Supreme Court of Mauritius, 2 avril 2026, 2026 SAV 57 – R BRU v POLICE

Page 1 R BRU v POLICE

2026 SAV 57

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAVANNE

Provisional Cause No.: 192/26

Roy Bru Applicant v/s

Police Respondent

Ruling

The applicant stands provisionally charged with the offence of « Drug dealing: Possession of cannabis for purpose of selling » in breach of Sections 30(1)(f)(i) and 47(5)(a) of the Dangerous Drugs Act. As per the provisional information dated 10th March 2026, the applicant stands provisionally charged with having on or about the 6th March 2026, unlawfully and knowingly possessed dangerous drug for the purpose of selling, to wit: a tied translucent plastic bag containing a significant quantity of leaf matter suspected to be cannabis, weighing 104 grams.

The applicant has, through his Counsel, moved to be admitted to bail and was represented by Me Veeriah of Counsel.

The Enquiring Officer, PS Gojadhur, was deputed to resist the present bail application and he deponed under oath.

Case for the Respondent

Facts and Circumstances:

The Enquiring Officer deponed as to the facts and circumstances of the case stating that on the 6th March 2026, following certain information in respect of a drug

Page 2 transaction, the police kept surveillance at Chateau Benares. According to the Enquiring Officer, the applicant repaired to the locus on an electric bike and while the police was trying to intercept him, he struggled and bolted away. The Enquiring Officer further stated that during the incident, the applicant dropped a tied translucent plastic containing suspected cannabis. On the spot, the police also secured a mobile phone, an electronic scale and the applicant’s electric bike. The applicant finally surrendered himself to the police on the 9th March 2026. He has a fixed place of abode.

According to the Enquiring Officer, the total value of the suspected drugs is Rs 156,000.

Grounds:

The Enquiring Officer put forward the three grounds upon which the respondent is resisting the present application for bail, namely: (i) Risk of reoffending (ii) Risk of absconding (iii) Risk of interfering with witnesses

Elaborating on the risk of reoffending, the Enquiring Officer stated that given that the drugs business is a lucrative one yielding quick and easy money, the police strongly believes that if he is released on bail, the applicant will reoffend. He is on bail for a cognate offence (Doc PPU 1) and he has been convicted for possession of cannabis (Doc X1) showing that he has climbed the ladder from possession to drug dealing.

Elaborating on the risk of absconding, the Enquiring Officer stated that the applicant has been provisionally charged with drug dealing and he can face a heavy penalty whenever the main case will be tried. The police therefore strongly believes that the applicant will abscond if he is granted bail. The moreso as he had bolted away upon seeing the police on the material date.

Elaborating on the risk of interfering with witnesses, the Enquiring Officer stated that in his defence statement, the applicant mentioned the names of two persons who were with him on the locus but who are still at large. The police strongly believes that the applicant will interfere with these two persons if he is released on bail.

Status of the enquiry:

Page 3

The Enquiring Officer gave evidence to the effect that the enquiry has not yet been completed.

Nature of the evidence:

It stems out of the Enquiring Officer’s testimony that there is direct evidence against the applicant. The applicant denied the charge.

The Enquiring Officer was duly cross-examined and confirmed that the applicant has strong family ties and is in gainful employment

Case for the Applicant:

The applicant, from the dock, explained his personal circumstances and promised to abide by all bail conditions.

The Law

While Section 3 of the Bail Act provides for a right to release on bail, Section 4(1) of the Bail Act provides for the grounds upon which a Court may refuse to release a defendant or a detainee on bail. Section 4(2) of the Bail Act further provides for the factors to be considered by the Court in deciding whether or not to refuse bail.

In the case of Hurnam Devendranath v The State [2004] PRV 53, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, citing with approval Noordally v Attorney-General [1986] MR 204, enshrined the principle according to which « the rule is that a suspect should remain at large, his detention on grounds of suspicion the exception ».

