Social Work England v Shingai Tutsirai Nyamapfene

HHJ DAVIS-WHITE KC:

1. I have before me an application by Part 8 claim form, issued on 20 June 2025 seeking the extension of an interim order pursuant to paragraph 14(2) of Schedule 2 of the Social Workers Regulations, 2018 (“the 2018 Regulations”). The extension sought is for 18 months to 30 January 2027. This is my ex tempore judgment.

2. The interim order was previously extended by the Court by order dated 19 March 2024 for a period of 16 months to the current expiry date of 31 July 2025. In fact, I think it is right that the period was not an exact period of months because the order ran to a different date of the month, but the judge obviously extended it to the end of the month for convenience.

3. The interim order in this case was originally imposed on 4 October 2022 for a period of 18 months. At this stage, it is disappointing to note that matters have got no further than almost, but not quite, completion of the first stage of an investigation process by the claimant and which has been underway since the matter was referred to the claimant on 8 August 2022, a period of just under three years.

4. Several further considerations and investigations of the case have yet to be made, assuming that the matter proceeds through the relevant procedural stages and it is determined that it is appropriate to take it to a full disciplinary hearing.

5. I will return to the chronology shortly.

6. As I said, in this case, the interim order is an interim order of suspension, imposed by adjudicators on 4 October 2022.

7. The background is that the defendant is a registered social worker, she was employed by Bristol City Council on 15 November 2021. As a new employee, she was placed on the assessed and supported year in employment or ASYE programme. The programme provides newly qualified social workers with extra support during their first year of employment. A number of concerns were raised during her first year.

8. At this stage, the current concerns as explained to me fall under various heads and are as follows: (i) Her ability to manage and progress a caseload in a timely manner, including taking action within appropriate timescales, working to deadlines and their work output. [I pause there to say that members of the public might regard it as slightly ironic that it is an allegation made by Social Work England, given the circumstances of this case.] (ii) An ability to make and maintain timely, accurate and detailed case recording. (iii) An ability to follow management instructions and/or advice. (iv) An ability to take responsibility for own learning and development. (v) An ability to work in a person-centred way (in that the social worker speaks to and gathers information from people around the service user rather than from the service user themselves), the quality of work produced by the social worker (including the social worker’s ability to exercise professional judgment and decision-making and understanding of relevant legislation.

9. Those concerns really all fall under one head.

10. The next head is concerns about the honesty of the social worker, in that the social worker is said to have told managers that tasks were in hand or had been completed when that had not been the case.

11. The third batch of concerns revolve around the social worker’s ability to recognise and respond to risk, examples include failing to follow management instructions, resulting in a vulnerable adult being left at unnecessary risk of harm. In addition, failing to take action or put in place support over a four-week period for a vulnerable adult who was self-neglecting, experiencing depression, and had expressed that they wished to end their life.

12. Fourthly, that the social worker may have an unmanaged health condition.

13. As regards the health condition, I have been given no real information. The relevant documents having been blacked out on the basis of, presumably, sensitivity and/or confidentiality.

14. I should point out that that information should have been put before the Court. There are well-known ways of preserving confidentiality and not making the documents available to public inspection, if that is appropriate, but yet making them available to the Court. In addition, it is possible to identify to the Court that there is a sensitivity issue so that the Court can consider whether or not, for example, it needs to sit in private to deal with some of those matters or whether it can deal with them without revealing unnecessary detail. The Court is wholly unable properly to take into account as a factor and give appropriate weight to unparticularised allegations of a health condition and unparticularised allegations that it is “unmanaged”.

15. Pausing there, the position is that the matter came before His Honour Judge Klein on 19 March of last year (2024). He was told that the report flowing from the investigation was imminently expected. Following receipt of that report (the “Investigation Report”), he was told that the following process would then follow. The Investigation Report would be sent to the social worker, and the social worker would be given a 28-day period to comment upon it, which would enable inaccuracies to be identified by the social worker and/or for her to make submissions. Thereafter, subject to any amendments to it as a result of hearing from the social worker, the report would be sent to the case examiners, who, as I will go on to explain are effectively an independent part of Social Work England that decide whether the case should go ahead and be referred to a final hearing or disposed of in some other way. In addition, if it to go to a final hearing, they will decide what, essentially, what the allegations, or as they are sometimes called, charges are, to make sure that they are clear, and in the view of the case examiners, appropriate and supported by the evidence.

