and in various written orders, I made clear as to what, at least, those further documents had to include.

5. I made a further clarificatory order on paper on 11 November 2025, which was not sealed because it was overtaken by further communications; and I made a further clarificatory order on 12 November 2025; as I sought to have more material in relation to why the Claimants said that this court ever had jurisdiction to deal with certain of their claims and as to what the Claimants said the position was with regards to the Second Claimant in relation to the General Medical Council and the Medical Practitioner’s Tribunal.

6. The Claimants then issued further applications, including an application of 19 November 2025 seeking to set aside what they called an order of 14 November 2025, where it seems to me they have confused the sealing date and the actual date of the order, and that they were referring to the order of 12 November 2025.

7. The Claimants further issued an application notice, notionally dated 2 November 2025, sealed on 4 December 2025, seeking an interim payment in matter 00065 for £600,000.

8. Neither of these claim forms have been served (i.e. neither that in matter 3534 nor that in matter 0065). That has been a consequent of previous orders of the court (prior to the orders which struck out each claim) staying each claim and providing that each claim form was not to be released for service.

9. I note here and elsewhere that Civil Procedural Rule (“CPR”) 25.21 provides in sub-rule (1) that, “The Claimant may not apply for an interim payment order before the end of the period of filing an acknowledgement of service applicable to the Defendant against whom the application is made.”, and that the period for filing an acknowledgement of service under CPR10.3 can only start to run after a claim form has been served, and further, under CPR 25.23, the court may only order an interim payment where various conditions are satisfied.

10. The hearing listed for 17 December 2025 was adjourned to 2 January 2026, and then to today, the 25 February 2026 as the Claimants said they could not attend due to various medical emergencies relating to the First Claimant’s medical condition and diabetes, and associated heart and other problems. While those adjournments took place as a result of emailed communications from the Claimants, the Claimants have not attended today and my attention has not been brought to any relevant recent email communication. I will consider later in this judgment as to whether or not I should proceed with the hearing today.

11. The history, in so far as I can gather from the mass of what are confusing, and in many cases unintelligible, documents received from the Claimants seems to me to be generally as follows.

12. Both of the Claimants are doctors; and they are, apparently, married, although their surnames are very slightly different.

13. The First Claimant was the subject of proceedings brought against him by the General Medical Council in the Medical Practitioner’s Tribunal, with the result that the Tribunal concluded that his name should be erased from the medical record by a decision of 29 October 2019.

14. The First Claimant then sought to issue a Notice of Appeal to the High Court, being effectively the Administrative Court, under Section 40 of the Medical Act 1983 in Form N161. The Notice of Appeal was stamped by the Administrative Court and sealed on 15 December 2020.

15. The First Claimant asserts that the Notice of Appeal was invalid, and of no effect, because he had not fully completed it. However, it was then to result in a number of hearings, before judges of the Administrative Court. Finally, it came before Ellenbogen J, who, on 4 May 2021, rejected an application from the First Claimant that he should obtain summary judgment in his favour on the appeal; and who on 9 June 2021 dismissed the appeal.

16. A transcript was obtained of Ellenbogen J’s judgment which was given neutral citation number, [2021] EWHC 4427, and which appears on the Westlaw website, although not on either of the BAILII or the National Archives Find Case Law websites.

17. The Claimants have asserted to me that, in consequence, the transcript and judgment of Ellenbogen J are in some way invalid. That, it seems to me, is wholly incorrect. The transcript is an approved transcript, approved by the Judge, of the judgment which the judge delivered. Whether or not the judgment appears on various websites does not, in any way, affect its validity.

18. The First Claimant sought to appeal Ellenbogen J’s judgment to the Court of Appeal; however, the First Claimant did not comply with procedural directions given by the Court of Appeal with the result that the Registrar of Civil Appeals dismissed the appeal by order of 30 September 2021.

19. I note that the Administrative Court appears to have lost the order dismissing the appeal made by Ellenbogen J on 9 June 2021 during the process of digitising its paper files on to its computer system. However, I do have a copy of the Administrative Court’s order of 9 June 2021 (obtained from the Court of Appeal) and which appears to me to simply carry into effect Ellenbogen J’s dismissal of the appeal which the First Claimant had brought.

20. The First Claimant, as I have said, has asserted to me that in some way or other, the notice of appeal was invalid with the result that what happened before and was directed by Ellenbogen J is all of no effect at all. It seems to me that that is clearly wrong. The various court orders made stand unless they are set aside by the court (see e.g. R(Majera) v Secretary of State [2021] UKSC 46). That has not occurred. Neither the Administrative Court nor the Court of Appeal has set them aside.

21. Further, it seems to me that the Notice of Appeal was clearly issued by the Administrative Court; as it was sealed, and the appeal was progressed not merely by the court but also by the First Claimant, including by his seeking summary judgment within it, and arguing the case before Ellenbogen J.

22. It seems to me that there is no possible ground for suggesting that in some way or other that proceeding was invalid.

