Supreme Court of Mauritius, 31 mars 2026, 2026 LPW 11 – Police v Marie Brenda Anouchka Manoovaloo

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Police v Marie Brenda Anouchka Manoovaloo

2026 LPW 11

PCN: 1827/25

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF LOWER PLAINES WILHEMS

In the matter of –

Police

v/s

Marie Brenda Anouchka Manoovaloo

RULING

The charge

The Accused stands provisionally charged with having, in or about the month of March 2016, at No. 63 Epingle Street, Mont Roches, criminally, wilfully and unlawfully agreed with other persons to do an act which is unlawful, in breach of section 109(1) of the Criminal Code (Supplementary) Act coupled with sections 216 and 222(1) of the Criminal Code.

The background facts

The present provisional charge was lodged on 27 October 2025 even though the Court was informed, during the course of the hearing, that another provisional charge for a more serious offence had been previously lodged against the Accused. That other provisional charge was struck out to give way to the present one, with there being no objection on behalf of the prosecution to the Accused being admitted to bail.

On the very same day that the present provisional charge was lodged, Learned Counsel appearing for the Accused moved that it be struck out on the ground of abuse of process. The motion was objected to by the prosecution.

The matter was fixed for Arguments on 2 February 2026 when the motion was heard.

The case for the Prosecution

On that day, PS Arcanthe (the “Enquiring Officer”) deposed on behalf of the prosecution to sustain the objection.

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The Enquiring Officer informed the Court that on 25 August 2016, following a request, police officers posted at the Camp Levieux Police Station repaired to No. 63 Epingle Street, Mont Roches where they found the body of Mr Jacques Laval Mario Bathilde, aged 61 years, on the first floor of his residence with his hands and feet tied. An autopsy carried out on the same day attributed the cause of death to a smothering asphyxia.

Following an enquiry, four persons were arrested, including the Accused. The Accused has given a statement to the police wherein sh e has admitted her participation not in the crime but after the act whereby, in her presence, a sum of money was remitted to another co-accused party.

The enquiry was completed on 26 November 2019 and the case file referred to the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions ever since. One co-accused party was prosecuted before the Intermediate Court and sentenced on 31 May 2022. Otherwise, the Enquiring Officer cannot explain the delay, if any.

Under cross-examination, the Enquiring Officer stated that –

(a) since 2016, there have been two enquiring officers and both have left the force;

(b) the case for the other two co-accused parties is being tried at the Assizes such that only the Accused has had no formal charge lodged against her;

(c) as per her statement, the Accused neither participated in the murder nor conspired to commit the murder;

(d) the Accused has been cooperative up until now; and

(e) a provisional charge against a person for some ten years would cause prejudice to that person.

Under re-examination, the Enquiring Officer stated that he is not sure whether the other two co-accused parties are indeed standing trial before the Supreme Court.

The case for the Accused

The Accused deposed under oath and explained that a provisional charge of murder was initially lodged against her following which she had spent some eight months on remand. She has always been available to the police and cooperated with the enquiry.

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At the time of the incident, she was living together with Mr Désiré Donovan Hansley Boodhun, one of the main accused parties. They were not married but have one child together. She is now civilly married to someone else whom she has known for five years and, together, they have a one-year-old child. She has been provisionally charged with an offence she did not commit.

The Accused further explained that the provisional charge has become tiring as she has had to report to the police station for the past ten years. She is now reporting twice a week and has to come to Court every three months. Whenever she attends to those commitments, she has to leave her child with a relative or a neighbour. She gave an undertaking that she would continue to remain available and cooperate with the police if ever the provisional is struck out.

Under cross-examination, the Accused admitted that, being given there is a provisional charge, it is normal for there to be restrictions.

Under re-examination, the Accused explained that the reporting frequency was reduced at the time when she had been pregnant and that a relative or neighbour cannot look after her child as she would do.

Analysis

I have considered all the evidence on record and the submissions made by both sides.

In cases like the present one, the complete Court file is usually available to the Court for perusal as to the exact chronology of events that ultimately lead to a motion as the present one being made by the defence.

In the case at hand, I am faced with a somewhat unique and rather tricky situation.

This is because, firstly, the initial provisional charge has been struck out and the present one lodged instead. Secondly, the motion of the defence came at the same sitting when the present provisional charge was lodged such that the present charge itself does not have much of a history.

Be that as it may, as I have been able to glean from the evidence adduced before me, it would appear that the Accused has been the subject of a provisional charge for the past ten years.

The motion itself was grounded in very broad terms. However, from the evidence adduced and the submissions offered, there appears to have been absolutely no doubt in the minds of both parties that the abuse of process alleged by the defence arose from the delay in prosecuting the Accused.