16. His Honour Judge Klein, as I said, was told that that report was imminent. In fact, there was an understandable, though disappointing, delay of six months or so after the hearing before him because it had been anticipated that medical records and/or evidence would be provided to Social Work England pretty speedily, at or about the time of the hearing before Judge Klein and for various reasons, nothing to do with Social Work England’s fault, it took a further six months until September for that material to come in.

17. Nevertheless, between September 2024 and July 2025, which is where we are now, is obviously nine months or so, and the report, I am told, is still not complete. I am told it is imminent. I am told it has been reviewed by a senior person within Social Work England, as well as, of course, the investigator. In addition, I am told that the allegations which I have outlined are being considered and drafted in a form that is thought to be appropriate and of greater assistance, both obviously to the case examiners, but also to the social worker themselves, to understand precisely what the concerns are of Social Work England and what it is said that, if I can put it like that, has gone wrong at the social worker’s end.

18. One of the aspects of the concern is, as I indicated, the question of the social worker’s health. Before Judge Klein, the evidence as I understand it was that, depending on what the records contained, because the records and/or medical report expected would come from the social worker’s own health carers, there might then be a need to obtain further medical evidence to deal with the position.

19. Mr Harris, who appears on behalf of Social Work England and who has, as always, been extremely helpful, is unable to tell me whether or not or what has been the result of the medical evidence received last September, in terms of whether it is going to necessitate further medical evidence or expert evidence or not.

20. Again, it is somewhat disappointing that the Court, having been told that that was a potential issue back in March of last year, has not been updated on the position.

21. Returning to the chronology. The grounds for imposing the original interim order was that it was necessary for the protection of the public, in particular but without limitation, to keep the social worker off the road and away from members of the public and service users, but also to promote and maintain public confidence in social workers and promote and maintain proper professional standards for social workers in England.

22. The decision was that an interim conditions of practice order was not appropriate, as such an order would be unworkable, as in effect needing too close a supervision of the social worker and, therefore, the order was a suspension order.

23. The interim orders under the regulations are subject to periodic review. I think it is right to say that the review period has changed more recently but at the latest review, which was in May 2025, the report of the adjudicators contained the following paragraphs: “23. The panel considered that the allegations against Ms Nyamapfene, which relate to her competency and performance were serious and had the potential to place service users at the risk of harm. The panel noted that the allegations were significant, wide-ranging, repeated, related to basic practice, occurred while support was available to her and involved allegations of honesty and integrity.

24. Based on the information presented to it, the panel considered that there was a sufficient case made out by Social Work England, in that the evidence presented was cogent and credible and raised a prima facie case. In forming this view, the panel noted that the evidence derived from a reliable source, that being Ms Nyamapfene’s former employer, Bristol City Council.

25. The panel next considered whether there was a risk of repetition of the alleged behaviour and conduct and concluded that there was. In forming this view, the panel noted that since the last review, Ms Nyamapfene had not engaged nor presented any information to demonstrate any insight into or remediation of the alleged failings for the panel to conclude that they no longer presented a risk. The panel noted that recommendations had been made by the previous panel about steps Ms Nyamapfene could take to assist today’s panel, but there was no evidence before it to demonstrate Ms Nyamapfene had considered or acted upon these. The panel considered the risk of repetition remained high and there is a significant risk to the public in that Ms Nyamapfene may repeat such conduct should they return to work as a social worker, unrestricted, thereby placing service users at risk of harm.

26. The panel considered that there was no new information before it in respect of these allegations which undermine the continuing necessity of an interim order and the panel, therefore, concluded that an interim order remained necessary on the grounds of public protection.

27. In light of the risks to the public, the panel also concluded that an informed member of the public would be concerned to learn, given the alleged concerns raised in this case, that Ms Nyamapfene was allowed to continue to practice without some restriction being placed upon their registration while Social Work England concluded these proceedings. The panel therefore considered that an order remains necessary in the wider public interest in order to maintain public confidence in the social work profession and uphold proper professional standards.

28. The panel next considered whether an interim order was necessary in Ms Nyamapfene’s own interest and concluded, based on the evidence available, that it was not.

29. Having concluded that an interim order remains necessary on the grounds of public protection Ms Nyamapfene’s own interest [SIC] the panel considered what order is sufficient and proportionate to protect the public and the wider public interest”.

