R v Anthony Mark Brown

WARNING: reporting restrictions may apply to the contents transcribed in this document, particularly if the case concerned a sexual offence or involved a child. Reporting restrictions prohibit the publication of the applicable information to the public or any section of the public, in writing, in a broadcast or by means of the internet, including social media. Anyone who receives a copy of this transcript is responsible in law for making sure that applicable restrictions are not breached. A person who breaches a reporting restriction is liable to a fine and/or imprisonment. For guidance on whether reporting restrictions apply, and to what information, ask at the court office or take legal advice. This Transcript is Crown Copyright.  It may not be reproduced in whole or in part other than in accordance with relevant licence or with the express consent of the Authority.  All rights are reserved. Neutral Citation No: [2026] EWCA Crim 596 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL CRIMINAL DIVISION ON APPEAL FROM THE CROWN COURT AT MANCHESTER (HHJ MARK SAVILL) [06FF0379024] CASE NO 202501847/A1 Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2A 2LL Wednesday 29 April 2026 Before: LORD JUSTICE JEREMY BAKER MR JUSTICE MARTIN SPENCER RECORDER OF KENSINGTON AND CHELSEA (HIS HONOUR JUDGE EDMUNDS KC) (Sitting as a Judge of the CACD) REX V ANTHONY MARK BROWN __________ Computer Aided Transcript of Epiq Europe Ltd, Lower Ground, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JE Tel No: 020 7404 1400; Email: [email protected] (Official Shorthand Writers to the Court) _________ MR M JOHNSON appeared on behalf of the Appellant. _________ JUDGMENT (Approved) MR JUSTICE MARTIN SPENCER:

1. On 29 October 2024 in the Crown Court at Manchester Minshull Street, before HHJ Mark Savill, the appellant pleaded guilty on the first day of his trial to the following offences, for which on 29 January 2025 he received the following sentences: • Having an article with a blade or point, contrary to section 139(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, 21 months' imprisonment. • Driving whilst disqualified, contrary to section 103(1)(b) of the Road Traffic Act 1988, 2 months' imprisonment, licence endorsed and disqualified from driving for 57 months. • Unlawful wounding, contrary to section 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, an extended sentence of 5 years, comprising a custodial term of 4 years and an extended period of licence of 1 year. The offences were ordered to be served concurrently.

2. The appellant, or applicant, renews his application for leave to appeal against the extended sentence of 5 years. Whilst the Single Judge refused leave to appeal against the sentence, he granted leave to appeal against the driving disqualification of 57 months imposed by the judge. Thus he is an appellant although only an applicant in relation to the application for permission to appeal against sentence.

3. The circumstances leading to these offences and the making of these orders were as follows. On 9 May 2024 the complainant, Matthew Goodman, had been in a public house in Salford and left at around 11.15 pm to go home. Mr Goodman was driving a white Citroen van and it only took him a couple of minutes to drive home: he parked his van outside his home. As he opened the door of his van to get out, two males (this appellant and Dylan Jones) approached him on a motorbike while he was still sitting in the driver's seat. The motorbike was ridden right up to the open doorway of the car. The appellant was driving and Jones was the pillion passenger. Jones pulled out a machete and started hitting Matthew Goodman with it. Mr Goodman did not see what the weapon was at the time but he knew it was sharp. He was struck multiple times with the weapon and felt sharp stabbing pains resulting in numerous wounds.

4. Mr Goodman's father came out of the house and shouted at the appellant and Jones, who then got back onto their motorbike and drove off. The incident was captured on CCTV. The motorbike that the appellant and Jones were on then crashed a short distance away and police officers attended and found the appellant at the scene. He had a head injury and told police officers that he had forgotten that the back brake did not work and that he should not have been driving because he was a disqualified driver. He was arrested at the scene.

