Supreme Court of Mauritius, 22 juin 2020, 2020 BRC 171 – Police v Sunil Choytun

Police v Sunil Choytun

2020 BRC 171

IN THE BAIL AND REMAND COURT

Provisional Cause Number 467/2020 (Black River)

In the matter of:

Police

v/s

Sunil Choytun

RULING

The Applicant stands provisionally charged with the offence of DRUG DEALING (POSSESSION OF CANNABIS SEEDS FOR THE PURPOSE OF CULTIVATING CANNABIS PLANTS) in breach of section 30 (1) (f) (i) and 47 (5) (a) of the Dangerous Drugs Act. The Applicant has moved that he be admitted to bail and he was represented by Me. A. Luximon at the bail hearing. The hearing for the Respondent was conducted by the Police Prosecutor and the Court proceedings were held in English language. The Respondent is resisting the motion and is objecting that the Applicant be granted bail on the ground of risk of re-offending.

THE CASE FOR THE PROSECUTION

PS Jules, the main enquiry officer was called by the Prosecution and he explained that he had been deputed by the Commissioner of Police to resist the present bail application on the above mentioned ground. The police officer went on to explain that on 22 nd May 2020 ADSU officers proceeded to Avenue De Lys, Canot and seized suspected cannabis seeds worth Rs 21 700. The officer went on to explain that the Applicant had confessed to the charge and that the police was basing itself on the fact that the Applicant was borne on record as per Doc X filed to believe that Applicant will re-offend if granted bail. The main enquiry officer stated further that the Applicant was not on bail and that only the FSL report was missing to complete the police enquiry.

In cross examination the officer denied that the ground of objection was a mere apprehension and he confirmed that the Applicant had family ties. The case was then closed for the Prosecution.

THE CASE FOR THE DEFENCE

The Applicant was explained his Constitutional Rights and from the dock he stated that he would abide by all bail conditions imposed by the Court. No defence witness was called and the case was then closed for the Defence.

Defence Counsel offered no submissions and simply left matters in the hands of the Court.

THE RELEVANT SECTIONS OF THE LAW

In the case of Hurnam v The State [2005 UKPC 49], the Privy Council held that only section 4(1) (a) of the 1999 Act specifies the core reasons for refusing bail. Individually, they are to be considered to provide a conclusive reason for refusing bail. Section 4(1)(a) of the Bail Act 1999 reads as follows:

4. Refusal to release on bail

(1) A Judge or a Magistrate may refuse to release a defendant or a detainee on bail where (a) (a) he is satisfied that there is reasonable ground for believing that the defendant or detainee if released is likely to – (i) (i) fail to surrender to custody or to appear before a court as and when required (ii) (ii) commit an offence, other than an offence punishable only by a fine not exceeding 1000 rupees (iii) (iii) interfere with witnesses, tamper with evidence or otherwise obstruct the course of justice, in relation to him or to any other person.

Secondly, as regards to paragraphs 4 (1)(b) to (f) of the Bail Act which are not compelling grounds or core reasons per se to deprive an individual of his liberty but, if relevant, the court need to take into account in order to determine the likelihood of the risks listed in section 4(l)(a) to materialise. The section of the Bail Act 1999 provides as follows:

(1) A Judge or a Magistrate may refuse to release a defendant or a detainee on bail where-

(b) he is satisfied that the defendant or detainee should be kept in custody –

(i) for his own protection; or (ii) in the case of a minor, for his own welfare; (c) the defendant or detainee, having been released on bail, has – (i) committed an act referred to in paragraph (a); or (ii) breached any other condition imposed on him for his release: (d) the defendant or detainee is charged or is likely to be charged with a serious offence; (e) there is reasonable ground for believing that the defendant or detainee has – (i) given false or misleading information regarding his names or address; or 5 (ii) no fixed place of abode; (f) a detainee has failed to comply with section 12(2).

Thirdly, a set of consideration is provided under section 4(2) of the Bail Act 1999 to assess the likelihood of the risks enumerated under section 4(l) (a) to materialise. This section provides that:

In making a determination under subsection (1), the Judge or Magistrate shall have regard to such considerations as appear to the Judge or Magistrate to be relevant, including –

(a) the nature of the offence and the penalty applicable thereto; (b) the character and antecedents of the defendant or detainee; (c) the nature of the evidence available with regard to the offence.

