E.ON UK PLC & Anor v Safe Hosts Internet LLP & Ors

Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 1071 (KB) Case No: KB-2023-003090 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE KING’S BENCH DIVISION Royal Courts of Justice King’s Bench Division Strand London WC2A 2LL BEFORE: MASTERDAGNALL BETWEEN:   E.ON UK PLC NPOWER COMMERCIAL GAS LIMITED CLAIMANT (1) CLAIMANT (2)   – and –     SAFE HOSTS INTERNET LLP 4ON 365 LIMITED HIGH COURT ENFORCEMENT OFFICER DEFENDANT (1) DEFENDANT (2) DEFENDANT (3) Known Legal Representation Mr Eoin MacLachlan (Barrister) on behalf of the Claimants Mr Brittain (Barrister) on behalf of the Second Defendant Mr Femi Adekoya (Barrister) on behalf of the Second Defendant Mr Sharghy (Barrister) on behalf of the Third Defendant Other Parties Present and their status None APPROVED JUDGMENT Judgment date:20 April 2026 (start and end times cannot be noted due to audio format) Reporting Restrictions Applied: No “WARNING: reporting restrictions may apply to the contents transcribed in this document, particularly if the case concerned a sexual offence or involved a child. Reporting restrictions prohibit the publication of the applicable information to the public or any section of the public, in writing, in a broadcast or by means of the internet, including social media. Anyone who receives a copy of this transcript is responsible in law for making sure that applicable restrictions are not breached. A person who breaches a reporting restriction is liable to a fine and/or imprisonment. For guidance on whether reporting restrictions apply, and to what information, ask at the court office or take legal advice.” “This Transcript is Crown Copyright.  It may not be reproduced in whole or in part other than in accordance with relevant licence or with the express consent of the Authority.  All rights are reserved.” Number of folios in transcript 161 Number of words in transcript 11,573 Master Dagnall:

1. This is a dispute as to ownership of goods in an enforcement context.

2. The Claimants supplied electricity to Safe Hosts Internet LLP, the Defendant in this claim, at Saxon House, 122 Winchcombe Road, Cheltenham (which I will call “Saxon House”). The Defendant fell into payment arrears. The Claimants obtained judgments against the Defendant dated 17 October 2024 for £200,000 and 13 December 2024 for £628,149.47. Interest accrues on each of such judgments at 8% per annum under the Judgments Act.

3. The Claimants then obtained writs of control addressed to Christopher Badger as High Court Enforcement Officer (and whom I will call “the HCEO”), dated 8 January 2025 for the first judgment and 3 February 2025 for the second judgment, and with the address for enforcement in each case being Saxon House, and each writ directing the HCEO to take control of the goods of the Defendant.

4. The HCEO then attended at Saxon House and seized large quantities of goods and equipment. Much of what was seized was then the subject of claims from other entities, including from 4ON 365 Limited (which I will call “4ON”) evoking, in effect, the procedure under Civil Procedure Rules 85.4 and 85.5: “ 85.4 (1) Any person making a claim under paragraph 60(1) of Schedule 12 must, as soon as practicable but in any event within 7 days of the goods being removed under the exercise of an enforcement power, give notice in writing of their claim to the enforcement agent who has taken control of the goods (‘the notice of claim to controlled goods’) and must include in such notice— (a) their full name and address, and confirmation that such address is their address for service; (b) a list of all those goods in respect of which they make such a claim; and (c) the grounds of their claim in respect of each item. (2) On receipt of a notice of claim to controlled goods which complies with paragraph (1) the enforcement agent must within 3 days give notice of such claim to— (a) the creditor; and (b) any other person making a claim to the controlled goods under paragraph (1) (‘any other claimant to the controlled goods’); (3) The creditor, and any other claimant to the controlled goods, must, within 7 days after receiving the notice of claim to controlled goods, give notice in writing to the enforcement agent informing them whether the claim to controlled goods is admitted or disputed in whole or in part. (4) The enforcement agent must notify the claimant to the controlled goods in writing within 3 days of receiving the notice in paragraph (3) whether the claim to controlled goods is admitted or disputed in whole or in part. (5) A creditor who gives notice in accordance with paragraph (3) admitting a claim to controlled goods is not liable to the enforcement agent for any fees and expenses incurred by the enforcement agent after receipt of that notice by the enforcement agent. (6) If an enforcement agent receives a notice from a creditor under paragraph (3) admitting a claim to controlled goods the following applies— (a) the enforcement power ceases to be exercisable in respect of such controlled goods; and (b) as soon as reasonably practicable the enforcement agent must make the goods available for collection by the claimant to controlled goods if they have been removed from where they were found. (7) Where the creditor, or any other claimant to controlled goods to whom a notice of claim to controlled goods was given, fails, within the period mentioned in paragraph (3), to give the required notice, the enforcement agent may seek— (a) the directions of the court by way of an application; and (b) an order preventing the bringing of any claim against them for, or in respect of, their having taken control of any of the goods or having failed so to do. 85.5 (1) Where a creditor, or any other claimant to controlled goods to whom a notice of claim to controlled goods was given, gives notice under rule 85.4(3) that the claim to controlled goods, or any part of it, is disputed, and wishes to maintain their claim to the controlled goods, the following procedure will apply. (2) The claimant to controlled goods must make an application which must be supported by— (a) a witness statement— (i) specifying any money; (ii) describing any goods claimed; and (iii) setting out the grounds upon which their claim to the controlled goods is based; and (b) copies of any supporting documents that will assist the court to determine the claim.(3) In the High Court the claimant to controlled goods must serve the application notice and supporting witness statements and exhibits on— (a) the creditor; (b) any other claimant to controlled goods of whom the claimant to controlled goods is aware; and (c) the enforcement agent. (4) In the County Court when the application is made the claimant to controlled goods must provide to the court the addresses for service of— (a) the creditor; (b) any other claimant to controlled goods of whom the claimant to controlled goods is aware; and (c) the enforcement agent, (‘the respondents’), and the court will serve the application notice and any supporting witness statement and exhibits on the respondents. (5) An application under paragraph (2) must be made to the court which issued the writ or warrant conferring power to take control of the controlled goods, or, if the power was conferred under an enactment, to the debtor’s home court. (6) The claimant to controlled goods must make the required payments on issue of the application in accordance with paragraph 60(4)(a) of Schedule 128, unless such claimant seeks a direction from the court that the required payment be a proportion of the value of the goods, in which case they must seek such a direction immediately after issue of the application, on notice to the creditor and to the enforcement agent. (7) The application notice will be referred to a Master or District Judge. (8) On receipt of an application for a claim to controlled goods, the Master or District Judge may— (a) give directions for further evidence from any party; (b) list a hearing to give directions; (c) list a hearing of the application; (d) determine the amount of the required payments, make directions or list a hearing to determine any issue relating to the amount of the required payments or the value of the controlled goods; (e) stay, or dismiss, the application if the required payments have not been made; (f) make directions for the retention, sale or disposal of the controlled goods; (g) give directions for determination of any issue raised by a claim to controlled goods.”

5. That resulted in the application of the HCEO made by application notice of 7 March 2025 seeking directions and the application of 4ON made by application notice of 27 March 2025 seeking the release of various goods to it. Those applications are now before me.

