SD v The Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (PIP)

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal sitting at Hull dated 1 October 2024 under file reference SC296/23/00337 involves an error on a point of law. The appeal against that decision is allowed and the decision of the Tribunal is set aside. The matter is remitted to a differently constituted tribunal for a complete rehearing. The new tribunal must considerand make relevant findings as to whether or not the claimant satisfied the criteria to be awarded the daily living component and/or the mobility component of personal independence payment from and including 17 October 2023. In so doing the new tribunal should in particular have regard to the submissions of the Secretary of State dated 2 July 2025. This decision is made under section 12(2)(b)(i) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. REASONS

1. This is an appeal, with my permission, against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal sitting at Hull on 1 October 2024.

2. I shall refer to the appellant hereafter as “the claimant”. The respondent is the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions. I shall refer to him hereafter as “the Secretary of State”. I shall refer to the tribunal which sat on 1 October 2024 as “the Tribunal” and the tribunal to which I am remitting the matter as “the new tribunal”.

3. The claimant appealed against the decision of 16 January 2023 that she was entitled to 6 points for the daily living component and 0 points for the mobility component of personal independence payment. She was not therefore entitled to either component of personal independence payment from and including 17 October 2023. The decision was subsequently reconsidered, but not revised, on 20 February 2023.

4. The matter ultimately came before the Tribunal on 1 October 2024 (an earlier decision having been set aside) when the claimant appeared telephone and gave oral evidence. A presenting officer also appeared. The appeal was refused.

5. The Tribunal found that the claimant was entitled to 7 points for the daily living component and 4 points for the mobility component of personal independence payment. She was not therefore entitled to the either component of personal independence payment from and including 17 October 2023.

6. On 19 May 2025 I acceded to the claimant’s application and granted her permission to appeal. It seemed to me that there was an arguable case that the Tribunal had erred in law in relation to daily living activity

6. In particular, and given what the claimant’s representative recorded about her oral evidence at the hearing, was she not potentially entitled to points for dressing and undressing in the light of regulation 4(2A) of the Social Security (Personal Independence Payment) Regulations 2013 which requires the activity to be done safely, to an acceptable standard repeatedly and, in particular, within a reasonable time period? Was paragraph 42 of the statement of reasons adequately reasoned? The claimant was awarded 7 points for the daily living component and 4 points for the mobility component. To be entitled to the standard rate she would need to be awarded 8 points. An award of 2 points for daily living activity 6 would have resulted in an award of 9 points and would have been material to the outcome of the appeal.

7. I did not, however, grant permission to appeal in relation to the grounds of appeal relating to the other activities, whether of daily living or of mobility, which seemed to me to be a disagreement with the Tribunal’s findings of fact rather than demonstrating an arguable case that the Tribunal erred in point of law.

8. On 2 July 2025 the Secretary of State provided submissions and supported the appeal. The claimant had nothing to add on 19 August 2025.

9. The Secretary of State confirmed that the claimant had not made any further claim for personal independence payment after the hearing on 1 October 2024.

10. Neither party has sought an oral hearing and I do not consider that it is necessary to hold one in order to resolve the matter. Both parties have also consented to a decision without reasons under rule 40(3) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008.

11. The Secretary of State submitted that (I have added paragraph numbers for ease of reference) “1. Considering the SOR and particular paragraph 42 which states “[…] is able to dress herself, she describes problems with doing up fastenings at the back, this can be resolved by doing a bra up at the front and then swivelling it to the back and avoiding clothes with back fastenings this restriction does not require the use of aids and would not give rise to an award of points. She dresses on the majority of the days and she is able to dress her whole body.”

2. With regards to daily living activity 6 — Dressing and undressing, the appellant in their PIP2 questionnaire state varying issues with the activity, such as issues with fastenings, footwear and zips, along with arthritic pain and numbness in the wrists and hands. Additionally adding they have issues with reaching to the head due to frozen shoulder pain.

3. The Appellant supplied medical evidence which reiterated the difficulties faced showing arthritic numbness in hands (Addition A page 9). This was also reported during the health assessment which they state, “Numbness to wrists and hands”.

4. In paragraph 11 of the SOR the FtT accepted the appellant suffers from osteoarthritis, swollen legs and lower back pain, and they are prescribed amitriptyline for pain.

5. While the FtT have stated that the appellant can do a bra up at the front and then swivel it to the back, does this mean the appellant is not dressing sufficiently, as they are having to adapt the normal process. Additionally the FtT also accepted that the appellant has osteoarthritis along with a prescribed pain medication. Within their inquisitorial function the FtT should have sought out additional information about the appellant’s physical ability especially their dexterity, and ability to reach different part of their body, while carrying out the activity. Considering front fastenings have the FtT contradictorily assumed this as a way of managing.

