Supreme Court of Mauritius, 23 juin 2020, 2020 PL2 51 – Pce v Lisette

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Pce v Lisette

2020 PL2 51

POLICE v LISETTE Nicolas

CN:5851/19 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF PORT LOUIS (2ND Division) In the matter of:

POLICE V LISETTE Nicolas JUDGMENT

Accused stands charged with the offences of 1. Outrage against an agent of civil authority in breach of section 156 (1) and (3) of the Criminal code. 2. Parking on a road (yellow line) in breach of Section72(2)(f) and 125 of GN 53/10. Accused pleaded not guilty to the charges and was not represented at trial stage. Prosecution produced a memo NTA for vehicle registration number 3276 ZW 08, marked as Doc A. Proseution stated that the accused declined to provide a statement in writing and accused agreed to same.

Prosecution called witness 3, SI Sultoo, who related that on the material day, the accused was on duty in police uniform at Jhummah Mosque street, in police uniform from 6.30 am to 13.30 hrs. Prosecution then called witness no.2, PC Kooyela, who related that on the material day, at 10.15 a.m, whilst on duty at Jhummah Mosque street, on patrol, he saw that the accused had parked his car along double yellow lines and the officer asked for his driving licence. The accused grew vexed and uttered foul words to his address. The accused was difficult and had to be driven to the police station, where the accused was booked for both offences. The officer could not recollect the vehicle number, but explained that the yellow lines were clearly visible. The case was then closed for the Prosecution. The accused was informed of his Constitutional rights and he elected to make a statement from the dock. The accused explained that he was spotted by the officer who told him “Mo pe rode toi depuis longtemps.”, following which the officer swore at him and informed his superior officer that it was in fact, him, the accused who was swearing. He explained that he was taken to the police station when in fact, the officer drove his vehicle without his permission. The case was also closed for the Defence. The law concerning the offence of outrage against agent of Civil Authority under Section 156 (1) and (3) of the Criminal Code reads as follows:

“Any outrage committed publicly, in any manner, whether against one or more members of the Cabinet or of the Assembly, or against a tribunal or court or one or more Magistrates, or a public functionary, or a minister of a religion recognised in Mauritius provided such outrage is committed against any of the aforesaid, whilst acting in the exercise of their functions, or on account of such functions, shall be punished by imprisonment, and by a fine not exceeding 100,000 rupees.

Where the offence is against a ministerial officer, or an agent of the civil or military authorities, the punishment shall be imprisonment for a term not exceeding 1 year, and a fine not exceeding 25,000.”

In the case of Appadoo v the State (2010 SCJ 411), reference was made to the following extract of Dalloz Recueil Vo Outrage note 2 which gives an in-depth outlook of the offence of outrage which is hereby reproduced:

“L’outrage «s’entend de toute expression dont la signification menaçante, diffamatoire ou injurieuse est propre à diminuer l’autorité morale de la personne investie d’une des fonctions de caractère public désignée par la loi et, par voie de conséquence, à porter atteinte au respect dû à la fonction»

Note 7 Dalloz Recueil Vo Outrage indicates the elements which constitute outrage:

«1. l’outrage doit être adressé à certaines personnes désignées et dont la qualité est déduite de la fonction exercée; 2. le fait doit revêtir une forme d’expression déterminée par la loi et avoir une signification outrageante; 3. Il doit y avoir relation entre l’outrage et la fonction; 4. l’outrage doit réaliser une atteinte effective de la personne outragée; 5. l’intention coupable est nécessaire»

The case of Bhayat v. The Queen (1982) MR 128, made reference to Garçon, Code Pénal Annoté, articles 222 à 225: «Nous croyons donc qu'en principe l'outrage est punissable, alors même que le fonctionnaire outragé agirait irrégulièrement. Le délit ne disparaîtrait que si l'acte était entaché d'une illégalité telle qu'il serait impossible de le rattacher en aucune manière à l'exercice des fonctions de la personne outragée. L'outrage, dans ce cas, ne serait plus constitué, parce qu'il ne serait pas reçu dans l'exercice ou à l'occasion de l'exercice des fonctions. N. 150. Des arrêts plus récents ont décidé que le caractère délictueux de l'outrage envers les agents de l'autorité n'est nullement subordonné à la valeur légale des actes qu'ils accomplissent; que, alors même que l'irrégularité de ces actes permettrait d'en demander l'annulation ou la réparation, elle ne saurait jamais autoriser ni excuser l'outrage dirigé contre le fonctionnaire au moment où il représente l'autorité publique et qui par suite atteint cette autorité. N. 152… que l'outrage fait à un agent de la force publique est punissable alors même qu'il se produit à l'occasion d'un fait que cet agent considérait par erreur comme un délit. »

The case of Appadoo quoted above made reference to the following excerpt of Garçon, CPA 1956 Ed, article 330, at N 31 et seq., which states: “la publicité existe non seulement au cas où l’acte … a été vu par une ou plusieurs personnes, mais aussi lorsqu’il est certain, notamment par la nature du lieu où il a été commis, que cet acte a été offert aux regards du public, et qu’il a pu être aperçu, même fortuitement”.

The Court has listened with great attention to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses as well as the unsworn testimony of the accused. .

The Court takes note of the following salient features of the present case: • It is clear that the complainant is a member of the police force as per the testimony of witness no.3. • The officer was performing his duties. • The Court took note of the version of PC Kooyela with regard to count I, given that the witness did not come across as convincing on this issue. The Court found him hesitant and he appeared to be relating a well-rehearsed version of facts.

The Court is of the view that given the state of the testimony of the complainant, it would be unsafe to rely upon same to convict accused under count I.

With regard to count II the Court finds no reason to impeach the evidence put forward by the Prosecution, the more so in view of the unsworn testimony of the accused.

The Prosecution having failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt under count I, Court dismisses count I.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the Prosecution has proven its case beyond reasonable doubt under count II finds the accused guilty as charged under count II.

Mrs Manjula Kumari Boojharut ( A. Senior District Magistrate) Delivered on 23 June 2020