Google Reviews Basé sur 233 réponses

214 Bermondsey Street Limited v Crispin Corfe & Ors

Introduction 1. This is an appeal from a decision of the First-tier Tribunal about leasehold service charges. The appeal was decided under the Tribunal’s written representations procedure. The appellant landlord, 214 Bermondsey Street Limited, was represented by its solicitors Colman Coyle Limited and the respondent tenant, Mr Corfe, Mr Crispin-Platt, Mr Nazeri and Ms Nicol presented their own case. The...

Source officielle

Calcul en cours 0

Introduction 1. This is an appeal from a decision of the First-tier Tribunal about leasehold service charges. The appeal was decided under the Tribunal’s written representations procedure. The appellant landlord, 214 Bermondsey Street Limited, was represented by its solicitors Colman Coyle Limited and the respondent tenant, Mr Corfe, Mr Crispin-Platt, Mr Nazeri and Ms Nicol presented their own case. The factual background and the decision in the FTT 2. The appellant is the freeholder of 214 Bermondsey Street, London SE1, and the respondents are the long leaseholders of the three residential flats in the building. Their leases contain service charge provisions in standard form, requiring the leaseholders to reimburse the landlord’s costs of complying with its obligations to repair and maintain the building; the terms of the lease are not in issue in the appeal. 3. The FTT in its decision explained that the ground floor of the building comprises commercial premises with the flats on each of the three floors above. The property was described in the landlord’s fire safety report as being built in the late 1930’s and may originally have been warehouse premises; it was converted to its present configuration in about 2011. A feature of the conversion is that the back of the premises and the balconies to each flat were clad with wooden cladding. The building itself is only 9.5 metres high, so it is not affected directly by the Building Safety Act 2024, but the works which are the subject of the invoices which are in dispute were carried out against the backdrop of the Grenfell Tower disaster and an awareness of the potential dangers of combustible cladding. 4. In August 2024 the appellant applied to the FTT for a determination of the respondents’ liability to pay the service charges for the year 2023-24. The FTT has jurisdiction under section 27A of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 to determine whether leasehold service charges are payable and, if so, in what sum; section 19 of that Act provides that service charges in respect of costs incurred by a landlord are payable only insofar as they were reasonably incurred. Once the parties had had the opportunity to set out their positions it became clear that only four items were in dispute: (a) An invoice dated 17th December 2020 from Celador Consulting Ltd to the appellant for £1,500 (£1,250 plus VAT) for “inspection and production of EWS1 report”. (b) An invoice with illegible date from “Assessed Risk (A trading name of Taylor and Son Group Limited)” to AHGR Ltd for £3,240 (£2,700 plus VAT) in respect of “FRAEW — Block 3, 214 Bermondsey Street, London, Se1 3FW (50% Upfront payment)”. Only £2,700 was sought to be recovered through the service charge. (c) An identical invoice to AHGR Ltd for £3,240, dated 30th June 2023 and described as “final payment”. In this case the appellant sought to recover the whole £3,240 in the service charge. (d) An invoice dated 5th October 2023 from Celador Consulting Ltd to the landlord for £6,000 (£5,000 plus VAT) for “pre-contract support in respect of DLUHC Cladding Safety Scheme funding application. Procuring B/Regulation Approval and Planning Consent. Agreed fee.” 5. All four items related to fire safety in the block; the sums in question were shared between the three flats in the service charge demands. There was a hearing before the FTT at which the appellant was represented by counsel, but no representative of the appellant attended which meant that counsel was not able to answer some of the panel’s questions. 6. In its written decision the FTT explained that the first invoice was for a survey, commissioned in order to examine the condition of the cladding and determine whether the appellant was required to do anything to it. The report concluded that the cladding was in good condition and did not require repair, and at that stage therefore there was nothing the appellant needed to do about it. The FTT decided that the cost of the survey was reasonably incurred and therefore that the corresponding service charge was payable. 7. The FTT decided that the fourth invoice was not reasonable and payable; it related to a possible application for funding for the replacement of cladding, for which the building could not have been eligible; the FTT took the view that the appellant ought to have been aware of that. There is no appeal in relation to the fourth invoice. 