Supreme Court of Mauritius, 30 mars 2026, 2026 INT 71 – Ramesh Ramdyah v. The Mauritius Civil Service Mutual Aid Association Ltd

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Ramesh Ramdyah v. The Mauritius Civil Service Mutual Aid Association Ltd

2026 INT 71

THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF MAURITIUS (Civil Division)

In the matter of: CN 516/2020

Ramesh Ramdyah

Plaintiff

v.

The Mauritius Civil Service Mutual Aid Association Ltd

Defendant

JUDGMENT

1. As per the amended proecipe dated 14 th November 2022, the Plaintiff contracted two loans from the Defendant whilst he was in employment. The Plaintiff avers that he made a non-refundable Mutual Solidarity Contribution to the tune of 4% to cover for the reimbursement of the loans in case of death or permanent disability which would render him incapable of repaying the loans.

2. The Plaintiff further avers that on 3 rd November 2005, he was injured at work and as a result thereof, he suffered from 75% permanent physical incapacity. He was examined by a medical board on 31 st March 2016 and was found unfit to perform his duties. The Plaintiff avers that although the Defendant became aware of his permanent incapacity which necessitated a premature retirement by him, the Defendant failed to settle the outstanding loans, thus, committing a breach of its contractual obligations towards him. The Plaintiff is, therefore, claiming from the Defendant the total sum of Rs.734,145., representing the sums deducted from his monthly pension up to July 2020 and moral damages, trouble and annoyance suffered by him. He is also claiming interest at the legal rate and deductions, if any, made from his pension from August 2020 up to the date of judgment. With costs.

3. The Defendant is denying the allegations levelled against it and avers that it has at all material times acted in compliance with the terms and conditions of the loan

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agreements which were duly signed by the Plaintiff. It moves that the amended proecipe be set aside with costs.

The Plaintiff’s case

4. Mrs. Indranee Reegah, Human Resource Manager at the Ministry of Public Service Administrative and Institutional Reforms, was the first witness called on behalf of the Plaintiff. She asserted that the Plaintiff was a civil servant occupying the post of office care attendant / senior office care attendant prior to his retirement. She produced a medical report dated 31 st March 2016 wherein the Medical Board certified that the Plaintiff was permanently unfit to discharge the duties of his post and that he should continue treatment [Doc P1]. She specified that a letter dated 20 th June 2016 was sent to the Ministry in that respect [Doc P2] and the matter was referred to the Public Service Commission. Based on the findings of the Medical Board, the Ministry recommended that the Plaintiff retired on medical grounds. Mrs. Reegah further stated that following the approval of the Public Service Commission, a letter dated 19 th July 2016 was sent to the Plaintiff whereby he was informed that his retirement on medical grounds would take effect as from 20 th July 2016 [Doc P3].

5. In cross-examination, Mrs. Reegah reiterated that the Ministry of Public Service Administrative and Institutional Reforms relied on the findings of the Medical Board. She confirmed that the aforesaid Ministry merely dealt with the administrative aspect and followed the Public Service Commission Regulations.

6. The Plaintiff, thereafter, testified and produced a series of documents [Doc P4 to P14]. He related how he got injured in the year 2005 whilst he was on duty at Moka District Court. He affirmed that Dr. Reebye with whom he had been following treatment at Flacq Hospital examined him anew after 31 st March 2016 and found that he was suffering from 75% permanent incapacity. He asserted that he continued working until the Medical Board found that he was unfit to work.

7. The Plaintiff went on to relate that at the time he got injured in 2005, he had a personal loan with the Defendant. Subsequently, he took a quick loan. He specified that he started contracting loans from Defendant since 1982 and used to have his loans recast. He explained that when a recast is done, the remaining amount of the previous loan is deducted from the new loan and there can be a change in guarantor. He further asserted that the terms and conditions of the loan taken by him were found at the back of the application form as well as on an information sheet. He read clause 5 of Doc P5 which dealt with Mutual Solidarity Contribution and stated that it covers the loanee in case of total permanent disability. He added that the fact that he had to

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retire at the age of 52 and could no longer work meant that he was suffering from total permanent incapacity and thus, clause 5 applied to him.

