R v Opemipo Jaji
___________________ LORD JUSTICE HOLGATE: 1. The provisions of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 apply to this offence. Under those provisions, where a sexual offence has been committed against a person, no matter relating to that person shall during that person's lifetime be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify that...
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___________________ LORD JUSTICE HOLGATE:
1. The provisions of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 apply to this offence. Under those provisions, where a sexual offence has been committed against a person, no matter relating to that person shall during that person's lifetime be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify that person as the victim of the offence. This prohibition applies unless waived or lifted in accordance with section 3 of the Act.
2. On 19 April 2013, following a trial in the Central Criminal Court before Singh J (as he then was) and a jury, the applicant (then aged 18) was convicted of one count of rape (count 2). One offence of rape (count 1) and one offence of attempted rape (count 3) were ordered to lie on the file.
3. On 7 June 2013 the applicant was sentenced by the trial judge to custody for life, with a minimum term of eight years less time spent on remand.
4. The Criminal Appeal Office has noted that on the Crown Court's record the sentence imposed was said to be pursuant to section 226A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. We direct that the record be corrected so that it refers to section 225 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.
5. The applicant renews his application for an extension of time of 3,903 days in which to apply for leave to appeal against sentence, following refusal by the single judge.
6. The factual background of this matter is extensively set out in the Criminal Appeal Office Summary. The applicant has made comments on parts of that summary. In our judgment, they do not materially affect the accuracy of the summary of the facts. It is unnecessary for us to refer in any more detail to those matters. They are well known to the applicant.
7. The applicant had three previous convictions for four offences from 16 September 2011 to 28 May 2012. They included an offence of sexual assault of a child under 13, for which the applicant received a ten month Detention and Training Order in 2011; and an offence of making indecent photographs of a child, for which he received a Youth Rehabilitation Order in 2012.
8. We have considered a pre-sentence report and a psychiatric report prepared by Dr Cumming, both of which were before the judge.
9. In his sentencing remarks the judge said that, since the conviction, the applicant accepted that he did commit the offence. Dr Cumming said in his report that the applicant had shown little insight into the offence, but that did provide a platform for him to work within a Sex Offenders Treatment Programme. However, the judge went on to say that he approached the degree of apparent remorse expressed by the applicant with caution. That was because the judge had had the opportunity to observe him while he gave evidence at the trial. He found that it was clear that the applicant is very capable of lying and manipulating others to suit his own interests. He also went on to explain why he had concluded that the applicant had an unhealthy interest in little girls.
10. The judge pointed out that one of the disturbing features of the case was that the applicant had just been to an appointment with the probation officer when he boarded the same bus as the victim of the index offence on 23 November 2012 and subsequently followed her in order to commit a very serious rape.
11. The judge applied the sentencing guidelines to arrive at what would have been the appropriate term of imprisonment if a determinate sentence had been passed in this case. There is no issue about that aspect of the sentence.
12. The judge went on to explain why he regarded the applicant as dangerous within the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. There is no issue raised by the applicant about that aspect of the sentence. The issue before the judge was whether he should pass an extended sentence under section 226A of the Criminal Justice Act, or a discretionary life sentence. The judge directed himself by reference to the principles which are well-established in the case law.
13. At this point the judge referred back to Dr Cumming's report. The expert was of the view that there was no evidence of a mental illness. Instead, the applicant had demonstrated an evolution of predatory sexual behaviour towards young, prepubescent girls. The expert was also of the opinion that it was very likely that the offence would have been repeated again if the applicant had not been caught. Consequently, he considered the applicant to pose a high risk of similar offending in the future.
14. The judge was well aware that he was being asked to pass a substantial sentence in relation to a relatively young offender. He said that he had given careful consideration to the question whether adequate protection could be given to the public by imposing a lesser sentence than one of life imprisonment. He concluded that in all the circumstances the public would not be adequately protected from the future risk of serious harm if he were to pass a sentence any less than one of life imprisonment. He asked himself the question: "Is the period that you are likely to be dangerous capable of reliable estimation as at the date when the sentence was passed?" The judge concluded, for the reasons he gave, that it was not.
15. We have read the proposed grounds of appeal composed by the applicant, together with his addendum to those grounds, dated April 2024. They may be summarised as follows:
1. The judge paid insufficient regard to the applicant's personal mitigation.
2. The judge treated counts which were left on the file as aggravating factors.
3. The judge was wrong to pass a life sentence, when an extended sentence would have sufficed in order to protect the public.
4. The sentence was manifestly excessive when compared to similar cases.
5. Media attention and racial bias led to a sentence that was manifestly excessive.
6. The judge increased the applicant's sentence due to his belief that the applicant had shown no remorse.
16. The single judge found each of those grounds to be unarguable for the extensive reasons set out in his decision. We entirely agree with each of those reasons, and there is no need for us to recite them here.
17. Since the refusal of leave by the single judge, the applicant has renewed his application for leave and has submitted a number of documents to the court. Having reviewed those matters, it is plain to us that the applicant has had an ample opportunity to make any further representations that he would wish to make since December 2024. In addition, the procedural position for renewing his application has been helpfully explained by the Criminal Appeal Office on more than one occasion to him.
18. On 24 November 2025, the applicant asked for today's hearing to be vacated. In addition, he had previously asked that he should be allowed to make representations in person. The material he put forward did not justify either course being taken as explained by the court in a response sent prior to this hearing.
19. Yesterday, the applicant submitted to the court further written representations which, in many respects, echo those which he has made previously. We have taken all of those matters into account. The question is: do they give rise to any arguable ground that the sentence was either wrong in principle or manifestly excessive?
20. It is not necessary for us to go through each and every one of those matters. We do not accept that the judge failed to have regard to relevant matters. Nor do we accept the criticisms which are made of the single judge.
21. Although the applicant criticises the pre-sentence report, no criticism could possibly be made of its key passages. We will simply refer to one of them. The author said: "There is a clear escalation of seriousness in [the applicant's] pattern of offending. This is now his third conviction for a sexual offence. In my view this [our emphasis] offence indicates that [the applicant] has become increasingly confident and predatory in his behaviour and there is clear evidence of a serious escalation in his risk. In [the applicant's] offending history there are indicators of recklessness, significant risk taking, predatory behaviour and preying on vulnerable young girls. It has also been voyeuristic and opportunistic in nature. Despite his guilty pleas, records indicate a consistency in respect of his implausible explanations for his offending behaviour. These usually involve trying to justify his actions and externalise blame." It was in that context that the author went on to deal with the robbery and sexual assault in 2011.
22. It seems to us that that quotation contains well-judged observations which are equally applicable to the material the applicant has submitted to this court recently.
23. For all these reasons the renewed application for an extension of time and for leave to appeal against sentence is refused. ____________________________ Epiq Europe Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof. Lower Ground Floor, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JE Tel No: 020 7404 1400 Email: [email protected]
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Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).
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