Supreme Court of Mauritius, 30 mars 2026, 2026 SAV 50 – A Y PERRINE v POLICE

Page 1 A Y PERRINE v POLICE

2026 SAV 50

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAVANNE

Provisional Cause No.: 211/26

Alex Yohanne Perrine Applicant v/s

Police Respondent

Ruling

The applicant stands provisionally charged with the offence of « Drug dealing: Possession of synthetic cannabinoid for purpose of selling » in breach of Sections 30(1)(f)(ii) and 47(5)(a) of the Dangerous Drugs Act. As per the provisional information dated 18th March 2026, the applicant stands provisionally charged with having on or about the 18th March 2026, unlawfully and knowingly possessed dangerous drug for the purpose of selling. The provisional information contains a further averment to the effect that a sum of money suspected to be proceeds of drugs was secured from the applicant.

The applicant has, through his Counsel, moved to be admitted to bail and was represented by Me Veeriah of Counsel.

The Enquiring Officer, PS Pydigadu, was deputed to resist the present bail application and he deponed under oath.

Case for the Respondent

Facts and Circumstances:

Page 2 The Enquiring Officer deponed as to the facts and circumstances of the case stating that on the 18th March 2026, the police searched the applicant’s house and secured a transparent plastic container containing 32 pieces of folded aluminium foil each wrapping a certain quantity of leaf matter suspected to be synthetic cannabinoid as well as a sum of Rs 4,050.

According to the Enquiring Officer, the total value of the suspected drugs is Rs 13,950.

Grounds:

The Enquiring Officer put forward the two grounds upon which the respondent is resisting the present application for bail, namely: (i) Risk of reoffending (ii) Risk of absconding

Elaborating on the risk of reoffending, the Enquiring Officer stated that given that the drugs business is a lucrative one which generates money, and as the applicant does not have a fixed job, the police strongly believes that he may reoffend if he is released on bail.

Elaborating on the risk of absconding, the Enquiring Officer referred to the seriousness of the offence with which the applicant is likely to be charged and for which he may receive a severe penalty thus leading him to abscond.

Status of the enquiry:

The Enquiring Officer gave evidence to the effect that the enquiry is short of the report from the Forensic Science Laboratory.

Nature of the evidence:

It stems out of the Enquiring Officer’s testimony that there is direct evidence against the applicant. The applicant is of clean record and is not on bail.

The Enquiring Officer was duly cross-examined and revealed that the applicant confessed to drug dealing. He confirmed that the applicant has a fixed place of abode and strong family ties.

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Case for the Applicant:

The applicant, from the dock, explained his personal circumstances and promised to abide by all bail conditions.

The Law

While Section 3 of the Bail Act provides for a right to release on bail, Section 4(1) of the Bail Act provides for the grounds upon which a Court may refuse to release a defendant or a detainee on bail. Section 4(2) of the Bail Act further provides for the factors to be considered by the Court in deciding whether or not to refuse bail.

In the case of Hurnam Devendranath v The State [2004] PRV 53, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, citing with approval Noordally v Attorney-General [1986] MR 204, enshrined the principle according to which « the rule is that a suspect should remain at large, his detention on grounds of suspicion the exception ».

The Supreme Court, in the case of Labonne J V v Director Of Public Prosecutions & Anor [2005] SCJ 38, found that « the two conflicting interests which the law of bail seeks to reconcile are, on the one hand, the need to safeguard the necessary respect for the liberty of the citizen viewed in the context of the presumption of innocence, and, on the other hand, the need to ensure that society and the administration of justice are reasonably protected against serious risks which might materialise in the event that the detainee is really the criminal which he is suspected to be. »

In the case of Maloupe M.G. v The District Magistrate Of Grand Port [2000] SCJ 223, the Supreme Court explained the rationale of the law of bail at pre-trial stage as follows:

« The rationale of the law of bail at pre-trial stage is, accordingly, that a person should normally be released on bail if the imposition of the conditions reduces the risks referred to above – i.e. risk of absconding, risk to the administration of justice, risk to society – to such an extent that they become negligible having regard to the weight which the presumption of innocence should carry in the balance. When the imposition of the above

Page 4 conditions is considered to be unlikely to make any of the above risks negligible, then bail is to be refused. »

A Court hearing an application for bail therefore has to undertake a two-stage assessment. It should firstly assess the risks warranting an objection to bail. Should those risks be substantiated, the imposition of conditions to reduce the risks to a negligible level should thereafter be considered. Bail should be refused only in the event that the imposition of conditions would be unlikely to make the risks negligible.

