Supreme Court of Mauritius, 27 avril 2026, 2026 PL2 14 – Police vs Sans Soucis

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Police vs Sans Soucis

2026 PL2 14

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF PORT LOUIS (DIVISION II)

In the matter of: CN 2583/19

POLICE

VS

JAMES BRUNO WESLEY SANS SOU CIS

ACCUSED

JUDGMENT

1. The accused stands charged with the offences of: (i) Count I-driving a motor vehicle without due care and attention in breach of Sections 123C(1)(a) of the Road Traffic Act, (ii) Count II-using an uninsured motor vehicle, (iii) Count III-Failing to report an accident within delay, (iv) Count IV-Driving a motor vehicle without licence, (v) Count V-Not affixing an MVL, (vi) Count VI-Failing to effect transfer committed on 26.11.2013.

2. The accused pleaded not guilty to the charges and was legally unrepresented.

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I- PROSECUTION CASE

3. The prosecution produced: (i) The NLTA record of motor cycle bearing number 5049 ZP (Doc A), (ii) A Memo Traffic Branch confirming that the accused had no licence (Doc B), (iii) The defence statements of the accused (Doc C & C1) (iv) A rough sketch (Doc D).

4. The recording officer was not cross-examined.

5. W3 testified that he was on the pavement when the accused riding a motorcycle hit him on his right hip. He was dragged and injured on his face and shoulder and his teeth were broken. He recognised the accused as he is known to wear a “plaque” in his left hand. He could not remember other details as he fell unconscious.

6. He was duly cross-examined.

II- CASE FOR THE DEFENCE

7. The accused was explained his right to testify under oath, from the dock, to stay silent and to call witnesses. He chose to depone under oath and explained that he did not know how W3 was injured. He was duly cross-examined.

III- ANALYSIS

A- COUNT 1-DRIVING WITHOUT DUE CARE AND ATTENTION

8. The law as it was in 2013 provided that: “123C. Driving without due care or reasonable consideration (1) Any person who drives a motor vehicle on a road or other public place (a) without due care and attention; or shall commit an offence and shall, on conviction, be liable to a fine of not less than 3,000 rupees nor more than 10,000 rupees and to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 months”.

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9. The elements of the offence are: (i) That the accused was driving a motor vehicle (ii) On a road (iii) Without due care and attention.

10. It is undisputed that the accident occurred on a road at Cite Roches Bois.

11. The real question in controversy is whether the accused was actually driving. This element will also have an impact on Counts 2, 3 and 4.

12. I have analysed the evidence of the accused and witnesses. This is a most puzzling case, to say the least, due to the completely different versions of the protagonists.

13. First, the version of the victim (W3) is that only the accused was driving the motorcycle and he recognised the accused who was wearing a “plaque” on his hand.

14. Second, the version of W6, half-brother of the accused, in court is that he does not know what happened. When his version to the police was put to him, he denied that he told the police that he was the pillion rider of the motorcycle driven by the accused.

15. Finally, the accused initially testified as per his statement, namely that he was riding as pillion rider of the motorcycle driven by W6. However, he then changed his version under cross-examination to deny his statement and stated that W6 took the motorcycle to try it before buying it.

16. I have carefully analysed the demeanour of all the parties. To begin with, I find that I can rely on the defence statement which was produced without any objection from the accused who did not cross-examine the recording officer. I find that his ultimate denial that the statement was signed by him to be unconvincing for the aforementioned reasons.

17. I thus find that the accused was indeed on spot with his brother, W6.

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18. Now I come to the evidence of W6 who was most reluctant and evasive to depone. He maintained that he did not know what happened and did not know the contents of his statement, when the prosecution put to him the report he had made to the police about the accident caused by the accused. It was clear to all that he was there to spare his brother, whilst being careful not to implicate himself as well. I find that W6 was indeed on spot with the accused. Else, if he was not on spot and unaware of the accident, I fail to comprehend why he would give a statement to the contrary to the police, especially that the defence is that W3 suddenly came on the street.

19. W6 was thus a “témoin de complaisance » for the accused. The fact that the accused did not cross-examine him further reinforces my finding.

20. Having come to the conclusion that the accused and W6 were on the spot, the next logical question is: who was driving?

21. The evidence of the accused and W6 contradicts each other, as each lay the blame at the other’s door, when defence statements were recorded. Given that a young child was injured, it is understandable that they would act as such.

22. Hence, I would have to rely on the evidence of an important protagonist on spot: the victim himself.

23. Whilst he was clear on the fact that he was hit by a motorcycle, his evidence as to who was the rider was problematic for a few, but important reasons:

(i) He did not actually see the accused. He did not recognise the accused from his face, but rather by the fact that the rider was wearing a “plaque” on his hand, (ii) He stated that the accused was alone, whereas I have found above that W6 was also on the motorcycle, (iii) He was totally unable to recall what the accused was wearing or even if he had been wearing a helmet, (iv) I also have to bear in mind that this was a 8-year-old who fell unconscious and who was accompanied by adults who had an axe to grind against the accused,

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(v) In those muddled circumstances which affect the reliability of W3, corroboration would have enlightened the court and helped to discard doubts which have crept up, as held in BOTTE AND ORS. VS THE QUEEN [1968 MR 80]: “This Court has on many occasions reiterated the well-known principle that unless the law makes it imperative, corroboration is not in every case indispensable; and a court may well act on the uncorroborated evidence of a witness found to be entirely reliable. But where the evidence of the sole witness called on a particular issue is not entirely satisfactory, whether because that evidence is not wholly disingenuous, or because, as may well be the case here, the witness's memory obviously fails him on at least one important question concerning the identity of two participants seen in a crowd, and a lingering doubt must remain as to his memory of other participants, and where, also as in the, present case, corroborative evidence is procurable but not called, this court will not be prepared to make any assumption in favour of the prosecution.”