8. The Plaintiff affirmed that a total sum of Rs.514,145. was deducted from his pensions although the Defendant had been informed that he had stopped working. He gave a breakdown thereof and claimed the aforesaid sum. He also claimed a sum of Rs.200,000 for moral damages which he asserted he suffered from. He stated that since his retirement on 19 th July 2016, his earnings were no longer the same.

9. In cross-examination, the Plaintiff stated that following his injury on 3 rd November 2005, he was temporarily unfit to work. He specified that he continued to work on and off from 2008 to 2016 until he retired. He confirmed that during that period, he had made a recast of the loans taken by him on a few occasions. He agreed that he elected to recast the loans in spite of being aware of his health condition since 2005. He added that he was entitled to do so as he was still working.

10. The Plaintiff agreed that in 1999, he took a personal loan and that the last recast of the aforesaid loan was done in January 2013 for the sum of Rs.680,000. He confirmed that he received the sum of Rs.77,765. following deduction of the amount of the previous loan. He admitted that he was well conversant with the procedures adopted by the Defendant. He, however, stated that he was unaware that the Mutual Solidarity Contribution was not applicable to him. He also disagreed that he was not entitled to any reimbursement for the deductions made from his pensions as the loan contracted by him was not a new one but a recast. He stated that the recast was done under the same conditions as the initial loan.

11. The Plaintiff further agreed that he had taken a quick loan in the sum of Rs.172,000 in August 2015. He conceded that in case of a quick loan, there is no possibility of any write-off in case of permanent disability. However, upon further questions being put to him, the Plaintiff stated that he was informed that he would be covered for total permanent disability.

12. The case for the Plaintiff was, thereafter, closed.

The Defendant’s case

13. Mr. Soobirajsing Jhoomuck, Assistant Manager, who was duly mandated to represent the Defendant in Court [Doc D1], adduced evidence in support of the defence. He explained the functioning of the Defendant. He asserted that the Defendant grants loans to public officials who are registered as members with it. He testified on the procedure adopted by the Defendant whenever a member contracts a loan. He asserted that the member is requested to read an information sheet containing the

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loan conditions before filling the loan application form. The officer at the counter explains the conditions and ensures that the loanee understands all the terms and conditions. The information sheet is not signed.

14. Mr. Jhoomuck stated that as per the records kept by the Defendant, the Plaintiff contracted loans from the Defendant after becoming a member in the year 1989. He explained that the Plaintiff contracted a loan in the sum of Rs.45,000 in November 1999. Same was recast on numerous occasions until 2013 [Doc D2]. Mr. Jhoomuck adduced evidence on the last personal loan taken by the Plaintiff. Referring to Doc P7, he asserted that it was taken in the amount of Rs.680,000 on 29 th January 2013 and was subjected to the conditions contained in Doc P10 which is dated 17 th January 2013 and not Doc P5 which is dated 12 th September 2013. He emphasised that the personal loan was not a new loan but a loan recast as can be gathered on the right- hand side of application form under loan type where the box mentioning loan recast was checked. He gave an account of what is meant by a loan recast and stated that when a loan is recast, it is subjected to new terms and conditions.

15. Mr. Jhoomuck, thereafter, testified on the Mutual Solidarity Contribution. He explained how deductions are made in respect thereof. He referred to clauses 5.2 and 8.1 as being the two clauses in the information sheet for personal loan [Doc D10] which concern Mutual Solidarity Contribution. He stated that clause 5.2 applies only to new loans. When questioned on whether the Plaintiff could benefit from the Mutual Solidarity Contribution, he replied that pursuant to clause 8.1, it was applicable to him only in case of death and not total permanent disability as the Plaintiff’s loan was a recast.

