Tomasz Bielicki v The Circuit Court in Lodz, Poland

Mr Justice Sweeting: Introduction

1. This is an appeal brought by Tomasz Bielicki, (“the Appellant”), against the order of District Judge Law, at the Westminster Magistrates’ Court on 11 July 2024, ordering his extradition to Poland. Background to the Case

2. The application for the Appellant’s extradition arose from an arrest warrant (AW) issued by the Circuit Court in Lódz, Poland, on 2 October 2023, and certified by the National Crime Agency (NCA) on 19 October 2023. The AW is a conviction warrant, seeking the surrender of the Appellant to enforce a sentence of three years’ custody, of which one year, eleven months, and ten days remained to be served at the time of the original hearing.

3. Poland is designated as a Category 1 territory for the purposes of the Extradition Act 2003 (EA 2003), meaning the request is considered under Part 1 of the Act, pursuant to the legislation stemming from the Trade and Cooperation Agreement 2020 (TACA). The Appellant, a Polish national, was arrested on 25 October 2023 at an address in Mansfield and appeared before a judge the following day. He did not consent to his extradition and has remained on conditional bail throughout the proceedings.

4. The AW derives from the decision of the Circuit Court of Lódz, dated 22 April 2021, in case number IV K 255/15. The AW states that the Appellant was present at the trial which resulted in this decision. The offences for which the Appellant was sentenced are detailed in the AW. These include: i) From an unknown date in January 2014 to the end of February 2014, participation in a criminal organisation whose object was to smuggle and traffic in narcotic drugs. This offence is penalised under section 258(1) of the Criminal Code. ii) From an unknown date in January 2014 to the end of February 2014, participation in a criminal organisation, with premeditated intent, for financial advantage, in an ‘intra-community’ supply of not less than 8,000 grams of narcotic drug cannabis, valued at approximately 56,000 Polish zlotys (over £11,000 at the 2024 conversion rate).

5. For the first offence, the Appellant received an eight-month custodial sentence. For the second, he received a custodial sentence of two years and ten months, along with a fine of 30,000 Polish zlotys. These were amalgamated to a composite custodial sentence of three years, with deductions for served detention periods.

6. Further information provided by the Judicial Authority (“JA”) confirmed that the AW of 2 October 2023 relates to the same offences for which the Appellant was previously extradited in February 2021. The purpose of this AW is to enforce the extant custodial sentence. The three-year sentence was not conditionally suspended, and the Appellant was required to report to serve his custodial sentence but was free to leave Poland after being sentenced.

7. The Appellant is 44 years old and has no prior convictions or cautions in this jurisdiction. He gave evidence that he arrived in the UK on 14 February 2015 for work, joined by his wife, Marta Bielicka, in April 2015, and their children, Alan (24) and Weronika (23), within a year. After he had been extradited to Poland in February 2021, he returned to the UK a few months later. He has consistently worked in the UK, currently as a car valet, and assists his wife with her hair salon. He manages his diabetes through diet. His wife does not drive and has health issues. His parents and two brothers reside in Poland and Germany, respectively.

8. The Appellant accepted his presence at the 22 April 2021 hearing and his awareness of the three-year sentence. However, he maintained a belief that his sentence would be suspended if he paid a fine. He acknowledged his unsuccessful application to defer the sentence and the dismissal of his appeal, which he learned of while in the UK, having returned in May 2021. He further stated he did not keep in touch with anyone in relation to the proceedings after his lawyer informed him his appeal was refused. His parents later told him in 2022 that the Polish police were seeking him.

9. Marta Bielicka, the Appellant’s wife, provided evidence, outlining her kidney problems, including a swollen kidney and water retention. She expressed significant worry about her health and ability to cope alone if the Appellant were extradited. She stated that the Appellant attends her medical appointments and assists in communication due to his better English. She asserted that no one else could assist her if the Appellant was extradited, because of her family’s health issues in Poland and her daughter’s financial contribution to the household precluding her from reducing work. She mentioned credit card debts and financial strain. Mrs Bielicka also stated that she was considering a consultation with a privately funded doctor for a further opinion, as two previous doctors had indicated that an operation was necessary. She conceded she could walk to work, which is ten minutes away, and could travel to the warehouse for stock by car or bus or walk for an hour. She also accepted that the warehouse delivers, but said the Appellant goes for additional items.

