Francis Bridgeman v The Commissioners for HMRC

Neutral Citation: [2026] UKFTT 00679 (TC) Case Number: TC 09879 FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL TAX CHAMBER Location: Decided on the papers Appeal reference: TC/2025/04115 Application for permission to appeal out of time; Martland principles applied; permission granted Judgment date: 07 May 2026 Before TRIBUNAL JUDGE MATTHEW DONMALL Between FRANCIS BRIDGEMAN Appellant and THE COMMISSIONERS FOR HIS MAJESTY’S REVENUE AND CUSTOMS Respondents The Tribunal determined the application for permission to make a late appeal without a hearing under rule 29 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009 (FTTTC Rules) with the consent of the parties and the Tribunal considering that it was able to determine the matter without a hearing. DECISION Introduction

1. This is the Appellant’s application for permission to make a late appeal against HMRC’s conclusion on statutory review of 12 April 2024 which upheld a final closure notice (FCN) under s28A of the Taxes Management Act 1970 (TMA 1970) in the amount of £16,891.75 for tax year ended 5 April 2013 (the Application). HMRC oppose the Application. The law

2. Where a final closure notice has been issued by HMRC under s28A TMA 1970, a taxpayer may appeal against that decision to HMRC under s31, and HMRC may offer to review the matter under s49C. If that offer is accepted, then HMRC proceed to undertake the review under s49E. Once HMRC have given notice of the conclusions of a review in accordance with s49E, the Appellant may then notify an appeal to the Tribunal under s49G within a post-review period of 30 days beginning with the date of the document in which HMRC give notice of the conclusions of the review. Section 49G(3) then provides: “If the post-review period has ended, the appellant may notify the appeal to the tribunal only if the tribunal gives permission.”

3. The principles applicable to whether the Tribunal should give permission for a late appeal were set out by the Upper Tribunal in the case of Martland v HMRC [2018] UKUT 178 (TCC) ("Martland"), at [44] – [47]. In summary: (1) It must be remembered that the starting point is that permission should not be granted unless the Tribunal is satisfied on balance that it should be. (2) In considering that question, the Tribunal can usefully follow a three-stage process: (i) Establish the length of the delay. If it was very short (which would, in the absence of unusual circumstances, equate to the breach being 'neither serious nor significant'), then the Tribunal 'is unlikely to need to spend much time on the second and third stages'; (ii) Establish the reason (or reasons) why the default occurred; and (iii) Evaluate 'all the circumstances of the case'. This will involve a balancing exercise which will essentially assess the merits of the reason(s) given for the delay and the prejudice which would be caused to both parties by granting or refusing permission. (3) The balancing exercise should take into account the particular importance of the need for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost, and for statutory time limits to be respected. This approach has recently been confirmed as correct by the Court of Appeal in HMRC v Medpro Healthcare Ltd [2026] EWCA Civ

14. (4) In carrying out the balancing exercise the Tribunal can have regard to any obvious strength or weakness of the applicant's case; this goes to the question of prejudice. There is obviously much greater prejudice for an applicant to lose the opportunity of putting forward a really strong case than a very weak one. It is important however that this should not descend into a detailed analysis of the underlying merits of the appeal. (5) Neither shortage of funds (and consequent inability to instruct a professional adviser) nor the fact that the applicant is self-represented should generally carry any weight in the Tribunal's consideration of the reasonableness of the applicant's explanation of the delay. Background

4. The Appellant took part in a tax scheme for the exploitation of film rights designed by Scion Structured Products Ltd (the Scion Scheme).

5. On 3 January 2024, HMRC issued a Review Conclusion letter concerning two discovery assessments made for the years 5 April 2011 and 5 April 2012 dealing with the tax consequences of the Scheme arrangements.

6. On 2 February 2024, the Appellant made an in-time appeal to the Tribunal following that conclusion, which was given a Tribunal case reference of TC/2024/01247 (the First Appeal).

7. On 12 April 2024, HMRC issued a review conclusion letter in respect of the FCN of 26 October 2023 in respect of tax year ending 5 April 2013, in amount £16,891.75 (the 2013 FCN Review).