23. The two Claimants then on 20 October 2022 issued Claim KB-2022-003534 in which they sought to sue two officers, one of the General Medical Council and another of the Medical Practitioner’s Tribunal, for damages. The basis of their claims has seemed to me throughout, and still now, to be altogether unclear, although in some way or other they seem to be asserting that the tribunal process in relation to the First Claimant was defective. I note that in various documents they appear to assert that the General Medical Council had not disclosed various documents to the First Claimant, but which documents the General Medical Council said were subject to legal professional privilege.

24. The matter 003534 was referred by the court officer under paragraph 2 of the Civil Procedure Rule and Practice Direction 3A to me, on the basis that the Claim potentially lacked reasonable grounds for bringing it or amounted to an abuse of process which might justify it being struck out under the provisions of Civil Procedure Rule 3.4, sub-rule (2), sub-rules (a) and (b) which read as follows: (2) The court may strike out a statement of case if it appears to the court – (a) that the statement of case discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing or defending the claim; (b) that the statement of case is an abuse of the court’s process or is otherwise likely to obstruct the just disposal of the proceedings;”

25. On paper, I concluded that both of those grounds might well be satisfied, in particular because the Particulars of Claim document supplied by the Claimants seemed to me, and still seems to me, to be unintelligible, and also not to contain any factual history or understandable set of facts upon which the claim was sought to be based. Further, the claim appeared to be an attempt to challenge the decisions of Ellenbogen J and of the Court of Appeal, and to amount to an impermissible, collateral challenge to decisions of the High Court and Court of Appeal.

26. I therefore made an order of 20 October 2022 staying that claim, providing that the claim form would not be released for service, and giving the Claimants a period of time in which they should produce proper Particulars of Claim which complied with the Civil Procedure Rules, and set out an intelligible case, and which engaged with the question as to whether or not the claim was impermissible collateral challenge to the previous judicial decisions.

27. The Claimants did provide further documents, but which appeared to me to be wholly unintelligible and subject to the previous defects.

28. They also sought default judgments. That, it appeared to me, was something of a nonsense; since a default judgment can only be obtained if a Defendant has failed to file an Acknowledgement of Service or a Defence in time; and since the Claim Form had not been released for service, there could have been no service on the Defendants, and no applicable time period could have run against them.

29. I refused the various requests for default judgments on that ground. I further determined them to have been totally without merit. I further made unless orders providing that unless proper Particulars of Claim were provided, in accordance with my orders, that claim would be struck out. Those unless orders were not complied with, with the result that the claim, matter 3534, was automatically struck out.

30. The Claimants then issued a further claim form under Claim No. KB-2024-0065, which they delivered to the court on 18 December 2023, and was issued on 16 January 2024. This claim was brought against the Administrative Court’s case progression office, Tameside and Glossop Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust, the General Medical Council and the Medical Practitioner’s Tribunal Service.

31. It followed litigation being brought against the Claimants in the County Court by Barclays Bank Plc seeking to repossess their home, on the basis that they had not been making payments under their mortgage; and where a possession order was made with which the Claimant did not comply; and where the possession order was eventually executed whereupon the Claimants re-entered the property and the County Court granted Barclays Bank a warrant of restitution.

32. The Claimants, however, had then in the High Court brought a further claim, KB-2022-005042 against Barclays Bank, The Redbridge Council and the General Medical Council and its officer Dawn Crook, who had been one of the Defendants to KB-2022-003534. Various Judges, including Master Stephens, Master McCloud and Hill J made orders against the Claimants; and the matter eventually came before Sheldon J who, on 15 July 2024, made an order dismissing an application to set aside previous orders and determined that it was totally without merit. Sheldon J further provided that enforcement action could continue in the High Court.

33. I return to Claim KB-2024-000065. That also was referred to me by the court officer under paragraph 2 of Practice Direction 3A. I first made in it an order of 18 January 2024 whereby I struck out the case against the Case Progression Office on the basis that it was not a proper Defendant, and that in any event the Court is immune from such a claim.

34. I otherwise considered that the Particulars of Claim provided were unintelligible. Insofar as I could understand them, they appeared to seek damages against the local NHS, the General Medical Council and Tribunal. It further seemed to me that at first sight those claims were, again, impermissible collateral challenges to the decisions of Ellenbogen J and the Court of Appeal; and also that if they were to be brought in the High Court at all, they should be in the Administrative Court.

35. I therefore stayed the proceedings, provided that the Claim Form should not be released from service until further order, and provided that the Claimants must provide proper Particulars of Claim, including a concise statement of the facts relied upon and as to why the claims were not abusive in terms of being collateral challenges to the previous judicial decisions, or being claims which in the High Court should be in the Administrative Court. I provided that the claim would be struck out unless proper Particulars of Claim were provided by 4.30pm on 11 April 2024.