6. I held a number of procedural hearings which resulted in a direction for trial in relation to the ownership of various of the goods and equipment. That direction effectively being made under the provisions of Civil Procedure Rules 85.10 and 85.11: “85.10 (1) At any hearing of any application under this Part the court may— (a) determine an application summarily; or (b) give directions for the determination of any issue raised by such application; (c) order that any issue between any parties to a claim to goods subject to enforcement be stated and tried, and give all necessary directions for trial; (d) give directions for the purpose of determining the amount of the required payments or any underpayment of the required payments pursuant to paragraph 60(5) of Schedule 12 and regulation 49 of the TCG Regulations; (e) summarily determine the amount of the required payments or any underpayment of the required payments pursuant to paragraph 60(5) of Schedule 129 and regulation 49 of the TCG Regulations10; (f) make directions for the retention, sale or disposal of goods subject to enforcement and for the payment of any proceeds of sale; or (g) make any order that the court considers appropriate. (2) Where a claimant to goods subject to enforcement or a debtor making a claim to exempt goods does not appear at any hearing listed on the application or, having appeared, fails or refuses to comply with an order made in the proceedings, the court may make an order declaring such claimant, or the debtor, and all persons claiming under them, for ever barred from prosecuting their claim against the creditor or any other claimant to the goods subject to enforcement, but such an order will not affect the rights of any other claimants to the goods subject to enforcement as between themselves. (3) Where a claimant to goods subject to enforcement alleges that they are entitled, under a bill of sale or otherwise, to the controlled goods or to the executed goods by way of security for debt, the court may order those goods or any part thereof to be sold and may direct that the proceeds of sale be applied in such manner and on such terms as may be just and as may be specified in the order. (4) Nothing in this rule limits the court’s case management powers to make any other directions permissible under these Rules. 85.11 (1) Part 39 will, with the necessary modifications, apply to the trial of an issue in an application under this Part as it applies to the trial of a claim. (2) The court by which an issue is tried may give such judgment or make such order as finally to dispose of all questions arising in the application. (3) Practice Direction 2B applies to the trial of an issue in an application under this Part.”

7. After substantial procedural argument and encouragement from and directions of the Court the parties have agreed a list of the goods and equipment which 4ON asserts belongs to it; being in a schedule which appears at pages 32 and onwards of the trial bundle. These included a number of items of, substantial in physical terms, computer hardware and equipment which might be expected to be found in a data processing centre.

8. The Claimants took the position that they contend that those items belong to the Defendant since the Defendant operated from Saxon House and carried on some form of computer data service provider operation.

9. 4ON says that those items belong to it. 4ON carries on a business which it says includes dismantling data processing centres and receiving in return for its services in doing so a combination of fees and the contents of such centres, and where it would then store those contents at Saxon House for some period of time, which might well be substantial, whilst it sees whether there may be any buyers for them.

10. 4ON says that the various items identified on the schedule as being claimed by 4ON are such dismantled contents belonging to it, and sourced mainly from four particular dismantled data centres at Hildenborough, GoDaddy Leeds, GoDaddy Slough and Tunbridge Wells; at which locations 4ON said that it had carried on relevant dismantling operations. 4ON has asserted that it could demonstrate that it had purchased certain other items on the schedule as also claimed by it.

11. The HCEO’s position throughout has been neutral. He has said that under Civil Procedure Rules Part 85 he was effectively caught up in a dispute between the Claimants and 4ON and was effectively interpleading between them. That stance has not necessarily been accepted entirely by 4ON as a matter of law.

12. I heard the trial first on 15 August 2025. There Mr MacLachlan of counsel appeared for the Claimants, Mr Brittain of counsel for 4ON and Mr Sharghy of counsel for the HCEO. The time was insufficient and there was also a procedural hearing relating to an interim application on 26 August 2025. The trial itself was effectively adjourned too and did recommence on 27 November 2025. That day was sufficient to complete the evidence but not the parties’ submissions.

13. There were further interim applications heard on 23 December 2025 and 2 January 2026 and where I directed that some of the goods were to be released to 4ON on various terms designed to protect the Claimants and the HCEO. I then received written submissions from Mr MacLauchlan and Mr Sharghy and also from Mr Femi Adekoya who had effectively replaced Mr Brittain for 4ON and who had also appeared for 4ON on 23 December and 2 January.

14. Although Mr Adekoya only took over the brief for 4ON after the close of the evidence I would regard his grasp of the case in his written submissions as being impressive whether or not I actually accept their substance; and I am grateful to him by having taken over the matter for whatever reason (as to which I have no detail and I do not speculate) from Mr Brittain.

15. The parties are agreed that the general legal framework for executing writs of control is contained in schedule 12 of the Tribunal Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (“the 2007 Act”) and the Taking Control of Goods Regulations 2013 (“the Regulations”).

16. A writ of control is directed to a High Court Enforcement Officer but executed by a High Court Enforcement Agent (whom I will call “the HCEA”) acting under their instruction.

17. In Schedule 12 of the 2007 Act, Paragraph 3(1) contains various definitions including of “controlled goods”: “3(1) In this Schedule— “amount outstanding” is defined in paragraph 50(3); “control” (except in paragraph 5(4)(a)) means control under an enforcement power; “controlled goods” means goods taken control of that— (a) have not been sold or abandoned, (b) if they have been removed, have not been returned to the debtor (unless subject to a controlled goods agreement), and (c) if they are goods of another person, have not been returned to that person; “controlled goods agreement” has the meaning given by paragraph 13(4); “co-owner” in relation to goods of the debtor means a person other than the debtor who has an interest in the goods, but only if the enforcement agent— (a) knows that the person has an interest in the particular goods, or (b) would know, if he made reasonable enquiries; “the court”, unless otherwise stated, and subject to rules of court, means— (a) the High Court, in relation to an enforcement power under a writ of the High Court; (b) [F1 the county court], in relation to an enforcement power under a warrant issued by [F1 the county court]; (c) in any other case, a magistrates' court; “disposal” and related expressions, in relation to securities, are to be read in accordance with paragraph 48(2); “exempt goods” means goods that regulations exempt by description or circumstances or both; “goods” means property of any description, other than land; “interest” means a beneficial interest; “money” means money in sterling or another currency; “premises” means any place, and in particular includes— (a) a vehicle, vessel, aircraft or hovercraft; (b) a tent or movable structure; “securities” includes bills of exchange, promissory notes, bonds, specialties and securities for money.”

18. Paragraph 3(2) reads: “3 (2) In this Schedule— (a) references to goods of the debtor or another person are references to goods in which the debtor or that person has an interest, but (b) references to goods of the debtor do not include references to trust property in which either the debtor or a co-owner has an interest not vested in possession.”

19. Paragraphs 4(1) and 4(2) read: “4 (1) For the purposes of any enforcement power, the property in all goods of the debtor, except goods that are exempt goods for the purposes of this Schedule or are protected under any other enactment, becomes bound in accordance with this paragraph. (2) Where the power is conferred by a writ issued from the High Court the writ binds the property in the goods from the time when it is received by the person who is under a duty to endorse it.”

