Supreme Court of Mauritius, 6 avril 2026, 2026 IND 13 – Kartick L.M.C. v Tropitex Solutions Ltd

1 Kartick L.M.C. v Tropitex Solutions Ltd

2026 IND 13

Cause Number 439/2020

IN THE INDUSTRIAL COURT OF MAURITIUS (Civil Side)

In the matter of: –

Mrs. Lolita Marie Chantal Kartick

Plaintiff

v.

Tropitex Solutions Ltd

Defendant

Ruling

The averments of this second amended plaint are as follows: 1. Plaintiff has been in employment with Tropitex Ltd since 1 April 2002. 2. The employment of Plaintiff was transferred from Tropitex Ltd to Tropitex Solutions Ltd with effect from 16 January 2018 and the Plaintiff’s years of service with Tropitex Ltd was taken over by Tropitex Solutions Ltd. 3. She last held the position of “Chef de Produits et Controleur de Qualite”. 4. Her last remuneration for March 2020 was in the sum of Rs 31,321. 5. By way of an email dated March 30, 2020, she was informed that her services were no longer required as from April 1, 2020, due to the alleged loss of a major client from USA.

2 6. The termination of her employment on April 1, 2020 was unlawful, unjustified and unwarranted. In addition, as expatiated below, the Defendant’s acts and doings in the context of the termination of her employment shows that the Defendant had breached its duty of good faith inasmuch as: (a) the Plaintiff was informed that, on 24 April 2020, she was paid one month’s basic salary in lieu of notice in the sum of Rs 16,100. Plaintiff avers that Tropitex Solutions Ltd ought to have paid to her the amount of remuneration which she would have earned during the notice period, that is, the sum of Rs 31,321, instead of Rs 16,100, with the result that she has been shortpaid the amount of Rs 15,221; (b) on 2 occasions during their weekly meetings in 2020, the Defendant’s directors namely Katty Chong Shin Sen and Jenifer Sooprayen have voiced out to all its employees employed as “Controleur de Qualite” including the Plaintiff that the department of “Controleur de Qualite” was overstaffed. The Plaintiff avers that this shows that the Defendant had already intended to reduce the number of employees in that department irrespective of its economic situation and the Defendant merely used the covid -19 pandemic and alleged loss of one major client from USA to expeditiously and without consultation terminate the employment of the Plaintiff and 3 other employees. It is to be noted that in the event that the Defendant’s economic situation has worsened due to covid-19 pandemic (which is denied), the Defendant would have been eligible to benefit from the Wage Assistance Scheme of the Government of Mauritius to ensure the payment of salaries of its employees, including the Plaintiff, instead of terminating her employment expeditiously and without consultation as averred above; (c) in fact, one of the employees of the Defendant namely Mevin Cournadin employed as “Controleur de Qualite” and whose employment was also terminated at the same time and for the same reason as the Plaintiff, was employed again namely around one year later by the Defendant for the same post of “Controleur de Qualite”; (d) the major client from USA allegedly lost as averred in paragraph 5 above has been doing business with the Defendant during the covid-19 pandemic and later thereby shedding doubt as to the veracity of the alleged loss of the said

3 major client from USA used as alleged reason to terminate the employment of the Plaintiff at the relevant time. 7. As a result of the unlawful termination of her employment, the Defendant is liable to the Plaintiff in the total sum of Rs 1,730,045.75 representing severance allowance, shortpay in respect of notice period, refund of untaken annual leaves and pro-rated end of year bonus. Defendant, for its part, has denied liability and has averred that Plaintiff’s tasks and duties, as well as those of four other ex-employees, were mainly in respect of a specific client namely Full Beauty Brands represented by Bilcotex Ltd. (i) Bilcotex Ltd, an authorised company, and its major client, Full Beauty Brands, operate in the United States of America. By way of a letter dated 27.3.2020, Bilcotex Ltd informed the Defendant that due to Covid-19 virus impact on businesses, Bilcotex Ltd’s client, Full Beauty Brands, decided to terminate its contract with Bilcotex Ltd; (ii) As a result of the aforesaid termination, Bilcotex Ltd informed the Defendant that it will not be in a position to renew its contract with the Defendant and the termination of the contract would take effect on 31.3.2020. (iii) In view of the loss of its major client, the Defendant faced an economic and/or financial downturn to such an extent that it was not in a position to keep its employees without affecting its solvency and competitiveness; (iv) Upon being informed by Bilcotex Ltd that the latter will no longer retain the services of the Defendant, the latter, acting in good faith, could not take any other course of action than to terminate, with effect from the 31.3.2020, the employment of all its employees, except for four of them (two of whom are directors and shareholders and the other two being the most senior in years of service); (v) In such circumstances and in view of the economic and/or financial situation in which the Defendant was, following the loss of its major client, the Defendant, through an email dated 30 March 2020, informed the Plaintiff that her services would no longer be required. (vi) The termination of Plaintiff’s employment was based on “motifs économiques” and /or was a “licenciement économique”.