36. I further provided in the order, because of the amount of all the communications which the Claimants appear to be making with the court, and which at first sight appeared to me to be abusive and likely to prejudice the efficient operation of the court, that the Claimants could only communicate with the court in various, specific ways. The Claimants were only to correspond with a specific named court officer, the identity of whom has since changed from time to time owing to changes in court staff.

37. The Claimants then sent further documents to the court which I considered and still consider by way of volume, amount and contents to be unintelligible and not to engage or deal with the essential points and directions which I have referred to above, and which I had set out in my various orders.

38. The Claimants also sought some sort of summary judgment against various Defendants.

39. In relation to this I noted then and now Civil Procedural Rule 24.4(1) provides: “A Claimant may not apply the summary judgment until the Defendant, against whom the application is made, has filed an Acknowledgment of Service or a Defence unless a) the court gives permission; or b) a Rule or Practice Direction states otherwise.”

40. There is no relevant Rule or Practice Direction, and I had not permitted the claim form to be released from service, and therefore there had been no service, let alone an Acknowledgement of Service or a Defence. I also regarded the Claimants’ case as being unintelligible, and seemingly abusive as stated above. I therefore could see no reason to give permission to allow a summary judgment application to be made.

41. What I did do was make an order of 30 July 2024 whereby I struck out the various claims as being totally without merit but gave the Claimants, since the order was being made without a hearing, an ability to apply to have the order set aside or varied within 21 days the service of it upon them. I further provided that such an application needed to be made by an application notice and supported by a witness statement giving grounds.

42. In a Further Reasons section of that order, I set out, in detail, my reasoning that the Claimants’ documentation did not comply with my previous unless order. In paragraph 4 of those Further Reasons, I set out, with full explanations; firstly, that there was no precise statement of facts relied on, as required for Particulars of Claim by CPR 16.4.

43. Secondly, that there was no chronological history which had I directed in my previous orders was required, and which would be necessary to understand the claims.

44. Thirdly, that the claim was simply unintelligible.

45. Fourthly, that there appeared to be contentions that a disciplinary process was being improperly conducted but a challenge to that would be either by way of an appeal under Section 40 of the Medical Act 1983 or, perhaps, a Judicial Review.

46. Fifthly that there had in fact been such challenges which had been dismissed by Ellenbogen J and the Court of Appeal, and so the claim appeared to be an impermissible collateral challenge to those decisions.

47. Sixthly, that the Claimants appeared to be making claims about their not having been revalidated by the General Medical Council; and where I set out that an appeal from a refusal to validate or re-validate exists to the Registration Appeals Panel under Section 29F of the Medical Act 1983 with further rights of appeal to the County Court, under paragraphs 7 and 8 of Schedule 3B to the Medical Act 1983; and, accordingly, such were not bmatters which could be the subject matter of challenge in the High Court.

48. Seventhly, that it was unclear whether the Claimants were saying that they were being made subject to some further disciplinary procedure or sanctions but, again, the scheme of the relevant statutes is that there are provisions to appeal to the Medical Practitioner’s Tribunal, with further rights of appeal to the Administrative Court; and that those matters are not for CPR Part 7 claims such as 3534 and 0065, being the claims which are before me.

49. Eighthly, that the Claimants had referred to some claim in defamation, but had not given any of the Particulars required by paragraph 4 of Practice Direction 53B; and, in any event, such a claim appeared to be limitation barred (their being a one year limitation period under section 4A of the Limitation Act 1980 with no application being made to disapply it under section 32A of the Limitation Act 1980)..

50. Ninthly, that the relevant events appeared to be potentially over six years ago, or if there was any Human Rights claim (which has a one year limitation period under section 7(5) of the Human Rights Act 1998 subject to an ability to seek for such to be disapplied), over a year ago; and so that the claims were therefore brought out of time under the various relevant statutory time limits.

51. Tenthly, that the claim against the Case Progression Office was unintelligible, and in any event it is a matter for the Administrative Court which has immunity to decide on its own procedure.

52. Eleventhly, that the material did not seem to reveal any contentions against the Second Defendant.

53. Twelfthly, that it was altogether unclear what was being said to be the claims against the Second, Third and Fourth Defendants,

54. Thirteenthly, that although the material referred to, in some way or other, NHS Pensions, it was unintelligible and appeared, so far as contentions were being made, to in some way or other to be consequential upon whatever were the other claims.

55. I further set out that default judgments could not be obtained in circumstances where the claim form had not yet been released from service and therefore had not been served; and, also, that the same position was the case in relation to summary judgment.

56. The Claimants now wish to, in some way or other, reinstate Claim 000065.

57. Following my Order of 30 July 2024 the Claimants continued to, and still do, besiege the court with correspondence asserting that the court should, in some way or other, grant them remedies in their favour on interim and summary bases.

58. To relieve the burden on court staff and to preserve the integrity of process in this case, and to enable court business to be properly conducted without undue interference of the Claimants who appeared to be abusing the system, I made orders containing penal notices to the effect that; firstly, the Claimants should not assert to the court, or anyone else, that the claims were still subsisting when they had been struck out. I ordered that in circumstances where the Claimants were sending repeated emails to all sorts of public officers, judges and authorities, asserting that they had judgments in their favour and that the claims were progressing.