24. In addition, it went on to consider, as I have said, that the interim suspension order should be continued.

25. Turning to the procedural position regarding the hearing before me. I am satisfied that there has been proper service on the defendant and that it is proper to proceed in her absence. As I said, at this hearing, conducted remotely by Teams, the claimant has been represented by Mr Aidan Harris of counsel. The defendant has not appeared. She did appear at the last hearing, although I think a little bit late, before His Honour Judge Klein. She has also appeared at some of the interim hearings, as Mr Harris pointed out and in correction of the skeleton argument lodged in this case.

26. Mr Harris, on behalf of Social Work England, is essentially seeking an 18-month extension.

27. Before I go into that, I give an outline of the regulatory regime. Under the 2018 Regulations, the regulator, now Social Work England, the claimant: “is obliged to cause a fitness to practice investigation to be carried out where satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for investigating whether a social worker’s fitness to practice is impaired”.

28. In broad summary, the process is that investigators are first appointed. The result of their investigation must then be reported to case examiners. The case examiners must consider the position, if of the view that there is no realistic prospect that adjudicators appointed under the regulations would determine that the social worker’s fitness to practice is impaired, then the case examiners have various powers, ranging from taking no further action to issuing a warning to the social worker, regarding their future conduct or performance.

29. However, if of the view that there is such a realistic prospect, the case examiners must refer the matter to a fitness to practice hearing conducted by adjudicators in accordance with the regulations. If the adjudicators find that the social worker’s fitness to practice is impaired, they have a range of sanctions that they can apply. As is common with medical and health professionals, the 2018 Regulations also provide for the possibility of interim orders. An interim order may suspend the social worker from practicing, an interim suspension order, as in this case, or impose restrictions or conditions which the social worker must comply with, an interim conditions of practice order. Either form of interim order is interim in the sense that it is put in place pending the outcome of the relevant investigation and disciplinary process.

30. Investigators or case examiners may refer the question of whether an interim order should be made to the Regulator. The Regulator then appoints a panel of adjudicators to determine whether to make the interim order. An interim order can only be made if the adjudicators are of the opinion that an interim order may be necessary for the protection of the public or in the best interests of the social worker (see paragraph 11(1) to Schedule 2 to the regulations). If of that opinion, the adjudicators may make an interim order for a period of up to 18 months. The Court is given power to extend such an interim order by paragraph 14(2) and (3) of Schedule 2 to the Regulations, which provide: (2) The Regulator may apply to the High Court to extend or further extend the period for which an interim order has effect (3) On an application under subparagraph (2) the High Court may: (a) Substitute a different period for which the interim order has effect; or (b) Confirm the order.

31. Under paragraph 14, as I have said, there are interim reviews, broadly at six-monthly intervals and on such review, adjudicators may revoke the order, vary the conditions, confirm the order, or replace the interim conditions of practice with an interim suspension order or vice versa.

32. Turning to the chronology in the investigation in this case.

33. In light of the concerns about her performance as a social worker, Bristol City Council confirmed in July 2022 that the Council was unable to confirm her in post. The matter was referred to Social Work England in August 2022 and the social worker’s employment ceased on 26 September 2022.

34. On 1 September 2022, the social worker provided her initial response to the concerns raised.

35. On 4 October 2022, the 18-month interim order was first imposed.

36. On 30 March 2023, Social Work England made a request for a health consent (that is consent for them to have access to medical information) to the social worker and requested more information from the Council.

37. On 9 June 2023, Social Work England chased the health consent.

38. On 26 June, the Council was chased further.

39. I pause there to say that sort of three-month delay, before chasing, is the sort of delay that should not occur going ahead from today’s date.

40. On 30 October 2023, Social Work England chased for the health consent again.

41. On 1 November 2023, the health request was provided by the social worker.

42. On 22 November, a request for information was made to the social worker’s GP.

43. On 8 February 2024, again the sort of delay that should not happen in this case going ahead, a chaser was sent to the GP.

44. On 9 February 2024, the GP responded that the social worker was not on their system.

45. On 21 February 2024, the claimant requested confirmation from the social worker about the medical information that she provided.

46. On 13 March 2024, updated GP details were received.

47. On 19 March 2024, the extension application before the High Court was made and dealt with and an extension of, I think, just sort of 16 months was ordered, as I have explained.

