P & Q (Children) (Finding of Fact), Re

IMPORTANT NOTICE This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the...

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IMPORTANT NOTICE This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of court. This Transcript is Crown Copyright.  It may not be reproduced in whole or in part other than in accordance with relevant licence or with the express consent of the Authority.  All rights are reserved. Case No: BH25P00477 Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWFC 99 (B) IN THE FAMILY COURT SITTING AT BOURNEMOUTH AND POOLE Courts of Justice Deansleigh Road Bournemouth BH7 7DS Date: 5 May 2026 Before: DISTRICT JUDGE VEAL – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – RE P AND Q (CHILDREN) (FINDING OF FACT) B E T W E E N: A FATHER Applicant – and – A MOTHER Respondent The Applicant appeared in person(with the assistance of a QLR, Cornelius Ebirilem) Ms Sam Moore (instructed by Harold G Walker Solicitors) for the Respondent Hearing dates: 13 and 14 April 2026 – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – JUDGMENT District Judge Veal: Introduction 1) The court is concerned with P and Q. They are twins born in 2015, so they are now 11 years old. Their mother M, and their father is F. I will refer to them as the “mother” and “father” respectively. 2) The father commenced these proceedings on 3 September 2025, seeking a child arrangements order and prohibited steps order, at which time he said that he was being denied contact with the children by the mother. The mother’s behaviour, he said, was based upon allegations made by her which he described as “disturbingly false.” 3) On 20 November 2025, the mother issued a cross application. She sought a child arrangements order for the children to live with her, and prohibited steps orders to prevent the father removing the children from her care. 4) On 15 December 2025, a child impact report produced by Elaine Milton was finalised. That set out, amongst other things, that Q and P did not want to see the father. The mother described her allegations of domestic abuse, and the father of conduct which he said showed that the mother was alienating the children from him. Ms Milton gave either/or recommendations, namely that, if the mother’s allegations were proven, an order be made that the children live with her and have no contact with the father or, if the father proves his allegations, that the court consider whether a Rule 16.4 Guardian should be appointed. 5) On 23 December 2025, District Judge Lowe directed statements with a view to the court determining whether a fact finding hearing was necessary. 6) On 26 January 2026, the mother issued an application for permission to rely on covertly obtained video evidence. 7) On 4 February 2026, Recorder Southern made an order for indirect contact between the children and the father. She determined that a fact finding hearing was necessary and proportionate, and directed further statements, that the parents obtain letters from their GPs, and made orders for disclosure from the local authorities involved, the children’s school, and the police. A decision on the mother’s application in respect of the video evidence was deferred for further information to be provided. 8) On 30 March 2026, HHJ Simmonds made an order at a pre-trial review. He gave permission to the mother to rely on video evidence, and extended the time for the father to file his letter from his GP. He did not file such a letter, but I have some of his medical records. 9) The case was listed on 13 – 15 April 2026 for a composite fact finding and welfare hearing before a Recorder. Unfortunately, no Recorder was available and the case therefore came to me. I am grateful to the parties and their representatives, in that I was able to hear the evidence and submissions on the factual allegations on 13 and 14 April 2026, and to determine, after hearing from the parties, that any welfare hearing in due course was unlikely to require oral evidence from Ms Milton. 10) I have read a large bundle of evidence. I have been assisted during the course of the hearing by the father, who appeared in person and was assisted by a qualified legal representative, and counsel for the mother. I have heard evidence from the mother, the father and the other witnesses whom they called. 11) The fact that I do not mention something in this judgment does not mean that I have not fully considered it, but it is impossible to refer in this judgment to absolutely everything I have heard and read. Legal framework 12) There is no dispute in relation to the jurisdiction of this court. The children are habitually resident in England and Wales. 13) It is also undisputed that both parents have parental responsibility for the children. 14) In this case, domestic abuse has been raised as an issue. That engages Practice Direction 12J to the Family Procedure Rules. Guidance has also been given by the court, and particular consideration to cases involving allegations of domestic abuse was given by the Court of Appeal in particular in Re H-N & Ors (Children) (Domestic Abuse: Finding of Fact Hearings) [2021] EWCA Civ 448 and in the more recent case of Re K [2022] EWCA Civ

468. 15) An examination of principles applicable during fact finding hearings has also been helpfully set out by Cobb J (as he then was) in the decision of the High Court in Re B-B [2022] EWHC 108 (Fam), in particular at paragraph 26 of his judgment. The allegations in this case are wide ranging, but I will come to consider them in clusters. 16) Section 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 confirms that behaviour is “abusive” if it consists of any physical or sexual abuse; violent or threatening behaviour; controlling or coercive behaviour; economic abuse; psychological, emotional or other abuse. It does not matter whether the behaviour consists of a single incident or a course of conduct. 17) That definition has been incorporated into Practice Direction 12J to the Family Procedure Rules at paragraph 2A. Practice Direction 12J provides further assistance, at paragraph 3, with what coercive or controlling behaviour is. It says: a) “coercive behaviour” means an act or a pattern of acts of assault, threats, humiliation and intimidation or other abuse that is used to harm, punish, or frighten the victim; and b) “controlling behaviour” means an act or pattern of acts designed to make a person subordinate and/or dependent by isolating them from sources of support, exploiting their resources and capacities for personal gain, depriving them of the means needed for independence, resistance and escape and regulating their everyday behaviour. 18) Those definitions, and domestic abuse in more general terms, were further considered in Re H-N, and I have in mind that which is said by the Court of Appeal, in particular at paragraphs 25 – 34 of the judgment. Within those paragraphs is a reference to the judgment in Re L (Relocation: Second Appeal) [2017] EWCA Civ 2121, in which Peter Jackson LJ made the point that: “Few relationships lack instances of bad behaviour on the part of one or both parties at some time and it is a rare family case that does not contain complaints by one party against the other, and often complaints are made by both. Yet not all such behaviour will amount to ‘domestic abuse’…” 19) Pursuant to paragraph 29 of Practice Direction 12J, the purpose of a fact finding hearing is to permit the court, wherever practicable, to make findings of fact as to the nature and degree of any domestic abuse which is established, and its effect on the child, the child's parents and any other relevant person. 20) It is helpful to have firmly in mind why that is important, and how the findings fit into the overall task that the court is to perform in these proceedings. 21) The issues for this court focus primarily on P and Q and their needs. In determining questions about their upbringing, it is the children’s welfare throughout their childhood that is of paramount consideration: Section 1(1) of the Children Act 1989. 22) The concept that domestic abuse is harmful to children speaks to a great extent for itself. If any explanation were needed, it can be found in paragraph 4 of Practice Direction 12J and paragraph 31 of Re H-N. I will set those out below. 23) Other fundamental principles to which the court will have regard include that any questions about the children’s upbringing are ones that the court should try to resolve without delay, because delay is likely to prejudice their welfare: Section 1(2) of the Children Act 1989. The court will not make any order unless it concludes that it would be better for the children than not making an order: Section 1(5) of the Children Act 1989. 24) And, importantly, subject to any questions about risk of harm, the presumption is that the involvement of both of their parents in the lives of P and Q will further their welfare: Sections 1(2A) and (6) of the Children Act 1989. When parents live separately, it follows from that that the starting point is that children should remain in contact with the parent that does not administer their day to day care. That starting point is, of course, always subject to the children’s welfare. Making an order for no direct contact is a serious and draconian order. The court should not do so unless it is satisfied that it is both necessary and proportionate to do so, and that no other less radical form of order will achieve the essential end goal of being in the children’s welfare interests whilst also promoting the involvement of each parent in their lives. 25) When coming to its ultimate conclusions, the court will have regard to the considerations referred to in Section 1(3) of the Children Act 1989. That will be the subject of further exploration in due course. 26) For present purposes, however, it is helpful if I further identify that, if domestic abuse is found in a case, paragraphs 35 – 37 of Practice Direction 12J deal with additional factors which need to be considered at the welfare stage. Those include the physical and emotional welfare of the parent with whom the children live, before, during and after contact. 27) Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights is engaged, and so any order the court makes is weighed against the right of those affected to respect for their private and family life, and their home. Evidence 28) In resolving disputed issues of evidence in this court, where a person asserts a particular fact, it is that person who must prove it. Because the mother and the father each make allegations which I am to determine against the other, each bears the burden of proving their own allegations. At no stage does the burden reverse. The person against whom any given allegation is made has to prove nothing. 29) The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. In other words, if it is shown that any particular fact is more likely than not to be true, then it is treated as having happened; if it is not proved, then the fact is treated as not having happened. This is sometimes referred to as the binary effect. The court is entitled to take into account inherent probabilities and improbabilities in deciding whether a fact is proved, but must base its findings on evidence, including reasonable inferences, and not speculation: Re B [2008] UKHL

35. 30) The court has regard to the totality of the evidence and does not compartmentalise it. My role is to survey the evidence on a wide canvas, considering each piece of evidence in the context of all the other evidence. It is in that way that I come to the conclusion whether the case put forward by each party has been made out to the appropriate standard of proof: Re B-B. 31) I remind myself that it is common for witnesses to lie in the course of an investigation or a hearing. They may do so for a variety of reasons, for example, shame, misplaced loyalty, fear or distress. It does not follow that, because they have lied about one thing, they have lied about everything: R v Lucas [1981] QB