59. Secondly, that the Claimants would only be able to issue applications and file documents in hard copy, rather than using the court’s CE file. The Claimants were submitting very many documents on CE file, and it was placing an wholly inappropriate burden on court staff to have to process them, and in some way or other deal with them, where the claims had been struck out.

60. I re-made those orders by a further Order of 21 March 2025.

61. The Claimants, notwithstanding this, then again applied on 7 August 2025 for interim payments. I directed a hearing, which took place on 11 August 2025 where I heard the Claimants in person and came to the conclusions, as I set out in an oral judgment Of which there is now an approved transcript [2025] EWHC 3619 (KB) available on The National Archives Find Case Law website. , that, contrary to the Claimants’ assertion, the Claimants had been struck out, and that the various applications for interim payments should be dismissed and declared to be wholly without merit.

62. I further provided in the order which I made on 11 August 2025 that, if the Claimants were to seek to apply to have the claims reinstated following their having been struck out, the Claimants would have to issue a hard copy application notice with evidence in support, which must include their proposed Particulars of Claim (so as to comply with my previous orders) and various other material. I further provided that the matters were to be referred to Lambert J, who is Judge in charge of the King’s Bench Division lists, to consider whether any civil restraint order, or other orders should be made. Lambert J has directed that Soole J should consider these matters, although that process has been suspended, effectively pending this hearing and judgment.

63. It seemed to me to be appropriate to achieve the CPR overriding objective, especially bearing in mind the Claimants being in person and apparent vulnerabilities, that I should make, and I did make, a further order of 13 August 2025 which set out further material which the Claimants would have to provide to justify any application to allow these claims to be reinstated and proceed.

64. The Claimants then applied, by application notice of 19 August 2025, to have at least 0065 restored. I, again, did not see there as being any intelligible, proposed Particulars of Claim or other documents from the Claimants. I accordingly made an order of 4 September 2025 making this clear, and further providing that if the Claimants wished to progress the matter, they would need to lodge at court in one single hard copy file without other material, in tabbed sections, various documents, including their proposed Particulars of Claim document, and which needed to comply with the court’s previous orders as to what it needed to include. The order provided that unless this was done the application would be dismissed.

65. The Claimants then issued a further application notice to restore the claims of 8 September 2025. They did provide some documents but which I did not see as complying with my previous orders. However, I decided to list a hearing for 10 November 2025.

66. The Claimants did attend the hearing on 10 November 2025. Prior to the start of the hearing, I had caused the court staff to hand to the Claimants a file containing all of the various previous orders. The Claimants said that they did not follow what I intended by my previous orders and also that those orders had a confusion between references to 2019 and 2020, which they said, in some way or other, invalidated what I had directed them to do.

67. I confirmed that I meant both of 2019 and 2020 in the various respects; but in order to give the Claimants, as Litigants in Person, and potentially vulnerable, a further opportunity to comply with my orders and present something intelligible and appropriate, I adjourned the matter to 17 December 2025. I explained orally in detail, including by reference to my previous orders what the Claimants needed to provide by 12 December 2025. I made a written order for the adjournment which was dated 10 November 2025.

68. Having made my order of 10 November 2025 it seemed to me that some further clarification would be helpful and that eventually resulted in my making an order of 12 November 2025 where I set out, again, what the Claimants needed to provide.

69. I was concerned that some of the assertions the Claimants seemed now to be making in documents related to the Second Claimant, where it appeared that the Second Claimant was under some suspension process invoked by the General Medical Council. In my order of 12 November 2025, I made orders directed towards the Second Claimant to clarify what she said was happening with regards to her and the General Medical Council and the Medical Practitioner’s Tribunal, and to clarify whether she was saying that that process was in some way being sought to be challenged in this litigation and if so on what basis.

70. The Claimants then issued a further application of 19 November 2025 seeking to set aside my previous orders, and then issued an application (dated 2 November 2025) on 2 December 2025, for, again, an interim payment.

71. There were thus now before me the four applications (19 August and 8 September 2025 seeking to restore the claims, or at least 0065; 19 November 2025 seeking to set aside my previous orders, and 2 November 2025 seeking an interim payment).

72. I had already listed the further hearing for 17 December 2025. The Claimants attended the court building on 16 December 2025, telling court staff that they wished to see me. I was engaged with other matters, and in the absence of an application notice or any documents setting out what the Claimants wished to see me about, I could not see why I should hold an unlisted hearing when I had listed the matter for hearing the next day. The Claimants did not produce any written document or explanation (although I directed the court staff to ask for such) why they wished to see me.