6. Furthermore the FtT in their inquisitorial function could have gathered additional information about the functional process the appellant follows when carrying out the activity, as there appears to be different declarations in both the PIP questionnaire and the medical assessment, the FtT have not provided any information about the barriers or restriction faced. Merely instructing the appellant to avoid clothing that has back fastenings, which is not a sufficient technique, in which an appellant can accomplish the activity, one cannot be expected to avoid clothing of a description to manage the activity without restriction. The activity of dressing and undressing looks at “clothing that is suitable for the situation”. It should be noted that the appellant cannot simply choose their clothing style due to physical limitations that would support their body this is contradictory to the findings to Judge Grey statement where they indicate creatin fastenings are necessary during the course of a day.

7. Furthermore I would like to draw the UT Judges attention as to what is held in Judge Gray states under LC v SSWP [2016] UKUT 150 (AAC) “Zips and buttons can be avoided up to a point on trousers and shirts, but most outer clothing demands one or other type of fastening, and doing up outerwear is something which can be necessary on a number of occasions during the course of the day.”

8. When reaching its conclusions, the FtT have not stated in the SOR what it made of the appellants oral evidence concerning the difficulties they encounter when dressing and undressing due to pain and discomfort some of which I have addressed above such as managing footwear, zips and fastenings due to pain. While the FtT is entitled to give weighting to whatever evidence that it chooses, where there is conflicting evidence, it must in the first instance explore and consider it in a holistic manner and provide sufficient reasons explaining why it preferred the evidence that it had. The FtT may have considered the appellant’s limitations with regards to dressing and undressing and whether she could undertake the activity in accordance with the provisions of regulation 4(2A) of the Social Security (Personal Independence Payment) Regulations 2013.

9. Furthermore I would like to draw the UT Judges attention as to what is held in PE v SSWP, [2015] UKUT 0309 (AAC), Judge Jacobs States the following, “On the other hand, the limitations on what clothing a claimant can cope with cannot be used to lower that standard. For example: a claimant who cannot manage buttons or laces cannot be tested by reference to their ability to dress in clothes fastened by Velcro. That would mean that the more disabled the claimant is in respect of an activity, the more difficult it would be to satisfy the descriptors.” “The tribunal must not identify the clothing to which the test is applied in a way that the defeats the purpose of the test by defining away the limiting effects of the claimant’s disability.” “But the tribunal is entitled to consider reasonable and practical alternatives. For example: claimants who cannot raise their arms to put on a pullover, may be able to put on a cardigan.”

10. Considering Judge Jacobs’ comments regarding dressing, and as the FtT simply concluded that the appellant should avoid clothing, and change their way of dressing by “swivelling” they have not considered the limiting effects of carrying this activity out.

11. It was incumbent on the FtT to further fact find on the limitations of the appellant and if their ability is hindered by the restrictions to complete the activity in a timely manner and is the appellant dressing to an adequate standard.

12. I respectfully submit for the reasons I have detailed above the FtT has erred in law, as it has made insufficient findings of facts and reasons in the SOR to support and explain its decision as to why the appellant did not satisfy any of the point scoring descriptors within daily living activity

6. The FtT under paragraph 42 of the SOR has not adequately reasoned the activity being disallowed.”

12. For the reasons identified by the Secretary of State, I am satisfied that there was the Tribunal made errors of law which were material to the decision and for that reason the decision of the Tribunal should be set aside.

13. In the circumstances I do not need to consider whether the Tribunal made any other errors of law.

14. I am satisfied that the resolution of any other grounds of appeal will fall to be subsumed at the hearing before the new tribunal.

15. I therefore allow the appeal and set aside the decision of the Tribunal. I remit the matter to a new tribunal which should conduct a complete rehearing of the matter.

16. I must stress that the fact that this appeal to the Upper Tribunal has succeeded should not be taken as any indication as to the outcome of the rehearing by the new tribunal. It is quite possible that the new tribunal may end up effectively coming to the same decision as the previous Tribunal, namely that the claimant was not entitled to either component of personal independence payment from and including 17 October 2023.

17. Alternatively, it is possible that the new tribunal might take a different view of the facts from that of the Tribunal and reach the conclusion that in fact the claimant was entitled to one or other or both components of personal independence payment from and including 17 October 2023.

18. It is for the new tribunal itself to decide which of these alternative options open to it applies, depending on the view it takes of the facts and providing it makes proper findings of fact and gives adequate reasons. It would not be appropriate for me to express any opinion either way on the merits of the appeal.

19. The following directions apply to the hearing before the new tribunal: (1) The new tribunal should not involve any member who was a member of the Tribunal involved in the hearing of the appeal. (2) The new tribunal must considerand make relevant findings as to whether or not the claimant satisfied the criteria to be awarded the daily living component and/or the mobility component of personal independence payment from and including 17 October 2023. In so doing the new tribunal should in particular have regard to the submissions of the Secretary of State dated 2 July 2025. Mark West Judge of the Upper Tribunal Signed on the original on 24 September 2025