Supreme Court of Mauritius, 29 avril 2026, 2026 MOK 25 – police v ramchurn

police v ramchurn

2026 MOK 25

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF MOKA

CN:7673/22

Police v Oomaotee RAMCHURN

Judgment

Accused is charged with the offence of insult in breach of section 296(a) of the Criminal Code.

She pleaded not guilty and was represented by Counsel.

The prosecution called witness 1 who produced the defence statement of accused. It contained a denial. In cross examination, the witness agreed that the accused cooperated with the police.

Witness 2, the declarant was called. She reported that on the material day she was in her yard. She saw the accused who is her neighbour. The latter entered her yard and upon being queried as to why she was here, she stated that it was her land, she had the right to come there to grow crop. Declarant reported that accused started swearing at her and stated “ salte, pitin, la terre pa pou toi ici, sa 2 pied par ici la pou moi”. She felt humiliated as there was other people on the road.

In cross examination, she agreed that they were not in good terms and there was a long standing bad blood between them given land issues. Declarant denied that the present case was reported out of spite. She also denied that she gave a different version in court in relation to the invective words allegedly used by the accused as mentioned in her statement to the police.

The defence did not adduce any evidence.

I have duly analysed the evidence on record as well as assessed the demeanour of the witnesses for the prosecution, mainly the declarant on whom the case for the prosecution lies.

I have note that there are some discrepancies in the wordings allegedly used by the accused as averred in the information and when she deponed in Court. The Court is alive to the principle laid down in the case of Vythilingum v The State (2017 SCJ 378) that “giving evidence in court is not a memory test and the failure to recollect with precision all the circumstances and details of an incident is understandable. What is important is for the court to be satisfied that the witness is speaking the truth in substance. The question is whether the variance in the present case is ‘slight’ or ‘substantial’. It is trite law that a witness does not need to state in verbatim what was allegedly said to him, especially when taking into account the time that has lapsed between the commission of the alleged offence and the time that the witness depones in court. In the present matter, I note that the alleged incident took place in 2020 and it is only now that the declarant is deponing.

In Rumjon v The State (2016 SCJ 315), it was held that:

“Indeed it is not uncommon for complainants in cases of insult not to be able to repeat in Court the exact words averred in the information, but the conviction for the offence of ‘insult’ is nevertheless upheld where the Court is satisfied that the words mentioned by the witness in Court are essentially to the same effect and convey the same idea and expression of abuse as the words set out in the information .”

I also bear in mind the following pronouncement made by the Supreme Court in Seelochun v The State [2018 SCJ 178] where it was held that:

“Should trial Courts hide behind the empty formula that there was only ‘a slight variance’ between the words of the information and what a complainant said in Court when such variance was actually substantial, there is a high risk of convicting accused parties against whom the case of the prosecution has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. This, in our view, would open the floodgates and set a wrong precedent in the practice of criminal law.”

Hence I find that the words used to her address, even though slightly different from what has been averred in the information, yet the variance is not substantial for me not to believe the version of the declarant.

Also, it has been borne out in evidence that clearly there is bad blood between the parties. However after careful consideration and having assessed the demeanour of witness, the court believes the declarant as she deponed in a consistent manner and stood test of cross examination. Her testimony remained unshaken.

The defence chose not to call the accused and closed its case. In Andoo v R (1989 MR 241), it was held “ where the evidence for the Prosecution establishes a strong and unshaken prima facie case and the accused chooses not to swear to his statement and expose himself to cross examination, the trial Court is perfectly entitled to conclude that the Prosecution evidence remains unrebutted. It is of course true that the burden of proving the guilt of an accused squarely lies on the Prosecution and that the accused is entitled to remain silent. His right to silence, however, is exercised at his risk and peril when, at the close of the case for the Prosecution, a prima facie case has been clearly established since the burden then shifts on him to satisfy the Court that it should not act on the evidence adduced by the Prosecution.

In the present case, I am satisfied that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt.

I find accused guilty as charged.

G.Rampoortab Senior District Magistrate 29.4.26