48. Pausing there, this Court has made comment on a number of occasions that where the Court has previously had an application, a Court considering a later application should be provided with details of what was decided by the earlier Judge and on what information. In this particular case, I have a short explanation of various things that His Honour Judge Klein said, by way of hearsay from Ms Poole, who obviously was not at the hearing and who is, in fact, the Head of Hearing Operations and Case Review. I asked Mr Harris, who said he had his note of the hearing before him, he having been counsel on that application, why his note of the hearing had not been put before the Court. He explained to me that there was a policy at Social Work England that notes of the hearing should not be provided to the Court or made public and his understanding was that this was on the basis that the document was privileged.

49. I should make absolutely clear, I cannot see any circumstances in which a note of a judgment, given in public by a judge, specifically being prepared for the purposes of noting what the judge has said, so that a later judge can be told, among other things, that that can be privileged. Of course, I understand that any communication about the note or enclosing the note to Social Work England may be privileged, but the note itself would not be, in my view. Indeed, it is common in serious cases, such as freezing injunctions, for a note of the hearing to be ordered to be provided to the other side and that, if I may say so, rather demonstrates the point.

50. In this particular case, given my decision and given the circumstances, I am going to order that Social Work England orders a transcript of these proceedings and once approved, lodges a copy of my judgment on CE File. It seems to me that that is not usually necessary but that if, as one would expect, a contemporaneous note of a judgment is taken on applications such as these and whether or not a respondent to the application was present at the hearing, that that note should be preserved, typed up at the time and then made available for any Court hearing of any subsequent application for a further extension of time.

51. Going back to the chronology, as I said, the decision of Judge Klein was on 19 March 2024. At that time, he was told that the investigator’s report was almost complete and was just awaiting outstanding medical information.

52. Now, as regards that, a request to the GP for information was made on 2 April 2025, again nearly three weeks after the GPs contact details had been provided.

53. There was then communications about payment and on 8 July, the GP confirmed that payment had been received. I am not told when payment was made. The GP was chased on 31 July and on 3 September and on 5 September 2024, the GP report was received. It was expected, I think, before Judge Klein that the report would be received in a month or so. Instead, it took considerably longer than that. However, in effect, therefore, six months of the period extended by Judge Klein was lost. As I find, by no fault of Social Work England.

54. However, thereafter, the question is why, from September until now, there is still no final report. The explanation for that is that I am told between December 2024 and February 2025, the case worker was hoping to finish the report. It is unclear what happened between October and February 2025, but anyway, there is a gap where it is not explained what was going on at all. The fact of the matter is, that the case worker left at the end of February, not having completed the report.

55. Again, it is difficult for me to make fair comment because I do not know what was going on. Mr Harris says, well, the case worker was obviously under a lot of pressure and had a high workload. That is evident and I do not assume anything more untoward than that.

56. However, it does seem to me that there has been a glitch or failing in the system because either the case worker should have been reporting back that there were issues and an inability to complete this report and/or the person supervising them should have identified that there was an issue and dealt with it by moving this case to somebody else or taking other steps to remove other work from the case worker.

57. After all, the Court had been told in March 2024 that the report was almost ready, subject to the medical evidence, and there had been an extension of time by the Court to the interim order on that basis. At that point, one would have hoped that the matter would be being dealt with urgently and kept under review. Instead of which, the case seems to have simply gone on within tandem with other cases with no care, or great care, taken or any recognition that this case was now one of some urgency, the interim order already having been extended once by the Court.

58. Indeed, as I understand it, one of Judge Klein’s comments was that he was not prepared to extend the interim order for the period of 18 months, as sought. In addition, he observed that in a situation, as a case such as this, where the social worker in question, is effectively a newly qualified social worker, there is a particular need to progress the matter speedily. Not least because, if the result of the disciplinary process at the end of the day is not suspension forever, then it is important that the social worker is brought back to carry out their social work role, both as a matter of fairness to them or at least their ability to do that, but as a matter of fairness to them and in the public interest. However, of course, in this case, as the years passed, even if totally exonerated, it is increasingly unlikely that the social worker will wish to come back to do social work, given the number of years that have passed while this matter has been hanging over her head.

59. The case worker left in February 2025, but it took a further month before the case was reallocated to a new investigator. Again, it seems to me that is an unsatisfactory length of time, given the particular circumstances. I am not told whether the case worker suddenly left, or whether it had been a planned leaving, but in any event, this case one way or another, should have been reviewed, and the progress being made (or not made) reviewed, and the need to reallocate as soon as the case worker left properly identified.

