Dring v Cape Distribution Ltd & Anor (Constitution — access to courts — open justice)

(2) CapeIntermediateHoldingsPlc[2017]EWHC811(QB) MrGrahamDringvCapeDistributionLtd,CapeIntermediateHoldingsPlc,Concept70Ltd&Ors(InterestedParties)[2017]EWHC2103(QB) R(GuardianNews&MediaLtd)vWestminsterMagistratesCourt[2013]QB618 ChanUSeekvAlvisVehiclesLtd[2005]1WLR2965 NABvSerco[2014]EWHC1255 GIOPersonalInvestmentServicesLtdvLiverpoolandLondonSteamshipP&I AssociationLtd[1999]1WLR984 DianAOvDavisFrankelandMead(afirm)[2005]1WLR2951 BaringsplcvCoopersandLybrand[2000]1WLR2353 TheLawDebentureTrust[2003]EWHC2297(Comm.) SmithklineBeechamBiologicalsSAvConnaughtLaboratoriesInc[1999]4AllER498 ABCLtdvY[2012]1WLR532 VariousClaimantsvNewsGroupNewspapersLtd[2012]1WLR2545 R(Taranissi)vHFEA[2009]EWHC(Admin)130 SayersvSmithklineBeechamplc[2007]EWHC1346(QB) DobsonvHastings[1992]Ch.392 PfizerHealthAbvSchwarzPharmaAg[2010]EWHC3236(Pat.) R(OntheApplicationofUNISON)vLordChancellor[2017]UKSC51 DonoghuevStevenson[1932]AC562 YatesvHMRC[2014]EWCH2311(QB) LillyIcosLtdvPfizerLtd(No.2)[2002]1WLR2253 MarlwoodCommercialIncvKozenyandothers[2005]1WLR104 WilliamsvUniversityofBirmingham[2011]EWCACiv.1242 NestecSAvDualitLtd[2013]EWHC2737(Pat.) Smith(ExecutoroftheEstateofSmith,deceased)vPortswoodHouseLtd[2016]EWHC939(QB) BlueandAshleyvTimesNewspapersLtd[2017]EWHC1553(Comm.) R(OntheApplicationofUNISON)vLordChancellor[2017]UKSC51 StokesvGuest[1968]1WLR1776at1783 ‘TDN13’authoritiesbeforethecourtbutnotreferredtoinjudgment: HillandBellinghamvBarnsleyandSonsLtdandothers[2013]EWHC520(QB) McGregorvGenco(FC)Ltd[2014]EWHC1376(QB) MacarthyandothersvMarksandSpencerandanother[2014]EWHC3183(QB) WoodwardvSSEnergyandClimateChange[2015]EWHC3604(QB) PrescottvUniversityofStAndrews[2016]CSOH3 —- SUMMARY Thissummaryisprovidedtoassistthereader.Themaintextofjudgmentprevailsintheeventofanyinconsistencybetweenthesummaryandthebodyofthejudgment. Principlesandstatusofthedocumentsinthiscase

1. Therightofaccesstocourtisinherentintheruleoflaw.

2. Opennessofjusticefostersthescrutinyofthecourtsbythepublic,protectstheintegrityofthecourtprocessandassiststhedevelopmentofthelawandlegalknowledge.Ittherebysupportsthepracticaleffectivenessoftherightofaccesstocourt.

3. Thecourtsdonotmerelyprovideapublicservicetothe‘users’whoappearbeforethem.Previouscasesformthebasisoftheadvicegiventothosewhosecasesarenowbeforethecourts,orwhoneedtobeadvisedastothebasisonwhichtheirclaimmightfairlybesettled,orwhoneedtobeadvisedthattheircaseishopeless.

5. Accesstoacourt,beingnotmerelytheprovisionofaserviceto‘users’entailsthatthepartiessubmittingtothejurisdictiondonothavefullsovereigntytodeterminesimplybyprivateagreementbetweenthemselvestheextenttowhichthepublicmaybemadeawareofanyaspectoftheproceedingsbeforethecourt.

6. Thereisaninherentandforeseeablepossibilitythatmaterialdeployedincourtbytheparties,orfiledupontherecordsofthecourtaspartofitsprocess,willformpartofthecorpusofmaterialwhichmaybedeployedinothercases,usedforthepurposesoflegaladvice,beingacademicallyorjournalisticallydiscussed,orconsideredbyParliament. Therulesandcommonlawjurisdictiontoorderaccesstodocumentsbythepublic

7. CPRrule5.4Cistheprimarymeansbywhichthecourt’scommonlawpowertoallowaccesstodocumentstothepublicfromthecourtrecordisadministeredbutthecommonlawisthemasterandnottheservantoftherules.Therulesprovideaqualifiedandcontrolledsystemofopennessregulatedbythecourtrulesinajudicialmanner.

8. WheredocumentsarefiledontherecordofthecourtthentheyfallwithinthescopeofCPR5.4C(2).

9. Serveddocumentsnotontherecordsofthecourtdonotfallwithinrule 5.4Cbutmaybedisclosedunderthecourt’scommonlawpower. Applicabletest

10. Documentsfiledontherecordofthecourtandwhicharereadortreatedasreadincourtaresubjecttoadefaultpositioninfavouroftheprincipleofopenjusticeiftheapplicanthasalegitimateinterest.

11. Wheretheapplicanthasalegitimateinterestthenthecourtmuststillcarryoutabalancingexerciseinrelationtoanyharmtootherpartieslegitimateinterestswhendecidingwhethertoallowaccess.

12. Documentsontherecordsofthecourtwhicharenotreadortreatedasreadaresubjecttoamorestringenttestnamelythattheremustbestronggroundsforthinkingthataccessisnecessaryintheinterestsofjustice.

13. Theprincipleofopenjusticeisengagednotwithstandingthatacasesettlesbeforejudgment.Itappliestodocumentsinsuchacasewhichhavebeenreadtoorbythecourt,treatedassoread,orwhich“havefeaturedin”theproceedings. Statusofthedocuments

14. Bundleswhichhavebeenfiledarepartoftherecordsofthecourt.‘BundleD’inthiscasedoesnotamounttoabundlefiledatcourt.Thepaperbundlesdofalltobetreatedasfiled.

15. Thepaperdocumentsotherthanthebundleswereretainedincourtattheendoftrialandheldtogetherwiththecourtfiles,andbecamedocumentsfiledontherecordsofthecourt,alternativelythedocumentsotherthanthoseinthebundlesfallwithinthecourt’sgeneraldiscretionastoaccess.Theyweredeployedincourtandplacedbeforethejudgeincludingafterheretiredtoconsiderhisdecision.TheyweresubjecttowhatLordJusticeToulsonreferredtoasthe‘defaultposition’thataccessshouldbegivenontheopenjusticeprinciple.

16. TheresidueofbundleDnotalreadycontainedinthepaperbundlesismaterialwhichfallsoutsidethescopeofthedefaultprincipleofopenness.

17. ThereisapowertoorderdisclosureofbundleDunderthecommonlawjurisdictionofthecourt,butIdonotexercisethosepowershere. Legitimateinterestandintendeduse

18. Alegitimateinterestcanincludeacademicinterest,usebyapressuregrouporuseinsomejournalisticformandindeedanynumberofotheruseswhichareulterior(inthepropersenseofthatword)withoutbeingillegitimate.

19. MrDringactsforagroupwhichprovideshelpandsupporttoasbestosvictims.Itsomerespectsitisalsoapressuregroupandisinvolvedinlobbyingandinpromotingasbestosknowledgeandsafety.Thosearelegitimateactivitiesandprovidelegitimateinterest.

20. Theintendeduseistoenablehimandtheforumofwhichheisanofficer,to: • makethematerialpubliclyavailable, • bymakingitavailabletopromoteacademicconsiderationastothescienceandhistoryofasbestosandasbestoluxexposureandproduction, • improvetheunderstandingofthegenesisandlegitimacyofTDN13andanyindustrylobbyingleadingtoitinthe1960sand1970s. • understandtheindustrialhistoryofCapeanditsdevelopmentofknowledgeofasbestossafety • clarifytheextenttowhichCapeisorisnotresponsibleforproductsafetyissuesarisingfromthehandlingofasbestoluxboards • toassistcourtclaimsandtheprovisionofadvicetoasbestosdiseasesufferers.

21. Thosearelegitimateaims. Specificityofapplicationandbalancingexercise

22. Thedegreeofspecificitywhichispossibleinanapplicationunderrule5.4Cmustnecessarilybelimitedinpracticaltermsbythefactthatwithoutseeingthedocumentsinthefirstplacethebestthatcanbeexpectedsoastoassistthecourtisthatgeneralcategoriesofdocumentsbeidentifiedunlessthereisaparticularidentifieddocumentwhichknownaboutandissought.

23. Theclassessoughtinthestatementprovidedwiththeapplicationwere: (i) Allwitnessstatements (ii) Experts’reports (iii) Transcriptsofevidence (iv) AlldocumentsdisclosedbyCapeandotherparties.

24. Iamsatisfiedthat(innoorderofpriority)thecontentofthosedocuments: i. wouldbelikelytobeofacademicandscientificinterestaspartofpublicandsocialdiscourseastothehistoryofasbestossafety,regulationandknowledgeasitdevelopedduringthe20thcentury,ii.wouldbelikelytobeconsideredbyadvisersadvisingpartiestoasbestoslitigationastothemeritsoftheircaseswheneverissuesarisewhichtouchuponTechnicalDataNotice13andconnectedRegulations,iii.islikelytoberelevanttheproductsafetyofasbestosinsofarasunderstoodwithinthemajormanufacturersandconnectedcompaniesascomparedwithgeneralpublicatvariouspointsinthe20thcentury,and iv. islikelytoberelevanttotheextenttowhichemployerdefendantscouldhavebeenexpectedtoappreciatetherisksofasbestos.

25. Partialaccesstothedocumentscouldleadto‘cherrypicking’intermsofthepublishingofnegativematerialespeciallyifaccesswasonlygiventomaterialwhichpaintsasbestos,andperhapsCapeinabadlight.Thereisarisk,butamuchreducedrisk,ofcherrypickingifaccessisgivenlessselectivelyandmoreratherthanlesswidely.

26. Arequirementforspecialcircumstancesisdesirableinthecaseofdisclosuredocumentsservedbutnotdeployedattrial,inthisinstancebundleD,toensurethatnon-partiesarenotplacedinabetterpositionthanpartiesinrelationtounusedbutserveddisclosurematerial.IdonotconsiderthatgroundshavebeenmadeoutfordisclosureinrelationtobundleD.

27. IwasnotpresentedwithsubstantialevidenceorargumentfromCapeastoharmtoitwouldsufferfromdisclosure,atthelevelofparticulardocumentsorclassesofdocumentwithinthepaperfiles.

28. IdonotregardtheposthocconcernsnowraisedbyCapeabouttheprivacyofpersonsnamedinthedocumentsinconnectionwithasbestosrelateddiseaseasagroundforrefusingpublicdisclosureofthesedocumentsasacredibleorweightyoneinthisinstance. Conclusions

29. Thebalanceisinfavourofdisclosureof: i. thewitnessstatementsincludingexhibits, ii. expertreports, iii. transcripts,iv.discloseddocumentsreliedonbythepartiesattrialiethosein thepaperbundlesonly, v. writtensubmissionsandskeletons, vi. Statementsofcasetoincluderequestsforfurtherinformationandanswersifcontainedinthebundlesreliedonattrial. InformaltermsIamthereforeallowingtheapplicationinrelationtodocumentclasses(i)to(iii)listedinthestatementofMsBainsdated6April2017butonlypartiallyallowingdisclosureofdocumentsincategory(iv).Iamalsoallowingdisclosureofcertainotherdocumentsasisapparentfromthelistjustsetout.

30. IamexcludingfromdisclosurethecontentsofbundleDforreasonsalreadygiven.Iamalsoexcludingcopiesofthedisclosurestatementsofthepartiesbecausethatwouldtendtoundermine(bygivingdisclosurebyindirectmeans)thedecisionIhavemadethatbundleDisnotdisclosed.

31. TheApplicantmayreturntocourttoseekadecisionastoaccessinrespectofanydocumentsinbundleDwhichitappearsuponconsiderationwereomittedfromthepaperbundles,yetwereinfactreliedonatcourt(thisoughttobeapparentfromthedocumentsforwhichaccesshasbeengivenasabove).BundleDshallremainimpoundedincourt.

32. ThedocumentssubjecttodisclosuretoMrDringshallthereforebemadeavailablebythecourttotheApplicant’ssolicitorasanofficerofthecourtforcopyingorscanninguponthegivingofanundertakingthatdocumentsnotwithinthescopeofthisorder,ifcontainedinthefiles,willnotbecopied.

33. IdirectthatthecourtfileandimpoundedbundleDshallnotbedestroyedintheusualcourseofadministrationofthecourtwithoutanorderofthecourt. —- FULLJUDGMENT Introduction

1. LordDiplockinHomeOfficevHarman[1983]AC280at303C CitedinR(GuardianNews)vWestminsterMagistrates’Court(CA)[2013]QB630. said(inaquotationfromJeremyBenthamandLordShawofDunfermline): “Publicityistheverysoulofjustice.Itisthekeenestspurtoexertion,andthesurestofallguardsagainstimprobity.Itkeepsthejudgehimself,whiletrying,undertrial”.

2. Ifonewere,however,toconsideracourtinwhichtherewasarightforthepublictoscrutiniseeverydetailofeverycase,foranypurposewithoutlimit,onecanreadilyseethatmanywouldfeartoventureintoitwiththeirbusinesssecrets,theirfamilydisputes,theirmostintimatepersonaldetails.Everypersonfrombusinesseswithvaluablecommercialtradeinformationtovulnerablepersonswouldrisklosingmore–whetherfinanciallyorinpersonalterms–thanjusticemightseemtothemtobeworth.

3. Onemustnotthereforereachforanintellectuallycomfortable,butovergeneralised,beliefthat‘opennessisalwaysandnecessarilyforthebest’.Itismorenuancedthanthat.Thelawandtherulesofcourthavedevelopedtoprovideaframeworkforensuringthatabalanceisstruckbetweenopennesstothepublic,andtheprotectionofthecorefunctionofthecourtwhichisthedoingofjusticeinthecasebeforeit.Capeforexampleherearguedthat“openjustice”mustnotbeseenastheanswertoeachandeveryapplicationforaccesstocourtrecords.Thereisajudicialprocessunderthecourtrulesandthedecisionismadeaccordingly,andnotbyblindlyfollowingaprinciplewithoutregardtothefactsofagivencase.ThatiswhyinthiscaseImustapproachthecaseonitsownfacts,whilstapplyingtheunderlyingrulesandprinciples.

4. Thisjudgmentdealswithsignificantquestionsastoamemberofthepublic’srightsofaccesstodocuments‘filedontherecordsofthecourt’whichincludematerialrelatingtothehistoryanddevelopmentofknowledgeinthe20thcenturyabouttherisksofasbestos.

5. Asisbynowwellunderstood,exposuretoinhaledasbestoscancauseterminalillness,aswellasdisability.Theextenttowhichsocietyadapteditsoutlooktowardstherisksofasbestosinthe20thcenturyisevidencedbythelonghistoryofcaselaw,reportsandarticleswhichpaintthepublicpictureofwhatwasunderstoodtobethecaseintermsofrisksandreasonablesafetyrequirementswhenhandlingasbestos-containingproducts.

6. Theimpactofasbestosrelateddiseaseinthiscountry(Iconfinemyselftothiscountrybutthewiderstoryofasbestosisaglobalone)inlegaltermsincludesthelargenumberofclaimsfordamagesforinjuryanddeathcausedbywrongfulasbestosexposure,oftenbyemployerswhoarecoveredbyinsurancedatingbackseveraldecades.Italsoincludessecondaryvictimclaims,suchasthechildofanasbestosworkerparent,whogoesontodevelopmesotheliomadecadesaftertheparent’sdeath,andwheretheexposureduringchildhoodwasfromasbestosfibresclingingtotheoverallsoftheparentontheirreturnhomeattheendofeachworkingday.

7. Whenonelooksatasbestos-relatedtortsoneoftenhastoconsiderquitehistoricmaterial,andtoconsiderwhattheextentofknowledgeatthematerialtimewasabouttherisksofexposure.Itisinthatcontextthatthematerialcontainedinthefileswhicharethesubjectmatterofthisapplicationmustbeseen.

