Supreme Court of Mauritius, 17 avril 2026, 2026 FLQ 64 – Police v S Ramana

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Police v S Ramana

2026 FLQ 64

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF FLACQ

Cause No: 3316/2025

In the matter of: POLICE

V SOORAYNARAIN RAMANA

JUDGMENT

THE CHARGE

1. The accused has been charged with the offence of insult in breach of section 296(a) of the Criminal Code. He pleaded not guilty and was not represented by counsel.

THE PROSECUTION’S CASE

2. Witness no.1, PC 9976 Bhoobunboy, identified, read and produced a defence statement which he recorded from the accused on 28.10.2023, wherein the latter denied the allegations against him.

3. Witness no.2, Mrs. Minachee Mootoosamy, explained under solemn affirmation, inter alia, that on 06.10.2023 at 11 48 hours, she was outside her house in La Lucie Roy when the accused, her neighbour, got into her yard and cut her flowers. Upon querying the latter, the accused swore at her by uttering “pitin vender liki”. She felt ashamed.

4. The accused duly cross-examined witness no.2 and the prosecution closed its case.

THE CASE FOR THE DEFENCE

5. The accused deponed under solemn affirmation and denied the charge against him. His version is that witness no.2 always level false charges against him and that he never swore at her. He added the he had stopped going to the place of witness no.2 since many years. He maintained his version during cross-examination.

THE LAW

6. Section 296 (a) of the Criminal Code provides that:

“Any injurious expression or any term of contempt or invective, or other abusive language, not carrying with it the imputation of a fact, is an insult (‘injure’) and

any person who is guilty of the offence shall be liable to the following penalties –.

where the offence is committed by means of words, exclamations or threats not made use of in public, a fine not exceeding 50,000 rupees”

7. The constitutive elements of the offence of insult are that there must be an injurious expression; or a term of contempt; or invective; or abusive language addressed to some person or corporation by means of words, exclamations or threats.

8. The words used must not carry with them the imputation of a fact (Bundhoo v The State ( 2001) SCJ 60).

9. It was held in Coonjan v. The Queen (1978) MR 137 that “an ordinary sensible man knows an insult when he sees or hears it.”

10. The requisite mens rea is a malicious intent which is however presumed in expressions which are injurious or offensive per se «jusqu’à ce que l’auteur du propos eût prouvé qu’il ne voulait pas injurier la personne à laquelle il l’a adressée» ( Morel v. Couve 1912 MR 78).

ANALYSIS

11. I have duly considered all the evidence on record.

12. With respect to cases of insult, our jurisprudence has established that prosecution witnesses do not need to repeat verbatim the words averred in the information especially when taking into account the time lapse between the commission of the alleged offence and the time that a witness depones in court. The court needs to be satisfied that the words mentioned by the witness in court are essentially to the same effect and convey the same idea and expression of abuse as the words set out in the information (Rumjon M. R. V The State 2016 SCJ 315).

13. In the information in the present matter, it has been averred that the accused allegedly used invective words to the address of witness no.2- to wit: “ta pitin doneur liki ki to problem”.

In court, the witness explained that the accused told her “pitin vender liki”.

14. There is a variance between what has been averred in the information and the testimony of witness no.2. The question is whether the variance in the present case is ‘slight’ or ‘substantial’. In comparing what has been averred in the information and what witness no.2 stated in court, I find that the variance is not substantial. This is because the invective expressions “pitin” and “liki” as averred in the information tally with the version of witness no.2 in court. I find that these expressions did not carry with them the imputation of a fact. Having seen and heard witness no.2 depone before me, I find her version credible.

15. On the other hand, the accused has denied the charge throughout his defence statement and in court under solemn affirmation. He confidently withstood the test of cross-examination. Having watched his demeanour in court, the accused as well struck me as a clear, straightforward and truthful witness.

16. Therefore, in this matter, the sworn evidence of witness no.2 and the accused rebut each other. I find the present matter to be a fit and proper case to apply the principle of the presumption of innocence as laid out in Goburdhun v The Queen 1956 MR 503, where it was held that:

“When, therefore, the sum total of the evidence in the case is taken into account, there was, in effect, the word of the victim as against the denial of the appellant. It is in such a case, particularly, that the principle of the presumption of innocence comes into operation. The application of that principle in every criminal case is the foundation of the right of the accused person to insist that the prosecution should discharge the onus that rests upon it to prove that he is guilty.”

CONCLUSION

17. In the given circumstances, the court is therefore satisfied that the benefit of the doubt should be given to the accused and accordingly dismisses the charge against him.

Y. Ramsohok Senior District Magistrate Date: 17.04.2026