8. On 29 April 2024, HMRC made an application for further and better particulars in respect of the First Appeal, sent by email to the Tribunal and copying in the Appellant, under heading “HMRC F&BP application – TC/2024/01247 – Francis Bridgeman”.

9. On 11 May 2024, within 30 days of the 2013 Review Conclusion, the Appellant sent an email to the Tribunal, copied to HMRC (the May 2024 Email). It was sent by replying to HMRC’s earlier email of 29 April 2024, and so had the heading “HMRC F&BP application – TC/2024/01247 – Francis Bridgeman”. The content of the May 2024 Email was as follows below, and it attached the 2013 Review letter: Dear Tribunal and HMRC, Further to the below, I formally request that, following the outturn of HMRC’s Review conclusions of tax year 2013 (copy attached), this be added to the appeal (as anticipated).  I will be requesting that year 2014 is struck from both consideration and proceedings as I have now found and shared with HMRC contemporary correspondence in this regard, including confirmation from HMRC in 2016 that no further assessment or liability would arise in respect of  that year. I will separately make some further representations and a formal request for directions  – including the above – shortly (I am not really able to do so in the next two weeks, but will endeavour to do so as soon as possible). This will principally raise concerns as to several observations made by HMRC in their F&BP (as defined below).  An immediately important one of these which I will raise here and now (albeit I will cover it formally in my request for directions), is the repeated statement in the F&BP that I am “a solicitor by profession”. This is incorrect, is not based on any information I have provided to HMRC and is a statement that if it had been made by me could result in me being liable to criminal prosecution for an offence under the Solicitors Act 1974. It is therefore wholly inappropriate for such statements to be made by the Respondents full stop – even if it were correct (which it is not), I am totally unaware of any basis on which it would be relevant to the taxable nature or otherwise of certain payments in respect of the Scion Arrangements a decade or more ago. Kind regards, Francis Bridgeman” (emphasis added)

10. On 25 June 2025; the Appellant served an application for various directions in respect of the First Appeal in which, among other things, he sought a direction for “the Appellant’s appeal in respect of 2013 be joined with this appeal”.

11. Following an exchange of correspondence between the parties, on 12 August 2025 the Tribunal issued a direction asking the parties to notify the Tribunal of the Tribunal case reference for the appeal concerning the 2013 FCN to which the Appellant was referring.

12. Neither party could identify any case reference for the purported appeal concerning the 2013 FCN. The Appellant made reference however to the May 2024 Email and his view that as the First Appeal was already active, he had genuinely believed that he had notified the Tribunal of his appeal for year 2013 within the required time limit. For their part, HMRC submitted that the May 2024 Email did not meet the requirements of rule 20 of the FTTTC Rules, in particular it does not set out the grounds of appeal or the result the Appellant is seeking, and so there had been no valid notice of appeal.

13. On 20 October 2025, Judge Snelders determined that the May 2024 Email does not meet the requirements to be a valid appeal for the reasons HMRC had submitted, and issued directions in the First Appeal extending the time for HMRC to submit their statement of case, explaining that this was in order to give the Appellant a short period of time to submit a Notice of Appeal to the Tribunal against the 2013 FCN, together with an application to submit an appeal late and to consolidate that appeal with this appeal.

14. On 24 October 2025, the Appellant submitted a notice of appeal in respect of the 2013 FCN (the 2013 FCN Appeal) together with the present Application.

15. On 29 January 2026, HMRC submitted their Notice of Objection.

16. On 9 February 2026, the Appellant submitted a response to HMRC’s Notice of Objection. The Parties’ submissions

17. I set out below a summary of the submissions of the parties with the aim to do justice to them without unnecessarily lengthening this decision. I assure the parties that to the extent that an argument has not been fully set out it was nevertheless considered when reaching my conclusion.