16. Mr. Jhoomuck further asserted that the Plaintiff took a quick loan in the sum of Rs.172,000. on 26 th August 2015. He added that the Plaintiff first contracted a quick loan on 20 th September 2011 and that same was renewed on numerous occasions until 26 th August 2015. He affirmed that the information sheet attached to the loan agreement produced as Doc P5 is for personal loan and is not the one provided when a quick loan is contracted. He specified that the information sheet for personal loan differs from that of a quick loan. He produced the information sheet for quick loan [Doc D3] and a quick loan renewal sheet with respect to the Plaintiff [Doc D4].

17. Mr. Jhoomuck disagreed that the Plaintiff was entitled to a refund due to total permanent disability. He explained that as per the policy of the Board of the Defendant, a client who suffers from total permanent disability is one who he is bedridden or cannot not do anything. He stated that the Board of the Defendant did not accept to refund the Plaintiff upon service of a notice mise-en-demeure as it was neither new loan nor a case of total permanent disability. He added that as a gesture of goodwill, the Board proposed a loan rescheduling but the Plaintiff was not agreeable thereto.

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18. Mr. Jhoomuck also stated that with respect to quick loan, there is no condition pertaining to total permanent disability. A risk premium is charged to write off loans in case of death of the client.

19. Finally, he stated that as per the records, the Defendant only became aware of the Plaintiff’s health conditions after his retirement on medical ground.

20. In cross-examination, Mr. Jhoomuck conceded that deductions were being made from the monthly pension of the Plaintiff during the period 2016 to 2018 for repayment of loans and Mutual Solidarity Contribution. He, however, emphasised that it was being done as per the terms of the loan agreements. He disagreed that a person with total permanent disability is one who cannot work and maintained that it is a person who is bedridden. He stated that the Plaintiff was not suffering from total permanent disability. Mr. Jhoomuck also explained the meaning of the term “premium” which appears in the information sheet for quick loan. He further stated that clause 5.2 pertaining to total permanent disability in the personal loan information sheet does not apply to the Plaintiff as it was not a new loan but a recast. He specified that a loan is classified as a new loan when a person applies for a loan with the Defendant for the first time.

21. Moreover, upon questions being put to him in cross-examination, Mr. Jhoomuck explained that before signing an application form for loan, a person has to read the conditions mentioned in the information sheet and must seek clarifications if things are not clear. He mentioned that it can be gathered from the application form at the top right-hand side corner whether a loan is a new loan or a recast.

22. Mr. Jhoomuck was adamant that the Defendant acted in compliance with the terms of the loan agreements, the information sheets and the policy of the Defendant. He denied that the Defendant is indebted to the Plaintiff in the sums claimed.

23. In re-examination, Mr. Jhoomuck specified that the Mutual Solidarity Contribution is a one-off payment.

24. The case for the Defendant was, thereafter, closed.

Analysis and Finding

25. I have duly considered all the evidence borne on record as well as the submissions offered on both sides and the authorities filed in Court.

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26. It is not disputed that the Plaintiff contracted a personal loan and a quick loan from the Defendant in January 2013 and August 2015 respectively. It can be gathered from Doc P7 that the personal loan was granted in the sum of Rs.680,000. and from Doc P5 that the quick loan was to the tune of Rs.172,000. It is not contested that both loans were recast and not loans contracted by the Plaintiff for the first time.

27. It is further borne out in evidence that the Plaintiff retired on medical grounds with effect from 20 th July 2016 following a finding made by the Medical Board on 31 st

March 2016 to the effect that he was unfit to discharge the duties of his post which was one of Office Care Attendant/Senior Office Care Attendant. The Plaintiff also affirmed that he was examined by Dr. Reebye after 31 st March 2016 and the latter certified that he was suffering from 75% permanent residual incapacity.

28. Moreover, it is common ground that despite the Plaintiff’s protests, deductions were made by the Defendant from his pensions for repayment of loans following his retirement. It is the contention of the Plaintiff that since he was suffering from 75% permanent incapacity and had to retire prematurely as he was found unfit to perform the duties of his post, the Defendant ought to have written-off the loans which was, according to him, covered by the Mutual Solidarity Contributions he made.