20. Paragraph 60 reads: “Third party claiming goods 60 (1) This paragraph applies where a person makes an application to the court claiming that goods taken control of are his and not the debtor's. (2) After receiving notice of the application the enforcement agent must not sell the goods, or dispose of them (in the case of securities), unless directed by the court under this paragraph. (3) The court may direct the enforcement agent to sell or dispose of the goods if the applicant fails to make, or to continue to make, the required payments into court. (4) The required payments are— (a) payment on making the application (subject to sub-paragraph (5)) of an amount equal to the value of the goods, or to a proportion of it directed by the court; (b) payment, at prescribed times (on making the application or later), of any amounts prescribed in respect of the enforcement agent's costs of retaining the goods. (5) If the applicant makes a payment under sub-paragraph (4)(a) but the enforcement agent disputes the value of the goods, any underpayment is to be— (a) determined by reference to an independent valuation carried out in accordance with regulations, and (b) paid at the prescribed time. (6) If sub-paragraph (3) does not apply the court may still direct the enforcement agent to sell or dispose of the goods before the court determines the applicant's claim, if it considers it appropriate. (7) If the court makes a direction under sub-paragraph (3) or (6)— (a) paragraphs 38 to 49, and regulations under them, apply subject to any modification directed by the court; (b) the enforcement agent must pay the proceeds of sale or disposal into court. (8) In this paragraph “the court”, subject to rules of court, means— (a) the High Court, in relation to an enforcement power under a writ of the High Court; (b) [F11 the county court], in relation to an enforcement power under a warrant issued by [F11 the county court]; (c) in any other case, the High Court or [F11 the county court].”

21. In the Regulations, Part 6, being Paragraphs 48 and 49, reads: “PART 6 THIRD PARTY CLAIMING CONTROLLED GOODS Application of Part 6

48. This Part applies where a person (“the applicant”) makes an application to the court claiming that goods of which control has been taken are that person's and not the debtor's. Payments into court by third party: underpayments

49. (1) Any underpayment to be determined by reference to an independent valuation under paragraph 60(5) of Schedule 12 must be undertaken by a qualified independent valuer. (2) Any underpayment determined by the qualified independent valuer must be paid within 14 clear days after provision of a copy of the valuation to the applicant.”

22. Schedule 12 and the Regulations do not directly answer the question of what is the legal position regarding goods seized by the HCEA which do not belong to the judgment debtor and in which the judgment debtor has no interest at all.

23. As a result, questions can arise as to whether the true owner has a claim in trespass to the goods or for wrongful interference with the goods including under the law of conversion and whether or not the true owner makes an application in accordance with Schedule

12. Further, a true owner may say that the terms of the writ of control simply do not extend to goods which do not belong to the judgment debtor; and that they have no obligation on them to take particular steps to claim seized goods of which they say that they are the true owner within particular time limits. I may have to consider those questions eventually in this litigation but I do not see that they arise before me at this point in time where I have directed on the applications to me that I should resolve the question of who is the true owner of the relevant seized goods.

24. Nevertheless Mr Brittain in his skeleton argument and oral submissions maintained that there is some burden of proof on the HCEO, and also the HCEA, to show that the seized goods belong to the judgment debtor, that is to say the Defendant. Mr Brittain contends that the HCEO must justify why the HCEA seized these particular goods and demonstrate that the writ of control extended to them. He says, therefore, that the burden of proof is on the HCEO at least to some extent to show that the Defendant judgment debtor was the owner and therefore that the writ of control extended to those goods which were seized.

25. That contention of law is disputed by Mr MacLachlan for the Claimants. He said, firstly, that there is no authority in favour of Mr Brittain’s submission. Secondly there is no reason why there should be a burden on the Claimants or the HCEO. Thirdly, that paragraph 60 of schedule 12 and Civil Procedure Rules Part 85 both talk of a person, here 4ON, making a claim to the controlled goods; and he therefore contends that the burden of proof should be on 4ON who is the Claimant to the controlled goods.

26. Mr Adekoya in his written closing submissions made no reference to this

27. Mr Sharghy, for the HCEO, says that it is unfair and unjust to place any burden on the HCEO rather all that the HCEO needs to have is a reasonable belief to suppose that the goods are those of the judgment debtor, and it is sufficient to establish such a reasonable belief that the goods are located at premises occupied by the judgment debtor. He says that in those circumstances Schedule 12 and CPR Part 85 then create a process for an issue simply to be fought out between the judgment creditor and the Claimant to the controlled goods, but where at first sight the burden of proof should be on the Claimant to the controlled goods to show that they are the person who owns them.

28. I am somewhat reluctant to deal with this general point of law. Firstly, because I do not see the burden of proof as being determinative of this case on the evidence before me and, secondly, this is a case where there is no suggestion that anybody was present in Saxon House when the HCEA attended to seize the goods on behalf of 4ON to then seek to resist or even to simply just object to their seizure. However I feel that I should give my analysis of this aspect as a matter of law.

29. Firstly, the writ of control only entitles the HCEO and HCEA to seize goods in which the Defendant, the judgment debtor, has an interest. That can be seen, firstly, from the wording of the writ itself; and. secondly, from Schedule 12 and the definitions contained in it and the wording of its Paragraph

3.

30. Secondly, in English law possession of goods usually confers a right (at least of possession if not ownership) to them, and, if not, evidences a right (at least of possession if not ownership) to them; which right can only be defeated by showing that a person seeking to take the goods is either the true owner or has some other right to take them, or, under section 9 of the Torts Interference of Goods Act 1977 which changes the previous common law rules, that a third party has a better right to the goods but then only usually on the basis that the third party is joined to the proceedings and advances their own claim.

31. Thirdly, generally the legal burden of proof in litigation is on a claimant, a person who has brought a claim to the Court asking for a remedy to change a particular present situation.

32. Fourthly, once the HCEO seizes the goods they gain a right to them, or at least that situation of effected seizure is evidence of a right to them, as the HCEO is then in possession of them – see above. This may be subject to some agreement that the HCEO has made or to a possible exception if the HCEO has taken the goods by force or under pressure of certain types of demand or threat. However none of those factual situations are the case before me.

33. Fifthly, once the HCEO has seized the goods someone claiming to be the true owner, although it may be possible for them simply to have a possessory right conferred on them by the true owner, that is to say to be a bailee of the true owner, can make a claim under paragraph 60 of Schedule 12 and possibly separately or additionally in trespass or conversion. See for example, my discussion of that topic in Herring v Sanbrook [2023] EWHC 1332.

34. Sixthly, in consequence it seems to me there are two types of scenario. The first is where the HCEO’s seizure of the goods was in the face of resistance, or possibly has taken place in similar circumstances where the seizure has occurred by way of use or force and/or threats so that the Court treats the situation of one of resistance. In those circumstances, it seems to me that the situation is that the HCEO needs to prove that the judgment debtor had an interest in the goods; otherwise it seems to me that the HCEO would simply have no right to seize them from whoever was then in possession of them. That person’s possession would amount to or evidence a right (at least of possession if not ownership) to the goods in law, see above In those circumstances it seems to me that the HCEO needs to demonstrate a superior right and therefore that the burden is on the HCEO to show that the judgment debtor had some interest in the goods (enabling the HCEO to rely on Paragraphs 3(2) and 4 of Schedule 12 so that the existence of the writ of control then justifies the seizure).