8. Inthiscase,thedocumentsinquestiontowhichMrDringseeksaccesswereincourtforthepurposesofalengthytrialconductedbyPickenJ,whichinbroadtermsraisedquestionsaboutwhatwasknown,andwhen,abouttheproductsafetyofasbestosbythebestknownmanufactureroftheproduct(Capeanditsconnectedcompanies).Itwaslitigationbroughtbyinsurers.ThiswasreferredtoastheProductLiabilitylitigationtodistinguishitfromaseparateclaim,withwhichIdonotconcernmyselfherebutwhichwasheardatthesametrial.Thedocumentscomprisethetrialbundles(oneofwhich,bundleD,wassupplied‘online’attrialviaadocumentmanagementsystemandnotonpaper),theskeletons,submissionsanddailytranscriptswhichwereprovidedtothejudge.Alsosoughtarestatementsofcasetotheextentnotalreadyprovided.BundleDcomprisedthetotalityoftheparties’disclosuredocumentswhetherornotdeployedattrial.Theotherbundleswere‘core’bundlesandonlycontaineddocumentsactuallyreliedonatthetrial.

9. Unusually(andIsuspectuniquelyinthehistoryofasbestoslitigation),thedisclosureexerciseinvolvedtheputtingtogetherofextensivequantitiesofhistoricmaterialandrecordsrelatingtoasbestossafetyandregulationinawaywhichonecansafelytakeitwouldhavebeendisproportionateinarun-of-the-millasbestosclaim.Thisclaimwaslargeenoughtojustify suchexpenditureandtime.MrIstedforCapeinhisfirstwitnessstatementgaveasuccinctsummaryofthelitigationatpara.10: “IntheProductLiabilityclaims,theinsurersallegedthattheemployeeshadbeenexposedtoasbestosdustwhenworkingwith,orinthevicinityofothersworkingwith,‘Asbestolux’and‘Marinite’boards(asbestosinsulationboardswhichhadbeenmanufacturedandsuppliedbymembersoftheCapegroupofcompanies).TheprincipalallegationwasthatCapeand/ortherelevantsubsidiarycompanymanufacturing‘Asbestolux’and‘Marinite’boardshadfailedadequatelytowarnoftherisksarisingfromoccupationalasbestosexposure.”andat19: “Overthecourseoftwoweeks,expertevidencewasgivenbyMr MartinStear,fortheClaimants,andbyProfessorSirAlasdairBreckenridgeandProfessorRogerWileyforCape…Followingtheconclusionofthetrial,butbeforeanyjudgmenthadbeenhandeddown,theProductLiabilityclaimsandtheCDLclaimsettled.”Andat18inhissecondstatement: “Aspartofthenegotiatedsettlement,anarrangementwasreachedwherebythelegalrepresentativesactingfortheClaimantsintheProductLiabilityandCDLclaimswoulddestroytheirhardcopybundles(orwould,inthealternative,returntheirhardcopybundlestotheirclients)andtheiraccesstotheelectronictrialbundlewouldbewithdrawn.Thepurposeofthis,sofarasCapewasconcerned,wastoensurethattheirconfidentialdocumentswerenotusedinanunauthorisedmannerorplacedinthepublicdomainwithouttheirknowledge.”

10. Iwillnotgointodetailofthepleadingsintheunderlyingcasebutanexampleavermentwhichhighlightstheflavourofthecaseisat3.2.4oftheAmendedParticularsofClaim.Thiswas,insummary,acaseaboutwhatCapeknewandwhen,inthe1960sand1970sorbefore,abouttherisksofasbestosexposureandthebehaviourofitsproductswhensubjecttomanipulationsoastogiveofffibreswhichcouldcausemesothelioma.ItraisedquestionsaboutwhetherCapeknewbut knowinglyfailedtotakestepstomakecleartherisksinvolvedofwhichitwassaidtobeaware.Para3.2.4oftheAmendedParticularsstates: “Bywayofsingleexample,theClaimantreliesuponthetranscriptoftheevidencegivenbytwoof[Cape’s]directors(DrGazeandMrHigham)givenonthe4thand5thJune1975.Thecombinedeffectoftheirevidencewasthattheycoulddirecttheactivitiesoftheirsubordinatecompaniesinrespectofhealthandsafety;thattheyhadknownoftheriskofasbestoscausingmesotheliomafromaround1960;thattheyeitherdidoroughttohaveprovidedwarningstothecompaniestheyweresellingasbestostointheUSAinoraround1960;thattheycouldhaveputwarningsontheirboardproductsfromaround10yearspriortotheirgivingevidencein1975”.

11. Thetrialproceededtoaconclusionandthejudgeretiredtoconsiderareserveddecision,butpriortojudgmentasettlementwasreachedoutofcourt.Ihavesetoutmoreofthehistoryintwopreviousjudgmentsasfollows,towhichitisessentialtohavereferencewhenreadingthisjudgment: (i) TheAsbestosVictimsSupportGroupsForumUKv(1)Concept70Ltd&Ors,(2)CapeIntermediateHoldingsPlc[2017]EWHC811(QB)and (ii) MrGrahamDringvCapeDistributionLtd,CapeIntermediateHoldingsPlc,Concept70Ltd&Ors(InterestedParties)[2017]EWHC2103(QB)andreferenceshouldbehadtothosejudgmentsbecauseIwillnotrepeattheircontentshere.

12. Thosedecisionssufficetodemonstratetheimportanceplacedbytheapplicantoncontentofthefilesincourt,andthereaderwillseetheresomereferenceto‘tweets’andotherpublicstatementsbycounselintheunderlyingclaimastotheirsignificanceandindeedalsoquotingsomeoftheirscientificcontent(whichisnotdeniedbyCapebutastotheimplicationsofwhichthereisconsiderabledisagreementforanotherday).Theoppositionanddeploymentoflegalresourcesonthepartof theinterestedCapepartiesrathersignalsthattheapplicationisofimportancetothemtoo.

13. Powerpointslidesfromapublicconference,placedinevidencebeforeme,indicatethatcounselforMrRawlinsonQCforConcept70followingtheconclusionoftheunderlyingtrialfeltthatthedisclosureinthiscaserevealedthat“CapewasstillsellingAsbestoluxin1980.”,“Significantomissionsinpreviouscases”,“HandlingAIBproduceddustlevelsmuchhigherthananticipated”and“MaybecomethesinglemostimportantweaponagainstTDN13 TechnicalDataNote13wasadocumentcreatedinthe1970’swhich–andhereItreadcarefullybecauseitisamatterofcontroversy–referredtoorgaveguidanceastoaminimumlevelofasbestosexposurewhichwasatthetimeregardedbythebodywhichproduceditasbeingacceptable.ItisamatterofcontroversywhichIdonotneedtoresolvehereastowhetherTDN13,whichappearstohavebeeninfluentialintheregulationoftheasbestosindustry,wasaspeciesof‘safetystandard’orwhetheritwasthecreationoftheasbestosindustryforself-servingendswhilstknowingthetruerisksofasbestosexposure. ”.

14. Thisjudgmentisnecessarilyalengthyoneinpartbecauseoftheweightofauthoritycitedtothecourtandarguedoverbyleadingcounselappearingwiththeirjuniorsforthegreaterpartofthreedaysandinpartbecauseofthesignificanceofthemattersarguedoverwhichspanareassuchasopennessofjusticeandtheprotectionofthelegitimaterightsoflitigants,andthepublicinterest,ifany,inthematerialinthiscase.Ihaveaccordinglysplitthejudgmentintotwoparts. Structureofthisjudgment

15. InPart1Idealwiththelegalissueswhichrelatetomattersofprinciple,jurisdictionandprocess.InthatPartIhavesetouttheparties’argumentsandthenmydecision.

16. InPart2Idealwithissuesastothestandingoftheapplicant,specificityoftheapplicationandthebalancingexerciseinrelationtothisapplication,andinthatPartmydecisionissetoutatthesametimeasaconsiderationofthepointsmadebytheparties.

17. InconsideringjudgmentIhadbeforemethefollowingwitnessstatements: ForMrDring: HarminderBains(6/4/17,8/6/17,22/9/17) GrahamDring(5/6/17)ForCape: JonathanIsted(19/6/17,8/9/17) — Part1:Principles,JurisdictionandProcess

18. TheapplicablecourtruleinthiscaseincivilcasesisCPR5.4C(2): “Anon-partymay,ifthecourtgivespermission,obtainfromtherecordsofthecourtacopyofanyotherdocumentfiledbyaparty,orcommunicationbetweenacourtandapartyoranotherperson.” Applicant’sargument

19. TheapplicantthroughMrWeirQCarguedthat,albeithedidnotneednecessarilytogobeyondthecourtrulesthemselves(thescopeofthecourt’sdiscretionfoundtherebeingample,hesaid,forhisclient’spurposes),thepowerofthecourttoallowdisclosureofdocumentsexistsasamatterofcommonlaw.Thecourtrulesexist,inthiscontext,toprovideaprocessratherthantocreatethepower.

20. TothateffecthecitedR(GuardianNews&MediaLtd)vWestminsterMagistratesCourt[2013]QB618,perToulsonLJat75.Thiswasinthecontextofcriminalprocedurerules: “…IdonotconsiderthattheprovisionsoftheCriminalProcedureRulesarerelevanttothecentralissue.ThefactthattherulesnowlawdownaprocedurebywhichapersonwantingaccesstodocumentsofthekindsoughtbytheGuardianshouldmakehisapplicationisentirelyconsistentwiththecourthavinganunderlyingpowertoallowsuchanapplication.Thepowerexistsatcommonlaw;therulessetoutaprocess.” Meaningoftheexpression“RecordsoftheCourt”

21. MrWeirarguedthatrule5.4Cincludesalldocumentswhichare‘inthecourtfile’.PerParkJinChanUSeekvAlvisVehiclesLtd[2005]1WLR2965at18: “18. Documents(a),(b)and(c)listedintheapplicationnoticearewithintherecordsofthecourt.Theyaretheparticularsofclaim,thedefenceandthereply.Thedocumentsat(d)intheapplicationnoticearenotwithintherecordsofthecourt.Theyare“requestandrepliestorequestsforfurtherinformation”.Thedocumentswithin(e)oftheapplicationnoticearewithintherecordsofthecourt.Theyarethewitnessstatementsofsixnamedwitnesses.Thedocumentswithin(f)arenot.Althoughtheyaredescribedasexhibits,thedocumentsidentifiedinpara(f)areinfactnumberedpagesinoneofthemanyfilesofdocumentswhichwereusedinthetrial.Thosefileswereremovedbythepartieswhenthecasesettled.Thustheyarenotpartoftherecordsofthecourt.”

22. MrWeir’spositionwasthattheeffectofthedecisionasto(f)inChanUSeekwasthatthebundlesusedatrial(inChanUSeek,actuallysomepageswithinthebundles)wereinprinciplepartoftherecordsofthecourtbutthatitappearedfromthequotationthat,oncehavingbeenremovedfromcourtatconclusionofthecase,thecourttooktheviewthatdocumentsin(f)had‘thus’–iebythatmeans–ceasedtobeapartoftherecordsofthecourt.

23. IwastakentoNABvSerco[2014]EWHC1255perBeanJ.at39whichwasreliedonasprovidingrathermorerecentclaritythatcourtbundlesareindeedpartoftherecordsofthecourt,atleastaslongastheyremainwithinthecourt’spossession: “CPR5.4Crecognisesthattheremaybealegitimatepublicinterestintheinspectionnotonlyofstatementsofcaselodgedwiththecourt,butalso,withpermission,otherdocumentssuchaswitnessstatementsorexhibitsplacedonthecourtfile.Thepublicinterestisnotconfinedtocaseswherethecourthasgivenjudgmentanditissoughttoseewhethertheunderlyingdocumentsprovidefurtherilluminationofthejudgment.Itmaybejustassignificanttodiscoverwhyacasesettled.ItistruethatanapplicationtoinspectdocumentsunderCPR5.4C(2)maybemadetoolatetobeeffectiveifallthecopiesofcourtbundleshavebeenreturnedtotheparties,asistheusualpracticewhenacasehasbeenconcludedandnoappealispending.Butthatisamatterofmechanics.Inthiscase,atthetimewhentheGuardianmadeitsapplication,thecourthadretainedthewitnessstatementsandexhibits.”

24. Iwasbrieflytakentosomehistoryontheopennessorotherwiseofbundlestothepublic.InGioPersonalInvestmentServicesLtdvLiverpoolandLondonSteamshipP&IAssociationLtd[1999]1WLR984at995FperPotterLJ: “Sofarasconcernsdocumentsthatformpartoftheevidenceorcorebundles,therehashistoricallybeennoright,andthereiscurrentlynoprovision,whichenablesamemberofthepublicpresentincourttosee,examineorcopyadocumentsimplyonthebasisthatithasbeenreferredtoincourtorreadbythejudge.Insofarasitmaybereadoutitwill“enterthepublicdomain”inthesensealreadyreferredtoandamemberofthepressorpublicmayquotewhatisreadoutbuttherightofaccesstoitforpurposesoffurtheruseofinformationdependsonthatperson’sabilitytoobtainacopyofthedocumentfromoneofthepartiesorbyotherlawfulmeans.Thereisnoprovisionbywhichthecourtmay,regardlessofthewishesofthepartiestothelitigation,makesuchadocumentavailabletoamemberofthepublic,nor,sofarassuchdocumentsareconcerned,doIconsiderthatanyrecentdevelopmentincourtprocedurejustifiesthecourtcontemplatingsuchanexerciseunderitsinherentjurisdiction…”

25. InNABvSercoBeanJnotedatpara.29thathedidnotregardthecaseofGIOasanylongergoodlawonthispoint,partlybecauseofthenoncitationofoneauthorityinthatcase,partlybecausetheCPRhadbeenintroducedandthedecisionhadbeenreachedundertheoldcourtrules(theRSC),andlastlythat: “QuiteapartfromtheRules,thecommonlawapproachtothedisclosureofdocumentsincorebundleshaschangedsignificantlysince1998,asshownbythemostrecentauthorityofR(Guardian NewsandMediaLtd)vCityofWestminsterMagistratesCourt[2013]QB618…”

26. InBlueandAshleyvTimesNewspapers[2017]EWHC1553(Comm.)LeggattJconsideredthescopeofthecourt’sgeneraldiscretiontoallowdisclosureofdocumentsincircumstanceswhereadocumenthadbeenservedbutnotfiled.Heconcludedat10that: “thereisnothingintheCivilProcedureRuleswhichprecludesthecourtfrommakinganorderunderitscommonlawpowerstoenableanon-partytoobtainacopyofadocumentwhichhasbeenservedinthelitigation,evenifthedocumenthasnotbeenfiledbyaparty” Isthereadifferenceofapproachbetweendocumentsdependingontheextentoftheiruseornon-useincourt?