73. On the morning of 17 December 2025 the Second Claimant emailed the court to say that the First Claimant was in hospital, and so neither of the Claimants could attend before me. She said that the First Claimant had been overcome by chest pains. Reluctantly, I decided that I had to adjourn the 17 December 2025 hearing; and I made an order, mistakenly dated 12 November 2025, but bearing a seal of 17 December 2025, adjourning the hearing until 11am on 2 January 2026, and requiring the Claimants, by 4.30pm on 30 December 2025, to file at court, in hard copy, a medical report from a medical practitioner, describing what happened regarding, and the medical condition of, the First Claimant on 17 December 2025.

74. I provided that further requests for an adjournment on medical grounds must be supported by a medical report setting out the relevant person’s condition and prognosis, and why they would not be able to attend, and when they would be able to attend. In the order I reminded the Claimants of the need to comply with my previous orders, including providing compliant proposed Particulars of Claim.

75. On 31 December 2025 the Claimants requested an adjournment of 2 January hearing saying that they could not attend due to the First Claimant’s “ongoing health deterioration”.

76. I was concerned as to whether it was appropriate to adjourn without further medical evidence and details. That being particularly in light of the requirements for there to be proper medical evidence to justify adjournments as set out in the decision in Levy v Ellis-Carr [2012] EWHC 163 and subsequent case law.

77. I decided, however, that the overriding objective required me to grant an adjournment taking into account the Claimants being Litigant in Persons and vulnerable, and made an order of 2 January 2026 adjourning the hearing to 11am on 25 February 2026, providing that the Claimants must by 4.30pm on 18 February file at court, in hard copy, a medical report from a medical practitioner in relation to the condition of the First Claimant, including as to the extent, if at all, that such condition was due to any voluntary decision of the First Claimant not to take prescribed medication (as there was a possible suggestion as to that in a document supplied with the Claimants’ request), and stating that the applications would be automatically dismissed, and determined to be totally without merit, unless that was done by 4.30pm on 18 February 2026.

78. I further reminded the Claimants of the needs to provide medical reports in full form if they sought adjournments, and to comply with my previous orders, including with regards to proposed Particulars of Claim and other documents. Again, provided that the Claimants should only contact the court or staff by way of delivery of documents in hard copy and not electronically, and not by use of CE file.

79. I set out my further reasons for making those various directons and orders in an addendum to that order.

80. It seems to me that all that gave the Claimants ample time to prepare for this hearing, and to provide appropriate documentation for it.

81. The Claimants then provided a number of documents, including an attendance report from a treating clinician at the hospital on 17 December 2025 which had been sent to the Claimant’s General Practitioner.

82. They further then sought, contrary it seems to me, to my orders, to CE file a considerable quantity of documents. Those documents were not provided in hard copy, but rather both electronically, which I had forbidden, and by use of CE file, which I had also forbidden, basically; and again so as to impose an, it seems to me, inappropriate burden on court staff.

83. I have looked through the various documents, many of which are duplicative and very difficult to understand. The Claimants have, again, included the attendance report of 17 December 2025 but with two articles on the effect of diabetes on person’s health. They have included numerous historic documents and various documents relating to the Barclays Bank litigation. They have included some documents which appear to contend for interim payments or for validations and ability to practice documents. They include other documents which seek for various persons, including me, to be prosecuted and which seek also for orders for them to re-enter the property which had been subject to the mortgage possession.

84. They also included documents relating to the Second Claimant; and from which it appeared that on 31 October 2024 the Medical Practitioners Tribunal decided to suspend the Second Claimant’s registration as a doctor at a hearing which the Tribunal had concluded the Claimant had deliberately decided not to attend. They further included a form of appeal notice against that Tribunal decision, although it is unclear as to whether that appeal notice was ever issued, and a hearing notice from the Tribunal for a hearing on 23 and 24 October 2025, although the Claimant provided no detail as to what happened regarding that hearing.

85. I have taken into account all the material that has been provided to me and which I have sought to summarise in this judgment; but wherever I have not mentioned matters that is because of considerations of time and space.

86. The Claimants are not present in the court today although I have not received any request for an adjournment from them. I therefore have to consider whether or not to proceed today to deal with their applications and other letters.

87. I have borne in in mind the provision of Civil Procedure Rule 23.11 “23.11 (1) Where the applicant or any respondent fails to attend the hearing of an application, the court may proceed in their absence. (2) Where – (a) the applicant or any respondent fails to attend the hearing of an application; and (b) the court makes an order at the hearing, the court may, on application or of its own initiative, re-list the application.” I note from it that where an applicant fails to attend, the Court may proceed in their absence; and also that there is an ability for an applicant, where the court has proceeded in their absence, to ask for the application to be re-listed, although that is a request which the court will only accede to on proper grounds.

88. With regards to the Claimants non-attendance, one question is whether the Claimants have had proper notice of this hearing. As far as that is concerned, I have looked at the court file and see that my previous order of 2 January, which provided for at this hearing to take place, was sent to the Claimants at the address which they had given in the claim forms of 40 Newlands Road, Woodford Green, Essex, IG8 0RU. However, when court documents have been sent to that address, envelopes have been returned to the court with the address crossed out but without any explanation as to who had returned it to the court.