4 (vii) The Plaintiff was fully aware that there was a great risk that the major client, Bilcotex Ltd, will no longer retain the services of the Defendant and that as a result, the employment of employees would be at risk. Prior to losing the contract with Bilcotex Ltd, Defendant had already lost its contract with GSM Europe. (viii) The Plaintiff was further informed by the Defendant that its future would depend on the outcome of the renewal of contract by Bilcotex Ltd and that if the said contract was not renewed, the Defendant would be facing a dire financial situation. The question was not of overstaffing but of the survival of the company and the wage assistance scheme would have been of no use. (ix) The Covid-19 pandemic worsened the situation and ultimately, Bilcotex Ltd, decided not to renew the contract with the Defendant. With the covid-19 pandemic and following the loss of a major client, the Defendant found itself in a serious financial situation and ultimately suffered a loss during the financial year despite having terminated the employment of the employees. (x) The said Mevin Cournadin was employed as “Responsible test/Merchandiser/Quality Controller” and was subsequently reemployed by the Defendant in his capacity as “Responsible Test” because the Defendant was able to secure a different contract solely for lab testing in Mauritius, quality control being performed abroad. (xi) The termination of Plaintiff’s employment was lawful, justified and warranted in view of the economic constraints faced by Defendant. (xii) The termination of the Plaintiff’s employment was inevitable in view of the dire financial situation of the Defendant. (xiii) In such circumstances, the Defendant acting in good faith, could not take any other course of action than to terminate the Plaintiff’s employment. The Plaintiff, as such, cannot be heard to say that the termination of her employment was allegedly unlawful, unjustified and unwarranted.

5 (xiv) Defendant has moved that the said second amended plaint be set aside with costs as the Plaintiff is not entitled to any of the items of the claim pressed. The trial started. The Plaintiff started deposing in chief as per the averments of her second amended plaint above. She said that she had a conversation with the representative of Defendant on 30.3.2020 and an email was sent on the same day to her to inform her that her services at Tropitex Solutions Ltd would no longer be required as from 1.4.2020 due to loss of Defendant’s major client from USA and that it had no other alternative than to terminate her employment contract due to the above circumstances as per her termination letter (Doc. P4). Further, in another letter there were the details of her severance allowance less contribution amounting to Rs 122,679 which would be credited to her. Learned Counsel for the Defendant, has objected to the production of that letter, because although it does not have the mention “without prejudice”, contains “without prejudice” element regarding possible negotiations for a settlement to be reached with the employee in question. The objection was resisted by learned Counsel for the Plaintiff as he insisted upon production of that letter. Learned Counsel for the Defendant although he agreed that there is no mention of “without prejudice” on the header of the letter, the contents of it are “without prejudice” and contain “without prejudice” information which cannot be disclosed without the consent of the Defendant. The matter was fixed for arguments. The three documents were produced for the sake of arguments only upon agreement of parties viz. a letter dated 6.4.20, another letter dated 5.5.20 and an email dated 17.6.20. The contention of learned Counsel for the Defendant is that the documents which the Plaintiff is seeking to adduce in evidence are “without prejudice” documents and they cannot be disclosed without the consent of the Defendant and no exception regarding the lifting of that cloak of “without prejudice” applies in this case. Paragraph 6(a) of the second amended proecipe (final plaint), following objections which have been raised, the Plaintiff deleted the reference to the letter