10. Weronika Bielicka, the Appellant’s daughter, gave a statement, detailing her employment as a support worker, involving 14-hour shifts, 4-5 days a week, making it difficult to assist her mother. She lives with her parents and assists financially, stating she could not afford to reduce her hours. She acknowledged that coping during her father’s previous 8-month custody period was hard.

11. The District Judge made factual findings. He concluded that the Appellant was a fugitive, rejecting his claim to have believed that his sentence would be suspended. He found that the Appellant knew he was required to report to serve his sentence and deliberately left Poland to avoid the consequences of conviction. This was based on the Appellant’s presence at trial and sentencing, his failure to keep in touch with his lawyer or the authorities, and his failure to return to Poland since 2021 despite being aware that the authorities were looking for him.

12. The District Judge determined that the Appellant’s fugitivity dated back to his departure from Poland after 22 April 2021, so there was no unexplained delay on the part of the JA. The District Judge also found that the Appellant’s wife was “overly, although not unreasonably, concerned about the prospects of her health deteriorating significantly,” noting that a consultant had assessed her as having “no major problems and not requiring surgery”. Furthermore, he found that the Appellant’s wife and daughter were able to cope, albeit with some difficulty, during the substantial eight-month period when the Appellant was in custody during earlier extradition proceedings.

13. Permission to appeal was initially lodged on 17 July 2024. An extension of time to file perfected grounds was granted on 8 August 2024, to allow for the collection of up-to-date information on the Appellant’s wife’s health. A further application by the Appellant for an extension was made on 4 September 2024, again relying on his wife’s deteriorating condition, including a visit to A&E with chest pain and the cancellation of a urologist appointment. Mrs Justice Collins Rice subsequently refused this further extension and permission to appeal on 28 October 2024. She observed that no arguable defect was apparent on the face of the District Judge’s Judgment in relation to Article 8, that his factual findings were open to him, and that he had carried out a proper balancing exercise. She noted that no new objective medical evidence had in fact been submitted since the extradition hearing. The test for admitting new evidence is a high one, and no explanation was given as to how the updated medical evidence could change the outcome. The Appellant then renewed his application for permission to appeal, which was granted by Mr Justice Calver on 17 December 2024. New medical evidence was submitted for the renewal application. The Relevant Law

14. The legal framework for this appeal is derived from Part 1 of the EA 2003, which governs extradition to Category 1 territories. Central to the present matter is section 21 EA 2003, which requires me to decide whether the Appellant’s extradition would be compatible with his rights under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), specifically Article 8, which protects the right to respect for private and family life.

15. The principles governing the application of Article 8 ECHR in extradition cases are well-settled and have been set out by the Supreme Court in Norris v Government of the USA (No. 2) [2010] UKSC 9 and HH v Deputy Prosecutor of the Italian Republic, Genoa [2012] UKSC

25. These cases confirm that the ultimate question is whether extradition would be a disproportionate interference with an individual’s Article 8 rights.

16. I must also consider the factors identified by Lord Thomas LCJ in Polish Judicial Authorities v Celinski [2015] EWHC 1274 (Admin). As stated in Celinski, the single question for the appellate court is whether the district judge was “wrong”. The Celinski Judgment sets out important considerations when performing the requisite balancing exercise, weighing the “pros” and “cons” for and against extradition.

17. A critical factor, as emphasised in Celinski at [39], and reiterated by the District Judge in his decision at [34], is that where the requested person is found to be a fugitive, the public interest in extradition “would require very strong counter-balancing factors before extradition could be disproportionate”. This raises the threshold considerably for the Appellant to establish a disproportionate interference.

18. In considering the appellate approach to Article 8 decisions, I take into account the guidance provided by the Divisional Court in Belbin v Regional Court of Lille, France [2015] EWHC 149 (Admin). At [66], the Court stated: “…In our judgment, generally speaking and in cases where no question of “fresh evidence” arises on an appeal on “proportionality”, a successful challenge can only be mounted if it is demonstrated, on review, that the judge below; (i) misapplied the well-established legal principles, or (ii) made a relevant finding of fact that no reasonable judge could have reached on the evidence, which had a material effect on the value-judgment, or (iii) failed to take into account a relevant fact or factor, or took into account an irrelevant fact or factor, or (iv) reached a conclusion overall that was irrational or perverse.”

19. This establishes a high bar for appellate intervention, requiring a clear error on the part of the District Judge, particularly where new evidence is not admitted.