720. 32) Witnesses may also be fallible, which goes to the reliability of their testimony rather than their credibility. I have in mind that a witness’ recollection of events is a process of fallible reconstruction which may be affected by external influences and supervening events, moulded perhaps also by the process of litigation, with past beliefs being reconstructed to make them more consistent with present beliefs and motivated by a desire to give a good impression: Gestmin SGPS SA v Credit Suisse (UK) Limited & another [2013] EWHC 3560 (Comm). 33) It is also important to consider whether discrepancies in the evidence arise because of lies designed to hide culpability, lies for other reasons or from faulty recollection or confusion at times of stress or when the importance of accuracy is not fully appreciated. The possible effects of delay and repeated questioning upon memory and hearing the accounts of others should also be considered. A desire to iron out wrinkles may lead to a process of what Peter Jackson J (as he then was) described as “story creep,” without any necessary inference of bad faith: Lancashire County Council v C, M & F (Children – fact finding) [2014] EWHC 3 (Fam). 34) In general terms, I have in mind that the court room is an alien environment for most witnesses, and in particular in the emotionally charged atmosphere of a contested family dispute, I do not make the assessment of their evidence solely by virtue of their behaviour in the witness box: Re M (Children) [2013] EWCA Civ 1147. 35) It is often unreliable to draw a conclusion from a witness’ demeanour as to whether they are telling the truth. Such an approach may reflect conscious or unconscious bias and prejudice. The objective and reliable approach I adopt is to focus on such matters as the internal consistency of the evidence, its logicality and plausibility, details given or not given and consistency against other sources of evidence (including what the witnesses have said on other occasions) and other probable or known facts. However, where facts are not likely to be primarily found in contemporaneous documents, my assessment of credibility does include the impression made upon the court by the witness, with due allowance being made for the pressures that may arise from the process of giving evidence: Re B-M (Children: Findings of Fact) [2021] EWCA Civ 1371. 36) I have heard direct evidence from witnesses during the hearing, of things that that they have said, done and experienced themselves. There has also been original evidence, for example evidence of things said which are relied upon for the fact that they were said, rather than necessarily for the truth of what was said. I have also been taken to hearsay evidence, matters not experienced by the relevant witnesses directly but which are relied upon for the truth of their contents, to which the court will generally speaking attach less weight, in particular when hearsay is in competition with direct evidence. 37) This is a case in which there are a number of allegations. The mother’s allegations against the father are characterised as physical abuse, emotional abuse, sexual abuse, coercive and controlling behaviour and harassment. She alleges that the father’s behaviour worsened, and that he put the children at risk, when he drank alcohol. The father’s allegations are that, post separation, the mother’s behaviour has alienated the children from him. 38) Within this judgment, I have referred to the allegations in square brackets, by reference to the numbering in the parties’ schedules of allegations. I have used the letter M to refer to the mother’s schedule and F to refer to the father’s. 39) In the context of Practice Direction 12J, and as confirmed in cases such as Re R (Children) [2018] EWCA Civ 198, F v M [2019] EWHC 3177 as well as Re H-N, the parties need to appreciate that the purpose of the family tribunal is not to establish guilt or innocence but to establish the facts so far as they are relevant to inform welfare decisions about the children. 40) The Court approaches propensity evidence with some care. However, if evidence is relevant and admissible, in circumstances in which there is a pattern of behaviour, conduct on one occasion may be taken into account in going to show that conduct of striking similarity is more likely to be true on other occasions: R v P (Children: Similar Fact Evidence) [2020] EWCA Civ 1088. 41) The father makes a formal allegation of parental alienation. I remind myself of the helpful way in which Peter Jackson LJ expressed the state of the law in paragraphs 7 – 13 of Re S (Parental Alienation: Cult) [2020] EWCA Civ

568. Fundamentally, the court’s determination is a question of fact: see, for example, Re C (Parental Alienation: Instruction of Expert) [2023] EWHC 345 (Fam). The Family Justice Council’s guidance in November 2024 invites the court to be satisfied of three things before making a finding of alienating behaviours: a) The child is reluctant, resisting or refusing to engage in, a relationship with a parent or carer; and b) The reluctance, resistance or refusal is not consequent on the actions of that parent towards the child or the other parent, which may therefore be an appropriate justified rejection by the child; and c) The other parent has engaged in behaviours that have directly or indirectly impacted on the child, leading to the child’s reluctance, resistance or refusal to engage in a relationship with that parent. 42) I have in mind the principles set out by MacDonald J in Re P (Sexual Abuse: Finding of Fact Hearing) [2019] EWFC 27, which further develops his judgment on the correct approach to such cases in AS v TH (False Allegations of Sexual Abuse) [2016] EWHC 532 (Fam). Cases of alleged sexual abuse create particularly acute forensic difficulties, not least because the abuse is not commonly witnessed by third parties. Allegations may emerge some time after the abuse is alleged to have occurred, and long after any physical evidence has disappeared. 43) I also have regard to the dangers of making assumptions in the context of sexual allegations: assumptions as to the kind of person who is a victim, the kind of person who is a perpetrator, how a victim might react and how a perpetrator might react. In the context of serious sexual abuse, there is no typical victim and no typical offender. Delay in reporting such behaviour does not mean it is untrue: a late complaint does not render an allegation untrue any more than a timely complaint renders it true. Equally, just because someone who says that they have been the victim of a serious sexual abuse has given inconsistent or incomplete accounts in the past does not mean that their allegation is untrue. Experience has shown that inconsistencies in accounts can happen whether a person is telling the truth or not. For instance, some people may go over and over events in their minds and their memory may be clearer or can develop over time, whereas other people may try to avoid thinking about an event at all, and so may have difficulty in recalling it accurately. 44) Just because someone consents to sexual intercourse on one occasion, that does not mean they must have consented to sexual intercourse on other occasions. There is a difference between consent and submission. A person consents if they agree to something when they are capable of making a choice about it and are free to do so. Consent can be given enthusiastically or with reluctance, but it is still consent. But when a person gives in to something against his or her free will, that is not consent but submission. They may submit due to threats, out of fear or by persistent psychological coercion. In those situations, they do not have free choice and this does not amount to consent freely given. 45) I have been reminded also of the principles from Re H (Minors) (Sexual Abuse: Standard of Proof) [1996] AC

563. 46) Specific considerations apply to the evidence of children. I have in mind the way in which MacDonald J developed the principles I have just outlined in paragraphs 5 – 8 of his judgment in Re P. In this case, some of what the children are alleged to have said on occasions comes from notes or reports produced by professionals. What the father said during the course of his evidence and submissions is that P and Q have been coached by the mother. 47) When weighing up the evidence, I must consider the fact that P and Q’s evidence stands as hearsay and has not been tested by cross-examination. The circumstances or context in which the children have given their evidence must also be considered, taking care not to focus attention on statements made by them at the expense of other evidence. 48) In Re P, MacDonald J draws on a number authorities for the propositions (a) that very young children do not appear to have the same clear boundaries between fact and fantasy as those which adults have learned to draw, (b) that children are often poor historians, likely to view interviewers as authority figures, many being suggestible and others anxious to please, not necessarily expressing themselves in clear terms and capable of misunderstanding or being misunderstood, and (c) the danger not only that children’s memories may be completely usurped, but that they may embellish or overlay a general theme with apparently convincing detail that can be very difficult to detect, even by the most expert assessor. 49) In this case, I have firmly in mind the terms of the Achieving Best Evidence (ABE) Guidance (January 2022). The Guidance is advisory rather than legally enforceable, and breach of the Guidance does not lead to inadmissibility of evidence. It is important not to discount a child’s testimony merely because that child has been exposed to suggestive questioning. However, significant departures from the Guidance are likely to result in reduced, or in extreme cases no, weight being attached to the interview. The court must therefore consider whether any flaws are so fundamental as to render the interview unreliable or to diminish its weight: Re E (A Child) [2017] 1 FLR 1675. 50) The relevant question is whether any breach is forensically significant: to what extent, if at all, do any failures undermine the reliability of the evidence: see Y and E (Children) (Sexual Abuse Allegations) [2019] EWCA Civ 206, per Baker LJ? Did the omissions undermine the credibility of what is being said, put words into the child’s mouth by suggesting an answer, encourage the child to exaggerate for reward, or cause the recorded account to be inaccurate or unreliable or assume an outcome? Of course, the court may evaluate the evidence given in a flawed interview in the context of other evidence and ask itself to what extent there is corroboration from elsewhere. 51) In overall terms, then, when considering whether the case has been proved to the requisite standard there is an overarching importance in the court standing back from the case to consider the whole picture and ask itself the ultimate question whether that which is alleged is more likely than not to be true, avoiding in the case of multiple allegations capitulating to suspicion and what MacDonald J in Re P described as the “beguiling adage” that there is “no smoke without fire.” Issues of fact and the evidence 52) In this case, I have had regard to the statements made by each parent and their oral evidence. I have also read statements given by Ms Z, a neighbour of the family when they were living in [the former family home], and Ms Y, the paternal grandmother. I heard oral evidence from each of those witnesses as well. 53) My overall impression of the mother’s evidence was that she presented as a straightforward witness. She answered every question asked of her in a measured fashion, adding relevant context as she went. I have in mind that it is the father’s position that she is a clever liar; she certainly presented as well educated and articulate. 