6 dated 5.5.2020 and deleted the reference to the negotiations which occurred and the discharge basis which were to avoid litigation in the future. So, the purpose of those letters is to try and reach a settlement in the context of a foreseeable litigation regarding termination of employment. Once the Plaintiff has removed the reference on the basis of his objection previously made that it is “without prejudice”, this amounts to clearly, in his view, an admission that the document was “without prejudice” and cannot be produced. It is now no longer in the pleadings and it is strikingly inappropriate in the circumstances for the Plaintiff to seek to adduce evidence and similar type of evidence after having removed it from the proecipe, when in his view, clearly, Defendant accepted that it is “without prejudice”. So, the removal of the reference to the letter of the 5.5.2020 and removal of the discharge agreement, for him amounts to an admission that the documents are “without prejudice”. But when we look at the documents themselves, it is a chain of correspondence and we cannot look at them in isolation. We clearly see when we look at the whole chain that there was an offer which was made, that offer was not accepted and that offer was withdrawn. The offer was made to avoid the dispute, to avoid the litigation. The “without prejudice” rule governs the admissibility of evidence and is founded upon the public policy of encouraging litigants to settle their differences rather than litigate them to a finish. The rule applies to exclude all negotiations genuinely aimed at a settlement, whether oral or in writing from being given in evidence. The purpose of the rule is to protect a litigant from being embarrassed by any admission made purely in an attempt to achieve a settlement. “Without prejudice” material will be admissible if, and these are the exceptions, if the issue is whether or not negotiations resulted in an agreed settlement but in relation to any other issue, an admission made in order to achieve a compromise should not be held against the maker of the admission or received in evidence. When we look at the letter, clearly what inference or admission the Plaintiff is seeking to draw from the correspondence is that there is an amount being offered over and above what is being provided by the law. What inference the Plaintiff will seek to draw is that there is a sort of admission that the termination was not justified. This is exactly the sort of prejudice, the sort of embarrassment which “without prejudice” rule is supposed to protect; otherwise, nobody will make an offer to try and settle the matter. If the offer which I make is then disclosed to the Court and used as a basis of saying, well you have admitted that you have not terminated properly

7 because you made me an offer. That will undermine the whole system of “without prejudice” communications and will undermine the whole idea of promoting settlements. Therefore, any discussions between parties for the purpose of resolving the dispute between them are not admissible (see- White Book 2005). He has referred to the letter of 17.6.2020 where it says that “you have not accepted the “without prejudice” offer and that offer is withdrawn”. So, it follows that the documents containing such material are themselves privileged from production. This head of privilege is not confined to admissions. This is important and applies to all bona fide “without prejudice”. It follows that the documents containing such material are themselves privileged from production. This head of privilege is not confined to admissions but applies to all bona fide “without prejudice” statements touched upon the strengths or weaknesses of the parties’ cases which placed a valuation on a party’s rights forming part of the attempt to compromise the litigation. What does that mean, is you have an X claim and I make you an offer of Y, which whatever it is, so if I make a valuation of your claim, and I say look I’m offering you this much that is privileged. So, for example, if I offer an amount in a letter, that is privileged. He relied on the judgment of Vestergaard Frandsen A/S and 2 Ors. v Bestnet Europe Limited and 4 Ors. [2014] EWHC 4047(Ch). The Court in that case, found that there was an exchange of correspondence which was what the Defendant was seeking to rely upon for the purposes of cost assessment. The Court found that the letters formed part of a chain of correspondence and the context of that chain was an attempt by the parties to resolve the assessment of cost proceedings. That was the purpose of the correspondence and the Court then addressed on the law on “without prejudice” privilege. The policy of “without prejudice” is not limited to an agreement between the parties. There is a public policy element. He referred to the case of Ofulue v Bossert [2009] AC 990 where the House of Lords firmly rejected any attempt to treat the public policy as having such a narrow scope. Lord Hope at paragraph 12 said as follows: “It is the ability to speak freely that indicates where the limits of the rule should lie. Far from being mechanistic, the rule is generous in its application. It recognises that unseen dangers may lurk behind things said or written during this period, and it removes the inhibiting effect that this may have in the interests of promoting attempts to achieve a settlement. It is not to be defeated by other considerations of public policy which may emerge later, such as those suggested in this case, that would deny them that protection.”