20. In relation to the admission of new evidence, the test is rigorous, as set out in Szombathely City Court v Fenyvesi [2009] EWHC 231 (Admin). New evidence must be “capable of changing the outcome of the extradition decision”. Fenyvesi also counsels against the prolongation of extradition proceedings in pursuit of potentially equivocal evidence, especially where Article 8 is the sole proposed basis of challenge. There is new evidence in this case in the sense that information about the Appellant’s wife’s medical condition, prognosis and treatment has been brought up to date. The Respondent did not suggest that this new material should not be received and assessed by the court, instead concentrating the argument on whether it would have made any difference to the outcome before the District Judge, suggesting that it was simply information about a trajectory that had already been mapped out in the evidence before him at the hearing. Issues on Appeal

21. The sole issue before me on appeal is whether the Appellant’s extradition would be compatible with his Article 8 ECHR rights, as protected by section 21 EA 2003. The Appellant seeks to overturn the District Judge’s finding that extradition would not constitute a disproportionate interference with these rights. The core of the Appellant’s renewed application for permission to appeal and his submissions at this hearing revolve around updated information in relation to his wife’s health condition, which he contends fundamentally alters the proportionality assessment. Submissions of the Parties

22. The Appellant urged me, in effect, to temporarily stay his extradition on compassionate grounds. He contended that he should be permitted to remain in the UK until his wife’s medical condition has stabilised and his care is no longer required. He highlighted his wife’s serious kidney condition, now requiring the maintenance of nephrostomy bags that must be changed every two days. He informed me that she is awaiting an urgent surgical operation, a “left robotic assisted pyeloplasty,” to address a “left PUJ obstruction,” and that she has experienced progressive loss of kidney function. A ureteric stent would be placed, requiring removal approximately four weeks post-procedure. He produced a letter from April 2025 detailing these medical developments. He further emphasised that his wife presented to A&E with severe chest pain in August 2024, leading to a prescription of strong painkillers, including morphine, and advice to report to hospital if the medication proves insufficient. In February she had attended the urgent care centre with a urinary tract infection and now has a preoperative assessment appointment for 1 August 2025 with a planned procedure to take place within a window of 2 to 18 weeks thereafter. Her working hours are reduced.

23. The Appellant stressed the indispensable emotional, practical, and financial support he provides to his wife. This assistance includes driving for stock for her salon, managing housework and cooking, and attending medical appointments to aid communication. He stated that his wife cannot imagine being left alone during her recovery after surgery, which he estimates would last at least six weeks, without financial means or care. He asserted that their daughter, now thought to be pregnant, would struggle to provide the necessary support due to her own long working hours and financial contributions to the household. While acknowledging his past wrongdoing, the Appellant appealed for time to serve his sentence once his wife has fully recovered.

24. The JA submitted that, while regrettable, the recent changes in the Appellant’s wife’s condition and her need for surgery do not render the overall decision of the District Judge wrong. The JA reiterated the powerful public interest in extradition, particularly in the context of the Appellant being a fugitive sought for serious drug offences, for which a significant custodial sentence was imposed. This public interest, the JA contended, weighs heavily in favour of extradition.

25. The JA pointed to the District Judge’s finding that Mrs Bielicka and her daughter were able to cope, albeit with some difficulty, during the Appellant’s prior eight-month period of custody. The JA submitted that while the Appellant now raises his daughter’s pregnancy, this does not necessarily mean she would be unable to provide necessary short-term assistance given the imminence of the surgical procedure. The JA further argued that necessary medical care for Mrs Bielicka would be provided by the state, and therefore, her situation, though affected by her husband’s absence, does not render the extradition disproportionate. The JA argued against providing an indefinite stay of extradition, which it suggested would not be an appropriate outcome given the nature of extradition proceedings and the uncertainty of medical recovery timelines. Discussion

26. I have carefully considered all the evidence and submissions, particularly the fresh material presented in relation to Mrs Bielicka’s health. The District Judge undertook a comprehensive and careful balancing exercise in relation to Article 8, which I am not lightly to disturb. My role is not to substitute my own judgment for that of the District Judge, but to assess whether his decision was, in the terms of Belbin, wrong.

27. A crucial starting point for my analysis, as it was for the District Judge, is the unequivocal finding that the Appellant is a fugitive from justice. The District Judge found, with certainty, that the Appellant was present at his trial and sentencing on 22 April 2021, knew he was required to begin serving his sentence, and deliberately left Poland to avoid these consequences. His failure to maintain contact with his lawyer or the authorities after his appeal failed, and his deliberate non-return to Poland despite knowing the authorities were looking for him in 2022, strongly supported this conclusion. The District Judge correctly dated his fugitivity from his departure from Poland after 22 April 2021. The implications of this finding are significant. As per Celinski, the public interest in extradition, particularly when the requested person is a fugitive, is very weighty and requires “very strong counter-balancing factors before extradition could be disproportionate”. This is not merely a quantitative exercise; the weight accorded to different factors is central to the balancing exercise. The District Judge correctly identified the overwhelming public interest in ensuring that those convicted of serious offences serve their sentences and that the UK does not become a safe haven.