27. MrWeir’spositionwasthatthelineofauthoritiesonaccesstocourtrecordsshowsadifferenceofapproachasbetweendocumentsreadto,ortreatedasreadtoinopencourt,andthosenotsotreated.PerPotter LJinGIO(supra.)at993B, “….whilethepartiestoanactionhavefreeaccesstoaffidavitsandotherdocumentsfiledintheaction,amemberofthepublicrequiresleavetoobtainsuchaccesswhich,nodoubt,willbereadilygiveniftheaffidavitorotherdocumenthasbeenreadinopencourt InGIO,thisextendedtowitnessstatementsorderedtostandasevidenceinchief(ie,notinaliteralsense‘read’aloudinopencourt),butnottoexhibitsreferredtointhem. .” PerMoore-BickJinDianAOvDavisFrankelandMead(afirm)[2005]1WLR2951: “Theaffidavitsreferredtointheorderswere,asIhavesaid,consideredbythecourtaspartofitsjudicialfunction.Theymayhavebeenreadoutinthecourseoftheproceedings,butIthinkitmorelikelythattheywerereadbythejudgeinprivateaspartofhispreparationforthehearingandthatparticularpassageswerereferredtoatthehearingitself.Inaccordancewiththepracticeofthecourtthehearingswouldallhavetakenplaceinchambersratherthanopencourt,butitisclearfromauthoritiessuchasBaringsplcvCoopersandLybrand[2000]1WLR2353andtheLawDebentureTrustcase[2003]EWHC2297(Comm)thattheseaffidavitsoughttobetreatedasiftheyhadbeenreadinopencourtandthatanyonewithalegitimateinterestoughttobeallowedreasonableaccesstotheminaccordancewiththeprincipleofopenjustice.[…]

57. Ontheotherhand,Idonotconsiderthatthecourtshouldbeasreadytogivepermissiontosearchfor,inspectorcopyaffidavitsthatwerenotreadbythecourtaspartofthedecision-makingprocess,suchasthosefiledinsupportof,orinoppositionto,theapplicationforsummaryjudgmentinthiscase.Thesewerefiledpursuanttotherequirementsoftherulesbutonlyforthepurposesofadministration.Theprincipleofopenjusticedoesnotcomeintoplayatallinrelationtothesedocuments.Idonotthinkthecourtshouldbewillingtogiveaccesstodocumentsofthekindasaroutinematter,butshouldonlydosoiftherearestronggroundsforthinkingthatitisnecessaryintheinterestsofjusticetodoso.”PerParkJinChanUSeek(supra.)at31: “…thecourtsfavourdisclosureratherthanwithholdingofmaterialsifthematerialshavefeaturedinproceedingsinopencourt…” PerToulsonLJinR(GuardianNews)vWestminsterMagistrates’Court(supra.)at85: “Inacasewheredocumentshavebeenplacedbeforeajudgeandreferredtointhecourseofproceedings,inmyjudgmentthedefaultpositionshouldbethataccessshouldbepermittedontheopenjusticeprinciple” Theroleof‘openofjustice’inpublicaccessapplicationsundertheCPR

28. MrWeirarguedthatthedictaespeciallyinGuardianNewsclearlyfavourthepositionthatwhereadocumentisreadortreatedasreadincourtthenaccessibilitytothepublicisthedefaultposition.InChanUSeekthecharacterisationwaswhetherdocumentsfeaturedinproceedingsinopencourt.HecitedSmithklineBeechamBiologicalsSAvConnaughtLaboratoriesInc[1999]4AllER498509c-eandBaringsplcvCoopersandLybrand[2000]1WLR2353at52-52,totheeffectthatstrictreadingincourtisnotrequired:modernpracticefavourspre-reading,andtheuseofstatementsasevidenceinchiefforexample,andthattheeffectofBaringsisthattheonusisonapartyopposingdisclosuretoshowthatadocumenthadnotenteredthepublicdomain.

29. Astotheprinciplesapplicablewhenapplyingtheconceptofopenjustice,intheGuardianNewscaseat79IwasreferredtoToulsonLJ’sobservationthatthepurposeoftheopennessprincipleisto“enablethepublictounderstandandscrutinizethejusticesystemofwhichthecourtsaretheadministrators”.Itwasarguedhoweverthatthefactthattheopennessprinciplehasthatasitspurposedoesnotmeanthatanapplicanthastoshowthatinanygivenapplicationtothecourthepersonallyhasashisaimthescrutinyofthejusticesystem.Itwassufficient,onMrDring’scase,thatthereisalegitimateinterestinseekingdisclosure.

30. Counselrelied,bywayofanexamplesaidtoillustratehispoint,ontheGiocase.Inthatcasethepartyseekingdisclosureofdocumentsfiledontherecordwasnotdoingsoforthepurposeofscrutinisingproceedingsinourcourts:itwasseekingthemexpresslyforitsowncommercialuse.Thejudgeatfirstinstancerefusedaccess.TheCourtofAppealreversingthatdecisionheldat996G-997Athat: ‘…quiteapartfromtheinterestsofthepress(whoaremembersofthepublicforthispurpose)mostpersonswhoattendatrialwhentheyarenotpartiestoitordirectlyinterestedinitdosoinfurtheranceofsomespecialinterest,whetherforpurposesofeducation,critiqueorresearch,orbyreasonofmembershipofapressuregroup,orforsomeotherulteriorbutlegitimatemotive.…Inmyviewtheappropriatejudicialapproachtoanapplicationofthiskindinacomplicatedcaseistoregardanymemberofthepublicwhoforlegitimatereasonsappliesforacopyofcounsel’swrittenopeningorskeletonargument,whenithasbeenacceptedbythejudgeinlieuofanoralopening,asprimafacieentitledtoit”.

31. HealsocitedABCLtdvY[2012]1WLR532perLewisonJat42dealingwithcaseswhereadocumenthasformedpartofthedecisionmakingprocess “Insuchacaseifanapplicantcanshowa‘legitimateinterest’inhavingaccesstothedocumentsthecourtsshouldleaninfavourofallowingaccess”

32. AlsocitedwasVosJashethenwasinVariousClaimantsvNewsGroupNewspapersLtd[2012]1WLR2545at65wherehereiteratedthatthecourtwillleaninfavourofdisclosurewhereadocumenthasbeenreadbyortothejudge.Inthatcaseat66VosLJdidhoweveralsoindicatethattherethatthecourtshouldlooktotheusewhichwillbemadeofthedocumentsandthatitisnecessarytoconsiderhowfarthedocumentsare‘trulyrequired…inordertoproperlyunderstandandreportthecourtproceedingsinwhichtheywerereferredtoandreliedupon’. Whatconstitutesa‘legitimateinterest’forthepurposeofpublicaccesstothecourtrecord?

33. IwastakentoTheLawDebentureTrust(documentsdisclosedwheretheymightprovideabasisforanallegationoffraud),R(Taranissi)vHFEA[2009]EWHC(Admin)130at6:“Anapplicationfordisclosureforthepurposesofcollaterallitigationdoesnotmeaninanysensethattheordercannotbemade”),ChanUseek:applicationforpurposesofpursuinganewsstory,heldtobealegitimateinterest,andSayersvSmithklineBeechamplc[2007]EWHC1346(QB)(expertreportsdisclosedtoensurethatdecisionmakerselsewherewerenotdeprivedofinformationastothepossibilitythataflawedprocessofanalysingdatahadbeenused).

34. InSayersinparticularatpara.21KeithJsaidinrelationtorule5.4C(2): “Itshouldbenotedthattheruleonlyappliestodocumentswhichhavebeenfiledwiththecourt.Itdoesnot,forexample,applytodocumentswhichhavebeenreferredtointhedocumentsfiledwiththecourt,butwhichwerenotthemselvesfiledwiththecourt.Andevenwithdocumentsfiledwiththecourt,theauthoritiesdrawadistinctionbetweendocumentswhichhavebeenreadorbeentreatedashavingbeenreadinopencourtontheonehand,anddocumentsontheotherwhich,thoughfiled,haveneverbeenreadorbeentreatedasreadbythejudge.Anyonewithalegitimateinterestinhavingaccesstoacopyofadocumentwhichhasbeenreadorbeentreatedasreadbythejudgeshouldnormallybeallowedtohaveit.”(ThejudgethenreferredtothehigherDianAOtestforunreaddocuments,andtothebalancingexerciseforthecourttoperform). Doessettlementbeforejudgmentmakeadifference?

35. MrWeirarguedthat,followingTheLawDebentureTrust[2003]EWHC2297Comm.thefactthatacasesettledwithoutjudgmentdidnotpreventtheopenjusticeprinciplefromapplying.PerColmanJat31-34whoobservedat34that “…theessentialpurposeofgrantingaccesstosuchdocumentsistoprovideopenjustice,thatistosaytofacilitatemaintenanceofthequalityofthejudicialprocessinallitsdimensions…thathoweverdoesnotinvolvemerelytheperceivedqualityoffinaljudgmentswithreferencetotheevidence,thesubmissionsandthelaw,butthequalityofjudicialcontrolonadaytodaybasis.…ifsuchanorderisappropriatebeforejudgment,…thereisnologicalobjectiontosuchanorderwhere,asinthepresentcase,thehearingproceededforseveraldaysandthensettled.”

36. Theabovewasacasewherewhatwassoughtwerecopiesofadvocates’submissions.InNABvSerco,BeanJat39stateddealingwithaccesstovariousdocumentsinthehearingbundles: “Thepublicinterestisnotconfinedtocaseswherethecourthasgivenjudgmentanditissoughttoseewhethertheunderlyingdocumentsprovidefurtherilluminationofthejudgment.Itmaybejustassignificanttodiscoverwhyacasesettled.ItistruethatanapplicationunderCPR5.4C(2)maybemadetoolatetobeeffectiveifallthecopiesofcourtbundleshavebeenreturnedtotheparties,asistheusualpracticewhenacasehasbeenconcludedadnoappealispending.Butthatisamatterofmechanics.Inthiscase,atthetimetheGuardianmadeitsapplication,thecourthadretainedthewitnessstatementsandexhibits.” Cape’sargument

37. MrFenwickQCpointedout,Isuspectcorrectly,thatthisapplicationisunprecedentedastoitsscope.ItwasCape’spositionthatnotonlyisthisapplicationunprecedentedinscope,itisalsoinCape’sviewanapplicationlackinganyclearlydefinedlegitimatepurpose.

38. Itwassaidthatthereisnolegalbasisfortheordersoughtandthatthecourtlacksjurisdictiontomakeit.Indeeditwassaidthattheevidenceinsupportwasinsufficienttoenablethiscourttodecidetheapplicationatall.Capehadgivenanundertakingtopreservethedocumentsinquestionsothatfuturelitigantscouldapplyfordisclosureiftherulesandlawpermitonaninterpartsbasisandinthelightofthis.

39. Properlycharacterised,thisapplicationwasintrutha‘fishingexpedition’ofthesortsooftenreferredtoincourtsandincaselawthatoneistemptedtoobservethatfishingmaybewhatthemanontheClaphamomnibusdoesduringhisraredaysoff.Itwassaidtobespeculative,andevenif(whichwasopposed)itwasallowedatallitshouldbeonalimitedbasisonly. Principleofopenjustice

40. TherewasnodisputebyCapethatthemainrelevantruleis5.4C(2).ItisarulewhichwassaidtobesimilartotheoldruleoftheRSC,namelyRSCOrd.63r4.DobsonvHastings[1992]Ch.392perSirDonaldNichollsV-Cwascitedat406thus: “CasesandcircumstancesvarysowidelythatanyattempttolegislateindetailinadvanceforaccesstoparticulartypesofdocumentsinparticulartypesofcasesacrossthewholespectrumofHighCourtlitigationwouldbeimpossible.Sotherulesprovide,ineffect,ageneralprohibitionbutwithabuilt-insafetyvalve:anypersonmayapply,exparte,(viz.withminimumformalityandexpense)tothecourtforleave.Thecourtwillthenconsiderallthecircumstances.”

41. ThepurposeoftheprincipleofopenjusticewascharacterisedbyCapeinrelianceontheDianAOauthorityverydifferentlyfromtheapproachadvocatedbyMrWeir.

42. ItwasCape’spositionthattheprincipleofopenjusticewasnotengagedatallincircumstanceswhereacasehadsettled(aswasthecaseinbothDianAOandthecasenowbeforeme).Atpara.30ofDianAOMoore-BickJstatedthat: “30. Itcouldbearguedthattheprincipleofopenjusticedemandsthatthecourtrecordsbeopentoallandsundryasarightinordertoenableanyonewhowishestodosotosatisfyhimselfthatjusticewasdoneinanygivencase.Butthathasneverbeenthelawanditisnotwhatrule5.4says….Theprincipleofopenjusticeisprimarilyconcernedwithmonitoringthedecision-makingprocessasittakesplace,notwithreviewingtheprocesslongaftertheevent.InthiscontextitisinterestingtonotethatCPR32.13dealingwithwitnessstatementsprovidesthatastatementwhichstandsasevidenceinchiefatthetrialisopentoinspectiononlyduringthecourseofthetrial.

31. Thispointisofsomerelevanceinthepresentcasebecausetheactioninquestionwasbegunin1994andwasconcludedbycompromisein1996.[Theapplicantnon-party]hasnointerestintheperformanceofthejudicialfunctioninthatcase,whichasfarasonecantellwasinanyeventverylimited.Itsimplyseekspermissiontousethecourtfileasasourceofpotentiallyusefulinformationtoassistitinotherlitigation.Thatdoesnotinmyviewengagetheprincipleofopenjustice.”

43. Cape’spositionontheabove,andinrelationtothepassagesfromDian AOwhichIhavequotedaboveinrelationtoMrWeirQC’sargument(paras.56-57oftheDianAOjudgment)wasthattheproperinterpretationofthedictareliedonbyMrDring’scounseltheopenjusticeprinciplewassimplynotengagedatallifacasesettledbeforetrial

44. Capestressed,asIthinkwasnotinissuebetweentheparties,thatwheredocumentshadnotbeenreadtothecourtaspartofthedecisionmakingprocessthenperMoore-BickJ“thecourtshouldonlydosoiftherearestronggroundsforthinkingthatitisnecessaryintheinterestsofjusticetodoso”.

45. TheessenceofthepositionfollowedbyCapewassummarisedinPfizerHealthAbvSchwarzPharmaAg[2010]EWHC3236(Pat.)whereFloydJashethenwasconfirmedthat:(i)therewasnounfetteredrightofaccesstocourtrecords,(ii)therequirementforpermissionwasasafetyvalvetoallowaccesstodocumentswhichoughttobeprovided,(iii)thattheprincipleofopenjusticewasapowerfulreasonforallowingaccesswherethepurposeistomonitorthatjusticewasdone,particularlyasittakesplace,(iv)thatwherethepurposewasnotthemonitoringofjusticewasdone,thecourtshouldleaninfavourofdisclosureifalegitimateinterestcouldbeshownandthedocumentshadbeenreadbythecourtaspartofthedecisionmakingprocess,(v)thatwheretheprincipleofopenjusticeisnotengagedsuchaswheredocumentshavenotbeenreadatall,whatwasrequiredwerestronggroundsforthinkingthatdisclosurewasnecessaryintheinterestsofjustice,and(vi)thattheCPRprocedureforaccesstodocumentsshouldnotbeusedwherecopiesofdocumentsareavailablefrompublicsources.

46. MrFenwickQCnotedinhisskeletonthattheDianAOcasehadbeenfollowedinABCvY,butthatLewisonJashethenwashadobservedinABCvYthatitmayhavebeen“puttingthepointalittletoohigh”forMoore-BickJtohaveconcludedthattheprincipleofopenjusticewasnotengagedatallinacasewherethepurposeofseekingaccesswasnottoscrutinizethedoingofjustice.ItwashispositionhoweverthatthelatercaselawestablishedthatthenarrowerpositionofMoore-BickJwastobepreferred.

47. Thecasehavingsettled,andonthefootingthatDianAOwastobepreferredandshowedthattheprincipleofopenjusticedoesnotapplytoasettledcase,theappropriatestandardformetoapplytothiscasewasnotthegenerousapproachofleaninginfavourofaccessbutratherthehigherthresholdofrequiringMrDringtoshowstronggroundsforthinkingthatdisclosurewasnecessaryintheinterestsofjustice.Such couldnotbemadeoutinthiscaseandCape’spositionwasthatdisclosureshouldberefused. TheimpactofGuardianNewsontheapproachtopublicaccess

48. MrFenwickreservedhisclient’spositionastoapossiblefuturechallengeinahighercourttotheGuardianNewsdecision,whichisaCourtofAppealauthority.WhilstheacceptedthattheDianAOcasehastobereadinthelightofthatdecision,therewereaspectswhichhestressedassistedCape’sanalysis.TheopeningparagraphofGuardianNewswasintermswhichweretotheeffectthatthepurposeofopenjusticewasthescrutinyofthecourts,whichwasconsistentwithDianAO.

49. IntermsofhowfarGuardianNewsoughttoassistme,Capestressedthefactthattheapplicantinthatinstancewasanewspaperandthecourtwasinfluencedbythereasonsforseekingthedocumentsnamelyaccesswhichthecourtconsideredtobeonamatterofgenuinepublicinterestandjournalisticpurpose.(Paras.76,82and87spokeintermsoftheseriousjournalisticpurposeandthecredibleevidenceputforwardastotheneedforaccesssoastoreportonamatterofpublicinterest).GoodreasonshadbeenputforwardbytheGuardian.