8. The appeal relates to the second and third invoices, which were for a further fire risk assessment; the FTT explained that on 16 May 2022 the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 was amended, by the addition of Article 6(1A) with the effect that landlords of certain residential premises, including 214 Bermondsey Street, became subject to increased fire safety duties. The FTT accepted that it was reasonable for the appellant to commission a further assessment in light of the change in the law, but disallowed the two invoices for a number of reasons. 9. First, it said that the appellant had not explained why the invoices were addressed to AHGR Ltd. Second, it had not explained the different VAT treatment of the two invoices. For those two reasons the FTT said that it was not satisfied that the appellant was under an obligation to pay the invoices or that it did pay them. It added that there were other reasons why it would in any event have reduced the amount payable in respect of the invoices: first, the appellant had not explained why it instructed Assessed Risk rather than asking Celador to update its earlier report, which the FTT said would have been cheaper, and second that the report was of such poor quality that it “would not have allowed anything close to £6,480” if the invoices had been payable. 10. The appellant has permission to appeal that decision on three grounds: first, that it did explain why the invoice was addressed to AGHR; second, that it did explain why the VAT treatment of the two invoices was different; third, that the respondents had not challenged the invoices on the basis that the wrong contractor had been instructed. There is no permission to challenge the FTT’s assessment of the quality of the report produced by Assessed Risk; the Tribunal has invited the parties to make representations as to the amount payable in case the appeal succeeds. Grounds 1 and 2 11. The FTT in its decision said this about the two invoices from Assessed Risk: “21. The second and third invoices have a number of problems. Firstly, the invoices are addressed to AHGR Ltd. As we have noted no explanation has been given for this, although an explanation would have been very easy. Secondly, the different VAT treatment of the second from the third invoice is also unexplained. Not claiming the VAT on the second invoice as part of the service charge raises an inference that someone (presumably AHGR Ltd) was able to reclaim the VAT. Again the evidence to explain this is a complete blank. … 22. In these unsatisfactory circumstances, we do not accept that the landlord has shown it was under an obligation to pay Assessed Risk or that the landlord (as opposed to AHGR Ltd) did pay Assessed Risk. On this ground we disallow invoices two and three completely.” 12. The appellant says that it did explain both the fact that the invoices were addressed to a different company and the fact that it was not claiming VAT on one of them. Its Statement of Case in the FTT explained the two invoices as follows: “Two invoices from Taylor & Son Group Limited trading as Assessed Risk. The first invoice’s date is eligible but the payment date is marked on the invoice in manuscript as 12th May 2023. The second invoice is dated 30th June 2023 totalling £6,480 inclusive of VAT. These invoices both relate to the production of a Fire Risk Assessment of External Walls with the first invoice being for 50% of the fee upfront and the second invoice being the balance. The total amount of those items is actually £12,480, which is £540 more than the sum claimed in the service charge accounts. This is due to the VAT attributable to one of the invoices being omitted from the service charges in error. That £540 is not sought as part of the Applicant’s application.” 13. In a reply to the respondents’ Statement of Case the appellant added: “As to the two invoices by Assessed Risk, these are incorrectly made out to AHGR Limited. This was a simple error on the part of the contractor. It is not clear that an invoice can be “defective” and to the extent it can, it is an issue for the Applicant to raise with the contractor. In any event, the Respondents do not challenge that the Second Report was carried out in respect of the Building, and that the costs were borne by the Applicant. As the costs were incurred by the Applicant in accordance with its obligations under the lease, they are recoverable by it.” 14. Accordingly, the appellant says it did explain the two points that troubled the FTT. First, the contractor made a mistake in addressing the invoices to AHGR Limited (a company at the same address as the appellant), but nevertheless this was work done for the appellant and it was liable to pay the invoices. Second, the appellant itself made a mistake in not including the VAT on the first invoice in the service charge. 15. Both the documents in which those explanations were provided were pleadings in the FTT, and were in the bundle before the FTT. The FTT was wrong to say that no explanation had been given for the two points that troubled it. 16. The FTT in its refusal of permission to appeal said that there was no evidence before it about either point, seemingly taking the view that the explanation given in the applicants’ statement of case settled by its solicitors was not evidence. The FTT’s procedural rules are not prescriptive about the form in which evidence can be given; in my judgment the explanation for these two points was before the FTT in a form that it should have taken into account. 