Hence, the wording of section 4(1) of the Bail Act 1999 makes it clear that release on bail at pretrial stage is the release upon conditions designed to ensure that the suspect:

(1) appears for his trial, if he is eventually prosecuted; (2) in case he happens to be the author of the offence of which is he suspected, does no further harm to society whilst being at large; and (3) does not interfere with the course of justice, should he be so minded.

The rationale as to bail was clearly set out in the case of Maloupe v The District Magistrate of Grand Port [2000] SCJ 233, where it was held as follows:

“The rationale of the law of bail at pre-trial stage is, accordingly, that a person should normally be released on bail if the imposition of the conditions reduces the risks referred to above- i.e risk of absconding, risk to administration of justice, risk to

society- to such an extent that they become negligible having regard to the weight which the presumption of innocence should carry in the balance when the imposition of the above conditions is considered to be unlikely to make any of the above risks negligible, then bail is to be refused.”

It is also trite law that in deciding whether to grant bail to the applicant, a balance must be struck between “on the one hand the need to safeguard the necessary respect for the liberty of the citizen viewed in the context of the presumption of innocence and, on the other hand the need to ensure that society and the administration of justice are reasonable protected against serious risks which might materialise in the event that the detainee is really the criminal which he is suspected to be” [Labonne v. DPP & Anor 2005 SCJ 38]

RISK OF RE-OFFENDING

Regarding the sole ground of objection raised by the prosecuting authorities, there is no doubt that drug dealing being a lucrative business, there is a serious risk of the Applicant being tempted to commit further offences, the more so that he is someone of “no calling”. I have further borne in mind the test as laid down in the case of CLOOTH V BELGIUM [1991] ECHR 71 (12 DECEMBER 1991 ), that is whether “the “danger” of a serious offence being committed by the applicant whilst on bail should be “a plausible one”.

On this score, I have assessed an overview of the evidence as per the decision in MALOUPE VS DISTRICT MAGISTRATE OF GRAND PORT [2000 MR 64] and I have taken into account the records of the Applicant which act as useful pointers in ascertaining the risk of re-offending on the part of the Applicant as referred to in the case of DOOKHIT S. v THE DISTRICT MAGISTRATE OF PAMPLEMOUSSES DISTRICT COURT, PAMPLEMOUSSES [2011 SCJ 101].

I note that the Applicant has made a confession in relation to the charge and I have further noted that the Applicant is borne on record for a drug related offence dated the year 2013 and therefore it cannot be said that he has an overriding pattern of behaviour which would induce him to commit a similar offence if released. Despite the lucrative nature of the drug business, I find that there is no evidence to support the only ground of objection raised by the police which seems to be a mere apprehension by the police.

I find therefore that an imposition of a heavy security will ensure the Applicant’s appearance before Court and will be an incentive for him not to indulge in any other offence to an acceptable level. In the case of DEELCHAND V THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS AND OTHERS (SUPRA) , the Learned Judge had this to say:

“Security appears applicable to all the risks as it may be an incentive to the applicant to appear for trial, to behave whilst on bail and to refrain from interfering with witnesses, or tampering with evidence”.

I have also taken into account the Applicant’s statement from the dock that he is prepared to abide by any conditions that the Court may impose. I am of the opinion that there are conditions which could be imposed to effectively reduce the risk of the Applicant re-offending to a negligible level.

After carrying out the required balancing exercise, I hold that the need for Applicant to be in continued detention in the circumstances does not outweigh his right to remain at large.

The Applicant is to be granted bail pursuant to the Bail Act 1999 on the following conditions:

(1) The Applicant is to furnish a surety of Rs 40 000 (cash); (2) The Applicant to enter into a recognizance in the sum of Rs 100,000 in his own name; (3) The Applicant is to reside at a fixed place of abode as indicated by him to the police; (4) The Applicant is to report to the nearest police station every Monday, Wednesday and Saturday once daily between 06 00 hours and 18 00 hours; (5) The Applicant should not commit any offence and reoffend whilst on bail; (6) A curfew order is imposed on Applicant. He is to remain indoors at his residential address as provided to the police between 20 00 hours and 05 00 hours on a daily basis. In case of emergency, the police are to be contacted to inform them of his predicament before proceeding outside during the hours of curfew.

B. PRAYAG-RAJCOOMAR (Mrs) Ag. Senior District Magistrate This 22 nd June 2020