28. The core of the Appellant’s renewed appeal rests upon the deterioration of his wife’s health since the District Judge’s original decision. It is evident from the new medical letters that Mrs Bielicka’s condition has evolved beyond the “no major problems” assessment highlighted in the original judgment. She now faces an ongoing PUJ obstruction, some loss of kidney function, and is awaiting a robotic-assisted pyeloplasty. Her hospital visits, including an A&E admission for chest pain, a urinary infection and the prescription of strong painkillers, indicate a more acute medical situation.

29. However, I must consider this within the context of the overall proportionality assessment. The District Judge noted that Mrs Bielicka’s anxiety about her condition went “substantially beyond the current state of the objective medical evidence” at that time. While the objective medical evidence has now shifted, necessitating surgery, the fundamental question remains whether this reaches the “exceptionally serious or severe” threshold required to outweigh the strong public interest in extradition. The prospect of an operation at some future stage was clearly canvassed at the original hearing and considered by the District Judge. The most recent assessment letter of 25 April describes the Appellant’s wife as relatively fit and well and still able to work. An operation was being discussed at that stage as an elective procedure which might not be successful and involved balancing a number of pros and cons.

30. It is a regrettable truth that many individuals facing extradition have family members with health challenges or who depend upon them. While the hardship caused by the Appellant’s extradition to his wife and daughter would be considerable, the District Judge's finding that they “were able to cope, albeit with some difficulty” during the Appellant's eight-month period in custody during earlier extradition proceedings remains a fair basis for the conclusion that they will be able to cope if he is extradited again. The family has proved resilient, even during the Appellant’s absence. While the nature of the current medical concerns, involving surgery, presents a different challenge, the family’s ability to provide emotional, practical, and financial support for each other, as found by the District Judge, remains. The Respondent’s point in relation to the state provision of medical care is also well made. The Appellant’s daughter’s pregnancy, whilst a significant life event, does not immediately, or in the short term, negate her capacity to provide some assistance.

31. Furthermore, the request for a temporary stay of extradition until Mrs Bielicka is “fully healthy” amounts, in effect, to a request for an indefinite stay and is not the question I am considering in the appeal. Medical recovery, particularly from significant surgery, can be prolonged and unpredictable. An extradition order cannot be held in abeyance indefinitely, contingent upon an uncertain future medical outcome. This would set a problematic precedent and undermine the mutual trust and cooperation inherent in extradition arrangements.

32. The District Judge correctly found that the Appellant was “living on borrowed time in the UK, and knew he was, and must bear responsibility for the consequences”. The Appellant did not suggest otherwise in his frank submissions to me. The gravity of the offending, drug trafficking and supply involving 8,000 grams of cannabis and the significant remaining sentence further reinforce the public interest.

33. Weighing all these factors, I am not persuaded that the District Judge’s overall conclusion on proportionality was wrong. While the updated medical information in relation to Mrs Bielicka’s health is certainly a serious concern, it does not, in my judgment, constitute the “very strong counter-balancing factors” required to render the extradition disproportionate, particularly given the Appellant’s status as a fugitive. The hardship, while genuine and unfortunate, does not, in my assessment, rise to the level of being “exceptionally serious or severe” in the context of extradition proceedings and the principles articulated in Celinski. Conclusions

34. For the reasons given above, I conclude as follows: i) The Appellant has not demonstrated that the District Judge was wrong in his judgment in relation to Article

8. The District Judge performed a fair fact-finding exercise, arrived at conclusions open to him on the evidence, correctly applied the relevant legal principles, and undertook a proper balancing exercise. ii) While I acknowledge the deterioration in Mrs Bielicka’s health and the challenges this presents to the family, I am not satisfied that this new information is of such a nature as to overturn the District Judge’s findings on proportionality or to render the extradition disproportionate in the overall balancing exercise, particularly in light of the Appellant’s status as a fugitive from justice.

35. Accordingly, I dismiss the appeal. The order for the Appellant’s extradition to Poland under section 21(3) EA 2003 stands. END