29. For its part, the Defendant disputes the Plaintiff’s assertions and strongly argues it was under no obligation to write-off the Plaintiff’s loans as a result of the Mutual Solidarity Contributions made.

30. At the outset, this Court needs to determine whether pursuant to the terms of the respective agreements, the Plaintiff was entitled to have his loans written-off on the ground of total permanent disability.

31. In so far as the personal loan is concerned, there are two provisions in the information sheet [Doc P10], namely clauses 5.2 and 8.1, which cater for Mutual Solidarity Contribution and the writing-off of loan. They read as follows:

“5.2 For all new loans, the following deductions will be made: (1) the mutual solidarity contribution for the loan (Note: Please note that the solidarity contribution on loan is non-refundable and is payable to offset the loan in case of death of loanee. It will also cover a loanee in case of total permanent disability); (2) the processing fee. … 8.1 Applicants for loans up to Rs1mn will be required to pay a one off processing fee of 0.50% on the loan amount and 0.75% if the loan amount exceeds Rs1mn together with Mutual Solidarity Contribution (MSC) of 2.25% to 3.25% depending on the term of the loan to write off the loan in case of death. In

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addition to death, the contribution may also cover total permanent disability of the loanee subject to Board approval in line with existing policy. The effective date of the MSC is when the loan has been disbursed.”

32. Whilst the Plaintiff agrees that the personal loan taken by him in January 2013 was a recast, he strongly argues that his situation is covered by clause 5.2 and this in spite of the use of the term “new loan”. For the Plaintiff, each time, a recast is done, the loan amounts to a “new loan” within the meaning of that clause. The Defendant, on the other hand, relies on the fact that the recast box was checked at the upper right hand side corner of the application form for personal loan under loan type [Doc P7] to argue that a distinction has to be made between a new loan and a recast loan.

33. After consideration of the above, I note that the term “office use” appears in that part of the application form where the recast box was checked. The evidence on record does not establish at what point in time the box was checked by the Defendant’s préposé and whether it was done in the Plaintiff’s presence and with his full knowledge. Of note, the representative of the Defendant merely adduced evidence on the procedure usually adopted when personal loans are applied for and was unable to enlighten this Court as to the procedure specifically applied to the Plaintiff’s loan. On the evidence placed before me, I have been left in the dark as to whether the Plaintiff was made aware that the terms and conditions were different for a new loan and a recast loan. Any doubt should be, thus, interpreted in the Plaintiff’s favour.

34. On that score, I find it apposite to refer to the principle governing contracts known as “contrats d’adhésion”. In such types of agreements, any ambiguity as to the applicability of the clauses has to be interpreted in favour of the party who did not participate in the drafting of the terms but who only affixed his signature to terms couched down by the other side. I here refer to article 1162 of the Code Civil Mauricien and the following extracts from the case of Sewraz Frères Ltd (In Receivership) v. British American Tobacco 2013 SCJ 43:

“We are of the opinion that the “agreement” between the parties is in the nature of a “contrat d’adhésion” which is described in Marty & Raynaud, Droit Civil, Tome II, 1er volume at para. 116 as follows :-

«on a proposé d’appeler contrats d’adhésion, ces contrats devenus nombreux et importants aujourd’hui, dont la conclusion n’est pas précédée d’une discussion entre les parties. Les clauses de la convention ont été établies par une des parties qui les offre de façon permanente au public; ces clauses sont, le plus souvent, imprimées à l’avance, elles ne peuvent être qu’acceptées purement et simplement et n’appellent qu’une adhésion pure et simple. De tels contrats se caractérisent par le procédé de la pré-rédaction unilatérale;

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ils aboutissent à une unification, à une standardisation de certaines relations contractuelles.»

Article 1162 of the Civil Code sets down the principle that :-

«Dans le doute, la convention s’interprète contre celui qui a stipulé et en faveur de celui qui a contracté l’obligation».

A fortiori, such an interpretation must apply to the interpretation of clauses which were unilaterally drawn up and which form the basis of an agreement akin to a «contrat d’adhésion».”