50. Inthecontextofthisapplicationtheroleof‘goodreasons’wasonCape’scaseparticularlyimportant.Iwastakentopara.85whereToulsonLJashethenwassaid “Idonotthinkthatitissensibleorpracticaltolookforastandardformulafordetermininghowstrongthegroundsofoppositionneedtobeinordertooutweighthemeritsoftheapplication.Thecourthastocarryoutaproportionalityexercisewhichwillbefact-specific.Centraltothecourt’sevaluationwillbethepurposeoftheopenjusticeprinciple,thepotentialvalueofthematerialinadvancingthatpurposeand,conversely,anyriskofharmwhichaccesstothedocumentsmaycausetothelegitimateinterestsofothers.”

51. This,togetherwiththefactthatPD5Apara4.3expresslyrequiredanapplicationforaccesstospecifythedocumentorclassofdocumentssoughtandthegroundsfortheapplicationtogethermeantthatacourtfacedwithanapplicationofthissorthadtobeinpossessionofthenecessarygroundsandthenecessarylevelofspecificityofapplicationinordertocarryoutthebalancingexercisereferredtoinGuardianNews. ReadingCPR5.4C(2)inthelightofCPR31.22:notprovidingthepublicwithrightsgreaterthanthepartiesthemselves

52. CapeadvancedanargumentthatonemustlookattheprovisionsofCPR5.4C(2)alongsidetheinterpartesdisclosureprovisionsoftheCPRinrule 31.22 andalsoCPR5.4B.

53. Rule5.4Bappliestopartiestothelitigationandunderthatruletherewasnoblanketrighttocopiesofalldocumentsfromthecourtrecords.Ratherthereisaspecificlistofavailabledocumentsbeyondwhichanapplicationhastobemade.Itwassaidtobesignificantthatthoseinterpartesprovisionswhichsetoutalistofalloweddocumentsmarkedlydonotrefertogivingaccesstodisclosurematerial.TherulesastoaccessbetweenthepartiestodisclosurematerialareinCPR31.22: “31.22 (1) Apartytowhomadocumenthasbeendisclosedmayusethedocumentonlyforthepurposeoftheproceedingsinwhichitisdisclosed,exceptwhere– (a) thedocumenthasbeenreadtoorbythecourt,orreferredto,atahearingwhichhasbeenheldinpublic; (b) thecourtgivespermission;or (c) thepartywhodisclosedthedocumentandthepersontowhomthedocumentbelongsagree. (2) Thecourtmaymakeanorderrestrictingorprohibitingtheuseofadocumentwhichhasbeendisclosed,evenwherethedocumenthasbeenreadtoorbythecourt,orreferredto,atahearingwhichhasbeenheldinpublic. (3) Anapplicationforsuchanordermaybemade– (a) byaparty;or (b) byanypersontowhomthedocumentbelongs.”

54. InMarlwoodCommercialIncvKozenyandothers[2005]1WLR104theCourtofAppealperRixLJheldthatinorderforanordertobemadeunderrule31.22(1)(b),iethegrantofpermissionbythecourtfortheuseofdisclosuredocumentsotherthanforthepurposeoftheproceedingsinwhichtheyaredisclosed,“specialcircumstances”areneeded.PerRixLJat43: “…wherepermissionissoughtforreleasefromtheobligationimposedbytheruleagainstcollateraluseofdisclosedmaterial,itisfortheapplicanttomakegoodhiscase,cogentlyandpersuasively,thattherearespecialcircumstanceswhichjustifysuchpermissionanthatpermissionwillnotoccasioninjusticetothepersongivingdisclosure:seeCrestHomesplcvMarks[1987]AC829.”

55. Clearly,saidMrFenwick,MrDringisnotapartyandhencecannotavailhimselfoftheinterpartiesrightstoapplyforpermissiontomakeuseofdisclosuredocumentsforacollateralpurpose.Hehadappliedonlyunderrule5.4C(2)whichwasasignificantfeaturesincewhereasrule31.22permittedapartytomakecollateraluseofdocumentsreferredtoincourt,rule5.4C(2)madenoreferencetodocumentsofthattypeatall.Thatrulemerelyreferredtoarighttoseekaccesstodocumentsfiledontherecordsofthecourt.Thatwassaidtobeasignificantrestrictiononthejurisdictionofthecourt.Alternativelyiftherewasjurisdictiontoallowaccesstodisclosuredocumentsatallthentheapplicationoughtatleasttomeetthestandardof‘specialcircumstances’demandedinthecaseofanapplicationinterpartesunderrule31.22applyingtheMarlwooddicta.Itwouldbewrongforamemberofthepublicunconnectedwiththecasetohavegreaterrightstoaccessanduseofdisclosuredocumentsthanthepartiesthemselves.

56. MrFenwickreferredinsupportoftheabovetothejudgmentofKeithJinSayersv.SmithKlineBeechamplc[2007]EWHC1346atpara22(otherwiseknownastheMMR/MRvaccinelitigation)whereKeithJsaid: “ThefirstreportofProfessorBustinandthereportsofProfessorSimmondsandProfessorRimawereneverreadorevertreatedashavingbeenreadbyme.TheSecretaryforHealthshouldthereforehaveaccesstothemonlyiftherearestronggroundsforthinkingthataccesstothemisnecessaryintheinterestsofjustice.Butthereisafurtherconsideration.Thereportsdrawonmaterialswhichweredisclosedbytheclaimants,namelythereportsonthedataprovidedbythetestscarriedoutonthespecimenstakenfromtheclaimantsandthecontrols.ItfollowsthattheSecretaryforHealthisseekingaccess,albeitindirectly,toinformationcontainedindocumentswhichweredisclosedbytheclaimants.Thatexplainswhy,whenMerckwantedtousetheevidenceofProfessorBustinandProfessorSimmondsintheproceedingsbroughtagainstitinPhiladelphia,itregardeditselfasrequiredbyrule31.22toseekthecourt’spermissiontousethatevidence.Bythesametoken,theSecretaryforHealthacceptsthat,ifheistobeabletoobtaincopiesfromthecourtrecordsofthefirstreportofProfessorBustinandthereportsofProfessorSimmondsandProfessorRima,heshouldnotbeinabetterpositionthanthedefendantswouldhavebeeniftheyweremakinganapplicationunderrule31.22.” Statusofthevariousdocumentsandbundles

57. Trialbundleswerenot,itwasargued,documents‘filed’byaparty.Atrialbundlecouldbefiled,butitwasnot‘adocument’.ReliancewasplacedonthefactthatCPR39.5providesthattheclaimant‘mustfileabundlecontainingthedocumentsrequired…’,whichwastakentohighlightthedistinctionbetweenfilingabundle,ontheonehand,andfilingthedocumentswithinit,ontheother.Referencewasmadetothefactthatoftentheterm‘lodged’wasusedratherthanfiled,albeittheruledoesstate‘filed’inrelationtobundles.(InGio,whichwascited,itwassaidthatbundleswerenot‘filed’,andthatwasreliedonbyMrFenwick(thoughInotethatGiowasdecidedundertheformercourtrulesandnottheCPR: therewasnoissuethatundertheCPRtherulesrequirethefilingofbundlestoday).

58. Astotheotherdocumentssuchasskeletonsandsubmissions,thoseweredocumentswhichhadbeendealtwith(inGio)underthecourt’scommonlawjurisdictionratherthanasdocumentsfiledonthecourtrecord.Gioremainedgoodlawtotheeffectthatthereisnogeneralrulewhichenablesdocumentstobeobtainedbythepublictoseeandcopya documentmerelybecauseithasbeenreferredtoincourt.NestecSAvDualitLtd[2013]EWHC2737wadcitedasindicatingthatthecourttherehadrefusedaccesstodocumentscontainedinbundles(whetherunderCPR5.4C(2)orthecourt’scommonlawjurisdiction)andhadtreatedGioasgoodlaw.

59. BundleDcouldnotbetreatedas‘filed’inaccordancewithCPR39.5becausecourtfilesintheQueen’sBenchDivisionareonpaperandnotelectronic,because‘filing’requireddeliverytothecourtofficeandinanyeventCPR5.5providedthata‘practicedirectionmaymakeprovisionfordocumentstobefiledorsenttothecourt’byelectronicmeansandtherewasnoprovisionforelectronicfilingofbundles.ThepositionthereforewasthatdocumentsintheQBDmustbefiledonpaperandbundleDthereforewasnotcapableofbeing‘documents’filedontherecordsofthecourt. Lackoflegitimateinterestinthiscase

60. OnCape’scaseMrDringhadnopersonalorprivateinterestinthematerialsought,suchashemightifhewereapotentialasbestoslitigant,asheaccepted,andsowhatremainedwasthereforeessentiallyamatterofwhetherthematerialwasdisclosableinthepublicinterest.Itwassaidthattheextentofthepublicinterestassertedbytheapplicantwas‘dubiousatbest’.

61. InparticularCapedisagreedwiththesuggestionsinthewitnessstatementsfiledfortheapplicantthatTDN13wasbeing(byimplicationwrongly)acceptedbycourtsinthiscountryashavingbeenatypeof‘safetystandard’andthattherewasaninterestinascertainingwhetherintruthTDN13merelysetalevelofexposureacceptabletotheasbestosindustrytosuititsownends.ThereweregeneralindicationsintheevidencethatdefendantsinunspecifiedcasesweredisputingliabilitybasedonTDN13beinganhistoricsafetystandard.Allthiswassaidtobewronginbothfactandlaw.IwastakentotheverywellknowncaseofWilliamsvUniversityofBirmingham[2011]EWCACiv.1242at5-6intheappendixtojudgment,perAikensLJ,wherehestated: “theFactoryInspectorateissued‘TechnicalDataNote13’in March1970.Itwasentitled‘StandardsforAsbestosDust ConcentrationforUsewiththeAsbestosRegulations1969’.Note13 containedguidanceonhowtheFactoryInspectoratewouldinterprethedefinitionof‘asbestosdust’usedinreg2(3)ofthe1969Regulations,whichincluded‘dustconsistingoforcontainingasbestostosuchanextentasisliabletocausedangertothehealthofemployedpersons’forthepurposesofdecidingwhenitshouldenforcethe1969Regulations.Insummary,wheretheaverageconcentrationofchrysotile,amositeandfibrousanthophylitewasrecordedasbelow2fibrespercubiccentimetreor0.1mg/m3theinspectoratewouldnotseektoenforcethesubstantiveregulations”.

62. Atpara.61ofthejudgmentAikensLJstated: “Inmyviewthebestguidetowhat,in1974,wasanacceptableandwhatwasanunacceptablelevelofexposuretoasbestosgenerallyisthatgivenintheFactoryInspectorate's‘TechnicalDataNote13’ofMarch1970,inparticulartheguidancegivenaboutcrocidolite.CompareWardvTheRitzHotel(London)Ltd[1992]PIQRP315,wherethemajorityoftheCourtofAppealheldthatindecidingwhethertheriskofinjuryfromfallingoveralowlevelbalustradewasreasonablyforeseeable,ahotelshouldhavebeenawareofandbeguidedbyminimumheightsandsafetystandardspublishedbytheBritishStandard’srecommendedstandardfortheheightofanybalustrade.TheUniversitywasentitledtorelyonrecognisedandestablishedguidelinessuchasthoseinNote13.Itistellingthatnoneofthemedicaloroccupationalhygieneexpertsconcludedthat,atthelevelofexposuretoasbestosfibresactuallyfoundbythejudge,theUniversityoughtreasonablytohaveforeseenthatMrWilliamswouldbeexposedtoanunacceptableriskofasbestosrelatedinjury.”

63. InMrFenwick’ssubmissionthen,TDN13wasthusnotasafetystandardbutguidanceastoathresholdforenforcementactionandtheWilliamscasewasmerelytreatingitasaguideastowhatwouldhavebeendone(quotingStokesvGuest[1968]1WLR1776at1783)by‘thereasonableandprudentemployer,takingpositivethoughtforthesafetyofhisworkersinthelightofwhatheknowsoroughttoknow’.

64. TherewasnodoubtthattodaythedustexposurelevelsinTDN13didnotpreventdevelopmentofmesotheliomabutthatdidnotaffectthecriteriabywhichtheemployersofpastdecadesweretobejudged.

65. ItwasmisconceivedaccordingtoCape,forMsBainsactingforMrDringtoraisepossiblechallengetoTDN13whichthelawdidnotregardasasafetystandardinanyevent,andtheexerciseinthiscasewasa‘majorfishingexpedition’inthehopethatsomethingmightturnup.Therewasnolegitimateinterestinthiscaseand,beyondthemisconceivedsuggestionthatTDN13wasbeingtreatedbycourtsasasafetystandardtherewasnootheridentifiedpurposebeyondmeregenerality.

66. ThetruepurposewasrevealedbytheconclusionofMsBains’thirdwitnessstatementinwhichshestatedthattheapplicantwouldmakeavailablethedocumentstootherlawyers,academicsandthepublicingeneral.Thatwasnotalegitimateinterestforthepurposesofthecourt’sbalancingexercise.Ifmerepublicationsufficedasalegitimateinterestthenallanapplicantwouldneedtodotosecureaccesstocourtrecordswastoassertthathewouldpublishit.Thatwoulddefeattheneedforrule5.4C(2). DecisionastoPart1 Theconstitutionalprincipleofaccessibilityofthecourts

67. InR(OntheApplicationofUNISON)vLordChancellor[2017]UKSC51theSupremeCourtconsideredthelawfulnessofcertaincourtfeeswhichhadbeenimposedbytheLordChancellorinthesystemofEmploymentTribunalsinthiscountry.Questionsofwhetherthelevelofthosefeesunlawfullyinterferedwithaccesstojusticewereconsidered.FeesplaynoroleinthedecisionwhichImustmake,buttheobservationsoftheirLordshipsabouttheroleofthecourtsinprovidingaccesstojusticeanddevelopingthecommonlawarerelevant.

68. InUNISONatpara.65theCourtnoted(inthecontextofthefeeslegislationbutrelevantlytoanyprocessofthesortundertakenthere)that: “IndeterminingtheextentofthepowerconferredontheLordChancellorbysection42(1)ofthe2007Act,thecourtmustconsidernotonlythetextofthatprovision,butalsotheconstitutionalprincipleswhichunderliethetext,[…]”

69. PerLordReedinUNISON(givingajudgmentwithwhichthewholecourtagreed): “66. Theconstitutionalrightofaccesstothecourtsisinherentintheruleoflaw.Theimportanceoftheruleoflawisnotalwaysunderstood.Indicationsofalackofunderstandingincludetheassumptionthattheadministrationofjusticeismerelyapublicservicelikeanyother,thatcourtsandtribunalsareprovidersofservicestothe“users”whoappearbeforethem,andthattheprovisionofthoseservicesisofvalueonlytotheusersthemselvesandtothosewhoareremuneratedfortheirparticipationintheproceedings.[…]”.

68. […]CourtsexistinordertoensurethatthelawsmadebyParliament,andthecommonlawcreatedbythecourtsthemselves,areappliedandenforced.Thatroleincludesensuringthattheexecutivebranchofgovernmentcarriesoutitsfunctionsinaccordancewiththelaw.Inorderforthecourtstoperformthatrole,peoplemustinprinciplehaveunimpededaccesstothem.Withoutsuchaccess,lawsareliabletobecomeadeadletter,theworkdonebyParliamentmayberenderednugatory,andthedemocraticelectionofMembersofParliamentmaybecomeameaninglesscharade.Thatiswhythecourtsdonotmerelyprovideapublicservicelikeanyother.

69. Accesstothecourtsisnot,therefore,ofvalueonlytotheparticularindividualsinvolved.Thatismostobviouslytrueofcaseswhichestablishprinciplesofgeneralimportance.[…]itisnotalwaysdesirablethatclaimsshouldbesettled:it Referring to the example of Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC

562. resolvedapointofgenuineuncertaintyastotheinterpretationofthelegislationgoverningequalpay,whichwasofgeneralimportance,andonwhichanauthoritativerulingwasrequired.

70. Everydayinthecourtsandtribunalsofthiscountry,thenamesofpeoplewhobroughtcasesinthepastliveonasshorthandforthelegalrulesandprincipleswhichtheircasesestablished.Theircasesformthebasisoftheadvicegiventothosewhosecasesarenowbeforethecourts,orwhoneedtobeadvisedastothebasisonwhichtheirclaimmightfairlybesettled,orwhoneedtobeadvisedthattheircaseishopeless.[…]

71. Butthevaluetosocietyoftherightofaccesstothecourtsisnotconfinedtocasesinwhichthecourtsdecidequestionsofgeneralimportance.Peopleandbusinessesneedtoknow,ontheonehand,thattheywillbeabletoenforcetheirrightsiftheyhavetodoso,and,ontheotherhand,thatiftheyfailtomeettheirobligations,thereislikelytobearemedyagainstthem.Itisthatknowledgewhichunderpinseverydayeconomicandsocialrelations.Thatisso,notwithstandingthatjudicialenforcementofthelawisnotusuallynecessary,andnotwithstandingthattheresolutionofdisputesbyothermethodsisoftendesirable.