8 So, the threshold to remove that cloak of “without prejudice” is very high. The question was whether some correspondence could be “without prejudice” while others could be open letters and not covered by “without prejudice”. So, the contention of the Defendant in Vestergaard Frandsen(supra) was that some documents had that privilege but others did not. The Court found the following: “I do not believe that this argument has any merit. Once a party has made a without prejudice offer, the recipient of the offer is plainly free to make a without prejudice response. The response may be to make a counter- offer, it may be to ask for more information, or it may be simply to reject the offer outright. He may even choose to ignore the offer completely. All those responses are protected by the privilege. If authority was needed for this proposition, there is plenty of it. In a well- known passage in Cutts v Head in which Oliver LJ made clear that the privilege protected all communications, which included ‘of course, as much the failure to reply to an offer as an actual reply.’ If it covers the failure to reply to an offer, it obviously must include the rejection of an offer. In Walker v Wilsher Bowen LJ stated that ‘it would be a bad thing and lead to serious consequences if the Courts allowed the action of litigants, on letters written to them without prejudice to be given in evidence against them or to be used as material for depriving them of costs’ [my emphasis]. In Reed, the Defendants were seeking to open up without prejudice correspondence to demonstrate that the Claimants had unreasonably rejected out of hand a proposal to go to ADR. The Court of Appeal refused to allow this, noting at [34] that it was a necessary consequence of the without prejudice rule that ‘in some cases the Court when it comes to the question of costs cannot decide whether one side or the other was unreasonable in refusing mediation.” So much so that the “without prejudice” rule is so severe that even when that document could have been useful, the Court says no, you cannot use it. So, everything is covered in the string of correspondence. So, whether it is the fact that an offence has been made, the fact that it has been refused or that there was no reply, or the reason why it was refused, all this is covered by “without prejudice” and none of it is admissible. The Mauritian authorities which cover the “without prejudice” principle are Société Jayediessem & Ors v La Serenissima Limited [1996 SCJ 358] and Enterprise Feljas & Masson v The Central Water Authority [2012 SCJ 468] where in the latter case the cloak of “without prejudice” was lifted as the offer was accepted. In the present case no agreement has been reached. In the

9 circumstances, the Court should not allow the Plaintiff to introduce in evidence the letters of 6.4.2020, 5.5.2020 and the email of 17.6.2020 because the whole is covered by the “without prejudice” privilege. The main thrust of the argument of learned Counsel for the Plaintiff is as follows. He has no qualms with the state of the law as stated by his learned Friend. He agrees on all the principles and exceptions. But just to reply on one of the points made earlier in relation to the letter that was sent by the Defendant Attorney on the 13.7.2022, where they took objection with the content of some paragraphs of the first amended plaint. The mere fact that the plaint was amended, this cannot be seen as an admission unless there is a clear statement on record at any point in time by the Attorney for the Plaintiff to the fact that those communications were indeed “without prejudice”. We have no such statement. So, we cannot by the mere fact of the amendment assume that Defendant agreed with whatever was stated in the letter dated 13.7.2022. He agrees that the rule “without prejudice” privilege is aimed at protecting the content of discussions which took place between the parties, whether orally or in writing, whether or not there is mention of the phrase “without prejudice” on the document. The rule aims at protecting those discussions and the contents of those discussions. The amendment which is made at paragraph 6(a) and the part which is deleted is “by letter dated 5.5.2020”. So, the reference to the nature and the date of the document is deleted. But then we see the Plaintiff was informed on 24.4.2020 that she was paid one month salary in lieu of notice. It seems to him that the content is still here. We only have the deletion of the document itself, the fact that it is a letter and the fact that it is dated 5.5.2020. So, what difference does it make if the full paragraph of the pleading is still there. Those three documents could not be seen as a negotiation at this stage. Doc. P4(the termination email) has already been produced. In his submission, the Plaintiff is merely being informed in detail of her severance allowance which is due, as Defendant had already stated when it terminated her employment in its email dated 30 th of March. He relied on the case of Bradford & Bingley plc v Rashid [2006] 1 WLR 2066, AC, which is a House of Lords judgment where it was held that the “without prejudice” rule has no application if the communication is designed to discuss the payment or repayment of an admitted liability. In the present case, Plaintiff was informed that she will be paid all her dues as per the employment law. This is specifically the letter dated 6.4.2020 which was just a question of informing her of the payment which will be made for her severance allowance as per employment law. This is not an offer and the timing is important. It is not as if this letter was communicated to the Plaintiff before