The Supreme Court, in the case of Labonne J V v Director Of Public Prosecutions & Anor [2005] SCJ 38, found that « the two conflicting interests which the law of bail seeks to reconcile are, on the one hand, the need to safeguard the necessary respect for the liberty of the citizen viewed in the context of the presumption of innocence, and, on the other hand, the need to ensure that society and the administration of justice are

Page 4 reasonably protected against serious risks which might materialise in the event that the detainee is really the criminal which he is suspected to be. »

In the case of Maloupe M.G. v The District Magistrate Of Grand Port [2000] SCJ 223, the Supreme Court explained the rationale of the law of bail at pre-trial stage as follows:

« The rationale of the law of bail at pre-trial stage is, accordingly, that a person should normally be released on bail if the imposition of the conditions reduces the risks referred to above – i.e. risk of absconding, risk to the administration of justice, risk to society – to such an extent that they become negligible having regard to the weight which the presumption of innocence should carry in the balance. When the imposition of the above conditions is considered to be unlikely to make any of the above risks negligible, then bail is to be refused. »

A Court hearing an application for bail therefore has to undertake a two-stage assessment. It should firstly assess the risks warranting an objection to bail. Should those risks be substantiated, the imposition of conditions to reduce the risks to a negligible level should thereafter be considered. Bail should be refused only in the event that the imposition of conditions would be unlikely to make the risks negligible.

In assessing the risks warranting an objection to bail, the Court has a duty consider all evidence put before it which would tend to increase or reduce the likelihood of the risks materialising. Indeed, in the case of Deelchand V v The Director Of Public Prosecutions And Others [2005] SCJ 215, the Supreme Court described the balancing exercise to be undertaken by the Court as follows:

« It stands to reason that the decision-making process in relation to bail will call for a balancing exercise where all relevant facts have to be given due weight in the balance either in favour of release on bail (where they tend to reduce the likelihood of one of the relevant risks materialising) or in favour of refusal of bail (where they tend to increase the likelihood of one of the relevant risks materialising). »

The Supreme Court, in the case of Deelchand (supra), also provided guidance for the assessment of the risk of absconding in the following terms:

Page 5

« 5.2 The risk of absconding has to be assessed with regard to several relevant factors. Although, as stated in the last passage quoted, the seriousness of the offence may, by itself or in conjunction with some other factor such as the defendant’s criminal record, give a basis for believing that the defendant will fail to surrender through fear of a custodial sentence, this factor must be viewed in conjunction with other factors which may well indicate that the defendant is unlikely to abscond.

5.3 In Neumeister v Austria (1968) 1 ECHR 91 (27 June 1968) at para 10, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the severity of the sentence which the defendant would be likely to incur, if convicted, does not in itself justify the inference that he or she would attempt to evade trial if released from detention:

“The danger of flight cannot … be evaluated solely on the basis of such consideration..0ther factors, especially those relating to the character of the person involved, his morals, his home, his occupation, his assets, his family ties and all kinds of links with the country in which he is being prosecuted may either confirm the existence of a danger of flight or make it appear so small that it cannot justify detention pending trial.”

5.4 Considerations relevant to the risk of absconding will include the strength, weakness or absence of family, community, professional or occupational ties and financial commitments as such ties, if strong, might be strong incentives not to abscond and, if weak might increase the risk of absconding. The strength of the evidence may also be relevant because if it is likely that the charge will not be proved, the defendant may be less likely to abscond. The court must ask itself: what would be likely to motivate the applicant to abscond and what would be likely to make him refrain from absconding? … »

The Supreme Court, in the case of Deelchand (supra), further ruled that « the risk of offending must be a real one, and that there must be adequate reasons to explain its existence. » The factors which may be considered when assessing the risk of reoffending are the criminal record of the Applicant, the nature of the offence he is suspected to have committed, the sentence expected in case of conviction, the extent

Page 6 to which the suspected offence is lucrative, the connection between the offence charged and the offence feared, the likely consequences of reoffending, the character of the applicant and the nature of the evidence against him.

In the same case of Deelchand (supra), reference was additionally made to a book by Neil Corre titled “Bail in Criminal Proceedings” (1990) in which the author pointed out the following which provide guidance in the assessment of the risk of interference with witnesses:

« “The exception’s most common manifestations are in cases where: (a) the defendant has allegedly threatened witnesses; (b) the defendant has allegedly made admissions that he intends to do so; (c) the witnesses have a close relationship with the defendant, for example in cases of domestic violence or incest; (d) the witnesses are especially vulnerable, for example where they live near the defendant or are children or elderly people; (e) it is believed that the defendant knows the location of inculpatory documentary evidence which he may destroy, or has hidden stolen property or the proceeds of crime; (f) it is believed the defendant will intimidate or bribe jurors; (g) other suspects are still at large and may be warned by the defendant The exception does not apply simply because there are further police enquiries or merely because there are suspects who have yet to be apprehended”»

Analysis

A Court undertaking the two-stage assessment has to address two questions. Firstly, does the evidence put before the Court substantiate the risks warranting an objection to bail? Should the answer to the first question be in the affirmative, secondly, will the imposition of conditions reduce those risks to a negligible level?