In assessing the risks warranting an objection to bail, the Court has a duty consider all evidence put before it which would tend to increase or reduce the likelihood of the risks materialising. Indeed, in the case of Deelchand V v The Director Of Public Prosecutions And Others [2005] SCJ 215, the Supreme Court described the balancing exercise to be undertaken by the Court as follows:

« It stands to reason that the decision-making process in relation to bail will call for a balancing exercise where all relevant facts have to be given due weight in the balance either in favour of release on bail (where they tend to reduce the likelihood of one of the relevant risks materialising) or in favour of refusal of bail (where they tend to increase the likelihood of one of the relevant risks materialising). »

The Supreme Court, in the case of Deelchand (supra), also provided guidance for the assessment of the risk of absconding in the following terms:

« 5.2 The risk of absconding has to be assessed with regard to several relevant factors. Although, as stated in the last passage quoted, the seriousness of the offence may, by itself or in conjunction with some other factor such as the defendant’s criminal record, give a basis for believing that the defendant will fail to surrender through fear of a custodial sentence, this factor must be viewed in conjunction with other factors which may well indicate that the defendant is unlikely to abscond.

5.3 In Neumeister v Austria (1968) 1 ECHR 91 (27 June 1968) at para 10, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the severity of the sentence which the defendant would be likely to incur, if convicted, does not in itself

Page 5 justify the inference that he or she would attempt to evade trial if released from detention:

“The danger of flight cannot … be evaluated solely on the basis of such consideration..0ther factors, especially those relating to the character of the person involved, his morals, his home, his occupation, his assets, his family ties and all kinds of links with the country in which he is being prosecuted may either confirm the existence of a danger of flight or make it appear so small that it cannot justify detention pending trial.”

5.4 Considerations relevant to the risk of absconding will include the strength, weakness or absence of family, community, professional or occupational ties and financial commitments as such ties, if strong, might be strong incentives not to abscond and, if weak might increase the risk of absconding. The strength of the evidence may also be relevant because if it is likely that the charge will not be proved, the defendant may be less likely to abscond. The court must ask itself: what would be likely to motivate the applicant to abscond and what would be likely to make him refrain from absconding? … »

The Supreme Court, in the case of Deelchand (supra), further ruled that « the risk of offending must be a real one, and that there must be adequate reasons to explain its existence. » The factors which may be considered when assessing the risk of reoffending are the criminal record of the Applicant, the nature of the offence he is suspected to have committed, the sentence expected in case of conviction, the extent to which the suspected offence is lucrative, the connection between the offence charged and the offence feared, the likely consequences of reoffending, the character of the applicant and the nature of the evidence against him.

Analysis

A Court undertaking the two-stage assessment has to address two questions. Firstly, does the evidence put before the Court substantiate the risks warranting an objection to bail? Should the answer to the first question be in the affirmative, secondly, will the imposition of conditions reduce those risks to a negligible level?

Page 6 In undertaking the two-stage assessment, I pay due regard to the fact that while the Enquiring Officer gave evidence under oath and was duly cross-examined, the applicant elected to make a statement from the dock, thereby not exposing himself to cross-examination.

Assessment of the nature of the evidence

I consider that the nature of the evidence against the applicant at pre-trial stage is in the form of real evidence of a transparent plastic container containing 32 pieces of folded aluminium foil each wrapping suspected synthetic cannabinoid secured from the applicant’s premises. It further stems out of the Enquiring Officer’s testimony that money suspected to be proceeds of drugs were also secured therefrom. I however note that no evidence of any paraphernalia additionally secured from the applicant’s premises was adduced. It on the other hand stems out of the Enquiring Officer’s testimony that the applicant has admitted to drug dealing.

In light of the above and of the real evidence, I find the nature of the evidence against the applicant at pre-trial stage in respect of the present provisional information to be reliable.