54) The father was more argumentative during his evidence, and deflecting of criticism, but he was seeking to make the point that he characterises the mother as manipulative and that her accounts were false. The greater problem with the father’s evidence, however, was that, at times, it was like shifting sand. The internal inconsistencies of it made some of his evidence difficult to understand. 55) Ms Z, I did not think, contrary to the father’s submissions, had any particular axe to grind. She was not someone who appeared to know the family well, but she lent support to the mother after what she perceived as an injustice which she overheard being done to her. It did appear to me that Ms Z did at times listen to neighbourhood gossip. 56) Ms Y, the paternal grandmother, did not give lengthy oral evidence, and so I did not form a view from her oral evidence alone as to her reliability. I accept that it is often the case that family members called to give evidence tend to align with the person who calls them, but that is not always true. 57) The father’s relationship with the mother of his older child, he told the court, ended after he discovered that she had been unfaithful to him. That is the context for the outcome of the police checks at that time. In 2012, the father received a caution for harassment, over a period from August 2010 to February 2012, of the mother of his older child. I gather also that a non molestation order was made in favour of the same former partner of the father. 58) The parties were in a relationship from 2013. 59) P and Q were born in early 2015. They both have some additional needs as a result of diagnoses of [a medical condition]; I understand that Q requires greater [medical] intervention than P. Both children are reported to be meeting age related expectations at school, they have a strong relationship with each other, and they appear to be well liked by their peers too. 60) Between 2015 and 2023, the mother alleges [M14] that the father would make her feels as if she had to have sexual intercourse with him at least twice a week. He would call her “cold” or “frigid.” The arguments would cause her to agree to have intercourse because it was easier to do so. 61) I will come back to the father’s evidence about this allegation later on. However, it was part of the father’s response to allegation [M14] that it has no relevance to the children’s welfare or child arrangements. That, in my judgment, itself raised a question about his insight into the sort of controlling behaviour which can impact a co-parenting relationship or the welfare of his children. 62) The parties married in September 2017. 63) From 2020, the mother alleges [M1, M4] that the father was verbally abusive of her, including shouting at her, in the presence of the children. She said that this would be a daily occurrence at times. The father denies the allegation, putting her to proof. He states that the mother frequently shouted at him, and he tried to de-escalate the situation. 64) From 2020, the mother also alleges [M2] that the father prioritised drinking alcohol over the children’s needs. For example, she says the father did not collect children from school on several occasions and she had to do so. When she got home, she found the father asleep and clearly intoxicated. 65) The father says that the mother’s account is exaggerated and misleading, and that he was a hands on parent. He maintained throughout his oral evidence that there was a direct correlation between his drinking, resulting from the mother’s behaviour towards him. He denied, by reference to his medical notes, that he had had a problem with alcohol since 2015. 66) The mother also alleges that the father drove under influence of alcohol [M5], and that the children would describe the father having accidents. That, she says, put them at risk of harm. The father accepts that he was convicted of a single offence committed in August 2023, but denies a pattern of drink driving behaviour. 67) Between 2020 and 2023, the mother alleges [M3] that the father would hit doors and walls sporadically, scaring her and the children. She described him breaking doors. There were no photographs, because she did not think to take any, or any other independent evidence. She did not report it to any family or friends at the time. She said that she was devastated and embarrassed, and did not want other people to know how bad things were. 68) The father denies the allegation, maintaining that he would try and calm situations rather than inflame them. 69) The parties separated for the first time in 2021. The mother said she left the father because of his drinking. She described in her witness statement a couple of incidents in the summer of 2021 when the father had been incapacitated due to alcohol consumption. She said she had reported that to the local authority but it closed its file because the mother had taken protective action. 70) The mother told the court that she tried to get the father to seek assistance for his alcohol use but he did not. On 24 September 2021, there was a referral from the mother’s GP to Surrey County Council after the mother had reported that the father was an alcoholic. That, in my judgment, was consistent with the mother’s evidence that she spoke to her doctor in in September 2021, who told her that the father would need to refer himself to services to secure help. 71) The mother told the court that she reconciled with the father in or about October 2021 based on promises he made to her at the time. 72) From 2022, the mother alleges [M13] that the father would harass her by sending numerous messages and emails. She states that they would come at least once a day, in different formats, and would be offensive, vile or misogynistic in nature. She states that the father would blame her for the children’s disabilities, and would tell her that a sexual assault that the mother had been the victim of when at university was something she had made up. The mother says that the impact of the messages was to ruin her self-esteem and confidence, in that she would start to believe the things that the father said to her over and over again. 73) The mother states that the father lost two jobs in the latter part of 2022, and his drinking worsened. She states that it was having an emotional impact on Q and P, so she took them to spend Christmas that year with the maternal grandparents. 74) When the mother and children returned to the family home in January 2023, the mother told the father that she wanted a divorce. His reaction, she states, was to say that he would take the children and leave her with nothing, so she was scared to proceed with the separation at that stage. 75) The mother states that the parties did then separate in April 2023. At that time, the father had lost another job and was drinking heavily again. The parties continued to live in the same house, but they were sleeping in separate bedrooms. The mother says that the children would tend to eat in their bedroom because of the atmosphere in the home, and the father told them that he was going to take them away. 76) In 2023, the mother alleges that the father would isolate her from her friends [M7], and that he was derogatory about her friends and family [M8]. She says he called her best friend “disgusting” and “chavvy,” and said that her friend Lucy had made her son the way he was, rather than accepting that he was autistic. The mother says that the way the father spoke to her about her friends wore her down and meant that she would no longer see them. 77) The father denies the allegations. 78) Between April and July 2023, the mother alleges [M10] that the father would burst into her bedroom and shout and rant at her. The mother exhibits a series of videos, which were covertly recorded, permission having been given for her to rely on them. Contrary to what he said in his witness statement of 28 January 2026, when he denied saying what was attributed to him at all despite knowing that the mother was seeking to rely on the videos, the father accepted in his oral evidence that what he said in the videos was abusive. 79) It was interesting that the father told the court that he had not watched or listened to the videos until the first day of the hearing, when I played them in court. He had had them for some time by then. Presumably, therefore, he only realised his behaviour had been abusive at that point. He said that what he said to the mother was always a reaction to things which the mother had said to him, and so both parents were abusive. 80) The mother sets out in fairly full terms, in paragraph 21 of her witness statement of 16 January 2026, what was said in the videos. I do not need to rehearse that. 81) On 10 May 2023 at 7:07pm, the father can be heard speaking in what I would describe as a simmering, aggressive tone. A young child can also be heard in the background. The father called the mother’s sister in law “disgusting,” and said that he would not touch the mother’s friend, W, with a barge pole. A few minutes later, the father said to the mother: “You’re shit, fucking ugly, and you’ve got a hairy face.” The father then, apparently in response to something the mother said about him being a “fat, balding bloke” and a “piece of shit,” referred to the maternal grandfather and someone called V being fat balding blokes as well. That sentiment was repeated on 11 May 2023 at 6:54pm, a whole day later, when the father also called the mother’s uncle a “dick and a cunt.” 82) For example, on 13 May 2023 at 06:36am, the mother alleges that, when P was next to her in her bedroom, the father said: “I will burn this fucking house to the ground before you get a fucking penny from me, you’re fucking bang out of order…” 83) The father’s response to the mother’s initial allegation [M9] was to deny making the threat or any of the circumstances described by the mother. However, given that it was captured on video, the father said in cross examination that that was a flippant remark he made when intoxicated, and that P was not in the mother’s room. 84) I note, however, that that same afternoon and evening, the father sent messages to the mother saying things like: “Ok I will give you a divorce, this is toxic, you have a filthy mouth and you know I tell the truth and will not stand for it… You won’t get this house you have no [claims] your [sic] a freeloader.” 85) On 23 May 2023 at 1:37am, the mother alleges that the father came into her room and said things along the lines of that she drove him to drink, that he manipulated her into having a vasectomy, that the house was his, and that he was angry that the mother had taken the children to the home of the maternal grandparents. I should say that the father continued to sound angry in each of the recordings made by the mother. 86) On 24 May 2023 at 3:52am, the mother alleges that the father put the television on so loud that it woke her and the children. 87) On 1 June 2023, the father called the mother a “slut” when ranting to himself downstairs. She said she was upstairs and the children were asleep. It was apparent to her that the father had believed that she was having an extra marital relationship, something which I should say was something explicitly communicated to her by the father in messages which I have seen. The mother states that she was not unfaithful to the father. 