60. The position now, as I have indicated, at the end of July, or middle of July, so some three and half months after reallocation, is I am told that the report is almost ready, exactly what Judge Klein was told some 16 months or so ago. I am told that the medical position is such that that is not going to delay the report. However, I still do not have a copy of the report, and it is unclear to me at the moment as to precisely when it will be produced. I am going to assume, for present purposes, that it will be produced by the end of July.

61. Taking matters forward from then, I am told that effectively, there will be a five-week period, or so to get the matter before case examiners. That takes us until the first week in August. I am then told it may take up to four months for the case examiners to look at the matter and that cannot be accelerated in any way, which seems surprising but unfortunate. If that is the case, then we are looking at the first week in January for that process to go ahead.

62. If the decision is to refer to adjudicators for a final hearing I am then told that the matter goes in a queue before it is sent the Social Work England’s lawyers, in effect, to carry out their own investigation and to themselves collect actual evidence by way of witness statements and the like before the matter can come back and the obtaining of evidence be regarded as at an end so that he case is then fit to go to a final hearing.

63. If the matter goes all the way to a final hearing, I am told that the whole process to get the case ready for such a hearing should take 12 months, which would allow approximately just under seven months for the lawyers to go through the process of gathering witness statements.

64. I am told by Mr Harris that there have been cases where solicitors have been instructed earlier than after the case examiners’ report, not surprisingly, in my view, he said in very serious and obvious cases, there have been occasions where, effectively, the lawyers have carried out or been instructed to carry out the initial investigation.

65. I note with concern that the problem, obviously each case turns on its own facts as to the best way of managing it, that in a case like this, where the evidence goes back to 2021/2022, the longer things are left, the more unreliable witness factual evidence becomes in terms of recollection and the like. Furthermore, the more times witnesses rehearse their evidence, first with the original case investigator then with the solicitors, the more unreliable the evidence becomes, as is now well-known in the light of the discussion in the case of Gestmin SGPS SA v Credit Suisse (UK) Ltd & Anor [2013] EWHC 3560 (Comm) and subsequent cases.

66. In addition, that the whole process can, as I have seen in other cases, be derailed by problems in finding witnesses after this length of time, by their memories not being good, and because the witness evidence has not been prepared at an earlier stage, one has duplication of time and effort, unreliability of the evidence, and further delay.

67. Anyway, the evidence before me at the moment is that that process is likely to take until the end of August 2026. I am then told that assuming, which may be big assumption, that there are no hiccups in getting the case read for final hearing, realistically the final hearing is probably not going to be until November or December of 2026.

68. That, of course, means, which Mr Harris accepts, that there is a more than realistic possibility that the order, if I extend it, even by 18 months, that there is going to have to be a further application to the court to extend the order further.

69. I now turn to the law regarding the approach of the Court to extensions to interim orders.

70. The criteria and approach to be applied in applications to extend an interim order, in this sort of context, is set out by Arden LJ (as she then was) in General Medical Council v Hiew [2007] EWCA Civ

369. In that case she was considering the then regulatory regime applied to medical practitioners, which, so far as material for present purposes, is extremely similar to that applicable in this case. Quoting her judgment: “28. …the criteria must be the same as for the original interim order, namely the protection of the public, the public interest or the practitioner's own interests. This means … that the court can take into account such matters as the gravity of the allegations, the nature of the evidence, the seriousness of the risk of harm to patients, the reasons why the case has not been concluded and the prejudice to the practitioner if an interim order is continued. The onus of satisfying the court that the criteria are met falls on the applicant for the extension. (The) relevant standard is the civil standard, namely on a balance of probabilities.

31. The statutory scheme thus makes it clear that it is not the function of the judge under section (and she cites the relevant section) to make the findings of primary fact about the events that have led to the suspension or to consider the merits of the case for suspension. There is, moreover, no express threshold test to be satisfied before the court can exercise its power under (the section of the Act corresponding to that under the Schedule to the 2018 Regulations), such as a condition that the court should be satisfied that there is evidence showing that there is a case to answer in respect of misconduct or any other matter. On the other hand, if the judge can clearly see that the case has little merit, he may take that factor into account in weighing his decision on the application. But this is to be done as part of the ordinary task of making a judicial decision, and a case where a statutory body makes an application on obviously wholly unsupportable grounds is likely to be rare.