89. Secondly, that the order and the hearing notice had been sent to the Claimants at the address “40 Woodford Green, Essex, IG8 0RU”. That appears to be an incorrect address in so far as it misses out the “Newlands Road”. On the other hand, those documents have not been returned by the Royal Mail; and previous documents sent out in that way to that address appear to have found their ways to the Claimant.

90. Further, the order and hearing notices were sent out to two email addresses [email protected] and [email protected], which email addresses had been given to the court by the Claimants and are regularly used by the Claimants (including by sending emails from them to the court).

91. I further bear in mind that, although an attendance report from a medical practitioner was produced previously dated 17 December 2025, no communications have been received from the Claimants with regards to their being unable to attend this hearing.

92. I applied the court’s overriding objective, CPR 1.1: “1.1 (1) These Rules are a procedural code with the overriding objective of enabling the court to deal with cases justly and at proportionate cost. (2) Dealing with a case justly and at proportionate cost includes, so far as is practicable – (a) ensuring that the parties are on an equal footing and can participate fully in proceedings, and that parties and witnesses can give their best evidence; (b) saving expense; (c) dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate – (i) to the amount of money involved; (ii) to the importance of the case; (iii) to the complexity of the issues; and (iv) to the financial position of each party; (d) ensuring that it is dealt with expeditiously and fairly; (e) allotting to it an appropriate share of the court’s resources, while taking into account the need to allot resources to other cases; (f) promoting or using alternative dispute resolution; and (g) enforcing compliance with rules, practice directions and orders.”

93. I have fully considered the overriding objective and the general principles as to whether the court should adjourn a hearing, including the Levy v Ellis-Carr case, and have concluded that is right to proceed. It seems to me clear that I should do so, my main reasons being as follows.

94. Firstly, in my judgment the Claimants clearly have knowledge of this hearing. They have had the documents sent to their actual home address and also have had the documents sent to their email addresses. They have not raised any query with the court about when the hearing is to take place. It seems to me by looking at all the circumstances together, and applying the balance of probabilities that it is more likely than not that they know of this hearing.

95. Secondly, even if the Claimants do not know of the hearing, it seems to me that they clearly ought to know of it and that it is their fault that they do not. Looking at the history, the Claimants having asked for the hearing on 2 January to be adjourned and not, on this hypothesis, having received anything further from the court, it seems to me that the Claimants would have been under a clear duty to ask the court as to what was happening, and so that, if they had done so, they would have learnt of this hearing. The Claimants seem perfectly well able to try to communicate with the court as they have lodged this mass of documents in the interim with the court.

96. Thirdly, the overriding objective contains within the provisions that the case should be dealt with expeditiously, and to further adjourn the matter would not comply with them.

97. Fourthly, although the overriding objective includes such matters as ensuring that the parties are on an equal footing and able to participate fully, and that the case is dealt with fairly, it seems to me that, notwithstanding the Claimants; vulnerabilities and the previous, although now somewhat old medical report, the Claimants have had every opportunity to find out when hearings were to take place and to attend the court; and that there is very much of a burden on them to justify the court not dealing with the matter now, and where they have produced no real current material which could justify the court to not deal with the matter now.

98. Fifthly, the overriding objective includes allotting to any claim the appropriate share of the court’s resources while taking into account the need to allot resources to other cases. It seems to me that to adjourn again would be entirely contrary to that provision and would result in the inappropriate use of court resources.

99. Sixthly, the overriding objective includes enforcing compliance with Rules, Practice Directions and Orders; and it seems to me that a further adjournment would be inconsistent with the various orders I have made, and particularly with the Unless order elements of them which effectively require the matter to be dealt with speedily.

100. Seventhly, it seems to me that this matter has been placing a wholly inappropriate burden on court staff and the sooner it is brought to the end, as long as that can be done justly, which I consider that it can, the better.

101. For all those reasons I am going to proceed with the hearing in the absence of the Claimants. I note also that CPR 23.11 provides a protection for the Claimants in terms of an ability to apply for a re-listing, and that, it seems to me, further justifies my proceeding today.

102. The second question is whether or not the applications have already been automatically struck out for failure to comply with my order of 2 January 2024, and which provided (with an unless order) that the medical report was to be supplied “in relation to the condition of the First Claimant” and which should include the extent, if at all, that the First Claimant’s condition is due to any voluntary decision of the First Claimant “not to take prescribed medication.”

103. It seems to me that the document which was provided was not really a proper report as to the First Claimant’s medical condition, in that it referred only to the position on 17 December 2025 and not that following the order of 2 January 2026. Further, it did not deal with the question of whether the First Claimant not taking medication was voluntary. All it says is, “Concern for the patient had no medications from his GP about previous MIs/stroke and has not been taking any medication since October 2024.” That does not deal with whether that situation was voluntary or involuntary.