88) On 9 June 2023, the mother contacted the local authority for advice. She described that the parents had recently separated, but were still living under one roof with the children. She described that, when sober, the father was fine and the man she married but, when he was drinking, she felt less in control of her ability to protect Q and P. 89) On 12 June 2023, the school inclusion leader noted that the father appeared to be unsteady on his feet and slightly slurring his words. The father said that he was, but it was not due to alcohol use, but due to the fact that he was on heavy painkillers when awaiting a knee operation. That explanation did not appear to me to be necessarily inconsistent with the record made by the school. However, the father in his oral evidence went so far as to say that the mother had turned professionals against him. 90) On 18 June 2023, the mother alleges that, at breakfast, the father started talking about her historic sexual assault. Again, that is captured on video at 10:16am, and it is apparent from that that he thought the mother had made it up. When asked why he had said what he said, the father’s response was to explain that the mother had persuaded him to have a vasectomy, on the basis that that would improve the parties’ sex life. In fact, it appeared that this was part of his response to allegation [M14]: he denied pressurising the mother to have a sexual relationship with him, but said that the mother had said that, after the vasectomy, the parties would be able to have more frequent sexual intercourse. After he had had the vasectomy, however, which looking at his medical notes was in or around February 2020, the father said that the mother continued to not want a sexual relationship, saying that she had been sexually assaulted when at university. It was apparent that the father did not believe that to be true, but I was unclear how that was a response to the question as to whether accepted what he said on 18 June 2023 was wrong. Ultimately, though, he did accept he should not have said what he did say. 91) The mother told the court that she did not report the father to the police straight away. She had found herself in a huge mess and simply wanted to get out. The mother says that she did seek assistance from the local authority and also telephoned the police non-emergency number. She felt that their response was inadequate; that, unless something serious happened, they would do nothing. The mother says that the police did not take further action, because her complaint did not meet the evidential threshold. 92) Of course, the police look at such matters with an eye on whether there is a realistic prospect of a conviction, per the Code for Crown Prosecutors, to the criminal standard of proof. I consider matters through a different lens, applying the civil standard of proof, and having had the benefit of hearing live evidence. 93) Ms Z, the neighbour, said that she used to hear the parties arguing. 94) In July 2023, the mother alleges [M11] that the father smashed her phone and threw it into a fish tank. It was put to her that she did not take a photograph of it, but her response was that the phone was in the fish tank so she could not. The mother told the court that she retrieved her phone and she carried on using it until it finally stopped working. 95) The father denies the allegation. He said he knew he had not thrown the mother’s phone into the fish tank. The fish tank was expensive, he said, he had invested a lot of money into it, and so he would not have thrown something with a lithium battery into it. The allegation, he stated, was inherently implausible in those circumstances. 96) On 12 July 2023, the mother alleges [M12] that the father grabbed her arm and swung her around, causing bruising to her upper arm. The context was that she had tried to take a bottle away from the father. She said that she had not reported it at the time to the doctor or police, because she was only left with bruises, but the mother did take photographs of the bruises which she says were caused. 97) The father denies the allegation. He says he would never have physically abused a woman, and the mother sustained bruises regularly at work. He states that the photographs do not demonstrate that the bruises were caused by him. 98) There is a record of the mother having contacted the local authority on the morning of 12 July 2023, recounting events from the day before, in which the mother said that the father had never been violent towards her or the children before, but that she felt that the father’s behaviour in front of the children amounted to emotional abuse. She does not appear to have mentioned the allegation of physical abuse on 17 July 2023, when she then spoke to the local authority. During the child and family assessment, the mother is recorded as having said that the father: “… has never got intentionally physical, he at times [tries] to take things from [the mother] and when [she tries] to take his keys away he will push [the mother].” 99) On 13 July 2023, there is reference, in the subsequent child and family assessment, to the father having collected the children from school. He was said to have “presented ok” against a backdrop of the school having had concerns for his alcohol consumption. There was reference to some form of accident in the car park later on the same day, but the school’s note does not appear to attribute that to the father, and the father was clear in his evidence that the white paint marks would not have been left by his car because it was not white. To avoid doubt, I do not find that the father caused that damage. 100) There was then further reference to Q having said on 13 July 2023 to a teaching assistant that the father crashes the car a lot, that he had hit either the pavement or something else on the previous day, and that the father drinks and drives. 101) On 20 July 2023, a concern was logged by the children’s school about the foyer smelling strongly of alcohol when the children were in it. The father said that he assumed he had been present. 102) On 21 July 2023, a record from the children’s school set out that Q had said that the father threw the mother’s telephone in the fish tank when he was drunk, and that P had said that the father shouts at the mother a lot when he was drunk and uses bad swear words. In fact, the school disclosure reveals a number of occasions when the children told staff about their experiences at home at this time. 103) On 22 July 2023, the mother took the children to stay at the home of the maternal grandparents. 104) A child and family assessment was carried out by BCP Council commencing on 13 July 2023, and concluding on 2 August 2023. It was then signed off in September 2023. During that assessment, both Q and P were reported to have had concerns (and this is my paraphrasing) about the father drinking daily, and shouting, being rude and unkind towards the mother and her family, and undermining the relationship between them and the mother. 105) The father accepted during the assessment that his alcohol consumption had escalated. He left the local authority with the impression that was accessing support for his alcohol use from We Are With You, the relevant local support service, although he told the court that he had, in fact, only had an initial telephone assessment and then took steps to stop using alcohol by himself. 106) The conclusions of the assessment were that the children had been exposed to parental conflict, but the risks had been reduced by the mother having taken the children to stay with the maternal grandparents. The father felt that the mother was withholding contact, and he had been signposted to obtain legal advice. The local authority’s recommendations were that the father’s contact should be supervised until he had resolved his issues. 107) The conclusions included this: “Your dad, together with your paternal grandmother, with whom you had a positive relationship… have taken a decision not to have any contact. Although this is unfortunate as they are part of your identity it appears nothing can be done at present for them to change their position… It must be… upsetting that he is declining to have contact with you at the moment, for reasons which do not appear to be in your interests at all.” 108) The father alleges that the children were coached to say what they were reported to have said in the child and family assessment, both to the social worker and the school. Neither the social worker nor any member of school staff was called to give evidence, however. 109) When asked about the social worker’s comments about the father and paternal grandmother having adopted a position whereby they had decided not to have any contact with the children, the father gave three different reasons. Initially, he said his position had been adopted because the mother had, in the week since being at home of maternal grandparents, alienated the children from him. The father later said that the conclusions of the assessment were completely wrong, and that it was the mother that he had not wanted contact with, rather than the children. 110) The father was asked to clarify his evidence in a number of ways, in particular because the conclusions did not support the idea that it was the mother he had said he did not want contact with. Given that he said that the social worker had got it wrong, I asked why he did not take that up with the local authority given the importance of the issues. I did not understand his evidence as to why he had done nothing about it. 111) The father then changed his position again, saying that the decision not to have contact was only supposed to be for the time being, or for a few days, and that the social worker had recorded the position correctly but “not favourably.” He later told the court that he had never seen the assessment at all until this hearing, something which he had not said in response to earlier questions. That might also explain, of course, why the father understood the advice about his contact needing to be supervised was given to the mother, and not him. However, I was unclear why, if it were true that he had not seen the assessment, he had not asked for it. 112) The father did have contact with Q and P on 5 August 2023, together with the paternal grandmother. He was due to see them again on the next day. 113) On 6 August 2023, however, the father was caught driving with excess alcohol. He was significantly over the legal limit, having been drinking the night before. He was convicted and sentenced on 28 September 2023, which sentence included a 26 month disqualification from driving, which period of disqualification was eligible for reduction if the father undertook a course. 114) In about August 2023, after the mother and the children had left the family home, Ms Z said that she saw the father riding off on his bicycle one morning at 3:30am. She said that he was wobbling as if he were drunk. It was put to her in cross examination that that could not have happened because the father had been awaiting a knee replacement. However, I have seen a message from the father on 25 August 2023 at 3:16am which refers to him going on a bike ride that morning. The father said during his own evidence that he thought it unlikely that what Ms Z said she had seen was correct, but later that he no recollection about it. He accepted that he had problematic relationship with alcohol at the time. 115) On 26 August 2023, Ms Z said she woke up at 10:00am – she had been working a night shift – having heard an altercation. Ms Z told the court that she heard a lady shouting at the mother in an unpleasant way, and she heard the children crying. The mother’s evidence was that the paternal grandmother had become nasty because Q had not wanted to stay with the father and paternal grandmother, saying: “You are evil, you have done this to the boys, just go.” The mother states that she put the children in the car to leave, and the paternal grandmother continued to shout at her as she did. 116) The paternal grandmother denied all of that in her evidence. 