72. […]althoughitisoftendesirablethatclaimsarisingoutofallegedbreachesofemploymentrightsshouldberesolvedbynegotiationormediation,thoseprocedurescanonlyworkfairlyandproperlyiftheyarebackedupbytheknowledgeonbothsidesthatafairandjustsystemofadjudicationwillbeavailableiftheyfail.Otherwise,thepartyinthestrongerbargainingpositionwillalwaysprevail.”

70. ThisapplicationdoesnotconcerndirectaccesstoahearinginthecourtsbyMrDring,inthesenseinwhichitwasconsideredinUNISON.Hehasnocasewhichheispursuingorwishestopursueanddoesnotanticipatebringingone.Ratherhisapplicationconcernshis(andthepublic’s)rightsofaccesstodocumentsconcerningthecasesoflitigantswhoseclaimshavealreadybeenbeforethecourtandheardinpublic.

71. ItisclearfromtheevidencebeforemeinthewitnessstatementsofMrDringandhissolicitorthatthepurposeofhisapplicationincludesobtainingthedocumentsforsuchmattersasmakingitavailablepublicly,causingorpromotingacademicconsiderationanddiscussionofthatmaterialinrelevantfieldsofstudy,and(byensuringthematerialis availabletoinformthemandtheiradvisersandtobeusedincourtifappropriate)facilitatingcurrentorfuturecaseswhichrelatetoasbestosexposureinthecourts.Itisself-evidentthatthepurposeofseekingdisclosureisnotthescrutinyofthedoingofjusticeduringthecurrencyofthetrialbecausethetrialwasoverbeforetheapplicationwasmade.

72. MrDringisanofficerandmemberoftheAsbestosVictimsSupportGroupsForum(UK)andIsetoutinmydecisionin[2017]EWHC2103(QB)atparas.46-47extractsfromsomeoftheevidencebeforemewhichdealwiththenatureofthatgroupandtheusesofthematerialanticipatedbyMrDring.Irefertothatjudgmentsoasnottooverburdenthisjudgmentwithquotation. Theopenjusticeprinciple

73. Theabilityofthepublictoaccessrecordsofcourtproceedings(subjectalwaystothecontrolofthecourtinanappropriatecasewherejusticewouldbedefeatedorimpairedbydisclosure Ishallreturntothisaspectbelow. )engagesconstitutionalnotionsofopenaccesstothecourtsinwayswhicharerelevantlysimilartobutnotidenticalwiththedirectformofaccesstocourtconsideredinUNISON.Inparticular: (i) TherightofaccesstocourtconsideredinUNISONisinherentintheruleoflaw. (ii) Itseemstomethatopennessofjustice,ofthesortconsideredherefostersthescrutinyofthecourtsbythepublic,protectstheintegrityofthecourtprocessandassiststhedevelopmentofthelawandlegalknowledge.Ittherebysupportsthepracticaleffectivenessoftherightofaccesstocourt. (iii) Thecourtsdonotmerelyprovideapublicservicetothe‘users’whoappearbeforethem.Rather,previouscasesformthebasisoftheadvicegiventothosewhosecasesarenowbeforethecourts,orwhoneedtobeadvisedastothebasisonwhichtheirclaimmightfairlybesettled,orwhoneedtobeadvisedthattheircaseishopeless. (iv) Althoughitisoftendesirablethatclaimsarisingoutofallegedbreachesofthelawshouldberesolvedbynegotiationormediation,thoseprocedures canonlyworkfairlyandproperlyiftheyarebackedupbytheknowledgeonbothsidesthatafairandjustsystemofadjudicationwillbeavailableiftheyfail.

74. Accesstoacourt,beingnotmerelytheprovisionofaserviceto‘users’asiftheyareconsumersofaproductakintothedispensingofstamps,entailsthatthepartiessubmittingtothejurisdictiondonothavefullsovereigntytodeterminesimplybyprivateagreementbetweenthemselvestheextenttowhichthepublicmaybemadeawareofanyaspectoftheproceedingsbeforethecourt.

75. Thisbringswithitatleastasadefaultpositionaninherentandperfectlyforeseeablepossibilitythatmaterialdeployedincourtbytheparties,orfiledupontherecordsofthecourtaspartofitsprocess,willformpartofthecorpusofmaterialwhichmaybedeployedinothercases,usedforthepurposesoflegaladvice,beingacademicallyorjournalisticallydiscussed,orconsideredbyParliament.ThusinChanUSeek(supra.)at31: “…thecourtsfavourdisclosureratherthanwithholdingofmaterialsifthematerialshavefeaturedinproceedingsinopencourt…”andPerToulsonLJinR(GuardianNews)vWestminsterMagistrates’Court(supra.)at85: “Inacasewheredocumentshavebeenplacedbeforeajudgeandreferredtointhecourseofproceedings,inmyjudgmentthedefaultpositionshouldbethataccessshouldbepermittedontheopenjusticeprinciple”

76. TheearliercasessuchasGio(priortotheCPR)andDianAOandwhicharemoreconservativeintheirapproachtodisclosureofcourtdocumentsmustbereadinthelightofthedevelopmentofthelawinGuardianNews.

77. InparticularoneseesaclearprogressionoftheviewtakenbythecourtsinthemorerecenteraifoneexaminesthejudicialprogressionofthoughtstartingatGioat995F,doubtedtobegoodlawinthepostGuardianNewserainNABvSercoat29andendingmostrecentlyinBlueandAshleyatpara10withLeggattJ’sstatementofthebreadthofthecommonlawjurisdictiontoorderdisclosureofserveddocuments.Themessagewhichemergesfromtheauthoritiesisthatthecommonlawdiscretionisawideonebutitsexerciseiscasespecific.Therulesregulateitsexercisebutdonotlimitthosepowers.

78. ‘Knowledge’thatthereisafairandjustsystemofadjudicationavailableifAlternativeDisputeResolutionfails,whichwasoneofthebenefitsofopenaccesstothecourtsreferredtoinUNISONwouldbeineffectiveifitwasmerelyanarticleoffaithamonglawyersorthosewhohavehadcourtexperience.Theprocessandoperationofthecourt,aswellasthesubstanceofanydecisionsandtheirlegalbasismustbeaccessibleifknowledgeofthefairnessofthesystemistoberealandnotillusory.

79. Summinguptherefore: (1) CPR5.4Cistheprimarymeansbywhichthecourt’scommonlawpowertoallowaccesstodocumentstothepublicfromthecourtrecordisadministeredbutthecommonlawisthemasterandnottheservantoftherules. (2) WheredocumentsarefiledontherecordofthecourtthentheyfallwithinthescopeofCPR5.4C(2).(Ifdocumentsareremovedfromcourt,BlueandAshleyvTimesNewspapersLtd[2017]EWHC1553(Comm.)mayprovideabasisforsayingthatthecourtcanrequirethemtobereturnedbutinthisinstancethedocumentshadnotinfactbeenremovedfromcourt). (3) Documentsfiledontherecordofthecourtandwhicharereadortreatedasreadincourtaresubjecttoadefaultpositioninfavouroftheprincipleofopenjusticeiftheapplicanthasalegitimateinterest. (4) Wheretheapplicanthasalegitimateinterestthenthecourtmuststillconsiderthebalancingexerciseinrelationtoanyharmtootherpartieslegitimateinterestswhendecidingwhethertoallowaccess. (5) Documentsontherecordsofthecourtwhicharenotreadortreatedasreadaresubjecttoamorestringenttestnamelythattheremustbestronggroundsforthinkingthataccessisnecessaryintheinterestsofjustice. (6) Serveddocumentsnotontherecordsofthecourtdonotfallwithinrule 5.4Cbutmaybedisclosedunderthecourt’scommonlawpowers.GioandNestecsupportanarrowapproachtoexercisingthatjurisdictionwheredocumentsaresoughtwhichfalloutsiderule5.4C.BlueandAshleydrawsthescopeofthepowerswidelybutalsoapproachestheirexercisecautiously. Istheprincipleofopenjusticeengagedatallincaseswhichsettlebeforejudgment?

80. IdonotacceptthatthecorrectinterpretationofDianAOisthatputforwardbyCapenamelythattheopenjusticeprincipleisnotengagedwhereacasehassettledbeforejudgment,andnortoIunderstandLewisonJtohavebeenaffirmingsuchaninterpretationofDianAOintheABCvYcase.TofollowwhyItakethatviewImustconsiderbrieflythefactsofDianAOandthenturntospecificallywhatMoore-BickJsaid.

81. TheapplicationinDianAOconcernedanapplicationforaccesstothecourtfileinacasewhichhadsettled.Itappearsfromthereportthatthecasedidnotproceedasfarasinthecasebeforeme(thejudgenotesatpara.31thatthejudicialfunctionhadbeenasheputsit‘verylimited’inthatcase).Theapplicantthereinitiallysoughtaccesstoalldocumentsinthecourtfile.Ineednotgointothefulldetailofthecourt’sdiscussionofthevariousdocumentsinthecasebutitisofnotethatthecourtinDianAOwasfacedspecificallywithtwotypesofdocumentnamely(a)thosewhichhadbeenused,atleasttosomeextentorother,aspartofthejudicialprocessonforexampleasecurityforcostsapplicationandaninjunctionapplication,and(b)affidavitswhichhadbeenfiledaspartofasummaryjudgmentapplicationwhichhadbeencompromisedbywayofunconditionalleavetodefend,andwhichhadnotultimatelybeenthroughanytypeofjudicialconsideration.

82. Thecourtallowedaccesstothedocumentswhichhadplayedaroleinjudicialprocess,butrefusedaccesstotheaffidavitsfortheabortivesummaryjudgmentapplication.

83. AgainstthatbackdroponethenlookscarefullyatthedictareliedonbyCapeinsupportofthepropositionthattheopenjusticeprincipledoesnotapplytoasettledcase,andlookstoseewhetherwhatissaidinthatcaseactuallymakesouttheassertionbyCapeinthefootnotetopara.13ofitsskeletonthatinDianAOtherewasadictumthat“asettledcasedoesnotengagetheprincipleofopenjustice”.

84. Idonotseethatitisatenablepropositionthatwhenproperlyread,Moore-BickJwasmakingsuchanassertion.Atpara.30ofDianAOthecourtsaidthattheprincipleofopenjusticewas: “primarilyconcernedwithmonitoringthedecision-makingprocessasittakesplace,notwithreviewingtheprocesslongaftertheevent.” Thecourtthenobservedthattheclaimhadendedbycompromisein1996(ie,longbeforetheapplicationforaccess)andstatedat31thattheapplicanthad: “nointerestintheperformanceofthejudicialfunctioninthatcase…Itsimplyseekspermissiontousethecourtfileasasourceofusefulinformationtoassistitinotherlitigation.Thatdoesnotinmyviewengagetheprincipleofopenjustice.”Thejudgethen(at56-57)foundthat: “Inthepresentcase,althoughthe[applicant]isnotinterestedinwhetherjusticewasproperlyadministeredintheDiancase,Ithinkitdoeshavealegitimateinterestinobtainingaccesstodocumentsonthecourtrecordinsofarastheycontaininformationthatmayhaveadirectbearingontheissuesthatarisein[theotherlitigationitwasinvolvedin].Ididnotacceptthesubmissionthatthelinkistootenuous…Moreover,Ithinkthatinthecaseofdocumentsthatwerereadbythecourtinaspartofthedecision-makingprocess,thecourtoughtgenerallytoleaninfavourofallowingaccessinaccordancewiththeprincipleofopenjusticeascurrentlyunderstood”

85. ItiscleartomethatthedictastatedabovearenotconsistentwithaninterpretationofjudgmentinDianAOthatasettledcasedoesnotengagetheprincipleofopenness.Ratherthemeaningconveyedwasthat: (i) ifthepurposeofaccessisnottoscrutinisethejudicialprocessasitistakingplacebutissomeotherreasonthentheprincipleofopenaccessisnotforthatreasonengagedand (ii) iftheapplicanthasalegitimateinterestwhichisnottootenuous,andthedocumentshavebeenreadincourt,thenthecourtleansinfavourofaccess“inaccordancewiththeprincipleofopenjustice”toquotethespecificwordsofMoore-BickJagain.

86. ThereisnorealisticreadingoftheabovequotedpassageswhichleadstotheconclusionthatMoore-BickJwasoftheviewthatasettledcasedoesnotengagetheprincipleatall,unlessoneispreparedtoignorethelastelevenwordsoftheabovequotation.

87. Proceedingfurther,onecanthenseethatthesettingofahigherthresholdforthesummaryjudgmentdocumentsinDianAOwhereby,suchdocumentsnothavingbeenreadbythecourtaspartofthedecisionmakingprocess,theyweresubjecttothe‘stronggrounds’testwasareferencetothefactssetout(atpara.47ofhisjudgment)inwhichhemakesitclearthatthesummaryjudgmentaffidavitshadmerelybeenfiledandneverreadbythecourtbecausetheapplicationwascompromisedbeforeanyhearingorjudicialconsiderationtookplace.

88. IacceptthatthefactreferredtobyCapethatTheLawDebentureTrustcaseciteddidnotconcerntherulewithwhichIamnowconcernedweakenssomewhattheforceofargumentbyMrWeirthatitisauthoritythatsettlementoutofcourtdoesengagestheprincipleofopenjusticeinanapplicationsuchasthis.ButwithduerespecttotheCapeargumentandtoMrFenwickitseemstomethattheNABvSercocaseisonpoint,didconcernthetypeofapplicationbeforemeandwasclear,perBeanJat30that“Thepublicinterestisnotconfinedtocaseswherethecourthasgivenjudgmentanditissoughttoseewhethertheunderlyingdocumentsprovidefurtherilluminationofthejudgment.Itmaybejustassignificanttodiscoverwhyacasesettled.”

89. ThatBeanJinNABvSercowasreferringtothepublicinterestinopenjustice,specifically,andnotmerelythepublicinterestinaverygeneralsenseisclearfromtheopeningoftheverynextparagraphofthatjudgmentinwhichheconfirmsthat“Ihaveconsideredwhetherthepublicinterestinopenjusticeisoutweighedinthiscasebytheriskofharmtothelegitimateinterestsofothers.”

90. Theprincipleofopenjusticeisengagednotwithstandingthatacasesettlesbeforejudgment.Itappliestodocumentswhichhavebeenreadtoorbythecourt,treatedassoread,orwhich(usingtheformulationinChanUSeek)“havefeaturedin”theproceedings Whichdocumentswerefiledontherecordsofthecourtinthiscase?

91. InthiscasethemaingroupofdocumentswithwhichIamconcernedarethosemarkedasBundlesAtoF.‘Bundle’Dwasprovidedsolelyinelectronicformviaadocumentmanagementsystemandisalargerepositoryofdiscloseddocuments.TheotherbundleswereonpaperandareaselectedsetofmaterialwhichwasgraduallyexpandedduringthetrialasdocumentswhichhadbeenexpresslyreferredtoweremovedacrossfromDtothepaperbundles,enablingacumulativelycompletedpapercorebundleforthejudgebytheendofthecase(whilststillensuringthejudgehadalldocumentsinthecase,viabundleD,ifrequiredtobedeployed).MrWeir’scasewasthatallofthosefilesAtoFwerethetrialbundles,filedassuch,andthattherecouldbenoquestionthat‘BundleD’wasanythingotherthanapartofthetrialbundlesandthereforewaspartofthe‘recordsofthecourt’attrialjustaswerethepaperfiles.

92. Inadditiontothepaperbundles,therewereatcourtasetofdailytranscriptsoftrialwhichhadbeengiventothejudge,andtheusualmiscellaneousdocumentsgeneratedduringthecaseanddeployedbeforethejudgesuchaswrittensubmissionsetc.

93. Itdoesnotappearthat(ashadbeenthoughttobethecasewhentheexparteapplicationwasmadetomeforthere-filingofthebundlesetc)anyrelevantdocumentsformingthesubjectofthisapplicationhadbeenremovedfromcourtasatthetimetheapplicationwasmade.