10 termination of her employment. Her employment was already terminated at that point in time and she had been informed already that she will be paid her dues and this is exactly what this is. It is a question of informing her of a payment in relation to an admitted liability. At that time there was no litigation and that was not a negotiation. It goes to the good faith of the claim and which is not an offer. However, he does concede that there are the words: “which will be credited to your account upon final agreement” but which should not be seen as proof or that the parties were negotiating at that time. The Defendant is only telling the Plaintiff, this is the detail of your severance allowance which is due, as Defendant had already stated when it terminated her employment in its email dated 30.3.2020. His submission is that those documents should go in, in the interests of justice to see what were the words communicated at the time by the Defendant. That was not a negotiation. He also relied on the case of Barnetson v Framlington Group Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 502; [2007] 1. W.L.R.2443. Learned Counsel for the Defendant submitted in reply that he relied on section 70 of the Workers’ Rights Act. Learned Counsel for the Plaintiff further submitted that he was relying on section 63 of the Workers’ Rights Act that the employer had to notify the employee and to give the reason for the termination. I have duly considered the arguments of both learned Counsel for the Plaintiff and Defendant. The purpose of the impugned three letters (inclusive of the email letter dated 17.6.20) as can be gleaned ex facie, by way of a chain of correspondence and the context of that chain was an attempt by the parties to find an agreement and which was not reached although the sum of Rs 16,100.00 was credited to the account of Plaintiff in that attempt but which eventually failed. Given that the 3 said letters pertain to an attempt at settling the case, cannot be construed as an admitted liability by the Defendant that the dismissal of Plaintiff was unjustified and that those letters aimed only at the quantum of severance allowance amongst others claimed by Plaintiff. First of all, the relevant part of the termination email letter (Doc.P4) for which there was no objection reads as follows: “Termination of employment

11 Further to the conversation we had on the 30 th March 2020, this is to inform you that your services at Tropitex Solutions Ltd will no longer be required as from the 1 st April 2020 due to the loss of our major client from USA. We have no other alternative than to terminate your employment contract due to above circumstances. (emphasis added) You will be paid all your dues as per existing employment law. We are working on the details that we will forward to you shortly.” Therefore, in that termination letter (Doc. P4), there is no mention that the Defendant had other alternatives in good faith than to terminate the employment of Plaintiff in order to impute that it was the reason the Defendant has stated that Plaintiff would have been paid all her dues as per existing employment law. Further, there is no mention made therein as regards the quantum of severance allowance amongst others. Had it been mentioned therein that in good faith, the Defendant had no other alternative than to terminate her employment for the reason given by it, then it would have meant that the termination was justified and there would have been no need to reach an agreement to payment of severance allowance. Now, in the impugned email letter dated 17.6.2020, the term “without prejudice” was used to establish an overpayment done to Plaintiff having nothing mentioned with regards to payment of severance allowance as opposed to the 2 other impugned letters dated 6.4.2020 and 5.5.2020 where the term “without prejudice” was not mentioned and concerned the quantum of severance allowance. At this stage, it is relevant to reproduce Section 70(1)(d) and 3(a) & (b) of the Workers’ Rights Act 2019 which provides: “70. Amount of severance allowance (1) Where a worker has been in continuous employment for a period of at least 12 months with an employer, the Court may, where it finds that – (d) the employer could have in good faith taken any other course of action instead of terminating the employment of the worker; order that the worker be paid severance allowance – (emphasis added)

12 (…) (3) For the purpose of this section, a month’s remuneration shall be- (a) the remuneration drawn by the worker for the last complete month of his employment; or” (b) An amount computed in the manner as is best calculated to give the rate per month at which the worker was remunerated over a period of 12 months before the termination of his agreement, including payment for extra work, productivity bonus, attendance bonus, commission in return for services and any other regular payment, whichever is higher. Now, the Defendant has denied in its plea that the termination of Plaintiff’s employment was unlawful, unjustified and unwarranted and that acting in good faith it could not take any other course of action than to terminate the Plaintiff’s employment and that Plaintiff was not entitled to the sum claimed inclusive of severance allowance. Therefore, the contention of learned Counsel for the Plaintiff that the Defendant is only telling the Plaintiff that this is the detail of your severance allowance which is due, and which Defendant had already stated when it terminated her employment in its email letter dated 30.3.2020(Doc.P4), is compellingly not convincing the more so as there was a complete abstraction of the term severance allowance as can be clearly seen above as per Doc. P4. Thus, it is abundantly clear that the purpose of the 2 impugned letters containing “without prejudice” material and the concluding impugned email letter dated 17.6.20 being sought to be put in by the Plaintiff, is to shed light on the part payment done in the sum of Rs 16,100.00 as part of the negotiation between the parties for a settlement to be reached but which did not materialize, in order to impute an admission of Defendant having unjustifiably terminated the Plaintiff’s employment. Indeed, in Société Jayediessem(supra), the Supreme Court precluded the disclosure of “without prejudice” communications by relying on the White Book under Order 24 rule 5 at paragraph 17 whereby it was stipulated that “without prejudice” material will be admissible if the issue is whether or not negotiations resulted in an agreed settlement otherwise, in relation to any other issue, an