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As explained above, the exact date when the Accused was initially arrested was not put forward during the course of the hearing. That would have been the date that would have set the hourglass trickling – Bissoon Mungroo vs Queen (1990 PRV 22). It would appear that the arrest took place sometime in the year 2016. At the time of reading of the present ruling, some ten years have since elapsed.

I must acknowledge that the Enquiring Officer has been pretty honest and forthcoming in his testimony before the Court. He outright acquiesced the fact that a provisional charge laid against a person for ten years is bound to cause prejudice to that person.

In order for me to assess whether or not the provisional charge should be struck out on the ground of delay, it is incumbent on me to carry out a balancing exercise between the raison d’être of the provisional charge and the prejudice being caused to the Accused by maintaining her under it.

The elements to be considered while assessing the delay factor have been laid down in State vs Bissessur & Ors (2001 SCJ 50), namely –

1. the length of the delay;

2. the reasons given by the prosecution to justify the delay;

3. the responsibility of the accused for asserting his right; and

4. the prejudice caused to the accused.

Insofar as the length of the delay is concerned, as already pointed out previously, this adds up to some ten years since the Accused was arrested and the initial provisional charge was lodged.

What, however, distinguishes the present matter with the other caselaw on this particular issue of delay is that the police enquiry into the present matter has already been completed and the case file already sent to the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions as far back as 26 November 2019.

The Enquiring Officer explained that, since then, a main case has been lodged at the Intermediate Court against one of the co-accused parties and the latter has already been sentenced on 31 May 2022. The other two co-accused parties are apparently meant to stand trial before the Supreme Court. Given the nature of the provisional charge laid against the Accused, it would appear that the outcome of the case before the Supreme Court would have some bearing on the formal charge to be lodged against the Accused.

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That being said, some ten years have passed without the Accused knowing whether a formal charge will be proffered against her. Even after factoring in the seriousness of the charge, the complexity of the case and the limits of our institutional resources, the time lapsed appears to be on the high side and does give rise to some real concern.

I shall now address my mind to the reasons put forward by the prosecution to explain this delay.

The enquiry into the present matter started on 25 August 2016 upon the discover of a dead body and it was concluded on 26 November 2019 with the case file being referred to the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions. The Enquiring Officer did mention, at some point in time during his testimony, that two previous officers who were investigating into the matter have retired. If at all, that would tend to explain the delay in completing the enquiry.

There is then the gap between November 2019 up until today consisting of more than six years. No explanation was provided as to this delay other than –

(a) a co-accused party has been prosecuted before the Intermediate Court and sentenced on 31 May 2022; and

(b) the Enquiring Officer being unsure as to whether the two other co- accused parties are indeed standing trial before the Assizes.

As to the assertion of her right, as alluded to earlier, the Court does not have the benefit of the whole picture inasmuch as the proceedings for the initial provisional charge laid against the Accused was not placed before the Court. Insofar as the present provisional charge is concerned, as already highlighted earlier, the Accused has asserted her right inasmuch as the motion being presently debated was made on the very day that the provisional charge was lodged against her.

I shall now consider the prejudice being caused to the Accused.

The Accused has testified to the fact that she has now moved on in her life (and she sounded very sincere) which, in itself, is not surprising given the time that has elapsed since the time that she was first arrested. She now has an offspring with a new partner to whom she is civilly married. She has to look after her child and the continuance of the provisional charge together with the stigma associated with it is adversely impacting her capacity to do so.

Overall, I have before me a person –

(a) who has been under judicial supervision for the past ten years;

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(b) whose movements have, ever since her arrest, been monitored by the police even though the frequency of monitoring has been altered;

(c) who, in the own words of the Enquiring Officer, has cooperated with the police enquiry and is not to be blamed for the delay in the formal charge being lodged;

(d) whose family appears to be facing some considerable amount of prejudice by virtue of the subsistence of the provisional charge; and

(e) who, from her deposition (which I believe), desperately wishes to close a dark past chapter of her life but who cannot do so through no fault of hers.

The issue of absconding not having been raised by the prosecution – the risk that the Accused flees the jurisdiction should the provisional be struck out and the Prohibition Order lapse – I shall not address same as I believe the prosecution harbours no such fears.

Altogether, when everything is weighed in the balance, the genuine prejudice being faced by the Accused and her family far exceeds the need for the continuance of the provisional charge, especially in the light of the inordinate delay that has elapsed.

Conclusion

For all the reasons mentioned above, I strike out the provisional charge against the Accused. All orders made pursuant to that provisional charge are to lapse.

It stands to reason that this shall, in no way, preclude the prosecution from lodging a main case against the Accused whenever it is ready to do so.

H. H. A. Rohamally Senior District Magistrate

31 March 2026