35. In those circumstances the HCEO is in the position of Claimant and is seeking a remedy to alter the subsisting situation as a matter of fact. In those circumstances it seems to me that the burden is on the HCEO to prove their entitlement, that is to say that the judgment debtor has an interest (as only an interest is required – see Paragraph 3(2) of Schedule 12) in the relevant goods.

36. The second scenario though is where the HCEO seizes the goods peacefully and where there is no resistance and no force or threats are used. In that situation the factual situation is that the HCEO has the goods and that the HCEO’s possession gives or at least evidences a right in the HCEO to have them. In those circumstances it seems to me that the third party claimant now needs to justify why they should be able to deprive the HCEO of the goods; and therefore the legal burden should be on the third party claimant. They are a “claimant” in truth, they are seeking a remedy and to invoke a statutory scheme and to alter the existing situation. In that scenario it seems to me that the burden of proof must be on them.

37. However, in order to discharge that legal burden, and while they have the primary alternative of proving true ownership open to them, it is probably only necessary for such a third party claimant to show that they were in actual possession of the goods when the seizure took place, as that possession itself either confers or evidences a right to (at least possess if not own) the goods and so that the HCEO was disrupting the then actual situation and needs to show their right to do so i.e. that the judgment debtor had some interest in the goods (and so that Paragraphs 3(2) and 4 of Schedule 12 would then apply so that the existence of the writ of control then justifies the seizure).

38. Seventhly, in this situation it is 4ON that is seeking a remedy to disrupt an existing situation of a non-violent seizure by the HCEO. It seems to me that 4ON is therefore the real Claimant in this dispute and it has the legal burden upon it to prove its case, at least to the extent that it was in possession of these seized goods when the seizure took place. While, in the light of my conclusions of fact and law below, I do not need to decide whether this legal analysis is correct, I think that it is only necessary for 4ON, even in such circumstances of non-violent seizure, to prove possession and not full ownership for the legal burden of proof (that the judgment debtor had an interest in the goods) to shift onto the HCEO to justify the seizure. That is because, as I have said above, actual possession gives rise to an actual right, or at least evidences an actual right, and so in that circumstance it is the HCEO which is having to justify their having changed an established pre-existing situation.

39. Eighthly, I regard all this analysis as being consistent with the statutory scheme of the 2007 Act, the Regulations and the CPR including in particular for the following reasons.

40. First, the scheme is to be seen in the context of human rights law. I do not see human rights law, including the right to possessions, as allowing an HCEO to seize property in the face of resistance without proving that the HCEO has a valid power in law to do so, and hence without the HCEO proving that the judgment debtor has an interest in the goods. Even without the application of ordinary human rights law to a person’s possessions, it seems to me that it would probably require express statutory wording for the Court to come to a different conclusion as a matter of ordinary statutory construction to a situation of a person, here the HCEO and through them the HCEA, seizing goods from a possessor who was resisting their seizure. Ordinarily, a person seeking to seize goods from a resisting possessor must justify the seizure and has the legal burden of proof upon them to do so. However, where there was no resistance the same considerations do not apply.

41. The position is more difficult to analyse where there was someone in possession but they did not resist. Nevertheless, possession amounts to, or at least evidences a right, and for the same reasons I consider that both human rights law and ordinary statutory construction would favour the HCEO having to demonstrate a legal right to seize (and thus an interest of the judgment debtor in) the goods. However, that must involve the third party claimant demonstrating that they were in possession.

42. Second, even though the statute provides for a third party to make a Paragraph 60 of the Schedule and CPR Part 85 application, that is only because the goods in question have already been seized. I do not consider that, especially in the light of the above, those provisions should place some burden on the third party claimant to show that the seizure, which I assume for these purposes changed the pre-existing situation, was unlawful.

43. Rather, third, it seems to me that the scheme places the burden of showing that a seizure was justified (i.e. that the judgment debtor had an interest in the goods) on the HCEO (and the HCEA; and, if they are wishing to uphold the seizure and defeat the Paragraph 60 of Schedule 12 and CPR Part 85 claim of 4ON, as they do here, the Claimants). However, that is only so long as the third party claimant, here 4ON, can show, at least (although proving ownership would do), that it was in possession at the time of the seizure, as otherwise 4ON has no basis to make its application and claim at all.

44. It seems to me that the statutory scheme is entirely consistent with my general analysis above.

45. In all those circumstances it seems to me that the legal burden of demonstrating that they were the true owner or at least were in possession of the goods at the time of the seizure is on 4ON. It does not seem to me that it is any answer to that for 4ON to simply assert that it was in possession of the relevant goods when the seizure took place. That would be a positive assertion and, especially as on the material before me the seizure took place without resistance from 4ON, 4ON would still have to prove it i.e. that it was in possession at that point in time.

46. I therefore agree with Mr MacLachlan’s and also Mr Sharghy’s submissions that the burden is on 4ON to prove at least possession at the time of seizure in the circumstances of this particular case. If such possession is proved, the legal burden of justifying the seizure by showing that the judgment debtor had an interest in the seized goods would then shift onto the HCEO (and the HCEA) and the Claimants.

47. I however do not agree with Mr Sharghy, if he was indeed submitting this, that in order to effect a seizure so as to obtain some property right the HCEO only requires a reasonable belief that the judgment debtor has an interest in (or is the owner of) the seized goods.

48. It seems to me that that may be relevant to a damages or compensation claim under the wording of the statutory provisions (see especially Paragraphs 63-65 of Schedule 12) but it does not seem to me that it affects questions of ownership or possession or rights to seize. In principle, the HCEO can only do what the writ of control allows, that is to seize goods in which the judgment debtor has an interest. If the judgment debtor has no interest in them, it does not seem to me that the HCEO can in some way or other invoke the provisions of the legislation to affect the questions of who is to turn out to actually be the owner and be entitled to the goods or, indeed, whether the HCEO had a right to seize them in the first place. On the other hand, as I have said, a question of belief and its reasonableness may well affect the question of any financial remedy and I say nothing about that.

49. Therefore in the circumstances of what occurred on the facts of this case, it seems to me that the burden of proof is on 4ON to show that it was the true sole owner of the goods (with the Defendant having no interest in them) or at least that 4ON was in (and entitled to and continued to be entitled to) possession of them. However while the legal burden of proof is on 4ON, the standard of proof necessary to discharge that burden is only in terms of factual matters the balance of probabilities, something to which I will return.

50. In this trial I have been provided with numerous documents in evidence but I have also heard oral evidence from a number of witnesses called by 4ON with no oral evidence being called by the Claimants or the HCEO. Those witnesses have all verified their witness statements and answered supplemental questions in evidence-in-chief. They were cross-examined and re-examined and answered questions from me. The evidence of some witnesses was advanced by witness statement in circumstances where the other parties, the Claimants and the HCEO, did not require those witnesses to submit to cross-examination.

