Supreme Court of Mauritius, 21 janvier 2020, 2020 ROD 6 – POLICE V GRANDCOURT BENJAMIN-1

POLICE V GRANDCOURT BENJAMIN -1

2020 ROD 6

POLICE V GRANDCOURT BENJAMIN

Cause Number :- 1061/2019

THE COURT OF RODRIGUES

In the matter of: –

POLICE

V

BENJAMIN GRANDCOURT

JUDGMENT

Introduction. 1. Accused stands charged with the offence of insult in breach of section 296 (b) of the Criminal Code. Accused pleaded not guilty and was not assisted by Counsel at trial. The trial. 2. For the prosecution, Jacquelin Grandcourt (“W2”) testified that on 15 April 2019, at 09.00 hours, while he was driving a vehicle on the main road of La Ferme and upon reaching a

shop called “Petit Coin Tranquille”, Benjamin Grandcourt called him “sauvage” in public and also said to him “falourmama”. W2 testified that he felt humiliated. 3. As regards to Accused, he stated from the dock that he did not see W2 on that day.

The law. 4. As regards to the law, section 296 of the Criminal Code reads as follows:-

Any injurious expression or any term of contempt or invective, or other abusive language, not carrying with it the imputation of a fact, is an insult (‘injure’) and any person who is guilty of the offence shall be liable to the following penalties – (a) where the offence is committed by means of words, exclamations or threats not made use of in public, a fine not exceeding 50,000 rupees;

(b) where the offence is committed by means of words, exclamations or threats made use of in public, a fine not exceeding 100,000 rupees;

Assessments.

5. I have assessed all the evidence on record. 6. In the present case, the case for the prosecution rests on the testimony of W2 who testified that Accused insulted him by calling him “sauvage” and also uttered to him: “falourmama”. He testified with great composure and gave his version of events without any hesitancy. He replied to the questions put to him by Accused and maintained that Accused did insult him. Hence, in that context, I find that W2 came forward as a witness of truth. 7. As regards to the defence, Accused made a statement from the dock and same cannot outweigh the version given by W2 under oath. Furthermore, I find that a simple denial statement from Accused and adding anything more cannot be said to have cast doubt in the prosecution case.

8. Hence, in the light of the above, I find for the prosecution Has the offence been proved? 9. Insult is defined in Dalloz, Repertoire de Droit Pénal et de Procedure Pénale (2e edition) as: “toute expression outrageante, terme de mépris ou invective qui ne renferme l'imputation d'aucun fait determine”. 10. At Note 10 of the repertoire, the elements as regards to the offence of insult are set out as follows:- i. Une expression outrageante, un terme de mépris ou une invective; ii. à l’adresse d’une personne ou d’un corps qui a été visé et justifié etre atteint; iii. dans une intention coupable; iv. publiée par l’un des moyens énoncés.

11. Furthermore, at Note 15, the following was said: “ par contre, in n’est pas nécessaire que le propos ou l’éxpression soit de nature à porter atteinte à la respectabilité. En effect, une expression, à raison de sa violence ou sa grossièreté, peut avoir un character injurieux et blessant. Il en est ainsi du terme de mépris et de l’invective qui impliquent la violence ou la grossièreté”. 12. Relying on the French authorities and after having analysed the words uttered by Accused, I am of the view that those words uttered amount to an insult.

13. As regards to the mens rea for present offence, in Carpen v The State [2010 SCJ 105], the Supreme Court stated the following 14. “….the offence of insult by means of words consists in the use of abusive language not carrying with it an imputation of fact. The requisite mens rea is a malicious intent which is however presumed in expressions which are injurious or offensive per se «jusqu’à ce

que l’auteur du propos eût prouvé qu’il ne voulait pas injurier la personne à laquelle il l’a adressée» – Morel v. Couve [1912 MR 78].” 15. Hence, to that effect, the expression that has been used by the accused clearly fall within the definition of the law and the presumption of malicious intent was in no way rebutted by the defence.

Conclusion.

16. Therefore, for the reasons as referred above and in the light of the evidence on record, I find that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, I find Accused guilty as charged.

D.J.A Dangeot Senior District Magistrate Delivered on 21 January 2020.