5. Police officers found the machete in a nearby garden, along with the keys to the motorbike. A subsequent testing of blood found on the machete provided a DNA match for the complainant Matthew Goodman. A balaclava and gloves found by the police provided a DNA match to Jones, who was later arrested, and a search revealed another machete in his bedroom. The appellant was later interviewed by the police and replied "no comment" to questions asked. Mr Jones provided a prepared statement denying all involvement in the index offences.

6. Matthew Goodman's injuries have been outlined in a statement of Dr Butler. They included an incision wound to the anterior chest wall, an incision wound over the right scapula (shoulder blade) and an incision wound over the anterior (front) of the right thigh. There was also an incision wound of the right upper arm which went through the deep tissue with suspected injuries to the muscles and nerves.

7. The appellant, who was born on 19 July 1988 and was aged 36, had 11 previous convictions for 26 offences spanning from 14 March 2006 to 30 January 2018. Those included a conviction for robbery and possession of a bladed article in 2017, for which he received an extended sentence of 9 years' imprisonment, comprising a 6-year custodial term and a 3-year licence extension after he had been found to be dangerous. At the time of these offences the appellant was on licence having very recently been released from prison.

8. Sentencing the appellant the learned judge observed that Matthew Goodman was deliberately targeted for this offence, although the reasons for that were not revealed and still remain obscure. He referred to the history of the proceedings whereby the appellant and his co-defendant were originally charged with an offence of attempted robbery and section 18 wounding.

9. The co-defendant, Jones, denied presence and involvement altogether, whilst the appellant, although admitting presence, denied involvement. Until the case came before Judge Savill on 29 October, there had been no offers from either defendant. On that day, what the judge referred to as "pragmatic resolution" of the case was reached, whereby the offence of wounding under section 20 of the Offences Against The Person Act 1861 was added to the indictment and a plea of guilty to that offence was accepted, with a not guilty verdict being entered in respect of the offences of attempted robbery and section 18 wounding.

10. In sentencing, the learned judge took the offence of wounding as the lead offence, with the sentence for that offence intended to reflect the totality of the offending, with concurrent sentences being imposed for the other counts. For the purposes of the Sentencing Guideline he categorised the offence as category A for culpability, there being a significant degree of planning or premeditation and for the use of a highly dangerous weapon. In relation to harm, he took the view that the case fell at the top of category 3 given the physical and psychological impact upon the victim. He considered that had the matter been contested through trial, the starting point would have been 3 years. Then, taking into account the aggravating features and in particular the appellant's record and the fact that he was on licence at the time of the offence, together with the contents of the pre-sentence report which he described as making "depressing reading", he considered the appellant to represent a high risk of serious reoffending and to present a high degree of risk of significant harm to the public and therefore to be dangerous for the purposes of section 279 of the Sentencing Act 2020. He raised the starting point from 36 months to 54 months, to which he applied a discount of 10 per cent as credit for plea, thereby reaching a sentence of 48 months' imprisonment (4 years). He considered and stated this to be a just and proportionate sentence, given the seriousness of the offending. Given the finding of dangerousness he applied an extended licence period of 12 months, thus taking the sentence to 5 years (the maximum for this offence).

11. In relation to the offence of driving whilst disqualified the learned judge said this: "I have to consider the issue of disqualification and at my discretion I disqualify you Brown, from driving for a period of 12 months. Given the extended sentence (determinate sentence) that I have imposed, the extension period, being two-thirds, will be one of 45 months making a total disqualification period of 57 months."

12. Grounds of appeal were submitted on behalf of the appellant by Mr Michael Johnson, in which it was contended that the sentence imposed by the judge was manifestly excessive on four grounds: i) Firstly, that the learned judge erred in finding that the case fell between low and medium harm for the purposes of the Sentencing Guideline. Harm should have been assessed as category 3 given a lower starting point. ii) Secondly, the learned judge attached too much weight to the aggravating features which led him to increase the starting point by too much before applying the discount for credit. iii) Thirdly, the learned judge erred in attaching no or insufficient weight to the mitigating features. iv) Finally, insufficient credit was given for the plea of guilty given that the appellant could not have pleaded guilty to the principal offence any sooner than he did as it had not previously been on the indictment.