51. I have reminded myself generally that with regards to witnesses: firstly, the Court’s appreciation of a witness and of the reliability or weight of their evidence and of each part of it is an holistic matter involving consideration of all their evidence as given together with surrounding material, including not only both documents and the inherent likelihood of events, but also the evidence of the other witnesses; which are all merely part of the wider holistic process of weighing together all the evidence and material before the Court, including both documents and the inherent likelihoods of events, when deciding issues of fact, as to which I deal further below.

52. Secondly, that even where a witness is saying what they believe to be the accurate truth, the process of human memory is fallible and it is easy for a witness to have misremembered or to have created a false memory, by, for example continually thinking about the subject or trying over hard to remember it or discussing it with others or simply through the ordinary processes of the subconscious, including the natural desire to some extent to justify oneself and one’s past conduct.

53. This is all the more so when events have taken place a substantial time ago, or were fleeting in nature, although it is possible for witnesses to refresh their memories helpfully, for example from contemporaneous documents. However, none of this means that a recollection should be simply disregarded, as the memory may be perfectly genuine, and there may be particular reasons why a particular conversation or event may have stuck accurately in a person’s mind.

54. Thirdly, the actual giving of their evidence by a witness is important and it needs to be assessed. However, and while there are dangers in seeking to assess a witness’s demeanour when giving evidence as such an assessment may be affected by numerous factors, including cultural, educational, psychological and psychiatric factors, there may be relevant factors affecting the weight to be given to their evidence, including whether and how they were prepared and able to engage with the questioning process.

55. Fourthly, the mere fact that a witness is being actually or apparently evasive or argumentative does not mean that the witness is being deceitful; and there may be alternative explanations, including for example embarrassment, or simply, and which is often to be expected when relevant events occur a long time ago, that they cannot remember the matter, or that they may have a substantial emotional investment in the matter.

56. Fifthly, the mere fact that a witness is being actually or apparently deceitful or just evasive regarding one or more matters does not necessarily mean that the witness is being deceitful or just evasive regarding other matters. It may affect the weight to be given regarding what is being said about those other matters, but a witness may often lie about one event while telling the truth about other events.

57. In considering the factual issues between the parties I have had to consider whether the relevant party on whom the burden of proof lies has shown to the civil standard of proof, being that on the balance of probabilities it is simply more likely than not, that any particular historical fact or event occurred. That is something which I have had to do and have done taking into account all the evidence, oral and documentary, as well as counsels’ submissions.

58. The Court should be careful before considering that it cannot come to a conclusion either way, that is to say that it is not more than 50% likely that a particular event occurred but also that it is not less than 50% likely that that event occurred. However, that can be an appropriate outcome of the evaluative process, although, since the real question is whether the relevant party has failed to prove a greater than 50.00 recurring percentage likelihood, it can be more accurate to say in those circumstances that the Court has asked itself whether that burden has not been satisfied and simply answered that it has not been satisfied.

59. Considering the issues regarding fact, I have borne in mind that the Court takes into account and tests all of the evidence, oral, hearsay, documentary and expert, considering what weight to give it and then weighing it all together as an holistic exercise in coming to its conclusions. In doing so the Court bears in mind, firstly, with regards to witnesses what I have already set out above.

60. Secondly, that contemporaneous documents are likely to have reflected what their creator was actually thinking at the time of their creation; so that they can to an extent speak from the past although subject to the reliability of the creator’s memory and their desire and ability to record accurately at that time. Likewise, if the creator is recording what someone else has told them, if that was also contemporary there is an increased likelihood that, firstly, the recording, and, secondly, the communicated statement are accurate; although all that is again subject to such matters as timing, general reliability and conscious or subconscious desires to influence. Although the Court must be careful to avoid over-reliance on them, contemporaneous documents can have an important weight.

61. Thirdly, inherent likelihoods of events are also important; although these can only be assessed in the light of the other facts whilst emphasising how this is an holistic exercise. If an event is inherently unlikely to have occurred, there should be evidence of sufficient weight to displace that unlikelihood before the event will be proved to have occurred. That can be especially true in relation to certain types of misconduct, as it is usually likely that people will conduct themselves in accordance with their social norms; but again this is highly fact sensitive, especially where people’s social norms may differ.

62. Mr MacLachlan has criticised various of 4ON’s witnesses and their evidence. I have had to consider those criticisms and have done so.

63. I also bear in mind that there is a degree of outrage from 4ON that the Claimants, who have called no evidence, are nitpicking over what 4ON says is very substantial evidence of 4ON’s ownership of the relevant goods.

64. 4ON says it is entirely credible that a company carrying on its business would not keep detailed records of items it had taken from a dismantled data centre, those items only being of interest to 4ON if they can find a buyer for them. Mr MacLachlan says that it is unreal that 4ON would not catalogue a record of items that 4ON says in this litigation have a real value.

65. I have simply had to weigh up all the evidence taking full note of these various contentions and submissions.

66. I do need to refer to what the goods are and of which I have a list in both the main schedule and particular individualised schedules produced by 4ON during this trial and some photographs.

67. There are a number, about 20, of Mardix switchgear units. These appear to be packaged. They bear various serial numbers said to be both of manufacture and service inspections. They are said to be being sourced from the Hildenborough project.

68. There are a number, about ten, of Trinity power units. Some have serial numbers. They are said to have been sourced from the GoDaddy Slough project.

69. There are a number, about seven, of Liebert/Emerson air conditioners said to have been sourced from the GoDaddy Slough project.

70. There are a number, about three, of Trinergy Cube systems. They are said to have been sourced from the Tunbridge Wells project.

71. There are a number, about four, Riello UPS client systems. They are said to have been sourced from GoDaddy Leeds. There are a further number, about ten, of Liebert air conditioners said to have been sourced from Tunbridge Wells.

72. There are some computers, LG monitors and screens, office desk chairs, cabinet and printer which are effectively miscellaneous although receipts have been produced for monitors and a printer system.

73. I turn to the various witnesses. The first was Mr Lee Gibbens, the effective controller of 4ON who gave evidence on affirmation. He first verified a witness statement of 3 April 2025. In that witness statement and in evidence-in-chief he said in particular, firstly, that 4ON would contract with an entity to decommission a data centre or similar. Secondly, that 4ON have no written terms of business but they would enter into an agreement whereby they would keep the decommissioned equipment with some adjustment price negotiated after taking into account what was constituted by 4ON’s services and what was the taken decommissioned equipment being paid either by 4ON to the customer or by the customer to 4ON. Thirdly, that the various goods came from the four sites as described and were stored for convenience in Saxon House. Fourthly, that he attached; first, various letters, emails and invoices regarding the various decommissioning contracts and their prices, some of which invoices referred to units of certain of the types in this dispute. Second, photographs of the goods in dispute. Third, some documents from suppliers and service inspectors seeking to match up the serial numbers relating to the locations to which supplies had been made and inspections taken place with the serial numbers of the seized goods.

74. On 15 August 2025 he was cross-examined as to this. He maintained his version of 4ON’s business and accepted that it was somewhat informal at least in its record keeping. He expressed annoyance that the Claimants and the HCEO would simply not accept his version of events and that they seemed to require some absolute verification and proof of the ownership of each individual seized item.