94. TheCPRrequire,inrule39.5expressly,thatbundlesfortrialbe‘filed’unlessthecourtordersotherwise.Theexpressionisnot‘lodged’or‘delivered’orsomeothervariant,but‘filed’.OtherpartsoftheCPR,notablypartsofPD5Ausetermsincluding‘filed,lodgedorheld’atthecourt,butnottheruleastobundles.

95. NeithermyselfasthemanagingmasternorPickenJorderedotherwiseinrelationtothefilingofbundles.ThecaselawalreadycitedabovesuchasNABvSercoamplyestablishesthatbundleswhichhavebeenfiledarepartoftherecordsofthecourt.Theyfallwithinthecourt’sjurisdictioninprincipleastoallowingaccessaccordingly.Cape’sargumentthatbecausetheCPRrefersto‘bundles’beingfiled,thatdoesnotimplythatthedocumentsinthemarefiled.Thatseemstomeanunrealisticapproach:bundlesaresimplycollectionsofdocumentsandwhenabundleisfilednecessarilysoarethedocumentswithinit.

96. AsregardsbundleD,thatdifferedfromtheothersinthatitwasapurelydigitalbundle.

97. CapewasincorrecttoassertthattheQBDdoesnotkeepelectroniccourtfiles.Itdoesdoso,aswellasfilesonpaper,butitiscorrectthatthesysteminuseelectronicallyisaverybasicrecordofcaseprogressionandeventsmaintainedbystaff.

98. HoweverCapeiscorrecttoassertthat‘bundleD’doesnotamounttoabundlefiledatcourt.ItisnotablethatPD5.4Aat2.2statesthat“(1)Unlessthenatureofthedocumentrendersitimpracticable,beonA4paperofdurablequalityhavingamargin,notlessthan3.5centimetreswide,”.Thatandotherprovisionsimplythatthebasicpositionastofilingatcourtis,absentaPracticeDirectioninaccordancewithrule5.5,apaperexercise.

99. PracticeDirection5Ballowsdocumentstobesent,insomecircumstances,byemail.ItmakesnoprovisionforfilingofdocumentsintheQBDelectronically.PracticeDirection51O,inforcefrom16November2015doesmakeprovisionforfilingofdocumentselectronically(thoughevenitrequirespaperbundlestobefiledaswellaselectronicones),butthatPDappliesonlyto“TheRollsBuildingJurisdictions”,andthiscasewasnotproceedingunderoneofthosejurisdictions.

100. ‘BundleD’wasmadeavailableasadigitalresourceincourtmuchasifaharddrivehadbeenretainedonthesolicitors’rowincourtsothatdocumentscouldbeextractedfromit,butinmyjudgmentonecannotconcludethatbundleDwasfiled.

101. Apartfromthebundles,therewereotherdocumentsdeployedincourtsuchasskeletons,writtensubmissionsandtranscriptsonadailybasis.Clearlythosewereplacedbeforethejudgeandreferredto.

102. Thereisalegitimatequestionwhetherallofthoseweretechnically‘filed’ornot,andwhetherhandingadocumenttoajudgedirectlyorviastaffincourtisnecessarilyalwaysthesamethingasfilingit.Theauthoritiesgenerallyappeartotreatsubmissionsandskeletonsas permittedtobedisclosedunderthecommonlawjurisdictionratherthanasbeingfiledandtriggeringrule5.4C.

103. Inthisinstancethedocumentsotherthanthebundleswereretainedincourtattheendoftrialandheldtogetherwiththecourtfiles,ratherthan,forexample,beinglookedatandhandedbacktotheadvocates,andinmyjudgmentthatsufficesintheparticularcircumstancesofthiscasetocausethemtohavebecomedocumentsfiledontherecordsofthecourtatleastforsolongastheyareatcourt.

104. IfIamwrong,thenthedocumentsotherthanthoseinthebundlesfallwithinthecourt’sgeneraldiscretionastoaccessandIwouldreachnodifferentconclusionastothemthanIdobelowonthebasisthattheywere(andare)partoftherecordsofthecourt.

105. CapecorrectlyacceptedinanyeventthatIcandirectthatanydocumentnotfiled,beplacedonthecourtfileandIreturntothatattheveryendofthisjudgment. Whetherfileddocumentshavebeensufficientlyreadortreatedasreadbythejudgesoastogiverisetoastartingpointofopenness? ThebundlesotherthanbundleD

106. MrWeirQCcorrectlyarguedthatfollowingSmithklineBeechamBiologicalsSAvConnaughtLaboratoriesInc[1999]4AllER498509c-eandBaringsplcvCoopersandLybrand[2000]1WLR2353at52-52,onehastotakeintoaccountthatmodernpracticeencouragestheprereadingofbundlesbyjudges.

107. InotealsothatinBaringsat51thefollowingpassagefromthejudgmentofLordWoolfMRhighlightstheexpectationwhichtherewasatthattimethatthecomingintoforceoftheHumanRightsAct1998andtheCPRwouldhavecertaineffectsontheapproachtodisclosureofcourtdocuments: “ThetensionbetweentheneedforapublichearingofcourtproceedingsandwhathappensinpracticeinthecourtswillbeincreasedwhentheHumanRightsAct1998comesintoforceandthecourtswillbeunderanobligationtocomplywitharticle6.Already,thiscourthasrecognisedtheneedtogive“appropriateweighttobothefficiencyandopennessofjustice”inthejudgmentofthecourtgivenbyLordBinghamofCornhillCJinSmithklineBeechamBiologicalsSAvConnaughtLaboratoriesInc.[…]AsLordBinghamCJrecognised,it“maybenecessary,withsuitablesafeguards,toavoidtoowideagapbetweenwhathasintheory,andwhathasinpractice,passedintothepublicdomain.”SincetheCivilProcedureRulescameintoforceitisimportanttoreducethegapsincejudgeswillbeincreasinglyperformingtheirroleoutofcourtaswellasincourt.”

108. Inthisinstancethebundlesonpaperweredeployedincourtandplacedbeforethejudgeincludingafterheretiredtoconsiderhisdecision.TheythereforenotonlyformedpartoftherecordsofthecourtbutIconsiderthatbyhavingbeenplacedbeforethejudgeandreliedonbytheparties,theyweresubjecttowhatLordJusticeToulsonreferredtoasthe‘defaultposition’thataccessshouldbegivenontheopenjusticeprinciple,inR(GuardianNews)vWestminsterMagistrates’Courtat85.CasessuchasSayersareexamplesoftheapproachtotake.

109. ThesamereasoningappliestothedocumentsotherthanbundleDnamelythesubmissions,skeletonsandtranscriptsprovidedtothejudge. BundleD

110. LeavingasidethequestionwhichIhaveansweredinthenegativeaboveastowhetherbundleDwas‘filed’,referringbacktothedefaultpositionsetoutbyToulsonLJinR(GuardianNews)vWestminsterMagistrates’Court,theplacingofdocumentsbeforeajudgeisonerelevantaspectofwhetherthedefaultpositionofopennessapplies.TheotheraspectreferredtobyToulsonLJatpara85ofhisjudgmentisthatofwhetheradocumentwasreferredto,havingbeenplacedbeforethejudge.

111. InthecaseofbundleDthatisproblematicbecausetheintentionofthepartiesinproducingbundleDatallwasthatwheredocumentswerereferredtotheywouldbecopiedacrosstoformpartoftheother,paper,bundlesonpaper.ThedocumentsinbundleD(savewheretheywerethesameasintheotherbundles)werebydefinitiondocumentswhich thejudgehadnotbeeninvitedtoconsider,asIunderstandtheevidencefromCapeastohowthedocumentbundleswereused.

112. MrWeirQCsubmittedtomethatifCapecouldshowthatanyofthedocumentsinbundleDwerenotreadbythejudgethenthecourtshouldadoptthemorestringenttestsetoutinDianAOnamelythatthecourtshouldnotallowaccessunlesstherearestronggroundsforthinkingthatitisnecessaryintheinterestsofjusticetodoso.

113. IdonotagreethatsuchaspecificapproachisnecessaryinthecaseofbundleD.AbsenthumanerrorintransferringorcopingdocumentsacrossfrombundleDtotheotherbundlesonpaper,theresidueofthecontentsofbundleDwerematerialsthatthejudgehadnotbeenaskedtouse,hadnotbeenreferredtoandtowhich,ifwishingtotakethemintoaccount,hewoulddoubtlesshavecomebacktoalertthepartiesandasktohearargumentaboutthemsuchthattheywouldthenbereferredtoandtreatedasread.

114. ItseemstomethatwithoutpiercingtheveilofthejudicialretiringroomonecanseereadilythatbundleDdidnotformpartofthematerialplacedbeforethejudgeforthepurposeofhisdecision.Itwasnotmaterialwhichfeaturedinthedecision-makingprocessorwasreadortreatedasreadbythecourt.

115. ThereforetheresidueofbundleDnotalreadycontainedinthepaperbundlesismaterialwhichfallsoutsidethescopeofthedefaultprincipleofopenness.Ishallmakeprovisionbelowfordealingwithanystraydocumentswhichfailedtobecopiedacrosstothepaperfilesbutwhichwerereferredto.

116. IntermsofthepotentialforanorderfordisclosureofbundleDunderthecommonlawjurisdictionofthecourt,Iconsiderthatthosepowersareinprincipleavailable(firstly)becauseitwastechnicallyplacedbeforethejudgeinthesensethatitwasavailableusingthedocumentmanagementsystemand(secondly)followingBlueandAshleyperLeggattJat10thecourt’spowersdoextendinprincipletoorderingdisclosureofserveddocumentstothepublicevenifnotfiledatcourt.IdiscussBlueandAshleyfurtherinPart2ofthisjudgmentundertheBalancingexercise. Theusetowhichthedocumentswillbeputandwhetherthereisalegitimateinterestinaccessinthiscase

117. FollowingGioandABCvYreferredtoinargument,onceadocumenthasbeensufficientlydeployedincourttogiverisetothestartingpointofopenness,thereisstillaneedfortheapplicanttoshowalegitimateinterest(andthereaftertoconsiderthe‘balancingexercise’inrelationtopossibleharmfuleffectstoothers’legitimateinterests).

118. Alegitimateinterestcanfromthoseauthoritiesincludeacademicinterest,usebyapressuregrouporuseinsomejournalisticformandindeedanynumberofotheruseswhichareulterior(inthepropersenseofthatword)withoutbeingillegitimate.Onemightdecideforexamplethatifamemberofthepublicsoughtaccesstodocumentsforthepurposesoffraudorofmakingundueuseofcourtresourcestheremaybenosuchlegitimateinterestbutsuchisnotthecasehere.

119. InVariousClaimantsvNewsGroupitisfairtosaythatVosJadoptedarobustapproachwhereitwasallegedthatdisclosurewouldriskprejudicingacriminaltrial,andthatisveryobviouslyacasewherethecourtmusttreadcarefully.Heindicatedatpara.66thatthecourtmustlookattheusestowhichthedocumentswouldbeputandtheextenttowhichtheyweretrulyrequiredtounderstandandreporttheproceedings.

120. Iacceptthebasicpointthatthecourtmustevaluatewhetherthereisalegitimateinterest.Idonotagree(ifsuchwasintendedbyVosJinVariousClaimantsvNewsGroup,whichIdoubt)thatlegitimateinterestislimitedtowhetherdocumentsarerequiredonlytounderstandandreportproceedings.Itisappropriatetoconsiderthataspect,butthescopeoflegitimacyofinterestisabroadoneillustratedbyGioandbyABCvY.

121. CapeattackedtheideathatenablingthedetailedexaminationoftheoriginsofTDN13anditsbasisatthetimeitwascreatedwasanaimwhichwaslegitimate,becausetheideaputforwardonbehalfoftheapplicantthatTDN13hasbeentreatedasa‘safetystandard’inasbestoslitigationwaslackinginlegalsubstance.BasedonCape’sinterpretationofWilliamsvBirmingham,itwassaidtobethecasethatthecourthadmerelytreatedTDN13asguidance.Moreovertheapproachtherewas andremainedgoodlawandhadforexamplebeenappliedinSmith(ExecutoroftheEstateofSmith,deceased)vPortswoodHouseLtd[2016]EWHC939.

122. AstoTDN13withduerespecttoCape,thequestionwhetherTDN13wasasafetystandard,wasguidance,orwasinsomesenseabogusdocumentcreatedbyindustryactinginitsownself-interestorsomethingelseentirely,isnotamatterIneeddelveintobeyondbeingsatisfiedthatthereisarealdebate,havingpublicinterest,astothevalidityandoriginsofTDN13.

123. IneednotdetermineanythingaboutTDN13inthisjudgmentotherthanthatitisthesubjectofalegitimatedesirebyMrDringtofurtherthepublicknowledgeandconsiderationofhowitcameaboutandhowitshouldbeapproachedinlaw,includingpotentiallyinfutureclaimsinvolvingCapeitself.

124. Inthisinstancetheevidence,whichIaccept,isthatMrDringactsforagroupwhichprovideshelpandsupporttoasbestosvictims.Itsomerespectsitisalsoapressuregroupandisinvolvedinlobbyingandinpromotingasbestosknowledgeandsafety.Thosearelegitimateactivitiesandprovidelegitimateinterest.Theevidencebeforemedemonstratesthattheintendeduseistoenablehimandtheforumofwhichheisanofficer,to: • makethematerialpubliclyavailable, • bymakingitavailabletopromoteacademicconsiderationastothescienceandhistoryofasbestosandasbestoluxexposureandproduction, • improvetheunderstandingofthegenesisandlegitimacyofTDN13andanyindustrylobbyingleadingtoitinthe1960sand1970s. • understandtheindustrialhistoryofCapeanditsdevelopmentofknowledgeofasbestossafety • clarifytheextenttowhichCapeisorisnotresponsibleforproductsafetyissuesarisingfromthehandlingofasbestoluxboards • toassistcourtclaimsandtheprovisionofadvicetoasbestosdiseasesufferers.

125. Thosearelegitimateaims.IdoacceptthatifanapplicantunderCPR5.2C(2)merelyassertedthathewantedaccesstodocumentssothathecouldpublishthem,andgavenobasisfortheimportanceoreffectsofsodoingorhismotives,itwouldnotinthatbareformbepersuasive.TothatextentIacceptCape’spositionthatanassertionofamereintentiontopublishthematerialobtainedwould,ifitsufficedwithoutmoreparticularity,essentiallydepriverule5.4C(2)ofmuchofitspurpose.Butthatisnotthepositionhere.Itisclearfromtheevidencewhattheintendeduseisandwhy. Part2–Thestandingoftheapplicant,thespecificityoftheapplicationandthebalancingexercise Standingoftheapplicant

126. Capesubmittedthatthisapplicationwasanullityandhadtobedismissed.TheapplicationhadbeenissuedoriginallyinanurgentexpartebasisandhadnamedtheForumastheapplicant.TheForumhadnolegalpersonality.

127. Whereanapplicationismadeurgently,itisunsurprisingthatasituationcouldarisewherecounselproceeded,aswasthecase,onthebasisthathebelievedtheForumtohavealegalpersonality.ImustaskmyselfwhethertheeffectoftheForumhavingbeennamedinerrorastheapplicantmeansthatthisapplicationmustbedismissed.Suchwouldbegrosslydisproportionate.MrDringwassubstitutedasapplicantandtheirregularitywascured.Thepropercourseisformetodecidetheapplicationonthatbasis. Specificityoftheapplication

128. Iconsiderthatthedegreeofspecificitywhichispossibleinanapplicationunderrule5.4Cmustnecessarilybelimitedinpracticaltermsbythefactthatwithoutseeingthedocumentsinthefirstplacethebestthatcanbeexpectedsoastoassistthecourtisthatgeneralcategoriesofdocumentsbeidentifiedunlessthereisaparticularidentifieddocumentwhichknownaboutandissought.ThePracticeDirection envisagesthatclassesofdocumentsshouldbeidentifiedanddoesnotexpectmorethanthat.