35. Additionally, it is noted that whilst the term “new loan” is used at clause 5.2, clause 8.1 makes no mention of “new loan”. It is clearly stipulated in clause 8.1 that in addition to death, the Mutual Solidarity Contribution may also cover the total permanent disability of the loanee subject to the Board’s approval in line with existing policy. There is no indication that clause 8.1 should be read subject to clause 5.2 or that clause 5.2 takes precedence over clause 8.1. Since there is nothing to indicate that clause 8.1 is not free-standing, it can safely be assumed that its provision is autonomous and that clause 8.1 deals with loans in general, including recast loans and caters for total permanent disability.

36. When testifying on clause 8.1, the representative of the Defendant at first stated that it deals with the writing-off of loans both in case of death and total permanent disability of the loanee and specified that the latter is subjected to the Board’s approval in line with existing policy. However, he subsequently contradictorily affirmed that the Plaintiff was covered in case of death only under clause 8.1. Yet, when adducing evidence on the reasons as to why the Board did not approve the writing-off of the Plaintiff’s loan, he himself stated that the Board was not satisfied that the Plaintiff was suffering from total permanent disability. The different versions given by the representative of the Defendant leaves this Court in doubt as to whether that provision was properly applied when determining the Plaintiff’s claim at the relevant time.

37. As regards to the quick loan, it is noted that the information sheet which was attached to the quick loan application form produced by the Plaintiff bears the heading “INFORMATION SHEET – PERSONAL LOAN” [Doc P5]. No explanation has been furnished by the Plaintiff as to how this information sheet was attached to the Quick Loan Application Form. That information sheet is admittedly different from the information sheet which applies to quick loan. In fact, the correct information sheet applicable to quick loan was produced as part of the Defendant’s case. The representative of the Defendant was, however, not in possession of a copy of the actual information sheet provided to the Plaintiff when he applied for the quick loan.

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38. I have carefully scrutinised the information sheet produced on behalf of the Defendant. It can be gathered therefrom that the term “Mutual Solidarity Contribution” does not appear anywhere on the information sheet. As rightly highlighted by the representative of the Defendant, clause 4.2 provides for the payment of a premium to offset the loan in case of death of the loanee. The premium does not cover permanent disability.

39. Furthermore, it is noted that during cross-examination, the Plaintiff conceded that in relation to quick loans, there is no possibility of any write-off if any permanent disability arises. However, he stressed that he was informed that he would be covered for total permanent disability in respect of the quick loan taken by him. His version is supported by the letter dated 27 th August 2015 [Doc P8] by virtue of which the Plaintiff was informed that the quick loan had been approved. It can be read therein that deduction was made for Mutual Solidarity Contribution. No explanation has been forthcoming on behalf of the Defendant as to why such a deduction was made if Mutual Solidarity Contribution did not concern quick loan.

40. In light of the foregoing, I find that the Plaintiff’s version on quick loan has not been seriously contradicted. I am, thus, inclined to believe him when he stated that he was told that he was covered in case of total permanent disability.

41. That being said, the next question which arises is whether the Plaintiff has been able to prove that he suffered from total permanent disability which would entail the writing-off of his loans.

42. In order to establish total permanent disability, the Plaintiff relied on the report of the Medical Board dated 31 st March 2016, his premature retirement on medical grounds and the undated report of Dr. Reebye.

43. It can be read from the report of the Medical Board that following an examination of the Plaintiff, the Board was of the opinion that the Plaintiff was permanently unfit to discharge the duties of his post and that he had to continue to follow treatment. It is observed that the finding of the Medical Board was restricted to the job performed by the Plaintiff at the material time and it was on the basis of that report that he retired from service. The report does not reveal whether the Plaintiff’s impairment would prevent him from performing other duties and if so, in what manner. Without any expert evidence being adduced on that score, this Court is not prepared to read more into the report than what is expressly written, the more so as there is not an iota of evidence before this Court as to the nature of the activities which were being carried out by the Plaintiff in his daily work routine. In the absence of any cogent evidence, this Court is not prepared to make any assumption.