104. It therefore seems to me to be arguable that, under the unless order provisions contained in my 2 January 2026 order, the applications have already been struck out have been stated to be totally without merit. However, it seems to me that whether or not that is the case, I should actually consider the applications at this point anyway.

105. The applications divide into two types. The first are applications seeking interim payments. As far as those are concerned, as I have already said, an interim payment can only be sought if the time for filing an Acknowledgement of Service has expired, see CPR 25.21(1). That is not the case here, because the time has not even begun to start to run (as it only runs from service of the claim form(s) and they have never been released for service, and so that no service of them could take place or has taken place). In those circumstances the application simply cannot be made and must be dismissed.

106. I further add that the application can only succeed if one of the conditions in CPR 25.23 are satisfied (i.e. that it is clear that the claim(s) will succeed, at least as to liability). At the moment, I do not see how that could possibly be the case particularly where the Particulars of Claim are, in any event, unintelligible.

107. I therefore dismiss the interim payment applications. It seems to me that they are totally without merit and I should so declare.

108. The second set of applications are effectively to reinstate the claims where they have been struck out for failure to comply with Unless orders. Since the application was to reinstate following a sanction, Civil Procedure Rule 3.9 applies: “3.9 (1) On an application for relief from any sanction imposed for a failure to comply with any rule, practice direction or court order, the court will consider all the circumstances of the case, so as to enable it to deal justly with the application, including the need – (a) for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost; and (b) to enforce compliance with rules, practice directions and orders. (2) An application for relief must be supported by evidence.”

109. As far as that rule is concerned, I have considered the general principles, as set out by the Court of Appeal in Denton v White [2014] EWCA Civ 906; and that what the court does is to carry out a three-stage analysis. The court asks itself, firstly whether the breach is a serious or substantial one. Secondly, whether there is any good reason for the breach. Thirdly, and notwithstanding, but informed by, the answers to the first two questions, whether it is just in all the circumstances for relief from sanctions to be granted. There the court takes into account the importance, although it is not necessarily determinative importance, of the CPR 3.9 (a) and (b) factors being, in effect, the effect which the breach(es) have had on the progress of the litigation, and the importance of compliance with Rules and Practice Directions and Orders.

110. Here it seems to me that I should analyse those questions in the light, in particular, of the following matters although I have considered the entire history and material in this case.

111. Firstly, the proposed Particulars of Claim have throughout been entirely unintelligible; and every version of them has been not only unintelligible but has failed to comply with my various orders in numerous respects, including: an absence of any concise statement of the facts, as required by CPR16.4; an absence of chronological history; an absence of the claim being set out in a way where it can be analysed; and a failure to engage with the various matters required by the court, and including the Claimants’ case as to each of why the claim is not a collateral challenge to the judgments of Ellenbogen J and the Court of Appeal, why the claim can be brought in the general list of the King’s Bench Division Court rather than having to be brought by way of Judicial Review in the Administrative Court, and why the claim should not be dealt with within the various appeal procedures in either the Medical Practitioners’ Tribunal and then to the Administrative Court, or the Registration Appeals Panel and then to the County Court, as set out in the Medical Act 1983.

112. Secondly, that at first sight the case in so far as it can be understood at all appears to be, firstly, an attempt to reproduce in the general list of the King’s Bench Division, by way of a CPR Part 7 claim, what was dealt with, in relation to the First Claimant, by the Medical Practitioners’ Tribunal in 2019, and then on appeal by Ellenbogen J, and then on the following appeal by the Court of Appeal. It is simply an impermissible attempt to challenge collaterally what has already been judicially determined by the appropriate determination procedure. In consequence, the case appears to be all and each of impermissible, bound to fail and an abuse of process. Secondly, in so far as the case relates to validation and licence to practice, it seems to me, at first sight, to be clearly an abuse and impermissible, since the relevant process is set out in the Medical Act 1983 as being by way of appeal to a Registration Appeals Panel, and then to the County Court. The High Court simply has no jurisdiction, and the that case is both bound to fail on jurisdiction grounds and is an abuse of process.

113. While I remain wholly unclear as to what the Second Claimant’s claim is in relation to her suspension, if one is brought at all, it seems to me again that that is a matter for the Tribunal and, under section 40 of the Medical Act 1983, a potential appeal to the Administrative Court. It is not a matter for a CPR Part 7 claim in the General List of the King’s Bench Division.

114. Thirdly, although I hold in any event that any attempts to challenge Ellenbogen J and to invalidate her decision are impermissible, the only challenge that is seemingly sought to be made by the First Claimant to Ellenbogen J’s decision is now on the basis that there was no appeal at all. As to that, firstly, as set out above, there clearly was an appeal. Secondly, it has already been judicially held by Ellenbogen J, and by way of dismissal of the appeal to it the Court of Appeal, that there was. Thirdly, even if there had been no appeal, that still would not justify claims being brought for damages in this court. The First Claimant’s only route to challenge his striking-off by the Tribunal would have been an appeal process which, on that hypothesis, he would have failed to initiate.