In undertaking the two-stage assessment, I pay due regard to the fact that while the Enquiring Officer gave evidence under oath and was duly cross-examined, the applicant elected to make a statement from the dock, thereby not exposing himself to cross-examination.

Page 7 Assessment of the nature of the evidence

I consider that the nature of the evidence against the applicant at pre-trial stage is in the form of real evidence of a plastic bag containing leaf matter suspected to be cannabis, an electronic scale and a mobile phone secured from the locus from which he had escaped. I find that the evidence of the ADSU officers who were keeping surveillance on the locus and who saw the applicant thereat also constitutes evidence against the latter. I however note that no evidence of any money suspected to be proceeds of drugs and other paraphernalia also secured from the applicant or from his premises was adduced. It further stems out of the Enquiring Officer’s testimony that the accused has denied the evidence against him and he has pointed to certain elements of exculpatory evidence into which the police has not yet fully probed.

I do bear in mind that it is the trial Court which will have to assess the evidence of the police officers involved in the operation which took place on the material date. Nonetheless and in light of the real evidence, I find the nature of the evidence against the applicant at pre-trial stage in respect of the present provisional information to be reliable.

Risk of reoffending:

The evidence of the Enquiring Officer regarding the risk of reoffending is based on the lucrativeness of the drugs business as well as the applicant’s records.

The evidence before me is to the effect that has one recent previous conviction for a drug related offence and he is also on bail in a drug dealing case which bears a provisional cause number of the year 2025 itself. I bear in mind that as per the applicant’s own admissions, he is the sole breadwinner in his family which comprises of his wife who is pregnant and of his two minor children. I consider that as the applicant is not a stranger to drug offences and has financial obligations in respect of his family, the risk that he may be lured by the lucrativeness of the drugs business and reoffend is real and plausible.

The evidence before me is further to the effect that a non-negligible quantity of suspected drugs valued at a non-negligible amount have been secured from the locus from which the applicant escaped. I reiterate my previous conclusion in respect of the nature of the evidence against the applicant at pre-trial stage. Bearing again in mind

Page 8 the lucrativeness of the drugs business, I find that the nature of the evidence against the applicant, coupled with the amount and value of suspected dangerous drugs secured weigh heavily in the balance in favour of increasing the likelihood of the risk of reoffending materialising.

In light of the above, I find that the risk of reoffending has been substantiated.

Risk of absconding:

As per the testimony of the Enquiring Officer, the risk of absconding is based on the seriousness of the offence and severity of the penalty which the applicant may have to face and the fact that on the material date he had bolted away on seeing the police.

The applicant in the present case has been provisionally charged with the offence of drug dealing in breach of Section 30(1)(f)(i) of the Dangerous Drugs Act. I have considered the nature of the offence under Section 30(1)(f)(i) of the Dangerous Drugs Act and I note that it carries a custodial sentence in the form of penal servitude for a term not exceeding 25 years and a fine not exceeding one million rupees. I consider that the offence with which the applicant is likely to be formally charged is a serious one. I further bear in mind the applicant’s previous conviction for a drug related offence. In the circumstances, I find that the offence with which he is likely to be formally charged additionally carries a severe penalty.

By virtue of Section 4(2)(b) of the Bail Act one of the factors which the Court is to take into account when assessing the grounds of objection to bail is indeed the nature and gravity of the offence and of the penalty. The judgment in the case of Neumeister v Austria (1968) 1 ECHR 91 referred to in the case of Deelchand (supra), however, makes it clear that « the severity of the sentence which the defendant would be likely to incur, if convicted, does not in itself justify the inference that he or she would attempt to evade trial if released from detention ». Other factors which can be taken into consideration when assessing the risk of absconding are « the strength, weakness or absence of family, community, professional or occupational ties and financial commitments ».