117) Ms Z sent a message to the mother at 10:18am, saying: “I’m sorry you had to go through that this morning. I’m not a nosy neighbour I promise just still in bed. You aren’t a horrible person. We all know what he’s like. I just felt I had to say something. That was tough on you.” 118) The mother states that the father did not see Q and P after 26 August 2023 until a video call in November 2023. She states that she wanted the children to have a relationship with their father, but it needed to be led by them, because if Q or P were forced, they would get upset and stressed. She believed that, at this time, the father was still drinking heavily because of the nature of some of his messages and his presentation. 119) On 15 September 2023, BCP Council’s child and family assessment concluded with the team manager’s comments. I have covered the evidence about that assessment already. 120) In a message at the end of September 2023, the father said to the mother: “The boys are disabled because you wouldn’t listen, everyone including doctors old you to stop working, only your mum said carry on… now we have disabled children, because of you. Because of that your blaming means me drinking…” 121) From 2023, the mother alleges [M6] that the father threatened to take the children from their school. His response to the allegation is that these were suggestions rather than threats. 122) The mother relies on messages from the father dated 7 October 2023, in which father said: “Maybe I should turn up at pick up times, clearly the school and social services don’t have a problem with me. Your [sic] just being nasty and ridiculous.” 123) It was put to the father that the school did have concerns, to which the father said that that school said something different to him to that which has been recorded. 124) In October 2023, the mother reported the father to the police in relation to his harassing messages. She did not seek a full police investigation at the time. The local authority spoke to the mother following her report, and there was discussion about giving the children the opportunity to voice any concerns that they may have through ELSA sessions at school. 125) The father admits [M13] that, during a highly emotional period post separation, and given the increasing restrictions on the time he could spend with the children, he sent a number of messages expressing frustration, distress and anger, and that some of his language was intemperate. However, he denied that his behaviour was sustained or harassing. 126) The mother states that the father saw Q and P four times in November and December 2023, but cancelled one further contact and did not turn up for another. She says he telephoned the boys on Christmas Day. 127) She also states that the father cancelled contact towards the start of January 2024, but then turned up unannounced at the maternal grandparents’ home with the dog on another day. The mother says that she and the boys were not at home, but the maternal grandparents told her afterwards that the father was visibly drunk. It appears that contact took place on 28 January 2024, but the mother says that the father shouted and screamed about not being invited to the children’s birthday party, and in the process upset them. 128) I have seen various messages from the father to the mother between 8 and 29 February 2024 which I would characterise as harassing. 129) On 3 May 2024, the children were recorded as being worried that the father was going to pick them up from school. 130) There was contact on 15 May 2024 after school, before Q and P went to cubs. 131) The father’s allegations all post date the parties’ separation, and he confirmed that they amount to an allegation of parental alienation. During the evidence he gave in cross examination, he sought to extend the allegations of alienation to a period pre-separation; it was too late for him to amend his case. Also, I note that the mother had not been cross examined about her evidence about when he had seen the children. In any event, the father said that he had been very unwell at the time of the parties’ separation because of what the mother had put him through, in other words that she had driven him to drink. 132) From June 2024, the father alleges [F1] that the mother refused to allow the children to spend weekday time with him, and that weekends were busy. His evidence is that there had been contact previously, which was controlled by the mother but, in June 2024, she told him not to collect the children from school. 133) The mother’s evidence is that she worked during the week, and in any event the children had extra curricular activities, and the local authority had advised that the father’s contact be supervised. Her position is that she did not prevent the father from having a relationship with Q and P. The father had asked to see the children on 9 June 2024, to which she agreed. However, she did not hear from him again about that, and so it did not happen. 134) The mother agrees that she told the father not to collect the children from school. She says that that is because the children wanted her to be present when they saw the father, and her work commitments were such that she could not be available straight after school. 135) The father makes a related allegation [F5] that, from July 2024, the mother went back on agreed levels of contact by curtailing sessions. 136) On 10 July 2024, contact took place at Burger King. The mother said that the father’s request for contact had been last minute, and they were going for food before parents’ evening. 137) On 28 July 2024, the mother emailed the father to say that contact arranged for the next day would need to be postponed because P had got himself worked up and upset. The father’s response was to call the mother “sick” and to say: “I won’t see the boys if you’ve poisoned them with your lies. Your [sic] obviously pathetic and scared that they will have fun with me, I bet you sleep great at night because your [sic] evil.” 138) The mother’s position is that she had agreed to pick the father up, and to spend time at [the beach] before going to an appointment and then to get food. She said that P had got himself worried and so she had therefore suggested a later start time. The father’s response was to choose not to attend at all. 139) On 6 August 2024, the father alleges that the mother cancelled contact at short notice. Her position was that she had put the father’s WhatsApp messages into an archive because her phone had been constantly pinging, and that she had asked him to email her instead, but he did not. She did not therefore cancel the contact; she had not known that he had wanted to see them. 140) On 13 August 2024, the father contacted the local authority for advice. He said that the mother was not allowing him to see Q and P without being present herself. He believed her to be controlling. The local authority signposted the father to legal advice. 141) On 27 August 2024, the mother said that the father had contacted her wanting to see the children. She suggested 31 August 2024 for the afternoon, but the father did not agree with that suggestion and so contact did not take place at all. 142) The mother told the court that she and children did not see the father from October 2024 until June 2025. She gives at least one example of her offering the father a date in December 2025 for contact. 143) The father alleges [F2] that the mother restricted his contact to brief, supervised public meetings, rather than allowing normal parenting time. He was critical of her decision to supervise the contact herself, saying, on 7 January 2025, that she must be present. 144) On 12 February 2025, the father emailed the mother and said that she had “fucked up when pregnant,” presumably to blame her again for the children’s [medical conditions]. That was something again the subject of an email on 9 June 2025. 145) In March 2025, the mother says P was referred to CAMHS due to his anxiety. I understand he remains on a waiting list but has an ELSA at school. 146) On 27 April 2025, there were emails to the mother from the father [M6], all of a similar sentiment, one of which said: “I’ve had no response so u [sic] guess I’m picking the boys up from school tomorrow.” The mother’s response was: “Please don’t you will upset the boys I was happy to see you on Saturday so they would be comfortable but tomorrow will just upset them…” 147) The father said that what he had said was borne of frustration. He said he did not intend to pick the children up from school. If that is right, what that must therefore mean was that the email was an opportunity to engage the mother in correspondence whereby he called her, for example, “fucking delusional.” 148) In April 2025, before his driving ban was due to expire, the father said he underwent an alcohol test through DVLA. I have not seen that. 149) In May 2025, the mother alleges [M15] that the father would threaten her that he would have more control when driving again. He said in an email on 7 May 2025: “I cannot believe how much more control I will have when I am driving again, no more of your abuse.” The mother took that as a threat; the father denies that the email was threatening. He states that it was a reference to the practical reality that he would be able to travel more independently to see the boys. 150) On 28 May 2025, the father said in emails: “If you thought I’d given up as you want you are very much mistaken, the car situation has been a temporary problem for me, not a permanent surrender by any means… God I can’t wait until I’m driving again.” 151) The mother made a report to the police on 1 June 2025 about the father’s harassing behaviour. It appears that she was given advice about non molestation orders. 152) The mother states that she, Q and P saw the father for the first time in seven months on 15 June 2025, for Father’s Day. By then, he had moved to [Hampshire] and was not visiting [Dorset] regularly because the house had been sold. 153) On 29 June 2025, the father alleges [F8] that the mother told him to communicate with her only through solicitors but, when the father did attempt to do so, the solicitors told him that they were not instructed. The mother says that she had told the father to speak to her solicitor if he wanted to take her to court, but that was not a bar on other forms of communication. 154) On 6 July 2025, the father alleges [F4] that the mother failed to adhere to the contact arrangements the parents had made. He states that there was agreement that he would meet the mother and the children outside Winchester Cathedral in order to spend a decent amount of time with P and Q. When he arrived, the father states that the mother did not turn up, and when he messaged her, she told him that she had been confused about the arrangements. He therefore drove to [Dorset] and was permitted to spend fifteen minutes with the children. 155) On 8 July 2025, the father contacted the local authority. He said that the mother was withholding contact, or restricting the length of contact. Again, the advice was that this would likely need to be resolved through the court process. 156) I have seen emails of 22 July 2025 whereby the father was saying that he intended to collect the boys from school, but the mother told him that they “do not want to go with you end of story.” That said, she did appear to be willing to see if Q and P did want to go and spend time with the father. 157) The father alleges [F6] that the mother unreasonably rejected venues he put forward for contact on 30 (or 31) July 2025, including a wildlife park and science centre, which limited the quality of contact. 