24. Such corroborating evidence could have been obtained by calling other witnesses on spot, including the friends of W3 who were with him at the material time 1 .

25. I also rely on the case of Turnbull cited in GOOLY J v THE STATE [2006 SCJ 118] regarding identification: “These guidelines are expressed in relation to a trial by Judge and Jury but are applicable, mutatis mutandis, in trials by Magistrates. These guidelines, when transposed within the context of trials by Magistrates, are to the following effect: (1) When the case against an accused depends wholly or substantially on the correctness of one or more identifications which the defence alleges to be mistaken, the trial Magistrate should warn himself of the special need for caution before convicting the accused in reliance on the correctness of the identification or identifications. He should also be mindful that a mistaken witness can be a convincing one and that a number of such witnesses can all be mistaken. (2) The trial Magistrate should examine closely the circumstances in which the identification by each witness came to be made (length of observation, distance, light etc.) and should direct his attention to any specific weaknesses in the identification evidence.

1 P. 40 record.

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(3) Even when a witness is purporting to recognise someone whom he knows, the trial Magistrate should be mindful that mistakes in recognition of close relatives and friends are sometimes made (in circumstances favourable to mistakes). (4) When the quality of the identifying evidence is poor, as for example when it depends solely on a fleeting glance or on a longer observation made in difficult conditions, the trial Magistrate should acquit the accused unless there is other evidence which goes to support the correctness of the identification.”

26. The quality of the evidence of W3 in identifying the accused is poor with regards to the circumstances of the identification: (i) The victim himself conceded that he only remembered some things before he was hit by the motorcycle, (ii) He never stated that he identified the accused by face, but rather because he saw a “plaque” just before he was hit, (iii) Whereas the accused whilst admitting that he wore a “plaque” and was on the motorcycle, denied that he was the one driving, (iv) W3 only had a fleeting glance at the accused, just before he was hit, (v) W3 ultimately lost consciousness.

27. I thus find that the prosecution has not been able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was the one driving the motorcycle.

B- COUNT 3-FAILING TO REPORT AN ACCIDENT WITHIN DELAY

28. Given my finding above regarding the identity of the driver which has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, I find that the offence has not been established as the accused not being the driver, had no duty to report the accident within the prescribed delay.

C- COUNT 4-DRIVING MOTOR VEHICLE WITHOUT LICENCE

29. Since I did not find beyond reasonable doubt that it was the accused driving the motor vehicle, this offence has also not been established.

D- COUNT 2-UNSING UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE

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30. Section 55(1) Road Traffic Act provides that: “55. Using uninsured vehicle (1) Subject to this Part, no person shall – (a) use; (b) cause or permit any other person to use, a motor vehicle unless there is in force in relation to the use of that vehicle by that person or that other person, as the case may be, such a policy of insurance or such a security in respect of third party risks as complies with this Part.”

31. The accused admitted in his defence statement that he allowed W6 to use the motorcycle for which there was no policy insurance in force at the material time (Folio No 13/104928). He admitted same during his cross-examination too 2 . Hence, there is no prejudice to the accused.

32. None of the defences under Section 56 Road Traffic Act are applicable, as well.

33. I will thus amend the information under Section 73 of the District and Intermediate Courts (Criminal Jurisdiction) Act, following the dicta in VENKIAH VS THE QUEEN [1984 MR 62]:

“(d) if there is or can be no likelihood of prejudice, more particularly if it is patent that the accused was all along fully aware of the real charge against him and has had every opportunity of saying what he had to say, there is no need or duty to amend the information for the purpose of enabling the accused to put forward a new defence, but there is simply a need and a duty to cure the defect in the information so that it discloses the proper offence and it can tally with the conviction.” (p.3)

34. I exercise my discretion under section 73 of the District and Intermediate Courts (Criminal Jurisdiction) Act by: (i) Deleting in the heading under Count 2, “55(1)(a)” and replace by “55(1)(b)”, (ii) deleting “use” and replace by “permit any other person to use”,

2 P 48.

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(iii) delete “by the said accused” and replace by “by Mr. Ruddy Juanito Carver”. And find the charge proved beyond reasonable doubt.

E- COUNT 5-MVL NOT AFFIXED & COUNT 6 -FAILING TO EFFECT TRANSFER

35. Similarly, the accused confessed to the charges in his statement and under oath. I thus find that the charges have been proved beyond reasonable doubt. CONCLUSION

36. For all these reasons, I find that the prosecution has: (i) Failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt on counts 1, 3 and 4 which are dismissed accordingly, (ii) Proved the case beyond reasonable doubt and I find the accused guilty as charged on counts 5 and 6 and the amended charge under count 2.

M. C. CHAVRIMOOTOO District Magistrate 27 April 2026