The Enquiring Officer has given evidence of the applicant’s fixed place of abode, and of his occupational and family ties. I do bear in mind that it stems out of the Enquiring Officer’s testimony that on the material date, the applicant had bolted away and

Page 9 succeeded in escaping despite having been pursued by the police. I however note that it is of his own accord that the applicant then surrendered himself to the police. I additionally note that there is no evidence of the applicant having attempted to abscond while in police custody or indicated his intention to abscond. All these, I therefore find, do not weigh in the balance in favour of increasing the likelihood of the risk of absconding materialising.

I further find that in the present matter, in itself, the nature of the offence with which the applicant is likely to be formally charged and the penalty attached thereto is not sufficient to tempt the applicant to think that he will have nothing to lose by absconding.

In light of the above, I find that the risk of absconding warranting an objection to bail is negligible and has not been substantiated.

Risk of interfering with witnesses:

The evidence of the Enquiring Officer on the risk of interfering with witnesses is based on the fact that the applicant has referred to two persons during the course of the enquiry but who have not yet been arrested.

I note that it stems out of the Enquiring Officer’s testimony that it is the applicant himself who had provided the names and addresses of the two persons whom he states were with him on the locus at the material time. Although these two persons may be potential suspects or potential witnesses in the present matter, I find it implausible that the applicant would warn them when he is the one who provided their names and addresses to the police in the first place. It bears reminding that the mere fact that there are suspects who have yet to be apprehended does not automatically imply that there is a risk of interference with witnesses warranting an objection to bail.

I further find that the evidence adduced by the Enquiring Officer does not show that the applicant has ever interfered with witnesses in the past. No evidence of the applicant having threatened witnesses or having made admissions that he intends to do so was adduced before me. No evidence of the applicant being closely related to any witnesses or suspects such that he may influence their testimonies has been ushered before me. I find that the absence of such evidence does not tilt the balance in favour of the risk of interfering with witnesses materialising. In addition, I find the

Page 10 possibility of the applicant interfering with the police officers who were part of the surveillance operation to be minimal if not inexistent.

In light of the above, I find that the risk of interfering with witnesses warranting an objection to bail is negligible and has not been substantiated.

The balancing exercise

Having found that the risk of reoffending has been substantiated, I now have to assess whether the imposition of conditions will reduce this said risk to a negligible level. In that respect, I bear in mind that no evidence of the applicant having breached bail conditions in the past was adduced before me. I again consider the one drug-related case in respect of which the applicant is on bail. I find it apposite to refer to the following extract from the judgment in the case of Director Of Public Prosecutions v Louis Jimmy Marthe [2013 SCJ 386a]:

« It must be pointed out that the real issue here is the respect or non- respect that an accused party has shown for the conditions of his release on bail. One of those conditions is that he will not commit other offences or get involved in any activity that smacks of illegality from a penal point of view. We are, of course, dealing with a situation that comes prior to a conviction which can only take place after due process before a trial court. »

Despite being on bail, the applicant has been involved in yet another activity smacking of illegality from a penal point of view. Nevertheless, I consider that among the risk- reducing conditions which may be contemplated, the Supreme Court in the case of Deelchand (supra) found that « Security appears applicable to all the risks as it may be an incentive to the applicant to appear for trial, to behave whilst on bail and to refrain from interfering with witnesses, or tampering with evidence. » The imposition of appropriate stringent reporting conditions would also provide police supervision over the applicant.

Conclusion

Page 11 In light of the above, I find that a combination of bail conditions will reduce the risk of reoffending to a negligible level. I therefore order that the applicant be admitted to bail on the following conditions:

(i) The applicant shall furnish a surety of Rs 50,000; (ii) The applicant shall enter into a recognisance of Rs 100,000; (iii) The applicant has to reside at a fixed address which he shall provide to the police; (iv) The applicant shall report to the police station nearest to his place of abode once daily between 06.00 hours and 20.00 hours; (v) The applicant shall not be in communication with any witness, potential witness, suspect and potential suspect directly or indirectly, including but not limited to in person, by post, by any telecommunication device, through any technological means, or through any social media platform; and

(vi) The applicant shall remain available to the police for enquiry when so required.

A Dhunnoo (Miss) District Magistrate This 2nd April 2026