158) In an email dated 28 July 2025, the father said to the mother: “I don’t know what the boys are into anymore, what do they like to do, what is fun for them?” There were then exchanges between him and the mother in which the father suggested the wildlife park for meeting, which the mother said that Q and P were not keen on, but the mother suggested an alternative, a National Trust property which is somewhere she said the children loved visiting. The father does not appear to have accepted that, and he said: “Why are you insisting on somewhere completely boring and uninteresting to everyone but you?” When the father arrived at the property, he told the mother not to bother coming because it was “utterly crap.” However, it does appear that contact took place. 159) That then led to communications about meeting another time. On 3 August 2025, the father says he asked to spend a day with Q and P, but the mother’s response was that they should take things slowly. In fact, the father had suggested meeting on two consecutive days, 6 and 7 August 2025, but the mother’s response was to say that she had spoken to Q and P who had said that “two days… is too much.” She then suggested meeting on 10 August 2025, saying: “I will sit in a café and you can take them for 10 mins on their own. Let’s take this slowly please.” 160) When the father suggested his 13-year-old niece attend as well [F3], but on 6 August 2025, the mother’s response was an immediate refusal, saying: “Well I would tell her pretty quick that it is not going to happen.” It appears from subsequent emails that the mother was due to be working on 6 and 7 August 2025. 161) On 7 August 2025, the father contacted the local authority for a third time. He said that the mother had picked a date for mediation which was the day before he was due to have surgery on his knee, and that she was arranging for the maternal grandmother to look after Q and P when she could not, when he could be doing so. It is unclear to me what the father wanted the local authority to do; he appeared to understand the previous advice to seek legal assistance. 162) On 8 August 2025, arrangements were made for the father to meet the mother, Q and P on 10 August 2025 at the beach, and the mother said that they would stay as long as the boys wanted to. 163) On 21 August 2025, the father alleges [F7] that the mother confronted him in public and made false accusations against him. In fact, in my judgment, it is likely that these events took place on 10 August 2025. The context was that the father was to spend the day with Q and P at [the beach]. At the beach, the mother was present and the boys went into the sea with the father. Because he became tired sooner, Q came out of the sea and back onto the beach before P and the father did. 164) The father alleges that the mother then started shouting at him in front of Q and P and other beach users, saying that he had been sacked from his job because he had been drunk, that he had not been allowed to use knives and that he had been told to drive home. The mother, he says, said that the father’s best friend had told her of these things, but when the father spoke to his friend, his friend told him that that was untrue. The father states that the mother packed up the boys’ things and that she and the children then left the beach, and that Q and P had been upset. 165) The mother’s position is that she felt that the meeting was going well until the father came out of the sea and asked Q why he did not want to see him. She says that Q told the father it was because he did not feel safe, and referred to an occasion when they had had to try and find the father when he had discharged himself from hospital. The mother denies shouting at the father, but accepts that a conversation took place in front of the boys about the father having been sacked for being drunk, something which his friend had told her. 166) On 14 August 2025, the father complained to the local authority about the mother’s behaviour at the beach. 167) What is also apparent from the emails is that the father had, on 21 August 2025, emailed the mother to say that “the mediator can’t even reason with you, thank you for absolutely proving my point…” Presumably, that was a reference to the mediation that the father had told the local authority about, and I note that the father’s knee operation was on 22 August 2025. The emails were clearly subsequent to the incident on the beach, which was referred to in them, and it is therefore probable that the beach visit was that on 10 August 2025, as I have said. In any event, there was reference in the emails to the discussion, during mediation, of the possibility of someone other than the mother supervising the father’s contact, and the mother having declined paternal family members as contact supervisors. 168) On 30 August 2025, the father sent the mother messages saying: “You are cruel and you are an absolute bitch and shit fuck… You don’t care about those boys… Well I am coming for you and have time on my hands. Leave X alone you nasty bastard.” X is the father’s older child. 169) On 3 September 2025, the father issued the present application. 170) On 13 and 28 September 2025, the father says that the mother reinforced to him that contact would only take place if the father attended alone, without any member of his family. 171) On 28 September 2025, the father messaged the mother and said: “Who the hell are you to tell me when I can and can’t see the children… How about I pick the boys up from school one day next week and take them out for a couple of hours, the school would be very brave to try and stop me and I dare you to try and get the law involved.” The mother’s response was: “Try it, the boys wouldn’t let you do it, they would make such a fuss I can’t see you forcing 2 children to go with you against their will would look very good…” 172) On 30 September 2025, the father sent the mother messages saying: “You were just a seriously not a [good] decision… you are an awful person and a horrible parent, you’ve weaponised those children… Forcing a man to have vasectomy and promising ‘imagine how much sex we will be having’ you forced me and even came in to make sure I went through with it, you bastard.” 173) The mother states that there was contact on 6 October 2025 and it continued on an ad hoc basis, approximately fortnightly. 174) In October 2025, the mother said that the father sent her 73 messages in three days. She reported the father’s harassment to the police. She told the court that she had not pursued her previous police report because she thought she had been making headway with the father, and denied that her report in October 2025 was a response to the father’s application. In fact, she said she did not see the application until November 2025 (and that appears to be right, looking at the court file), but that the father had told her that he was going to make one. 175) The father maintained that his communications to the mother were borne of her unreasonable behaviour. He said that the police did not pursue a prosecution because they could see that the correspondence was about contact with the children. 176) On 20 October 2025, police bail conditions were imposed on the father not to contact his older daughter, X, or her mother. Those bail conditions were renewed on 14 January 2026. As I understood his evidence, the father said that the mother was behind the allegations made by the mother of his older child. He expressed frustration that the relationship between him and his daughter had broken down. 177) On 5 November 2025, the father says that the mother refused to allow Q and P to attend the paternal great-grandmother’s 100th birthday celebration. 178) On 10 December 2025, the father contacted the local authority and queried whether it had advised that his contact should be supervised. The father made contact with the local authority on two further occasions in December 2025 and January 2026. 179) On 10 December 2025, the father was prescribed antidepressants. 180) The father makes an allegation [F9] that the mother restricted and controlled a contact session on 24 December 2025. He states that the mother rejected the initial venue agreed but then suggested meeting in a coffee shop in Salisbury for a limited period. 181) This was an example given by the mother of a time when she had suggested that the father see the children, and that she had suggested Salisbury due to the planned road closures at the time. She had asked the father where he suggested, if he did not want to meet in Salisbury, but that his response was that he would not attend at all. 182) I have seen text messages between the parties in which there was discussion about the road closures, but the messages are incomplete, and do not include any suggestions from the father as to where to meet in the light of the traffic issues. 183) On 31 December 2025, the father says that the mother refused to allow the children to attend the paternal aunt’s wedding. 184) On 6 January 2026, the mother met the father at an arcade with Q and P. The mother said that she wanted to facilitate a relationship between the father and the children, and she put on a brave face. She said she had done all she could to facilitate contact, and denied that she was trying to frustrate contact whilst giving the appearance of reasonableness. 185) The father has not seen the children since that occasion because, on 12 January 2026, police bail conditions were imposed on the father not to contact the mother directly or indirectly by any means save for child care contact and arrangements to be facilitated via child services, and not to attend anywhere he reasonably believed the mother to be. It is apparent from the local authority disclosure that the father believed the report made by the mother to be another ploy to prevent him from seeing the children at a time when he was progressing a legitimate application. 186) On 14 January 2026, the father reported the mother to the police for an assault pre-separation, for theft of some of his personal effects and parental alienation, including false allegations made by her. He said that he felt very angry and that he had been treated unfairly – he had been arrested the day before and wanted to return the allegations and for the mother to be arrested. The police took the matter no further. 187) I have read the school disclosure that I have not specifically commented upon. That tends to paint a picture of the Q and P continuing to have worries about their relationship with their father, and an alignment with their mother. 188) On 4 February 2026, the court gave permission for the father to file a report from We Are With You. He did not do so, saying at the hearing on 30 March 2026 that he had only had one phone call with We Are With You. I have dealt with this evidence already. The father had not therefore engaged with the structured day programme or one to one work recommended. He says that he now has the issue under control, and he drinks less. 189) After the hearing in February 2026, the father sent a letter to children. He said he missed them, and referred to challenges in changing the way things were. The father was asked why he had not said sorry to Q and P, and his response was that he had already apologised to them in person. Since then, the children have received a birthday card each from the father, plus a card at Easter in which he said he would see them soon. 190) On 10 March 2026, a letter from the mother’s GP set out that she had been prescribed antidepressants between 2016 and October 2025, with a gap of about seven months in 2022. 191) The father did not file a letter from his GP as directed by the court. He did provide medical notes, but those appear to be incomplete. 