115. I do note that the Claimants have made some assertions or claims about non-disclosure of documents by the General Medical Council during the Medical Practitioners’ Tribunal and appeal to Ellenbogen J process. However, all I can see from the papers before me is that the General Medical Council asserted legal professional privilege in relation to relevant documents, which, in principle, they would have been entitled to do, with the result that the (asserted to be) privileged documents were withheld from both the Claimants and the Court (and, presumably, also the Medical Practitioners’ Tribunal). If the First Claimant wished to challenge that then he should have done so in his appeal to Ellenbogen J. If the First Claimant did not do so, such is entirely his own fault. If the First Claimant did do so but Ellenbogen J did not rule upon such matter, the only available to challenge to the Claimants would have been by way of appeal. However, their appeal to the Court of Appeal failed, due to their failures to comply with the directions of the Court of Appeal, although, on the limited material before me, I do not see how such a challenge could have succeeded in the face of an assertion of legal professional privilege.

116. I turn then to the Denton analysis. ThefFirst question is whether there were serious and substantial breaches of my orders. It seems to me very clear that that was the case. They simply had not been complied with in all the various respects which I have identified; and, in particular the Particulars of Claim were simply unintelligible, did not contain the material which I and the Rules directed that they should have contained, and did not enable the matter to be properly progressed.

117. Secondly, whether there is any good reason for that. It seems to me that there was no such good reason. Even though the Claimants are Litigants in Person and potentially vulnerable, they have simply failed to do what the court have set out in repeated written detail prior to the strikings-out, and subsequently in oral detail, for them to do. Their failure to do that, it seems to me, is entirely their own fault and there is no good reason.

118. Thirdly, whether it is just in all the circumstances of the case to grant relief from sanction. As to this, I am only informed, rather than compelled, by my answers to the first two questions but both of which are very much against granting relief from sanction. It does not seem to me that the Claimants have discharged what the case-law holds is a heavy burden upon them, although I would have come to the same conclusion even if it was not a heavy burden, in any way at all. The Claimants have simply failed to produce intelligible documents. Their case, for the reasons which I have given, seems first sight obviously an abuse and obviously bound to fail. The Claimants have failed and continue to fail to engage with or comply with the court’s orders.

119. Looking at the CPR 3.9 factors, the Claimants’ failures to comply with the court’s orders, and in particulars the unless orders, has had a very considerable effect on this litigation, resulting in a number of abortive hearings and expenditure and waste of court staff time. Looking at the importance of compliance with Rules, Practice Directions and Orders, the Claimants have simply failed to comply with numerous rules and orders, and where the court has explained to them, very carefully and so that it should have been absolutely clear to them, exactly what they had to do.

120. It seems to me that there is no possible reason or justification for granting a relief from sanction here and I therefore refuse those applications.

121. In view of all of my above reasons, and having considered the matter generally, I consider all of the various application which I am dismissing today to have been totally without merit.

122. I am therefore going to dismiss each,and all of the applications of 19 August 2025, 8 September 2025, 2 November 2025, 19 November 2025 and any other applications that the Claimants have made to have either or both of the claims reinstated and for relief from sanctions and for default judgment, summary judgment or interim payment. I determine and certify each and all of them as having been totally without merit. I refer these claims to Soole J in light of the various matters which I have dealt with or refer to above, and also what happened in KB-2022-005042, to consider making civil restraint orders and/or injunctions and/or other orders.

123. In the light of all of the above, and the continued attempts by the Claimants to file documents and contact court staff and judges and others and to use the CE filing system in breach of my various orders, and to the very substantial concern (and distress) of court staff and distraction and disruption to the work of the Masters’ side of the King’s Bench Division, I am again going to order, and grant an injunction (with a penal notice), that the Claimants should only contact the court or court staff by way of delivery of documents in hard copy, and not by email or CE file. Under the jurisdictions identified in Titan Wealth Holdings Limited & Ors v Marian Atinuke Okunola[2026] EWCA Civ 138 at paragraphs 37-40.

124. I am further going to provide that copies of the order from this hearing should be sent both by post to both of the two addresses even though, I think, one probably does not exist but Royal Mail may well understand what is meant by it, and by email to the two email addresses. In view of what I have said above as to such methods being successful in the past, I will provide that that will amount to good service upon the Claimants and each of them.

125. However, it does not seem to me to be appropriate, at this point, to make some order dispensing with personal service for the purposes of the penal notice which I am going to include. It will be for the High Court Judge, presumably Soole J, to consider whether or not to do anything in particular as a result of that.

126. I am including a penal notice as it seems to me that the Claimants’ conduct over the history of the matter and the effect on court staff and on the proper operation of King’s Bench Division has been serious, and that a Penal Notice is required in order to seek to have it stopped.

127. These are my reasons for the order that I am making, and which order I will provide in written form to Court staff to service in accordance with its terms. ————— Approved11.5.2026