75. He had put to him that the Defendant’s accounts showed ownership of substantial stock which no longer seemed to exist at the point in time when the Claimants had sought to enforce against the Defendant, but that 4ON’s accounts on the other hand did not show substantial stock over the relevant period, and that 4ON had not produced any fixed asset register. He said that these items were mere stock, not fixed assets, and while 4ON had kept various lists of items they had never kept a comprehensive list as such was not necessary for the carrying on of 4ON’s business. He said that it was for 4ON’s accountant to decide how to value stock within its accounts.

76. He accepted that the Defendant would also have had goods at Saxon House, but maintained that these seized goods belong to 4ON. He said that further enquiries could be made to further match up serial numbers, and criticised the Claimants and the HCEO for not investigating the matter and ownership but simply demanding that 4ON produce proof of its ownership.

77. The matter then being adjourned, he produced further witness statements of 20, 21 and 26 August 2025. Included within those witness statements he, firstly, provided attempts to link up the serial numbers of various of the goods with test certificates and evidence from suppliers and manufacturers, again to seek to demonstrate that the goods in question were sourced from the four decommissioning projects.

78. Secondly, he provided a copy of an invoice and evidence of payment appearing in a bank statement by 4ON for the LG monitors and purchases of them by 4ON from Currys online, and of the printer system by purchase by 4ON from the DPS group.

79. He further sought to confirm all this by a further witness statement of 25 November 2025.

80. This resulted in him being further cross-examined on 27 November 2025. In this, he accepted that much of the collation of 4ON’s evidence had been carried out not by him but by his assistance, Shelley Bouchard. He accepted that 4ON had not produced any contemporaneous list of stock. He said now that this was not feasible with so many items being taken from decommissioned sites, even though he had said in his earlier evidence and witness statement that such lists did exist.

81. He said that the items would not be insured on any individual basis and that no list was required for insurance purposes even though that might result in difficulties in the making of any insurance claim. He accepted that only some of the Mardix units were identified by suppliers and services as having been located previously at the Hildenborough site, and he could not explain why Mardix had chosen not to identify all of those units. He accepted that 4ON had not asked Mardix for further supporting information.

82. Mr MacLachlan submitted that Mr Gibbens was an unreliable witness who was combative and who had failed to supply further evidence, in particular lists which Mr Gibbens had said existed and/or could obtain.

83. I agree that Mr Gibbens was combative. He clearly sees it as outrageous that the Claimants and the HCEO will not accept 4ON’s assertions of ownership and keep seeking more and more evidence.

84. It also seems to me that while he can provide evidence with regards to the general conduct of 4ON’s business he has left the collation of detailed evidence to Shelley Bouchard and accounting to the accountant. To that extent his evidence is limited.

85. On the other hand his evidence was not contradicted by the evidence of any of the other witnesses and was consistent with the documents which have been advanced to me.

86. I do not see it as improbable, notwithstanding the points about lists and Mr MacLauchlan’s other points, that 4ON’s businesses would be conducted in a way which does not involve precise record keeping or listing of items. It seems to me that that would be a perfectly realistic commercial choice on the part of 4ON in order to save money and administrative costs, and logical in the context of its business, notwithstanding the difficulties which might be caused, in particular in relation to insurance claims should for example there have been a fire at the premises at which items were stored. While it seems to me a potentially careless attitude ,it seems to me to be a realistic commercial choice to take to avoid administrative expense.

87. In all the circumstances it seems to me that Mr Gibbens should be seen as a witness of truth as to matters of which he had knowledge, including the generality of the four projects and how 4ON operated its business; but, on the other hand, his evidence does not deal with the detail and, as a person as opposed to the documents which he has advanced, his evidence is limited.

88. The next witness was Oliver Hook whose witness statement was dated 12 May 2025. Everyone accepted, in my view rightly, that he was an honest and credible witness. He referred to having witnessed Cube, Liebert and other units having been transported by 4ON from the Tunbridge Wells project to storage at Saxon House. In cross-examination he accepted that he had not recorded or investigated serial numbers.

89. The next witness was 4ON’s accountant Nicolas Standeven, a chartered accountant of Crossley and Co at Cheltenham. He produced two witness statements. In his first witness statement of 17 May 2025, he said that he had acted as accountant for the Defendant and that none of the goods were within the Defendant’s records. In the second witness statement of 29 October 2025 he said that he had acted as accountant for 4ON and that records showed that payments for the goods were recorded in 4ON’s accounts.

90. He also said that the goods were treated as stock but as having no realisable value unless and until a buyer was found for them, and that, as a result, generally their existence would not be reflected in 4ON’s accounts as the valuation for any individual item would be at the lower of cost and net realisable value, and that, unless and until any particular goods were sold, they would have no value within the accounts.

91. In cross-examination Mr Standeven said that these accounting processes were carried out as far as he was concerned by informal conversations without any lists of goods being produced to him unless there had been a sale or purchase invoice which would be recorded in a day book ledger. He said that the Defendant would in its business have had substantial plant and machinery, the value of which would have been capitalised within its accounts.

92. With regards to the subject goods he could not say whether any positive valuations would have been given to them as such, that would depend on whether there had ever been an invoice relating to them with a specific price.

93. He referred to another associated company of the Defendant and also possibly of 4ON, namely Blynx Aim Ltd having purchased the Defendant’s assets through some form of insolvency or pre-insolvency process.

94. Mr MacLachlan criticised Mr Standeven’s evidence as lacking any specificity in relation to the goods which are the subject matter of the trial before me. However Mr MacLauchlan also criticised Mr Standeven and also Mr Gibbons for not revealing that Blynx was said to have been created in order to purchase the Defendant’s assets, and he asserted had done so at a low price so that Blynx would effectively become a phoenix version of the Defendant. Mr MacLachlan said that this cast credibility on Mr Standeven’s evidence and, by extension, Mr Gibbons’ evidence.

95. I do not see much force in that criticism. I agree that Mr Standeven did not seem a very impressive witness, but that was mainly because all he could say is that he would not include a real value for the goods which are the subject matter of this trial in 4ON’s accounts for the reasons that he outlined. That, whether or not it is a correct accounting treatment, seems to me to be credible evidence as to the reason as to why in 4ON’s accounts there are only ever shown a low level of physical assets.

96. Mr Standeven was simply treating the decommissioned goods as having a net realisable value of nil unless and until a purchaser was found unless, which would generally not be the case, there was some particular invoice or other document which gave them a particular value. It seems to me that that evidence of Mr Standeven’s was perfectly consistent with the evidence given by Mr Gibbons and not contradicted by any other witness or document.

97. I do not see much force in relation to what is before me in Mr MacLachlan’s criticism relating to the Blynx transactions. It may be that that criticism as a matter of general law and circumstance is justified. However, 4ON is not relying on a phoenix scenario of its having purchased goods out of somebody else’s insolvency so as to become a new version of that somebody else. 4ON asserts that it simply had a different business from that previously carried on by the Defendant and now by Blynx, and that the subject goods of the trial before me had been genuinely acquired in that operative business.

98. It seems to me in all those circumstances that the thrust of Mr Standeven’s evidence as to how goods taken from the decommissioned data centres were treated in 4ON’s accounts was credible, was consistent with the evidence of other witnesses, and that there is no real reason to reject it. On the other hand it has the consequence that Mr Standeven’s evidence does not amount to any direct evidence of the ownership of any of the items in dispute before me.