Risk of reoffending:

The evidence of the Enquiring Officer regarding the risk of reoffending is based on the lucrativeness of the drugs business and the fact that the applicant is not in stable gainful employment.

It stems out of the Enquiring Officer’s testimony that the applicant has a clean record and is not on bail. This, I find, does not weigh heavily in the balance in favour of increasing the likelihood of the risk of reoffending materialising.

However, the evidence before me is to the effect that a non-negligible quantity of individualised doses of suspected synthetic cannabinoid valued at a non-negligible amount has been secured from the applicant. I reiterate my previous conclusion in respect of the nature of the evidence against the applicant at pre-trial stage. Bearing in mind the lucrativeness of the drugs business, I find that the nature of the evidence against the applicant, coupled with the amount and value of suspected dangerous drugs secured from him weigh heavily in the balance in favour of increasing the

Page 7 likelihood of the risk of reoffending materialising. The moreso as the applicant is the sole breadwinner who single-handedly caters for his wife and baby.

In light of the above, I find that the risk of reoffending is real and plausible and has been substantiated.

Risk of absconding:

As per the testimony of the Enquiring Officer, the risk of absconding is based on the seriousness of the offence with which the applicant is likely be charged and the severity of the penalty he may have to face.

The applicant in the present case has been provisionally charged with the offence of drug dealing in breach of Section 30(1)(f)(ii) of the Dangerous Drugs Act. I have considered the nature of the offence under Section 30(1)(f)(ii) of the Dangerous Drugs Act and I note that it carries a custodial sentence in the form of penal servitude for a term not less than 5 years but not exceeding 25 years together with a fine not exceeding one million rupees. I consider that the offence with which the applicant is likely to be formally charged is a serious one. I bear in mind the evidence of the Enquiring Officer in respect of the amount and estimated value of the suspected drugs secured. Notwithstanding the applicant’s clean record, I find that the offence with which he is likely to be formally charged additionally carries a severe penalty.

By virtue of Section 4(2)(b) of the Bail Act one of the factors which the Court is to take into account when assessing the grounds of objection to bail is indeed the nature and gravity of the offence and of the penalty. The judgment in the case of Neumeister v Austria (1968) 1 ECHR 91 referred to in the case of Deelchand (supra), however, makes it clear that « the severity of the sentence which the defendant would be likely to incur, if convicted, does not in itself justify the inference that he or she would attempt to evade trial if released from detention ». Other factors which can be taken into consideration when assessing the risk of absconding are « the strength, weakness or absence of family, community, professional or occupational ties and financial commitments ».

The Enquiring Officer has given evidence of the applicant’s fixed place of abode and of his family ties. These, I therefore find, do not weigh in the balance in favour of increasing the likelihood of the risk of absconding materialising.

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I further find that in the present matter, in itself, the nature of the offence with which the applicant is likely to be formally charged and the penalty attached thereto is not sufficient to tempt the applicant to think that he will have nothing to lose by absconding.

In light of the above, I find that the risk of absconding warranting an objection to bail is negligible.

The balancing exercise

Having found that the risk of reoffending has been substantiated, I now have to assess whether the imposition of conditions will reduce this said risk to a negligible level.

In that respect, I bear in mind that the applicant is not on any bail and no evidence of him having breached bail conditions in the past was adduced before me.

Among the risk-reducing conditions which may be contemplated, the Supreme Court in the case of Deelchand (supra) found that « Security appears applicable to all the risks as it may be an incentive to the applicant to appear for trial, to behave whilst on bail and to refrain from interfering with witnesses, or tampering with evidence. » The imposition of appropriate reporting conditions would also provide police supervision over the applicant.

Conclusion

In light of the above, I find that a combination of bail conditions will reduce the risk of reoffending to a negligible level. I therefore order that the applicant be admitted to bail on the following conditions:

(i) The applicant shall furnish a surety of Rs 10,000; (ii) The applicant shall enter into a recognisance of Rs 30,000; (iii) The applicant has to reside at a fixed address which he shall provide to the police; and

Page 9 (iv) The applicant shall report to the police station nearest to his place of abode once every Tuesday and Saturday between 06.00 hours and 20.00.

A Dhunnoo (Miss) District Magistrate This 30th March 2026