32. The evidence on the application will include evidence as to the opinion of the GMC, and the IOP or Fitness to Practise Panel, as to the need for an interim order …

33. The court is not expressing any view on the merits of the case against the medical practitioner. In those circumstances, the function of the court is to ascertain whether the allegations made against the medical practitioner, rather than their truth or falsity, justify the prolongation of the suspension. In general, it need not look beyond the allegations. If the medical practitioner contends that the allegations are unfounded, the medical practitioner should challenge by judicial review the original order for suspension or the failure to review it and make some other decision in accordance with section 41A(2). On such an application, the decision of the IOP or Fitness to Practise Panel will then be examined on well-established judicial review grounds”.

71. It seems to me that Arden LJ’s judgment should be glossed in the particular circumstances of this case as regards paragraph

30. In considering the protection of the public, it seems to me the Court should have regard to section 37 of the Children and Social Work Act, 2017: “37 Over-arching objective (1) The over-arching objective of the regulator in exercising its functions is the protection of the public. (2) The pursuit by the regulator of its over-arching objective involves the pursuit of the following objectives— (a) to protect, promote and maintain the health, safety, and well-being of the public; (b) to promote and maintain public confidence in social workers in England; (c) to promote and maintain proper professional standards for social workers in England”. Some of these matters no doubt also fall within the “public interest” head that Arden LJ referred to.

72. Of course, it is those criteria that the interim review panel of adjudicators considered and took into account.

73. Applying the law to the facts in this particular case, it seems to me that a point may be reached at which the prejudice to the social worker is such as to outweigh the public interest in a continuation of an interim order, in circumstances where the overall disciplinary proceedings have got to the stage where they have not been pursued with the vigour that should be expected.

74. In this particular case, it seems to me that the usual sort of timetable outlined to me by Mr Harris, whereby this case could be expected to come on for hearing, assuming for a moment that a final disciplinary hearing is the route properly decided upon by, for example, the case examiners, come on for hearing before November or December of next year.

75. It seems to me that that is unacceptable in this particular case, given the circumstances of His Honour Judge Klein’s decision last year and given the delays resulting from Social Work England being unable to prepare a report over a year later by July 2025 as we are now at.

76. In those circumstances, it seems to me that Social Work England need to accelerate this case and to take necessary steps, for example, to ensure that any chasing of material is done much more quickly than it might routinely be done and the example I have already given of two or three months before sending chasing letters is simply unacceptable in this case going ahead. It is not enough simply to follow the usual timelines given the manner in which the early part of the timeline (complaint to investigator’s report) has taken as long as it has, and way outside any norm.

77. Similarly, it seems to me that careful consideration should be given to the question of whether the solicitors can and should be instructed at an earlier stage than would normally be the case, possibly, when the matter is sent to the case examiners. I understand entirely that there may be problems about doing that and I cannot, as I put it to Mr Harris, micro-manage the investigation procedure. I simply throw out for consideration that that maybe one of the things that would help speed matters up in this case.

78. I consider that it should be possible to get this case on for final hearing by the end of July next year. That would, allowing for a period of six months to be taken into account as being caused by the delay in getting the medical records, give Social Work England an extra six months, as it were, on top of the period ordered by Judge Klein.

79. Assuming that the hearing should be heard by the end of July, I would, as is customary, allow a further two-month leeway in case the hearing is in July but there are delays for example, adjournment of the actual final hearing or delays in the panel producing its decision.

80. However, I make clear that I am extending on the basis that my anticipation is that unless something truly unusual further emerges, that the case should be got on for final hearing by the end of July. In addition, I should express my view, though that is a view that cannot bind a future judge, that this is really a final extension.

81. I make these comments so that Social Work England are under no illusions as to the need to get on with this particular case.

82. Therefore, my order will be to extend the interim order for a further period until the end of September next year, which I think is an extension of 14 months.

83. I will direct that a transcript of this judgment is obtained by Social Work England, so that it can be considered at Social Work England in connection with this case and more generally (for example, regarding notes of hearings) and also that it should be filed, once approved, on CE File. End of Judgment. Transcript of a recording by Acolad UK Ltd 291-299 Borough High Street, London SE1 1JG Tel: 020 7269 0370 [email protected] Acolad UK Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof. This transcript has been approved by the judge.