18. The Appellant in his Application states that he had erroneously thought that he had duly notified the Tribunal of his appeal against the 2013 FCN by way of the May 2024 Email. It was only after his application to consolidate what he understood to be the appeal against the 2013 FCN with the First Appeal that it was brought to his attention that there was any possible issue, and only after the Tribunal’s letter of 20 October 2025 that it was made clear to him that it was not a valid notice of appeal. The matters in issue in the First Appeal and the 2013 FCN Appeal are identical and arise from the same documentation and arrangements, and the only difference is that the amount of tax differs by year. He contends there would be no further time or resource required on the part of HMRC or the Tribunal in considering the 2013 FCN Appeal in addition to the First Appeal because they will stand or fall together.

19. HMRC contend that the length of delay is 529 days, over 17 months, and this is serious and significant. HMRC submit that the Appellant’s belief that the May 2024 Email was sufficient is not a sustainable position, as he was clearly aware of the correct process to issue an appeal as evidenced by the notice of appeal of 2 February 2024 for the First Appeal. There was no evidence that the Appellant chased either the Tribunal or HMRC to ensure that what he claims was a valid appeal notification had been accepted. HMRC submit that the Appellant’s prior profession as a solicitor is a relevant factor in terms of assessing his capacity to understand what was required to lodge a valid appeal. On the third stage of Martland, HMRC submit that should the Application be allowed, the Respondents would be prejudiced in that they will have to divert resources to handle an appeal which they were entitled to consider closed, especially given the significant length of the delay, and the Tribunal will also have to divert some resources, and that weight must be placed on the fundamental principle that statutory time limits should be respected. Further, to the limited extent that the merits of the 2013 FCN Appeal should be considered, the Appellant’s case is weak in the light of the decisions of the FTT, UT and Court of Appeal in Good & Ryan v HMRC [2020] UKFTT 0025 (TC); Good v HMRC [2021] UKUT 0281 (TC) and Good v HMRC [2023] EWCA Civ 114 which also concerned the Scion Scheme.

20. By way of his brief response on these points, the Appellant accepts the 529 days of delay, but submits that needs to be seen in context of the May 2024 Email having been sent to the Tribunal within the 30 days, and that it was only by the Tribunal’s letter of 20 October 2025 that he was informed by the Tribunal that this step did not amount to a valid appeal under Rule

20. He reiterates that the delay arose from a genuine procedural misunderstanding rather than from inaction or indifference. At the time of the May 2024 Email, the Appellant already had an active appeal before the Tribunal in respect of earlier years raising the same issues. He believed that he was simply adding a further year to existing proceedings rather than commencing a new appeal. The Appellant accepts that this belief was mistaken but submits that it was reasonable in the circumstances. He says the fact of his prior legal training is of limited relevance, and he has never had any expertise in tax law or litigation. He contends he took prompt corrective action once the Tribunal explained that the procedural requirements had not been met. He submits that any prejudice is limited, and makes reference to the fact that HMRC’s objection itself acknowledges that there is a further tranche of litigation relating to the Scion scheme, with a case Adams v HMRC TC/2024/01576 to be heard in September 2026, and that HMRC anticipates that the First Appeal will be stood behind that appeal. Discussion

21. On the first stage of the Martland test, the delay in this case from the expiry of the 30 day period after the 2013 FCN Review of 12 April 2024, 12 May 2024, to the 24 October 2025 when the 2013 FCN Appeal was submitted, is 529 days. That is clearly a serious and significant delay.