192) The father denied every allegation made by the mother until they were shown to be incontrovertibly true. The father said he wanted no communication with the mother, and I was curious in those circumstances how he envisaged a co-parenting relationship would work. I remained unclear after hearing his answer. 193) The father confirmed that he has not engaged with services around domestic abuse, despite accepting some of the allegations during the hearing. He said that he does not have a partner currently, and is in a happier place. He did not think that he has any issues with domestic abuse, in that he has moved on. 194) Finally, I am aware of an email sent to the court by the father after the hearing of evidence and submissions, but before delivery of this judgment, on 17 April 2026. The father said this: “I just want to let it be known that despite what [the mother’s] barrister said in court, I have been treated unfairly and family services never visited me. I contacted them and this has been confirmed. So I have been berated in court for this for no reason. “I also require the court’s complaints policy, the way the barrister was allowed to speak to and belittle me needs questioning. Her use of words and her assumptions were derogatory and offensive, in any other work environment they would not be acceptable.” 195) What I found interesting about that was that the mother’s counsel had put the mother’s case to him, in my assessment perfectly properly and professionally, during cross examination. That was her job. He did exactly the same himself in his cross examination of Ms Z and, through the QLR, cross examination of the mother. Analysis and findings 196) I have tried to summarise the evidence more or less chronologically because I think it helps provide context. Standing back and looking at that evidence overall, and re-evaluating some of the provisional views I have already expressed, there are a number of conclusions that I reach. It is necessary for me to articulate my findings in a fairly linear way, but in reality the strands of information which inform my decisions are intertwined and each of the answers that I have come to is informed by the whole context. 197) I think it is helpful to make some general observations before turning to the specific allegations. 198) The first of those is this: in my judgment, the exercise that I have to conduct is one whereby the court needs not only to consider whether allegations are proved as a matter of fact, but then also go on to consider whether, if those facts are established, they are capable of amounting to abuse. 199) In my judgment, not all behaviour which can be perceived, for example, as controlling is capable of amounting to domestic abuse. People deploy, in everyday life, a range of skills to try and persuade other people to say or do things that they want them to do. The definitions in Practice Direction 12J, to which I have already referred, leave room for the court to conclude that not all controlling behaviour amounts to domestic abuse, and the court in Re H-N, to which I have referred, made it plain, too, that not all patterns of controlling behaviour will be abusive. 200) Similarly, not every argument is abusive, not every name that one party calls the other, or a child, is likely to lead the court to the inexorable conclusion that one party is a perpetrator of abuse and that the other is a victim. These, it seems to me, are questions of nature and degree, and in my judgment the fact that people behave badly when life throws at them a curve ball, or when their relationship is on the rocks, or when they separate, can often be put down to people behaving badly at times of stress rather than abuse. Re L, a case I have already referred to, I think exemplifies that. 201) There is a second general conclusion which I need to express before I address the individual allegations, which is in relation to the evidence of the children. Each party relies, when it supports their case, on things that the children have said, but the father in particular seeks to distance himself from them when the things recorded as having been expressed by the children suits him less. Neither P nor Q has been formally ABE interviewed as far as I am aware. The sources of evidence of what the children have said include records created by social workers and the school, for example. 202) Both parties were legally represented prior to this hearing, including at the hearing on 4 February 2026 when the court determined that a fact finding hearing was necessary and proportionate. It was only after that that the father ceased to have legal representation and the order reflects that a QLR was appointed to assist him because the court was told that he would be unrepresented at this hearing before the order was drawn. Prior to that, the possibility of a fact finding hearing was firmly in the contemplation of the parties. 203) I have found no reference to either party seeking that either Q or P give evidence at the fact finding hearing, or to any part of the process that would be engaged per Re W (Children) (Abuse: Oral Evidence) [2010] 1 FLR 1485. There is no reference either to either party seeking that any police officer or social worker or member of school staff attend the fact finding hearing to give live evidence (as opposed to the author of the child impact report being requested to attend the welfare hearing). The father was asked why he did not call one of the staff members at the school to give evidence, and his response was that he was only given permission for one third party witness, but that direction could have been revisited were an application to have been made. 204) For those reasons, I have necessarily worked on the basis that neither party took issue with the way in which the children were questioned by professionals. That is important when considering the careful directions I have given myself about the evidence of children and the ABE Guidance. 205) Thirdly, some of the mother’s allegations tend to point towards coercive or controlling behaviour of the father. I am not satisfied that the father was successful in perpetrating behaviour which was controlling of the mother, but I am satisfied that, at times, he intended to perpetrate coercive or controlling behaviour. 206) In fact, the mother has come across as a resilient woman. If there was an imbalance in the way in which the parents communicated, it was that the father’s attempts at threats, humiliation or intimidation were met with incredibly level headed responses by the mother. 207) However, I am not satisfied on balance, for example, that the mother was isolated from her friends [M7]. The mother took herself and the children to the home of the maternal grandparents when things got too much, and there was nothing really to suggest that her other relationships were impacted by the father’s behaviour. 208) The allegation of sexual abuse [M14] is not proven either. The mother’s case, at its highest, was that she gave reluctant consent to sexual intercourse, but that was still consent. Had she not consented, my assessment of her was that she would have known that that was wrong and would have been likely to have told someone at the time. After all, she had made a report to her GP, for example, about the father’s drinking in 2021. There was no medical evidence about her allegation of sexual abuse, and no contemporaneous report. The father agreed that he had a desire to have a more regular sexual relationship, but he says that the context was in relation to promises made to him by the mother prior to his vasectomy. 209) However, I am satisfied that the father was verbally and emotionally abusive of the mother, which must have been wearing as well as extremely upsetting. It likely did impact her self esteem, as she said. It was also likely to have impacted the children, who on occasions, were present. I can take allegations [M1, M4, M8, M9, M10 and M13] as a cluster. The covert recordings prove these allegations without more, although I have carefully set out other evidence to try and capture the all consuming extent of the father’s abuse at the time. I doubt that the father really intended to burn the house down, but in my judgment the father was not able to manage the circumstances of the breakdown of the parties’ relationship and he behaved in a way which was designed to upset the mother. I doubt that he intended Q and P to be impacted, but his behaviour failed to consider that they were likely to be caught in the middle of his abuse towards the mother. 210) In reaching this conclusion, I have considered the first general conclusion that I set out above in the context of Re L. However, I am satisfied that the father’s behaviour was abusive, and not just bad behaviour. Furthermore, it was not, as the father contends, merely situational to the period when the parties originally separated, for a number of reasons. 211) Those reasons include that 2023 was not the first time this had happened, and nor was it the last. The parties had separated in 2021 for similar reasons. However, in my judgment, the father’s abuse has continued since 2023. I have referred to the harassing messages in February 2024, for example. The father called the mother’s uncle a “prick” and the like, but it is the relentlessness of the messages which, in my assessment, was the greater issue. Even in the context of what ought to have been courteous communications about contact arrangements, the father was calling the mother all sorts of names, or levelling blame at her, right the way through 2025. 212) The other issue concerns the father’s alcohol use. The father himself accepted that he used alcohol as an unhealthy coping mechanism, but stopped short of admitting that it in any way contributed to any problems, except on 6 August 2023, which he had to admit was a problem because it had resulted in a criminal conviction. However, in my judgment there is so much evidence about the father’s alcohol consumption, for example the mother’s report to her GP in 2021, and what was recorded by the school and children’s social care in 2023, that on balance allegation [M2] is proven. The circumstances of what the father accepts happened on 6 August 2023 is so strikingly similar and proximate to what the children said at school that I also find allegation [M5] proven. 213) It is perhaps one of the more poignant parts of the evidence that, even in June 2023, the mother was still saying that, behind the alcohol consumption, there was still the man she married. However, in my judgment, things got worse after that. The concern which that raises is that, even if the father is right that his alcohol consumption is now much less, which would be to his credit, he did not engage with support services at the time. The father considers himself to be in a better frame of mind at the moment. The concern I have is that life will be likely throw new challenges at the father at some point, and I am less than confident that the father has developed healthier ways of coping with stressors than was the case in 2021 or 2023. 214) I should also say that, if the father is right that his alcohol consumption is now under control, the father’s ongoing angry responses to any challenge of his actions give rise to a separate concern. Even if he does think that he is right and everyone else is wrong, I wonder whether he may benefit from anger management work. 215) The mother’s allegation [M11] that the father threw her telephone into the fish tank is proven. It is an unlikely thing to have made up, let alone (as the father suggests) coached the children to have said. What would that have really achieved, given everything else that was going on at the time? When Q recounted that incident at school, and P gave an account of different things happening at the time, it is more likely than not in my judgment that they were telling the truth. 