13. Mr Johnson has renewed these grounds before us today, and we are very grateful to him both for his appearance and for his eloquent submissions. He referred to the fact that the judge took the starting point at the very top of category 3 effectively as if it were trespassing into category 2 for harm. He points out that category 2 encompasses grave or permanent injuries and although the most serious injury was to Mr Goodman's arm, this was not disfiguring and his physical abilities have not been impaired. He thus submits that the judge was not warranted in raising the starting point to the top of category

3. Secondly, he refers to the aggravating features and accepts that they are seriously aggravating, particularly the previous convictions, but he points out that although there are previous convictions for robbery, there is no previous actual violence or force used on any victim: the robberies comprised the threat of force rather than the use of actual force. He accepts that the aggravating features warranted a significant upward adjustment but submits that the extent of the adjustment by the learned judge in this case (50 per cent) was excessive. He also repeats his submissions that there were some mitigating features which, as he put it, should have led to some modest downwards travel.

14. Finally, he refers to the credit given by the learned judge which he submits should have been greater and he points to the significant effect this would have on the sentence and in particular, it would mean that no finding of dangerousness could be made. He points out that the prosecution at trial were in difficulty caused by the non-attendance of the victim. He submits that many other defendants would have kept going but the plea ended that process giving the victim some closure and comfort and absolving the CPS from what would have been a difficult decision in the circumstances. He submits that this should be reflected in some additional credit and any deviation from 10 per cent, again, would have a significant effect on the sentence and the finding of dangerousness.

15. Despite Mr Johnston's submissions, we are unpersuaded that the sentence was manifestly excessive. We can do no better than adopt the views and reasoning of the Single Judge who said this: "Taking into account the psychological harm to the victim and the permanent scarring including the scarring from one wound which went through the deep tissues, the Judge was entitled to conclude (as he did) that this offending fell at the top end of Category 3 harm as well as Category A culpability (which you do not challenge), which has a range of up to 3 years. Hence, the starting point of 3 years. In terms of personal factors, the Judge was bound to take into account, as severely aggravating, (a) the fact that these offences were committed whilst you were on licence having been very recently released from prison, and (b) your previous convictions which include a robbery and possession of a bladed article in 2017 for which you received an extended sentence of 9 years (6 year custodial term and 3 year licence extension), having been found “dangerous”. Your pre-sentence report made unhappy reading and concluded that you posed a high risk of significant harm to the public. You say that the Judge failed to take into account that you had completed one course, which demonstrated some resolve to take your life on a different track; but that pales into insignificance compared with the aggravating factors. There is no basis for asserting the Judge did not take it into account: he did not arguably err in not specifically referring to it in his sentencing remarks. 10% discount for your plea was not arguably wrong. You pleaded guilty on the first day of your trial, having until that moment refused to accept any involvement in the offending. In the circumstances, the fact that you pleaded guilty to (amongst other things) an offence which was only included on the indictment that day, does not undermine the appropriateness of that discount."

16. We agree with all those reasons set out by the Single Judge and we consider that it gives a complete answer to the submissions made on the appellant's behalf by Mr Johnson, such that the application for leave to appeal against sentence is refused.

17. We turn to the disqualification and the learned judge does appear to have made a miscalculation. He intended to impose a further disqualification of 12 months to start upon the appellant's release from custody. Given the custodial term of 48 months, and the fact that the appellant would serve two-thirds of that term before release (32 months), the total disqualification should have been 32 plus 12, that is 44 months rather than 57 months.

18. We accordingly allow the appeal to this limited extent: we quash the disqualification of 57 months and apply in its place a disqualification of 44 months. Epiq Europe Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof. Lower Ground Floor, 46 Chancery Lane, London, WC2A 1JE Tel No: 020 7404 1400 Email: [email protected]