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44. Turning now to the report of Dr. Reebye, it is observed that it is an undated report. In Court, the Plaintiff asserted that the examination was done after his retirement on 31 st

March 2016. Dr. Reebye reached the conclusion that there had been a worsening of the state of the lumbar spine over the years since the Plaintiff’s injury at his site of work on 3 rd November 2005 and that this led to a forward shift of the 5 th lumbar vertebrae over S1 vertebrae, which worsened the symptoms and disease of the Plaintiff. According to Dr. Reebye, there would be continuous and permanent worsening of the symptoms and disease which would eventually require a surgical intervention and such surgery might complicate into paralysis of the lower limbs and the Plaintiff would be wheel chair bound with bowel and bladder involvement. Taking into account the sufferance of the Plaintiff, the objective clinical findings on examination and the fact that the Plaintiff would have to undergo a surgical intervention with lots of complications, Dr. Reebye assessed that the Plaintiff had a permanent residual incapacity of 75%.

45. It is noted that whilst Dr. Reebye mentioned in his report that the Plaintiff had been retired on medical ground by a professional Medical Board, he made no findings as to the Plaintiff’s inability to perform any job other than the one he was found unfit to perform by the Medical Board. It is a matter of regret that he was not called as a witness to enlighten this Court on this aspect which is, in fact, crucial to the Plaintiff’s case.

46. Furthermore, I note that one of the factors taken into account by Dr. Reebye when assessing the permanent incapacity of the Plaintiff is the fact that the latter would have to undergo a surgical intervention with lots of complications. Many years have lapsed since the Plaintiff was examined for the purposes of the report drawn up by Dr. Reebye. However, when testifying in Court, the Plaintiff did not utter a single word as to the medical treatment followed by him thereafter. Had the Plaintiff undergone any surgery and suffered from further complications, one would have expected him to bring such evidence before this Court. Quite intriguingly, he simply relied on the old unexplained report of Dr. Reebye.

47. On the issue of total permanent disability, I have also addressed my mind to the submissions offered on both sides as regards the threshold to be applied. Learned Counsel for the Plaintiff invited this Court to adopt the approach followed in the case of Lai Wee Lian v. Singapore Bus Service (1978) Ltd [Privy Council Appeal No.53 of 1983] cited with approval in the case of Louise v. Mauritian Eagle Insurance Co. Ltd & ors [2019] SCJ 84 where the earning capacity of a person suffering from 85% incapacity was found to be virtually nil. He submitted that a person with 75% permanent incapacity is, in effect, totally disabled. Learned Counsel for the Defendant, on the other hand, submitted that the evidence on record fell short of establishing total permanent disability. I further note that in the course of his testimony, the representative of the Defendant contended that as per the policy of the

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Defendant’s Board, a person is considered to suffer from total permanent disability when he is bedridden or cannot not do anything.

48. I wish to remark that the finding in the case of Lai Wee Lian (supra) was made in relation to a determination on loss of future income in a case which fell in the realm of tort. However, even if this Court were to assume that the use of the term “total permanent disability” in the information sheet would refer to a situation where the earning capacity of the loanee was nil as contemplated by Learned Counsel for the Plaintiff, this Court has not been satisfied that the threshold has been met by the Plaintiff evidentially. There is no evidence on record to show that the Plaintiff would not have been in a position to do any job other than the one he was performing at the time of retirement and whether his earning capacity was nil. In the absence of any expert evidence on the issue, this Court is not prepared to surmise.

49. The mere fact that the Plaintiff was suffering from 75% permanent incapacity and was found unfit to perform the duties of his post at the relevant time cannot be automatically equated to total permanent disability. It was incumbent upon the Plaintiff to adduce expert evidence to establish that he qualified for coverage under the loan agreements. He has, however, lamentably failed to do so.

50. For all the reasons set out above, I find that the Plaintiff has failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that he suffered from total permanent disability which would have entailed the writing-off of the loans contracted by him with the Defendant. I, accordingly, dismiss the present action. With costs.

30 th March 2026

C. Servansing-Bhuruth Magistrate Intermediate Court