99. The next witness was Paul McCullough. His witness statement was of 27 May 2025. He set out how he had overseen the decommissioning and transfer to Saxon House of the Mardix goods from Hildenborough, the Riello units from GoDaddy Leeds and other units from GoDaddy Slough although he had not been involved in their specific removals. He provided documentary evidence being photos of relevant decommissioning work and invoices for costs and safety assessments.

100. In evidence-in-chief he extended this to refer to the Mardix and Trinergy and Liebert and Riello units and said that they were from Hildenborough, GoDaddy Slough, Tunbridge Wells and GoDaddy Leeds respectively and that he had inspected them as they were then stored and seized at Saxon House with the HCEO. He accepted that he could not say where all of the various goods had come from without a detailed investigation of serial numbers, but he confirmed the generality that those goods located at Saxon House were sourced from 4ON decommissioning projects.

101. No cross-examination was made of him by either Mr MacLauchlan nor Mr Sharghy despite their being given the usual invitation to do so. Mr MacLachlan accepted that Mr McCullough was an honest witness which he clearly was but asserted that Mr McCullough’s evidence was limited and therefore of limited value.

102. I also have other witness statements, one from Shelley Bouchard being her witness statement of 28 March 2025. No cross-examination was sought of her. Mr MacLauchlan said that he accepted that she had collated documents but submitted that she had no material direct knowledge with regards to any of the particular goods and, rather, simply had engaged in a document collation process.

103. I also had a witness statement of James McCarthy of 28 May 2025. He said that he was an engineer engaged in 4ON’s decommissioning work at GoDaddy and had removed various of the Liebert air conditioning units identified by serial numbers. He was not called to give evidence. In circumstances where I am unsure as to the extent to which his evidence was being advanced, it seems to me that I could only at most treat his witness statement as a hearsay document but where it seems to me that I should give it little weight.

104. Those were the various witnesses of fact. In his closing written submissions Mr MacLachlan mainly engaged with the question of burden of proof. In one sense I see that approach as justified in that it responded to what was seemingly the main point being advanced by Mr Brittain whose written and oral submissions had seemed very much to emphasise the question of burden of proof; although I do note that Mr Brittain also contended in general terms that the factual evidence of witnesses and documents did prove 4ON’s case.

105. Mr MacLachlan did, however, further submit that 4ON’s material was simply a mass of documents and submissions which did not properly evidence ownership of specific individual items. He contended that the Court should not engage in some sort of collating exercise and that 4ON had simply failed to discharge the burden of proof upon it.

106. It seemed to me reviewing Mr MacLauchlan’s written submissions and where I have taken them all into account that Mr MacLauchlan further made the following points and contentions. With regards to the witnesses and where I have already referred to his comments upon them, he effectively invited the Court to give their evidence little weight. With regards to matters pertinent to ownership, he submitted, as he had done in particular in his written skeleton argument; firstly, that 4ON had produced no inventory of its own assets.

107. Secondly, that 4ON including, by Mr Gibbens, who had had at least some real involvement in the Defendant he having been a member of the relevant limited liability partnership even if he had fallen out with its controller, had failed to say what were the Defendant’s assets and how he could differentiate between what were the Defendant’s assets and the goods that 4ON claimed.

108. Thirdly, that as the Defendant in its accounts had recorded substantial stock, plant and machinery, and that 4ON had recorded very little, the obvious inference was that any particular goods at Saxon House would belong to the Defendant and not to 4ON.

109. Fourthly, that what 4ON should have done was to produce a complete chain of documents showing that each claimed item came from a relevant project of 4ON’s or a purchase by 4ON; and without such a full paper trail existing, 4ON’s claim would simply not meet the burden of proof which was upon it.

110. He submitted that for one or more of 4ON’s witnesses to say that they had collected Mardix units or other goods from a decommissioning site and had taken them to Saxon House and left them there was simply not good enough. There had to be a complete chain of serial numbers, and without it 4ON should lose, it having failed to satisfy the relevant burden of proof.

111. Mr Adekoya, although only recently instructed, engaged closely with the evidence in his closing written submissions saying in particular as follows. Firstly, that 4ON had adduced documentary evidence in the form of bank statements and invoices of purchases of the LG computers and the printer and had also produced invoices with regards to each of the four decommissioning projects.

112. Secondly, that 4ON had adduced direct witness evidence from various of its employees as to what had happened in terms of decommissioning, removal of decommissioned goods and storage of them at Saxon House.

113. Thirdly, that 4ON had adduced indirect witness evidence from its accountant Mr Standeven and others with regards to 4ON’s practice of retaining decommissioned equipment at Saxon House and of not including it in 4ON’s accounts unless and until it was sold.

114. Fourthly, that 4ON had produced many documents tying serial numbers of seized goods and seized equipment to specific projects and it should not matter if 4ON could not do that with regards to each and every item. It showed not merely ownership of specific items but also the general position of where items stored at Saxon House had come from and that 4ON owned those items.

115. Fifthly, that the mere fact that the Defendant also operated from Saxon House in no way meant that the goods belonged to the Defendant. The Claimants had simply produced no evidence to that effect.

116. Sixthly, that the Defendant’s witnesses were credible.,

117. Seventhly, that, as had been dealt with at the interim hearings and in my judgment delivered at the interim hearings on 2 January 2026 and which has neutral citation number [2026] EWHC 826, 4ON had, even before the Claimants obtained judgment against the Defendant, sought to sell a substantial element of the seized goods abroad; and thus had treated those goods and behaved as if those goods belonged to 4ON rather than the Defendant or anyone else.

118. He relied on all such matters in support of his contention that 4ON had proved that it was the true and sole owner of the seized goods.

119. I note that Mr MacLachlan did not seek to make any further submissions following those of Mr Adekoya, although I bear in mind that to do so he would have had to have made an application as I had not given him any invitation or encouragement to do so.

120. Mr Sharghy’s position for the High Court Enforcement Officer was effectively neutral with regards to the substance of the evidence. Mr Sharghy only it seems to me really made submissions as to the legal test to be applied.

121. As stated above, I consider that the legal and as a result also the evidential burden of proof is on 4ON, although this is only to the civil standard of balance of probabilities. Notwithstanding that and Mr MacLachlan’s able submissions I find that 4ON has discharged those burdens with regards to each and every one of the items listed in 4ON’s schedule.

122. I have taken into account all the material and submissions before me in coming to that conclusion even where I have not specifically mentioned them for considerations of time and space. It is essentially because I accept Mr Adekoya’s arguments as set out in his written submissions and which I have summarised above.

123. However I have seen as particularly important the following matters. First, I accept 4ON’s witnesses’ substantial evidence that 4ON’s business model was in effect to collect in equipment of the relevant nature from its decommissioning projects and to store that equipment at Saxon House. That is particularly important as; firstly, it renders it perfectly likely that individual items would belong to 4ON and not to the Defendant or someone else, notwithstanding that those other entities were also operating from Saxon House.

124. Secondly, it means that there is no particular reason why any individual item should be thought to belong to the Defendant or indeed a third party rather than 4ON.