129. Inthiscaseatalatestagetheapplicants,challengedbytherespondentstobemorespecific,andIthinkattemptingtohelp,providedadetailedlistofdocuments.Thatapproachisundesirablewhere,aswasthecase,theidentificationofthedocumentsbasedonthatlistwouldhaverequiredinsightintothemindsoftheparties.Askingfor‘allwitnessstatements’wouldbeaproperrequestinformalbeitbroad,butnotarequestsuchas‘allmaterialreliedonbytheClaimanttoestablishaparticularproposition’whichtomymindconfusesthistypeofaccessapplicationwithaspeciesofdisclosureapplicationasbetweenpartiestoaclaimandlackspracticalprecisionasregardsthecourt’sabilitytoknowwhatdocumentsareintended.

130. Cape’spositionwasthattheapplicationwassimplytoovague.Theapplicationwasattackedasbeingeffectivelyarequestforalldocumentsincludingtheparties’disclosure.Itdidnotspecificallyidentifywhichdocumentssoughtwere‘partoftherecordsofthecourt’andwhichweresoughtunderthecourt’sgeneraldiscretion,orthegroundsonwhichtheyweresought.ItwasCape’spositionthatthishadtheeffectthatthecourtcouldnotproperlygrantpermissionundertherulesandcouldnotproperlycarryoutthebalancingexerciseenvisagedinGuardianNewsatpara.85.

131. IdonotacceptthecriticismsbytheCapepartiesthattheapplicationasawholeistoovaguetoenableittobedecidedorfailstoidentifytheclassesofdocumentsought.Thisapplicationinstrictpointofformasissuediseffectivelyanapplicationfortheentiretyofthedocumentsatcourtbutnonethelesstheclassesofdocumentwerelisted(butwitha‘catchall’requestattheendwhichmeantthattheneteffectwastorequestalldocuments).Theclassessoughtinthestatementprovidedwiththeapplicationwere: (i) Allwitnessstatements (ii) Experts’reports (iii) Transcriptsofevidence (iv) AlldocumentsdisclosedbyCapeandotherparties.

132. Theclassesofdocumentssoughtarereadilyidentifiedandtheyaretheonespresentlyoccupyingseveralmetresofshelfspaceandaharddiskinmycourtroom.ImustinterprettheruleandPracticeDirectiontorule5.4CasbeingsubjecttotheprincipleofproportionalityinthewayinwhichcourtsallocatetheirresourcesandaccordinglyinthisjudgmentIhavetakenthesameflexibleapproachIwouldwithanymemberofthepublicandthatistoconsidertheextentandformofdisclosurewhichinmyjudgmentisappropriate,giventheclassesofdocumentssoughtandthereasonsgiven,withanycountervailingconsiderations.

133. Intheseapplications,whichMastersoftenencounterinanunopposedform,theusualapproachisarelativelyinformalconsiderationoftherequestandnotanoverlytimeconsumingorresource-heavyprocess.Thecourtsmustbalancetheirlimitedresourceswiththeneedtogiveeffecttoopenness,andacomplexoroverlydetail-heavyapproachwouldbeunattractiveriskbeinganexcessiveuseofpreciouscourtresources. TheBalancingexercise Balancingtheconstitutionalrightofopenaccesstothecourtsandcourtprocesses,andtheconstitutionalrightsofpartiestoreceivejusticethroughthecourts

134. Theconstitutionalrightofaccesstoacourtwouldbeunacceptablyimpairediftheactofgoingtocourt,perhapshavingnochoiceotherthantodosoinsomeinstances,necessarilyentailedthateverydetailofeverycasewasavailabletothepublic.

135. Claimsinvolvingtradesecrets,intimatepersonaldetails,libelsandfalsehoodswhichwouldbedamagingifre-published,andnodoubtotherformsofinformationcouldbedisclosedifcourtproceedingswereunavoidably‘open’totheirfullestextent,andsuchcouldinseriouscasesdefeatthepointofbringingtheclaimatall,orplaceanunacceptablecommercial‘price’onaccesstothecourtinmuchastheimpositionofcourtfeesimpairedaccessintheUNISONcase.

136. Sincetheprimedutyofacourtistodojustice(nowaprinciplereflectedintheoverridingobjective,whichre-statesthecommonlawbutdoes notreplaceit),itwillsometimesbethecasethattheconstitutionalrighttoopennessofcourtprocessisoverriddenbyconsiderationsofdoingjustice.Insuchcasesitisthecourt’sdutytorestrictaccesstoextentnecessarytoensurethatjusticecanbedoneeffectively.

137. Tothatendtherulesofcourtprovideaqualifiedandcontrolledsystemofopennessregulatedbythecourtrulesinajudicialmanner.Thecourtrulesprovideasystemwherebyinanappropriatecaseapartymayseekordersfromthecourtrestrictingpublicationofdocuments.

138. Inadditiontoseekingordersastonon-disclosureofdocumentsfromthefile,apartymayalsoseekinanappropriatecasetohaveproceedingsheldincamera,orforproceedingstobeanonymisedwhollyorpartly(thelatterbeingcommonplaceinasbestoscasesconcerningdyingmesotheliomavictimswhosecasesproceedinthespecialistMasters’rapidaccessasbestoscourtswhichIdescribedinsomedetailinmyjudgmentinYatesvHMRC[2014]EWCH2311(QB)).Ihavenotbeeninformedinthiscaseofanyapplicationsmadeforhearingsincameraorforanonymity.

139. Theaboveformsofprotectionarenotthesoleprotectionsforaparty.Iaccept,asCapeargued,thatthereisaneedtoperformabalancingexercisealongthelinesenvisagedinGuardianNewswithitsreferencetheretoabalancingexerciseintermsoflookingatthelegitimateinterestsoftheapplicantandthepotentialforharmtotheinterestsofothersintheeventofdisclosure. Theimportanceofthedocumentsonfile

140. IamsatisfiedbasedontheevidenceinthewitnessstatementsbeforemefromMrDringandMsBainsthat(innoorderofpriority)thecontentofthesedocuments: i. wouldbelikelytobeofacademicandscientificinterestaspartofpublicandsocialdiscourseastothehistoryofasbestossafety,regulationandknowledgeasitdevelopedduringthe20thcentury,ii.wouldbelikelytobeconsideredbyadvisersadvisingpartiestoasbestoslitigationastothemeritsoftheircaseswheneverissuesarisewhichtouchuponTechnicalDataNotice13andconnectedRegulations,iii.islikelytoberelevanttheproductsafetyofasbestosinsofarasunderstoodwithinthemajormanufacturersandconnectedcompaniesascomparedwithgeneralpublicatvariouspointsinthe 20thcentury,andiv.islikelytoberelevanttotheextenttowhichemployerdefendantscouldhavebeenexpectedtoappreciatetherisksofasbestos(inthatregardthematerialwillnotnecessarilyassistclaimantsasagainstemployersperse,if,astheapplicant’ssidesuspect,TDN13wasessentiallyabogusstandardcreatedbytheasbestosindustry).

141. ThepointwasmadeforMrDringinevidencethatitwouldbemostundesirableifcourtsdealingwithmattersrelatingtoasbestossafetyandTDN13weretohavetoproceedinignoranceofthemattersinthesedocuments.Totheextentthatthedocumentswouldinprinciplebeavailablefordisclosureintheusualcourseofacourtclaiminterpartesthatoughttobeadiminishedconcernbutitisnotfullydiminishedbecauseconsiderationsofproportionalitycomeintoplayinpersonalclaimsrelatingtomesotheliomagiventhevalueofsuchclaims,andhenceitmaybethatinpracticethedisclosureprocesswouldnotsuffice.

142. Thisisperhapsbesthighlightedbynotingthatthepost-Jacksonapproachtoproportionalitymeansthatevenifdisclosureinthecourtsofaclaimisnecessaryitshouldnotbeorderediftodosowouldbedisproportionate.Therefore,theavailabilityofinterpartesdisclosureordersinmesotheliomaclaimscannotbeacompleteanswertotheriskthatacourtmayproceedwithoutaccesstothematerialcontainedinthesefiles.

143. Asimilarconcern,inthatitreflectsadesiretoensurethatcourtsarenotkeptinignoranceofmaterial,washighlightedinSmithklineBeechamBiologicalsSAvConnaughtLaboratoriesInc[1999]4AllER498at511hperLordBinghamCJwhosaid: “Itisinourviewunsatisfactoryifintheproceedingselsewheredecisionsaremadeinignoranceofthegroundswhichledthe PatentsCourtinthiscountrytoholdthepatentinvalid.[…] ConnaughtshouldnotbeinaworsepositionthanifthematerialsonwhichLaddieJreliedinmakinghisdecisionhadbeenreadaloudinopencourt,butnorinouropinionshouldtheybeinabetterposition.”

144. Iacceptthatheretherewasnoultimatedecisionandhencethepointmadeastoknowledgeofthebasisforadecisiondoesnotapplybutitisacloselyrelatedandinmyviewvalidconcernexpressedbytheapplicantherethatdirectingthematerialinthiscasenottobeaccessiblebythepublicwouldriskthecourtsproceedingwithoutthepartiesbeinginapositiontodrawthatmaterialtothejudge’sattentionwhenappropriate.

145. Thisinturnrelatescloselybacktothepointsalreadymadeabovethatthecourtsarenotaprivatedisputeresolutionforumbutrathertheyplayapublicroleininformingothercasesbothastolawandprocedureand,astheabovequotationshowstobedesirable,astofactsandknowledgeinspecialistareas. Cape’sinterestsandriskofharmduetodisclosure ‘Cherrypicking’

146. IaccepttheconcernsofCapeinsubmissionsthatpartialaccesstothedocumentscouldleadto‘cherrypicking’intermsofthepublishingofnegativematerialespeciallyifaccesswasonlygiventomaterialwhichpaintsasbestos,andperhapsCapeinabadlight.Thereisarisk,butamuchreducedrisk,ofcherrypickingifaccessisgivenlessselectivelyandmoreratherthanlesswidely.

147. Thiscourtisnot,saveinrelativelyunusualcircumstances,thearbiterofhowthepublicdiscussthecontentandimplicationsoflegalproceedingsbeforethecourts.MrDringandthepublicatlargemayplaceemphasisonsomematterswhichweregoneintoincourt,ratherthanothers,justascounselintheoriginalcase(afteritsconclusion)didhimselfinrelationtocertainofthe‘testdata’mentionedinthepowerpointslidesquotedin mypreviousjudgments,butabenefitofopennessofjusticeinademocracyisthatbalancecanbeprovidedbytheCapepartieswhothemselveshavetheinformationandanatleastequalabilitytomakepublicanyinformationtheywishforthesakeofbalance. Upholdingsettlementsbetweenparties

148. AstoCape’sargumentthatthereisapublicbenefitinensuringthatsettlementsreachedbythepartiesareupheldinanygivencaseandindeedtheCPRencouragesettlementandrequirethecourttoencourageit.Iagreethatifpartiesareconcernedthatthe‘dirtywashing’orthetradesecretsandsoforthcontainedinmaterialwhichneedstobeconsideredattrialwouldallemergeinpublicevenintheeventofasettlement,thenthatmightdiscouragesettlement.(HoweveronemightwellsaythatconverselysuchaconcerniftruemightencourageADRoutofcourtinthefirstplace).Buttheprimeconcernastodisclosureissurelymetbythefactthattherulesprovideaveryeffectiveframeworkforgenuinelyconcernedpartiestoseeknon-disclosureordersorordersforhearingsincameraduringthetrialandbeforethematerialinquestionisventilatedinpublic.

149. Ifmaterialissufficientlysensitivethattheendsofjusticewouldbeinterferedwithbypublicventilationofitthenthemeansexisttoensurethatordersaremadetothateffect:itistellingthatthiswholetrialtookplacewithoutsuchordersbeingsoughtandthatthesettlementtookplacedespitetheevidencehavingbeengivenandsubmissionsmadeopenlyincourt.

150. Itisnomattertothiscourtthat,afterhaving‘gonepublic’incourt,thepartiesmaylaterhavedecidedthatatermofsettlementwouldbeconfidentialityorasherethedestructionorreturnofthedocuments,unlessthecourthasspecificevidenceandreasonswhydamagewouldbecausedbyadheringtotheprincipleofopenness.InLillyIcosLtdvPfizerLtd(No.2)[2002]1WLR2253perBuxtonLJat25“Simpleassertionsofconfidentialityandofthedamagethatwillbedonebypublication,evenifsupportedbybothparties,shouldnotprevail.Thecourtwillrequirespecificreasonswhyapartywouldbedamagedbythepublicationofadocument.”

151. Itwouldbeveryunattractivebasistoconcludethattheprincipleofopennessshouldbeoustedheresoastorespectanagreementthatdocumentsfreelydeployedinopencourtwithoutapparentconcernatthetimeshouldceasetobeavailabletopublicscrutinymerelybecausethepartiessoagreeprivately.

152. Itwouldbedamagingtoconfidenceinouropencourtsystemforproceedingsofthissorttoappeartohavetakenplaceinamannerinaccessibletothepublicaftertheevent.Thisrelatesbacktotheimportantobservationthatthecourtsarenotaprivatedisputeresolutionforumforthepartiesakintomediationorarbitrationandthatthepublicinterestindevelopingthelaw,andinensuringconfidenceinthesubstanceandprocessofjusticeareinplaywheneverpartiessubmittothejurisdictionofthecourt.Afortioriwherethematerialisoflegal,socialandscientificinterest. Preventionofspuriousclaims

153. AfurtherobjectionbyCapewasthatrestrictingaccesswouldhelptopreventspuriousclaims.Thereismileageinthatpointtotheextentthatreleasingtheinformationmayindeedpromptmoreclaimsinrelationtoharmsaidtobedonebyasbestos,andthereforeonemayassumethatamongthoseclaimstherewillbespuriousorweakcaseswhichmightnototherwisehavebeenattempted.

154. Onemustbalancethatsideeffectwiththeprospectthatmeritoriousclaimsmaywellalsoariseifitisthecasethat,whenthesubjectofTDN13nextcomestobeconsideredbymeoranotherjudge,thedocumentsinthesefilespersuadethecourtthatthestandardswereknownbytheindustrytobeunfoundedornotwellfounded.Itwillbeforthecourts,providedastheyarewiththenecessarytoolsofcostsandcasemanagement,todispatchhopelessclaimswiththeusualvigouroftheMasters’corridormirroredonehopesinothercourts.Theasbestos‘court’asIcalleditinYatesvHMRCintheMasters’corridoriswellabletosortthewheatfromthechaff. Impactonthedisclosureprocessinfutureclaims

155. Capearguedthattherecouldbeimpact,ifaccessisgiven,uponthewillingnessofpartiestogivedisclosuretoeachotherinclaims.ThisinmyjudgmentparticularlyappliestobundleDwhichconsistedofserveddisclosuredocumentsnotreadorreliedonattrial.Capeargued,albeitthatthecaseofSayersreferredtodidnotstrictlydecidethepointbecauseitwasconceded,thatbyanalogywithCPR31.22ifapartyseeksaccesstodocumentswhicharenotfiledontherecordsofthecourtbutareinsteadpartofthedisclosedmaterialinthecasewhichhasnotbeenfiled,thenatestof‘specialcircumstances’shouldapplyequivalenttotheapproachtakentothecourtsunderCPR31.22fordisclosuredocumentsnotreadattrial. Inanapplicationunderrule5.4C(2)whichmightgiverisetopublicaccesstodocumentswhichoriginatedintheparties’disclosuredocuments,doesafurthertestof‘specialcircumstances’applyanalogoustoCPR31.22?

156. ItwillberecalledthatCapecitedtheMarlwoodcaseandadictumofKeithJinSayersarguingthatamemberofthepublicoughtnottobeallowedaccesstodisclosuredocumentsonabasiswhichwasmoreadvantageousthanapartyundertheinterpartesrulesastodisclosure,eveniftheydidamounttopartoftherecordsofthecourtwhichwasnotaccepted).

157. MarlwoodandSayersdonotassistmeinrelationtodocumentswhichhavebeenreferredtoincourtandwhichformpartoftherecordsofthecourt.WheretheSayerscasedoesassist,isthecaseofdisclosuredocumentswhicharenotfiledandnotreferredtoincourt.Inthatevent KeithJadoptedthetestof‘specialcircumstances’byanalogywithrule31.22referringtoMarlwoodalbeithedidsoonthebasisofaconcessionbytheSecretaryforHealth.

158. Itseemstomethatsuchanapproachisdesirabletoensurethatnonpartiesarenotplacedinabetterpositionthanpartiesinrelationtounusedbutserveddisclosurematerial,andalsothattheconcernsIhaveexpressedaboveastothepossiblechillingeffectsofregularuseofthewidecommonlawpowersmentionedinBlueandAshleyareavoided.