13 admission made in order to achieve a compromise should not be held against the maker of the admission or received in evidence, an extract of which reads as follows: “Learned Counsel for the applicant has submitted that what Senior Counsel for the respondent did in filing his affidavit went against Order 24 rule 5 regarding “without prejudice communications” and should be discarded. The White Book under Order 24 rule 5 reads as follows at paragraph 17: “Without prejudice communications – The “without prejudice” rule governs the admissibility of evidence and is founded upon the public policy of encouraging litigants to settle their differences rather than litigate them to a finish (Cutts v. Head [1984] Ch. 290; [1984] 1 All E.R. 597, C.A.). The rule applies to exclude all negotiations genuinely aimed at a settlement whether oral or in writing, from being given in evidence. The purpose of the rule is to protect a litigant from being embarrassed by any admission made purely in an attempt to achieve a settlement. “Without prejudice” material will be admissible if the issue is whether or not negotiations resulted in an agreed settlement (Walker v. Wilsher [1889] 23 Q.B.D.335), but in relation to any other issue an admission made in order to achieve a compromise should not be held against the maker of the admission or received in evidence.” The point taken by learned Counsel is well founded.” Indeed, this extract from The White Book 2005 volume 1 under paragraph 31.3.40 at page 756 is directly in point: “Any discussions between the parties for the purpose of resolving the dispute between them are not admissible, even if the words “without prejudice” or their equivalent are not expressly used (Chocoladefabriken Lindt & Sprungli AG v Nestle Co Ltd [1978] R.P.C.287). It follows that documents containing such material are themselves privileged from production. This head of privilege is not confined to admissions but applies to all bona fide without prejudice statements which touched upon the strengths or weaknesses of the parties’ cases or which placed a valuation on a party’s rights forming a part of the attempt to compromise the litigation, (…)” (emphasis added) Again, in Enterprise Feljas & Masson(supra), the exception has been highlighted as follows at page 3:

14 “It is well settled in the case law that one party may be allowed to give evidence of what the other said or wrote in the course of without prejudice negotiations in the case of any concluded contract or estoppel and also where the exclusion of the evidence would act as a cloak for perjury, blackmail or other “unambiguous impropriety”: see Wilkinson v West Coast Capital & Ors [2005 EWHC 1606]. Counsel on both sides are indeed agreed on the principles of law governing the admission of the “without prejudice” letter in question, and in particular on its admissibility in the context of evidence tending to show that there has been an agreement in relation to the question of interest or bad faith on the part of the respondent.” In Framlington Group(supra) and Bradford & Bingley(supra) referred to by learned Counsel for the Plaintiff, it was stressed that the claim for “Without prejudice” privilege was not to be rejected, although litigation had already commenced between the parties. In the present case, there is no agreement reached between the parties, ex facie the 3 impugned documents in relation to payment of severance allowance so that it would be erroneous to construe that the only dispute between them rested on the quantum of the claim, let alone that there has been no admission of bad faith (ex facie Doc. P4) on the part of Defendant concerning the termination of Plaintiff’s employment as also invoked in its plea. Thus, it is misconceived for learned Counsel for the Plaintiff to construe that there has been an admission of liability by Defendant which would have meant an agreement reached between the parties for payment of severance allowance on the basis of the termination letter (Doc. P4) followed by the 3 impugned documents. Therefore, I take the view that the 2 impugned letters followed by the impugned concluding email (showing that no agreement was eventually reached between the parties) are covered by the public policy privilege namely the “Without prejudice” privilege and are disallowed. For all the reasons given above, the objection taken by learned Counsel for the Defendant is acceded to and the matter is fixed proforma to 13.4.26 for both learned Counsel to suggest common dates for continuation.

S.D. Bonomally (Mrs.) (Vice President)

15 6.4.2026