125. Thirdly, 4ON have provided substantial clear evidence; first, that they were the contracting decommissioning entity on the four projects, that is both documentary in the form of invoices and other correspondence and from individual witnesses. Second, that many of the specific items at Saxon House were sourced from the four projects and therefore owned by 4ON. As to this there are the Mardix units where many serial and inspection numbers match other number, and, where the paper trail does not exist, the inspection numbers still are in sequence and it would seem to be odd if they had come from elsewhere other than the decommissioning projects. In this context I bear in mind that it was up to Mardix to identify how much assistance to give, albeit that they have provided substantial paper trail detail which supports 4ON’s case.

126. Fourthly, there is the evidence from McCullough and Hook which was wisely not challenged, and which I accept, that they transported many Liebeck, Trinity, Riello, Cube and other, including vector, units from 4ON’s project sites to Saxon House. It seems to me that there is every reason to suppose that those were the units of those natures seized as set out in the schedules before me.

127. Fifthly, there are further the invoices which clearly show that 4ON purchased from ordinary external suppliers the LG computer and monitors equipment and the printer. It seems to me that this is all strong documentary, supported by in part unchallenged witness, evidence with regards to very much of what 4ON claims.

128. Sixthly, if all that above-mentioned material stored at Saxon House belongs to 4ON, it seems to me to render it all the more likely that the associated material also all comes from the four sites or otherwise belonged to 4ON.

129. Seventhly, I regard Mr Gibbens’ evidence as credible and to be accepted. He described 4ON’s operations as taking place in ways which on all the evidence it seems to me I should accept. Much of what he says in relation to individual goods is backed up by documents and other witnesses

130. As far as the question as to how accounts were compiled and operate it seems to me that what Mr Gibbens said was done should be accepted. It was his own evidence where I regard him as being a witness of truth. It was confirmed by Mr Standeven, he being a practicing accountant and who seemed to me to be an honest witness. It seemed to make accounting sense, whether or not all accountants would have taken the same line and approach. It had the value to 4ON that it would reduce tax liabilities over what they might otherwise be had items individually or as a whole given some substantial valuation in accounts, at least until any sales occurred. Whether or not that is right and proper in tax law, it seems to me to be commercially credible as an approach. Companies will not wish to incur a tax liability if they feel there is a justification for including assets at a low or nil valuation. They will have to pay tax in due course if and once they sell those assets, but in any event they will have postponed the relevant tax liability which may never arise.

131. Mr Gibbens said that all the goods in the relevant area of Saxon House were 4ON’s. As I have said there is substantial direct and indirect other witness and documentary evidence that that was the case. It seems to me to be perfectly credible that he was telling the truth with regards to the other relevant seized items.

132. Eighthly, there is the fact that 4ON contracted to sell many of the seized goods by the Swedish contract before the relevant judgments or at least the writs of control came into existence. That it seems to me is some more evidence favouring the goods having come from the various decommissioning sites and being owned by 4ON.

133. Ninthly, while I accept that it was Shelley Bouchard who collated 4ON’s documents, the collation makes sense and was approved by Mr Gibbens who had overall control of the business. It is to considerable degree supported by the evidence of Mr Hook and Mr McCullough.

134. Tenthly the only evidence that the Claimants seem really to have adduced with regards to the ownership of the seized goods are the fact that substantial plant machinery and stock is shown in the Defendant’s accounts, and that the Defendant also operated from Saxon House. However, it does not seem to me that that material in any way evidences that other entities did not operate from or store their own goods at Saxon House; and, as I have already said, it seems to me clear that 4ON did so. Thus it does not really seem to me that the Claimant’s evidence really adds much or is of much weight to what I have to decide although I have borne it in mind.

135. Eleventhly, I have reminded myself that the burden of proof is on 4ON. On the other hand, all 4ON has to do is to adduce more weightier evidence than the Claimants have done. It seems to me that 4ON has adduced a great deal of credible evidence and the Claimants have adduced very little of particular relevance or at least weight.

136. Twelfthly, I have borne in mind that the burden of proof is on 4ON but it is only on the balance of probabilities. I do see some force in Mr Gibbens’ criticism of the Claimant’s case that they seem to have been requiring 4ON to produce precise documentary proof of ownership in relation to each item. That, of course, is not the evidential test. I simply have to consider whether or not on all the evidence 4ON has proved that it is more likely than not that 4ON was the true sole owner.

137. Thirteenthly, in relation to this it seems to me from my legal analysis that the burden of proof would actually only fall on 4ON if 4ON had not been in possession at the point when the HCEO seized the relevant goods. It seems to me in practice that I should accept the evidence of Mr Gibbens and of others that 4ON was actually in possession of the relevant goods at the point of seizure.

138. However, whether or not that is correct, it does not seem to me that it should matter as, even if 4ON was not in possession and so that the burden of proof of ownership falls on it as opposed to merely a burden of proof of showing that it was in possession either being or with the consent of the true owner, I hold that on all the evidence 4ON has demonstrated on the balance of probabilities that it was and is the true sole owner of each and all of the scheduled items that it claims.

139. Fourteenthly, I accept that as Mr MacLauchlan would contend it is technically possible for some of the seized goods to belong to 4ON and others not to do so. However I find Ms Bouchard’s collation and all the evidence before me as highly persuasive that this entire collection of goods identified in the relevant schedules as being claimed by 4ON were all previously acquired and owned by 4ON prior to the seizure; and I so hold that as being established on the balance of probabilities.

140. I make clear again that I have taken into account all the evidence and submissions, but it simply seems to me that 4ON has discharged the burden upon it, assuming that as I hold to be the case there was a burden of showing ownership and if not ownership at least possession upon it; and that that conclusion answers the question which is before me at this trial.

141. The consequences though are not being determined in this judgment. What I am going to do is I am going to now adjourn the hearing but with certain orders. What I am going to order is as follows. The hearing and the various applications shall be adjourned to 10.30am on 30 April 2026 with a half day time estimate. I call that “the adjourned hearing” and that order there (a) shall be extended until further order and which is to be considered at the adjourned hearing (1) the time for filing any appeal notice in relation to this judgment. (2) Time seeking any permission to appeal in relation to this judgment. (b) There be adjourned to and for consideration at the adjourned hearing all questions as to (1) time for filing any appeal notice in relation to the judgment. (2) Permission for appeal in relation to the judgment. Further, that there shall also be considered at the adjourned hearing (a) all questions as to costs and costs are reserved to the adjourned hearing. (b) All orders consequential upon the judgment. Further, the parties shall liaise and shall by 4.30pm on 28 April 2026 file and serve (a) their proposed orders and any applications including for permission to appeal and regarding time to appeal. (b) Any relevant statements of costs.

142. I am proposing to and will be adjourning the hearing on that basis in order to ensure that the fact of the adjournment does not prejudice any party and that all rights relating to appeal are preserved in accordance with CPR and the various case law dealing with the processes of dealing with permission to appeal and time for filing Appellant’s notices. Approved 11.5.2026 This Transcript has been approved by the Judge. The Transcription Agency hereby certifies that the above is an accurate and complete recording of the proceedings or part thereof. The Transcription Agency, 24-28 High Street, Hythe, Kent, CT21 5AT Tel: 01303 230038 Email: [email protected]