159. Ifmeredisclosurebetweenthepartieswithoutdeploymentincourtwastotriggertheopennessprincipleforallitemsdisclosedonecanseethatpartieswoulderronthesideofgivingonlythedisclosurerequiredbytherulesandnomore.Itwouldmoreseriouslybeasignificantchillingfactorinthewillingnessofpartiestocometocourtatalliftherewasalowthresholdtobeappliedtoordersfordisclosureofsuchserveddocumentsatcommonlaw.Thatisastrongcountervailingconsiderationwhereoneisconsideringdisclosureofthetypeofunfiled,andunreadmaterialinbundleD.

160. InBlueandAshleyLeggattJatpara.12madethepointthatitisonethingtoconclude(asIhavedoneintheprecedingpartsofthisjudgment)thatinrelationtodocumentssuchasthoseinbundleDthecourthasacommonlawpowertodirectdisclosurebutitisanothertodecidethatthepowershouldbeexercisedinagivencase.Inmyjudgmentifdocumentsarenotonesdeployedincourtbutareunused(butserved)disclosurematerialsthenacautiousapproachandspecialcircumstancesarerequired.

161. ThislitigationwasaboutthesubjectofasbestossafetyandthedevelopmentofknowledgeintheareasinwhichMrDringisinterestedincludingTDN13.Thepartieswereattrialwerefullyrepresentedanddeployedthedocumentswhichwenttotheissuesinthecase.TheproceedingsdidnotrefertodocumentsinbundleDwithoutthembeingcopiedtootherbundles,andtheredoesnotseemtometobeanygroundtothinkthatanappreciationoftheunusedinbundleDwhichwerenotseenassufficientlyrelevanttobereliedoncouldrealisticallyfurtheraimsofMrDringwhichonemightseeaslegitimateinrelationtothiscaseandthissubjectmatter(Idealwithlegitimacyofhisaimsbelow).

162. AconcernofCapeinargumentisthatfulldisclosureofdocumentsmightalsodiscouragepartiesfromtakingapragmaticapproachtodocumentmanagementindocument-heavycasestothejudgeviameanssuchasthedocumentmanagementsystemusedhereanddescribedinCape’sevidence.Icanseeandacceptthatifthemerepresenceincourtoftheentiretyofthedisclosuredocumentsmeantthattheyformedpartoftherecordorwereeasilyamenabletopublicaccessunderthecourtscommonlawpowers,thatsuchwouldbearisk.

163. IhavealreadyconcludedabovethatbundleDwasnot‘filed’.InthiscaseeventhoughapplyingcasessuchasBlueandAshleythereisajurisdictiontoorderaccesstoitatcommonlaw,Idonotseegroundsorspecialcircumstancesfororderingdisclosureofithere.Thereiseveryreasontoencouragepartiestoensurethatasystemisavailablesothatdocumentswithindisclosureandwhicharereferredto,aremadeavailableeffectivelytothecourt.Itisonlyatthepointwheredocumentsplayaroleintheproceedingsthattheopennessprincipleapplies. Cape’sundertakingtopreservethedocuments

164. Capehasofferedtoretainthedocumentsitselfsothatinprincipletheyareavailableasatargetforapplicationsfordisclosurebypartiesinthecourseofactualorcontemplatedlitigationinfuture.Suchisasensiblepositionbutitdoesnotgototheissuehere.MrDringisnotapartyorlikelypartytolitigationinvolvingasbestosandnorarenodoubtmanyofthemembersofthepublic,academicsandlawyerswhowouldnonethelessbeinformedbyaccess.

165. Theprinciplesandfocusofdisclosurerulesdifferfromtherulesastoopenjustice.Openjusticeisaimedatscrutinyandunderstandingofcourtproceedings,decisions,processandsettlement,andtheholdingofjudgestoaccount.Disclosureinthecourseofaclaimisaverydifferentcreatureanddoesnotbyitselfimplyanydegreeoflaterpublicaccess.ThereforewhilstCape’spositionastoavailabilityofthisgroupofdocumentsislaudableitdoesnotaffectmydecision.Itisalsodifficulttoseethatinaroutineasbestoscasethevalueoftheclaimwouldpermitsearchanddisclosuretotheextentwhichwas,unusually,appropriateinthiscase. ThatthetranscriptsprovidedtothejudgewerepaidforbythepartiesandnotMrDring

166. ApointwasmadebyCapeaboutthefactthatthepartiesborethecostsofthedailytranscripts.Thatiscorrectandindeedthepartiesborethecostofthefiles,paperandcopyingofdocumentsforthejudgetoo.Idonotseethatthefactthatapartyhaschosentobearthecostofa transcripttoassistthejudge,andhasthendeployedthattranscriptincourtsothatthejudgecanmakehisdecision,caninanywaydisplacetheopennessprinciplebasedonthenotionthatthetranscriptcosthimmoney. EvidenceofspecificharmtoCape’sinterestsinrelationtospecificdocumentsorclassesofdocumentssought

167. Iconsiderthat(absenttheapplicantfailingtomakeoutacasethatthe‘defaultposition’astoopennessapplies)itisfortheobjectingpartytoshowwhyparticulardocumentsorclassesofdocumentssoughtwouldriskdoingitharmifdisclosed.

168. IhaveconsideredwhetheritisnecessarythereforeformetoconsidereachandeverydocumentinthepaperbundlesandotherpaperdocumentsandtoascertainwhetherthereisariskofharmtothelegitimateinterestsofCapeindisclosureofeachsuchdocumenttotheextentwhichwouldoutweighthelegitimateinterestsofMrDringinhavingaccess.

169. Inthisinstancethenatureoftheapplicationasissuedwasinrespectofalldocumentsonthecourtfileandindisclosure,andCapeasarepresentedpartywasinapositionifitsowishedtodirectspecificargumenttomeastoparticularissueswithparticulardocumentsorclasseswhichitwasawarewerewithinthefiles.

170. It,ofcourse,hadtheadvantageofknowingwhatthematerialconsistedof,whichMrDringdoesnotinanydetail.IwasnotpresentedwithsubstantialevidenceorargumentfromCapeastoharmtoitatthelevelofparticulardocumentsorevenclassesofdocumentwithinthepaperfiles.LookingatthesecondwitnessstatementofMrIstedwhichdealswiththecountervailingconsiderationsformetotakeintoaccount,atpara.6(d)itisnotablethatnoneoftheareasofobjectiontherecondescendtoparticularsastoharmlikelytobedonetoCapeitselfinrespectofdisclosureofanyofthewiderangeofdocumentsappliedfor.IdonotacceptthatCapewasunabletoputforwardevidenceofpotentialharmtoitsinterestsformetoconsider,merelybecauseofthebreadthofthematerialsought. Privacyconcerns

171. MrIstedinhissecondwitnessstatementraisedaconcernthatamongthematerials,theremaybereferencestoindividualpreviousemployeesintheclaimswhichhadbeenbroughtagainstthevariousinsuredclientsoftheclaimants,whosufferedfromasbestosrelateddiseasesandthatthosepeoplewouldnothavebeenawareatthetimethattheirmedicalconditionscouldbemadepublic.

172. NofurtherdetailisgivenaboutthisobjectionbutImusttakeintoaccounttheprivacyrightsofsuchpeopleintheeventthatthesedocumentsrelatetothem.Thatistemperedbythesadfactthatmesotheliomainvariablycausesthedeathofthesuffererandthattheproductliabilitycasesrelatedtoclaimssettledbyinsurerswhichwerenecessarilysomeconsiderabletimeago.TheparticulargentlemanwhoisnamedintheProductLiabilityParticularsofClaim(onesuspectsreallyasanexampleofmany)isaMrRoyIrwin.Hisclaimwasissuedin2012.Itwassettledin2012.Itrelatedtohisemploymentinthe1970sduringtheeraof‘TechnicalDataNote13’.Hedevelopedmesothelioma,onassumesinorabout2012whichtriggeredhisclaim.ItisvirtuallyimpossiblethatMrIrwinisalivetoday,giventheprognosisofmesothelioma.Idonotconsiderthathisprivacyrightsoutweighthepublicinterestindisclosureinthiscase.Ifhewere,contrarytomyexpectation,tobealivetodaythenIwouldexpecttheapplicant’ssolicitorstoinformmeandarrangementscouldbemadetoaskforhisviewsastothedisclosureofanymaterialwhichrelatestohismedicalcondition.

173. IwasnotpresentedwithspecificargumentbyCapeastoparticularsofotherindividualswhosemedicalconditionsmightbereferredtointhedocuments.Itseemstomethattotheextentthosematerialsweredeployedinopencourtandreadbythejudge,andthatthatwasdonewithoutaskingthem,iftheyarestillalive,thentheirprivacyhasalreadysubstantiallybeenlost.Iwasnottoldofanyindividualswhoseconsenthadbeensoughtforbythepartiesfortheuseoftheirmedicalconditionrelatedmaterialincourtinthisclaim.Theimpactontheirprivacy,iftheyarestillalivetoday,isthereforeverymuchreducedbythefactoftherehavingbeentheprioruseoftheirmaterialinopencourt.Inmesotheliomaclaimsthespecialistmastersregularlymakeanonymity orderstoprotectdyingclaimantsanditwasopentothepartiesorthecourttohavemadesuchordersinthiscasebutitappearsneithersidefeltsuchwasappropriate.IdonotthereforeregardtheposthocconcernsnowraisedbyCapeabouttheirprivacyasagroundforrefusingpublicdisclosureofthesedocumentsasacredibleorweightyone. Conclusions

174. ThisjudgmentrelatestotheProductLiabilityclaimdocuments(helpfullythefileswereseparatelymarkedastowhichclaimtheyrelatedtoinviewofthesimultaneousconsiderationofsomeclaimsrelatedtoinsurancecover).

175. Astostatementsofcase,submissionsandskeletons,thosesaynomorethanwouldeitherhavebeensaidorallyorbyreference,orwouldbetreatedasasubstitutefororalsubmissions,andthepublicinterest,andMrDring’sinterestinseeingthemsoastounderstandthemannerinwhichtheevidenceandargumentsdevelopedaboutthesafetyhistoryofasbestos,andhowtheissuesweremetbyeachsideinthelightofthedocumentsreliedon,isclear.

176. Astotranscriptsofdailyhearings,thesearenomorethananon-partycouldobtainbypayingforatranscriptandthesameconsiderationsapplyasaboveintermsofunderstandingthemannerinwhichtheevidenceandargumentsdevelopedaboutthesafetyhistoryofasbestos.

177. Thestatements,expertreportsandthedocumentsreliedonbythepartiesinthetrialbundles(iethoseotherthanbundleD)ifdisclosedmaywellexposeCapeorotherstolitigationinageneralsense.Iacceptthatsomeclaimsmighttakeplacewhichlackmerit,anditseemstomethatthestatements,reportsanddocumentsaretheitemswhichmostengagethatconcern.ButingeneralifthesedocumentsdoexposeCapetopotentiallitigationthentheywouldbelikelytobedisclosableinanyeventasbetweentheparties.

178. ThereisastrongpublicinterestinfacilitatingabetterunderstandingofthehistoryofasbestossafetyandtheoriginsofTDN13.Thereisalegitimateinterestinensuringthatmaterialdeployedinthiscaseisavailabletocourtsandlegaladvisersintheinterestsofbothconsistency ofdecisionmakingandprovisionofadviceastomeritsorlackthereof,andtoenablethepublictodiscussandconsiderhowthematerialinthiscaseledtoasettlement.

179. Iconsiderthereforethatthebalanceisinfavourofdisclosureof: vii. thewitnessstatementsincludingexhibits, viii. expertreports, ix. transcripts, x. discloseddocumentsreliedonbythepartiesattrialiethosein thepaperbundlesonly, xi. writtensubmissionsandskeletons, xii. Statementsofcasetoincluderequestsforfurtherinformationandanswersifcontainedinthebundlesreliedonattrial.

180. IagreewithCapethatpartialdisclosureofdocumentsreliedonattrialcouldcreateapublicimagewhichisbiasedorincompletebywayof‘cherrypicking’.Cape’spreferencewasofcoursefornoaccesstobegivensoastoavoidsucharisk.Thelonglistoftypesofdocumentsoughtbytheapplicantwhichwasproducedshortlybeforetrialhighlightstheriskthatverytargetedaccesstosolely‘negative’documentsinacomplexstorywouldbeundesirable.Ithereforeconcludethatitwouldservenousefulpurposeto‘fillet’thedocumentswithintheabovecategories.Theywereallbeforethecourtandreliedon,bydefinition.To‘edit’thefilesinthiscasewoulditselfvergeonappearingtocensortherecordofproceedingswithoutanyrealbasisfordoingsoandwouldbeadisproportionateexerciseabsenttherehavingbeenspecificsubmissionsbyCapeastoconcernsaboutparticulardocuments.

181. InformaltermsIamthereforeallowingtheapplicationinrelationtodocumentclasses(i)to(iii)listedinthestatementofMsBainsdated6April2017butonlypartiallyallowingdisclosureofdocumentsincategory(iv).

182. Iamalsoallowingdisclosureofthewrittensubmissionsandskeletons(thesewerenotreferredtointhefirststatementinsupportoftheapplicationwhenissuedbutwereinsubstancesoughtinMsBains’finalstatement).

183. TheinclusionofstatementsofcaseisbaseduponanindicationinMsBains’secondstatementthatnotallthepleadingshadbeenmadeavailabletoherclientfromthecourtfiletodateandthatthemissingstatementsofcasewerethereforerequested.Inclusionofrequestsforfurtherinformationandanswersappearsreasonablynecessarytotheunderstandingofthecase.

184. IamexcludingfromdisclosurethecontentsofbundleDforreasonsalreadygiven.Iamalsoexcludingcopiesofthedisclosurestatementsofthepartiesbecausethatwouldtendtoundermine(bygivingdisclosurebyindirectmeans)thedecisionIhavemadethatbundleDisnotdisclosed.

185. TheApplicantmayreturntocourttoseekadecisionastoaccessinrespectofanydocumentsinbundleDwhichitappearsuponconsiderationwereomittedfromthepaperbundles,yetwereinfactreliedonatcourt(thisoughttobeapparentfromthedocumentsforwhichaccesshasbeengivenasabove).BundleDshallremainimpoundedincourt.

186. ThedocumentssubjecttodisclosuretoMrDringshallthereforebemadeavailablebythecourttotheApplicant’ssolicitorasanofficerofthecourtforcopyingorscanninguponthegivingofanundertakingthatdocumentsnotwithinthescopeofthisorder,ifcontainedinthefiles,willnotbecopied.

187. IdirectthatthecourtfileandimpoundedbundleDshallnotbedestroyedintheusualcourseofadministrationofthecourtwithoutanorderofthecourt.

188. ItwasacceptedbyCapethatthecourthasadiscretiontodirectthatadocumentbeplacedonthecourtfileifitsochooses.WhilstIhavedecidedthattheskeletons,submissionsandtranscriptswereeffectivelyfiledinthecircumstancesofthiscase,Idirectthatthetranscripts,submissionsandskeletonsshallfortheavoidanceofdoubtbeplacedonthecourtfileinanyevent. Permissiontoappeal

189. IhaveindicatedinadvancetothepartiesthatIwillconsiderpermissiontoappealofmyownmotion.

190. InmyjudgmentthereisnorealprospectofasuccessfulappealandnoothergoodreasonforanappealandIthereforedonotgrantpermissiontoappealtoeitherpartyinsofarasIhavedecidedpointsagainstthem.

191. Itmaybethatthiscase,intheeventofanappeal,oughttobeheardbytheCourtofAppealinviewoftheneedforreasonableexpeditionofcaseswhichrelatetomesotheliomaclaims,theimportanceofthedocumentstowhichIhavealludedinthisjudgment,andbecausethedecisionofLordJusticeToulsontowhichIhavereferredwasitselfatCourtofAppeallevelandiscentraltotheapproachtakenastothedefaultpositionbeingopennessofaccess.Irespectfullyexpressthatview.Howeverasamatterofjurisdiction,thiscourthavingrefusedpermissiontoappeal,anyrenewedapplicationmustbemadetoaJudge(otherthanaMaster),havingthejurisdictionoftheAppealCourt. MASTERVICTORIAMCCLOUD 5 December2017