Supreme Court of Mauritius, 11 février 2020, 2020 PL2 29 – Pce v Panchoo

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Pce v Panchoo

2020 PL2 29

POLICE v PANCHOO Pravesh Sona CN: 3359/19

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF PORT LOUIS (2nd Division)

In the matter of:

POLICE V PANCHOO Pravesh Sona JUDGMENT Accused stands charged with the offences of Threatening verbally, in breach of sections 224 and 226 of the Criminal Code and Assault in breach of Sections 228 & 230(1) of the Criminal Code. Accused pleaded not guilty to the charges and was not represented at trial stage.

Prosecution called PS Sumputh, who read and produced defence statement of the accused, marked as Doc A. Prosecution then called witness no.3, Mrs Marie Priska Isabell Tismar, who related that on 06/04/16 at 10.30 a.m, whilst at home at Ste Croix, the accused threated to throw acid on her if she does not give him money. She related that she felt scared and that additionally, he assaulted her on the leg. The case was then closed for the Prosecution. The accused was informed of his Constitutional rights in creole and elected to make a statement from the dock.

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The case was then closed for the Defence. The Court has given due consideration to the evidence on record. Sections 224 and 226 of the Criminal Code read as follows: “224 – Demanding by written threat of violence Any person, who by any writing, whether anonymous or signed, threatens any individual with murder, poisoning or any other attempt against the person of such individual punishable to penal servitude, shall be punished by penal servitude, where the threat is accompanied by an order to deposit a sum of money in a certain place, or to fulfill any other condition.

226 – Threatening verbally Where the threat, so accompanied by an order or condition, has been made verbally, the offender shall be punished by imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years.”

In the case of Mudhoo H V The State (2012 SCJ 411) , the Supreme Court enlightened us on what constitutes threat and its constitutive elements:

“It follows from the above that: (1) in the case of a written threat, there would be an offence under section 224 where the written threat is accompanied by an ‘order’ or ‘condition’; (2) there would still be an offence under section 225 even where a written threat is not accompanied by any ‘order’ or ‘condition’; (3) but there would be no offence in the case of a verbal threat unless it is accompanied by an order or condition as described in section 224.

In fact, ‘menace’ would only constitute an offence under section 226, in case of a verbal threat,where the threat is accompanied by such an ‘order’ or ‘condition’ as is specified in section 224 (…)

An offence would only lie in respect of a verbal threat under section 226 where the following constitutive elements have been established. These are explicitly set out in Garçon, Code Pénal Livre III Art. 305 à 308, following an analysis of the corresponding provisions which create the offence of ‘menace’ in French law: “E. Caractère de la menace. – 36. … … …

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C’est au juge qu’il appartient de déterminer leur caractère et de décider: 10 Si l’écrit ou le propos incriminé est de nature menaçante; 20 si cette menace a pour objet un attentat contre les personnes puni de peines perpétuelles, ou des violences ou voies de fait; 30 enfin, si elle est sous ordre ou sous condition. ”

We need first to observe that it is not any type of a verbal threat which would give rise to an offence under section 226. The threat must not only be “de nature menaçante” but there would be an offence only where a person is threatened with ‘murder, poisoning or any other attempt against the person’ which is punishable by death or penal servitude. This element has been clearly established in the present case since the appellant threatened to kill the complainant.

But that is not enough. It must also be established that the verbal threat is accompanied by an order or condition, as is explicitly set out in the following extract from Encyclopédie Dalloz – Pénal Vo Menaces: “28. b) Ordre de remplir une condition. Le régime général des menaces d’atteintes graves aux personnes exige, pour que la menace soit punissable, qu’elle ait été faite « avec ordre de remplir une condition » … … … l’auteur de la menace signifie à la personne menacée que l’infraction sera exécutée si la condition n’est pas remplie. ”

The condition that is impressed on the person who is threatened needs not, however, be linked to the carrying out of a positive obligation. It may also consist of an obligation to abstain or to refrain from doing something, like in the present case where the complainant was being intimidated and coerced into refraining from hitting back at the appellant’s dog. “La condition peut aussi consister en une obligation de ne pas faire ou de s’abstenir” [Encyclopédie Dalloz (Supra) – at Note 29].

This is also made explicit in Garraud Droit Pénal Spécial (Deuxième Edition) Tome Quatrième V0 Menaces at para. 1686: “D’ailleurs la menace sous condition comprend, dans la généralité de ses termes, la menace sous condition de ne pas faire, de s’abstenir, aussi bien que celle de faire. Il n’existe, en effet, aucune raison de distinguer entre ces deux formes de menaces. ” (…) However, although the threat must be accompanied by an order to comply with a condition, such a condition must not be merely of a hypothetical nature. The threat which consists of an order to comply

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with a condition must not only be of an intimidating nature but must be of a nature which exercises a “contrainte morale” on the conduct of the threatened person.

This is clearly made out in the following excerpts from Encyclopédie Dalloz (Supra):

“28. … … … Le coupable porte atteinte à la liberté d’agir de la victimeparcequ’il l’intimide et la contraint à un certain comportement. 29. … … … Mais l’ordre de remplir une condition doit être une véritableinjonction contraignante et pas uniquement une injonction intimidante, l’ordre ne devant pas être abandonné à une condition dont le caractère par trop éventuel lui enlève tout aspect contraignant.”

This is also expressed in Dalloz Répertoire de Droit Pénal Tome VI Vo Menaces at Note 81: “81. Condition hypothétique – Enfin, l’ordre de remplir une condition doit être une véritable injonction contraignante et pas uniquement une injonction intimidante;(underlining is my own) en cas de condition hypothétique, on doit considérer que la menace n’existe pas.”

It has therefore to be determined on the facts whether the verbal threat made by the appellant was accompanied by an order to fulfill a condition of such a nature as is explicitly set out in Dalloz, Répertoire de Droit Pénal (Supra) at Note 69:

“69. Pouvoir d’interprétation judiciaire – Il appartient au juge de déterminer …… … s’il y a ou non condition, celle-ci étant une injonction faite à autrui qui se trouve contraint de s’y soumettre s’il veut éviter d’être victime des faits qui lui sont promis dans la menace. Le coupable porte ainsi atteinte à la liberté d’agir de la victime parce qu’il l’intimide et la contraint à un certain comportement.” »

The complainant explained clearly how the accused threatened her and how she felt. She also explained how he assaulted her. The Court finds no reason not to give credit to her version, given she came across as credible. The accused tendered his apologies from the dock. The Court takes the view the Prosecution has proven its case beyond reasonable doubt under count I and count II. Court finds accused guilty as charged under count I and count II.

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Mrs Manjula Kumari Boojharut (District Magistrate) Delivered on 11 February 2020