216) Given all of the circumstances at the time, on balance I also prefer the mother’s evidence about allegation [M3]. I do not see why it was an answer to the allegation that the mother did not take photographs at the time. She was not case case building; she was simply trying to navigate the difficult situation in which the father had put her. 217) As a matter of fact, in my judgment the allegation [M12] that the father physically caused the bruising to the mother on 12 July 2023 is also likely to be true. The mother herself said that the father had not been physically abusive towards her just that morning, and so this appears to have been something of a one off incident later that day. I do not know why the mother would have taken photographs of an injury sustained at work, as the father suggested the bruises were. However, on balance, given the other findings I have made during this timeframe, it is likely that the injuries were sustained as the mother said they were. That said, the mother did not assert that the father had set out to physically abuse her when she made her allegations to the local authority in its contemporaneous assessment, and in fact she appears to have said that she was injured in the context of her intervening when he was drunk, and that is then consistent with the mother not having left the family home for another ten days. 218) I accept the submission of the father that a person who makes a covert recording is more likely to be portrayed, during that recording, in a much better light than the person being recorded. However, in my judgment, this is but one example of many of the father missing the point. 219) The father says that his behaviour was a reaction to the mother’s abuse of him. He did not seek findings of that sort at this hearing, and perhaps the mother was not totally blameless for the way in which the parties’ relationship broke down. However, in my judgment the greater issue is that the father has generally sought to deflect the blame onto the mother, without showing any accountability for his own behaviour. It is a concern that the father has refused to admit any allegation until it was proven to be true, even though he must have known how he had behaved, even if he had been consuming alcohol. Even if he felt that the mother had been behaving badly towards him, he did not hold back in his correspondence with her when calling her “fucking delusional,” or an “absolute bitch,” or when blaming her for the children’s medical conditions. 220) If it were not self-evident, paragraph 4 of Practice Direction 12J sets out that: “Domestic abuse is harmful to children, and/or puts children at risk of harm, including where they are victims of domestic abuse for example by witnessing one of their parents being violent or abusive to the other parent, or living in a home in which domestic abuse is perpetrated (even if the child is too young to be conscious of the behaviour). Children may suffer direct physical, psychological and/or emotional harm from living with and being victims of domestic abuse, and may also suffer harm indirectly where the domestic abuse impairs the parenting capacity of either or both of their parents.” 221) In paragraph 31, the court in Re H-N went on to say also that: “It follows that the harm to a child in an abusive household is not limited to cases of actual violence to the child or to the parent. A pattern of abusive behaviour is as relevant to the child as to the adult victim. The child can be harmed in any one or a combination of ways for example where the abusive behaviour: i) Is directed against, or witnessed by, the child; ii) Causes the victim of the abuse to be so frightened of provoking an outburst or reaction from the perpetrator that she/he is unable to give priority to the needs of her/his child; iii) Creates an atmosphere of fear and anxiety in the home which is inimical to the welfare of the child; iv) Risks inculcating, particularly in boys, a set of values which involve treating women as being inferior to men.” 222) This court is often told by professionals about the effects of parental acrimony on children, and the child and family assessment and child impact report are no exception. Children caught in the centre of their parents’ conflict will often feel conflicted themselves and that may manifest itself in a number of ways and perhaps not immediately. For example, a child may give mixed messages, telling one parent one thing and then the other something else, in order to appease them. One only has to step back for a moment to appreciate that that could, in fact, add fuel to the fire between the parents. On other occasions, a child may align with his or her primary caregiver and that might, of course, give the other parent the impression of alienation. 223) In my judgment, the father has minimised the evidence of how the children felt at the time of the parties’ separation. As I have already found, there was no challenge to the way in which the children’s reports were captured, and there was consistency in the way the children were expressing themselves within the context of the findings I have made. In those circumstances, it is highly unlikely that the children were coached in the period to July 2023. 224) That then sets the backdrop for how the local authority, and subsequently the mother and Ms Milton of Cafcass, have said the children are feeling towards the father. In my judgment, it is likely that the worries that Q and P had have persisted because the father has done very little to allay them. 225) On 26 August 2023, the children were put in the centre of their parents’ conflict by the father and paternal grandmother. I accept Ms Z’s evidence about that, which was consistent with other evidence. She was someone with no particular allegiance to the mother. 226) If the mother is right about what happened at contact on 28 January 2024, again the father will have put the children in the middle of the adult dispute. However, even if that is not right, given that the mother was contending with an ongoing barrage of abuse from the father, that would have been likely to have impacted the children at least indirectly because his harassment was a distraction from the job of parenting the children, and his behaviour made it more difficult for her to see him in a positive light. 227) The incident at the beach on 10 August 2025 [F7] was one which involved a factual matrix which was broadly agreed. In that sense, it is proven. The father did not call his friend to give evidence, but it was common ground that the father had lost his job. It is a concern that neither party took steps to shield the children from exposure to the adult conflict on that day. I think it unlikely, in the circumstances, that the mother would have been jealous of the good time that the father was having with the children on the beach as he submitted: why would she otherwise have brought them? More likely is that the mother is right that the father did not engage in a child focused way with the genuine worries which Q continued to express on that day, which meant that the trip was cut short when he or both children became upset. 228) Q and P were aware of the adult conflict, of that I am certain. Even if the father did not intend the suggestion that he would collect the children from school [M6], or the expression that he would have more control when his driving ban ended [M15], as threats, which I doubt given the way in which he expressed those things, the father’s lack of insight into the harm he had already caused to both the mother and the children has meant that his appreciation of the impact on them of the things he said has been sadly lacking. That is despite the children having expressed their worries to the school and, via the mother, to the father. The father’s letters to the children, whilst on one view expressing that he is hoping to see them soon, may not have been received in that way. For the avoidance of doubt, I do find the allegations proven. 229) Because of the way the father expresses his allegations, I can take them together as a cluster, in that each of them is really a different facet of steps which he says the mother took to erode the frequency and length of contact between him and the children. 230) There is some truth in the allegations that the father makes, as a matter of fact. I do not need to rehearse the correspondence which I have already set out, which speaks for itself. However, in my judgment, there is a difference between things being shown to be true and the finding of abuse, namely of alienating behaviour, that the father seeks. There are three main reasons for that. 231) Firstly, some of the child arrangements were not all that clear and there was room for misunderstanding. 232) Secondly, we know that the local authority’s advice was that the father’s contact needed to be supervised until he had resolved his issues. That then naturally put restraints on the contact sessions. 233) The father asserts that the local authority has been somehow biased towards the mother and that he was never told that the advice it gave was that the father’s contact needed to be supervised. For the reasons which I have already explored in some detail, I think that unlikely to be true. If he was not told about the outcome of the child and family assessment in 2023, however, I am extremely unclear why he did not ask the local authority for the outcome of the assessment sooner. The father’s email of 17 April 2026 changes none of those conclusions. 234) I have not completely understood why the mother decided to supervise the father’s contact with Q and P herself. That has put her in a position whereby she has then had to repeatedly deal with the father’s ongoing abusive behaviour herself although, as I have said, she has managed that in an apparently resilient way. That meant that the father continued to have a direct relationship with Q and P until January this year. That fact, in itself, tends to undermine the father’s allegations which, taken together, are allegations that the mother has been alienating the children from him. 235) The third reason is that the father’s abuse of the mother has persisted. The father does not accept that there is anything wrong with his behaviour, or that he needs to undertake work around domestic abuse. I have expressed a concern that the father does not appear to have taken steps to find alternative strategies to manage stress or anxiety which has previously caused him to resort to alcohol use. The father did not even admit allegations which he knew were captured on video or in correspondence, and put the mother to proof of those allegations, which in my judgment tends to suggest that he has used this litigation to perpetuate his abuse of her. Even his email of 17 April 2026 tends to suggest that he thinks that there is one rule for him, and another one for everyone else. What follows from that is that the father has, on balance, not resolved the issues which the local authority thought gave rise to the need for supervision, even approaching three years on. 236) In those circumstances, who can blame the mother for being cautious about exposing Q and P to further risks of emotional harm? And in those circumstances, in my judgment I can by no means be satisfied that the three elements needed to establish alienating behaviours by the mother are proven, in particular the second of the elements that I described. It is likely, in my judgment, that a significant part of the reason why Q and P do not wish to see the father is as a result of his abusive behaviour. 237) That concludes this judgment.


Open Justice Licence v2.0 (The National Archives). Republication avec attribution. Computational analysis necessite accord complementaire.

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