22. On the second stage, I find that the reason for the delay is that the Appellant genuinely thought the May 2024 Email was sufficient to appeal the 2013 FCN following the 2013 Review Conclusion. This is for the following reasons: (1) That is what the Appellant states in his Application and submissions in response. (2) The language of the May 2024 Email in the opening paragraph indicates that this was the intention: the reference to “formally” in “I formally request”, and the substance of that request, that the Review Conclusion in respect of tax year 2013 “be added to the appeal”. Further, the May 2024 Email attached the 2013 Review Conclusion letter which was the subject of the appeal. (3) HMRC rely on the fact that the Appellant had notified the Tribunal of an appeal in the usual way in respect of the First Appeal, as evidence that he knew what to do to issue an appeal. But that merely begs the question as to why he did not issue the appeal in the ordinary way. In my judgment, this also indicates that – mistakenly – the Appellant genuinely did not think he needed to do the same again in respect of the 2013 FCN. If he did think he needed to follow the same process, it seems inherently unlikely that he would have sent the May 2024 Email, rather than undertake that same process. Rather, because the basis of his appeal against the 2013 FCN was on the same grounds as those in respect of the 2011 and 2012 tax years in the extant First Appeal and sought the same outcome, it seems that he considered that the same process did not need to be gone through, and an appeal to the 2013 FCN could just be “added” to the extant appeal by way of a purportedly “formal” notification by email to the Tribunal to this effect. (4) The language of the Appellant’s application of June 2025, a direction for “the Appellant’s appeal in respect of 2013 be joined with this appeal”, is consistent with the Appellant considering at that point, June 2025, that there was an extant “appeal in respect of 2013”.

23. This is not therefore a case where a taxpayer has been completely inactive and then, late, seeks to appeal a decision. Rather, the Appellant did take steps – insufficient but in good faith – to bring a further appeal in addition to the First Appeal within the 30 day time period, and it was not until over a year later in August 2025 that the issue arose as to whether the May 2024 Email was sufficient, and not until 20 October 2025 that the Tribunal determined that it was not. Following that determination, the Appellant acted promptly, submitting the 2013 FCN Appeal and making the Application on 24 October 2025.

24. On the third stage, the balancing exercise evaluating all the circumstances of the case, the starting point is that permission should not be granted unless the Tribunal is satisfied on balance that it should be. I give particular weight to the need for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost, and for statutory time limits to be respected. I take into account the very long period of delay in the case, which is significant and serious, and that there would be some prejudice to HMRC were the appeal to be allowed to continue. These factors weigh in the balance against granting permission. On the other hand, I have accepted that the Appellant did act to appeal the 2013 FCN within the time limit, and his mistake in thinking that the May 2024 Email sufficed was a genuine one for the reasons above. So this is not, in my judgment, a case where an appellant has failed to have any regard to, or respect for, statutory time limits, and in my judgment that makes a very significant difference to the overall balance. Further, there would be prejudice to the Appellant if the Application were refused, as he would lose the ability to contest the 2013 FCN in respect of £16,891.75.

25. As for other points: (1) As to the merits of the underlying appeal, notwithstanding the decisions in Good referred to above, that has not been the end to litigation concerning the Scion Scheme; HMRC accept that there is a further tranche of litigation, with the case of Adams v HMRC being listed for hearing in September 2026. Against that background it does not seem to me to be a case where the lack of merit is sufficiently clear without a detailed analysis that this factor weighs decisively in the balance in the third stage exercise. (2) As to HMRC’s submission as to his previously being a solicitor, I note the Appellant’s response that he was not an expert in tax law or litigation, and I do not place significant weight on this. (3) I also do not take into account the fact that the First Appeal is in any case proceeding as a factor in the Appellant’s favour at the stage 3 balancing exercise, given the Upper Tribunal decisions in Romasave (Property Services) Limited v HMRC [2015] ILIT 254 (TCC) at para 100and Websons (8) Ltd v HMRC [2020] UKUT 154 (TCC) para 46-49.

26. In all the circumstances, on the particular facts of the Application before me I am satisfied that notwithstanding the very lengthy delay, given the reason for the delay the overall balance is in favour of the Appellant, and permission should be granted for him to make a late appeal. Consequential directions

27. HMRC agree that if the 2013 FCN Appeal is admitted late, it should be consolidated with existing matter TC/2024/01247. I direct: (1) The 2013 FCN Appeal TC/2025/04115 is consolidated with the First Appeal TC/2024/01247, and that this consolidated appeal is to proceed hereafter under single appeal reference TC/2024/01247. (2) HMRC file and serve a consolidated Statement of Case within 60 days of the release date of this decision. Right to apply for permission to appeal

28. This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice. Release date: 07 May 2026