17. Neither explanation has been seriously challenged by the respondents, save to say that they still do not accept that the invoices were payable by the appellant. Yet they accept that the work was done, they have Assessed Risk’s report. They take issue with the further explanation now provided by the appellant in its written representations in the appeal, as follows: 18. “In further written submissions in the appeal the appellant said this: “Assessed Risk was the trading name of Taylor & Son Group Limited. At the time that the invoices were raised, Taylor & Son Group Limited had been dissolved, but that was not known to the Appellant at the time. The Appellant now believes that Mr Taylor was and is trading as a sole trader under the name Taylor & Son (and also used the name 3 Assessed Risk as a sole trader as well as for Taylor & Son Group Limited), and that the work was carried out by Mr Taylor as a sole trader but incorrectly invoiced using Taylor & Son Group Limited’s invoice paper. The Appellant can no longer reach Mr Taylor, however, and has been unable to establish precisely what happened.” 19. The respondents call into question the credibility of that explanation, they say that the number of errors involved is troubling, and they say that it is unsatisfactory that the appellant cannot now contact Mr Taylor. They still do not accept that the appellant paid the invoice. 20. The further explanation provided in the appeal, including the fact that Mr Taylor cannot now be contacted, is not relevant to a review of the FTT’s decision. In my judgment the FTT should have taken account of the explanation given by the applicants’ solicitors and included in the material before them. Had it been aware of those explanations it could not have disallowed the two invoices on the basis of the contractor’s error in addressing the invoices to the wrong company, given that there is no serious challenge to the appellant’s position that the report, which the parties all have, was produced for it and it incurred the cost. Nor could it have disallowed them because of the appellant’s error in not charging VAT on the first one – which comes nowhere near to suggesting that “someone (presumably AHGR Ltd) was able to reclaim the VAT” as the FTT said. 21. Accordingly I set aside the FTT’s decision at its paragraph 22 on the basis that it was taken without having regard to relevant evidence. Ground 3 22. The FTT explained that had it been persuaded that the appellant did incur the costs under the invoices to Assessed Risk, it would have reduced the amount payable for two reasons. The first is the subject of the third ground of appeal: “23. If we are wrong in this, there are other grounds on which we would disallow the invoices. After the landlord received the report, it was aware that it was under no obligation at that time to carry out any works in respect of the cladding. Once the law changed on 16th May 2022 the position changed. It was reasonable for the landlord to investigate the effect of the change. However, the obvious step to take would be to instruct Celador to update its report. 24. The landlord has adduced no evidence to show why it decided to instruct Assessed Risk instead of Celador. … The cost of an update from Celador would have been small. Instead, the landlord (or more accurately AHGR Ltd) instructed Assessed Risk at a total cost of £6,480. That is unexplained. 25. Accordingly, even we had been wrong in not finding that the landlord was obligated to Assessed Risk in the sum of £6,480, the amount we would have allowed would have been a small figure.” 23. The appellant points out that the respondents had not made any complaint about the fact that Assessed Risk was instructed rather than Celador. The FTT introduced this point by itself. It should therefore have given the appellant the opportunity to explain its choice of contractor. Had it done so, the appellant would have explained that following the changes in the legislation, Celador did not have the requisite experience and relevant qualifications to carry out a report of that kind and the Landlord therefore decided to instruct Assessed Risk to prepare a second and different report. That, says the appellant, would have been a complete answer to the FTT’s difficulty. 24. The issues identified by the FTT in its directions of 25 February 2025 were whether the works covered by the disputed invoices were within the landlord’s obligations under the lease, and whether the costs of the works were reasonable, in particular in relation to the nature and quality of the works. The FTT did not identify the decision to instruct a different contractor as an issue. Nor did the leaseholders’ statement of case of 12 May 2025. IN the appeal the respondents say that the FTT’s reasoning was consistent with their own challenge to the invoices; but they do not suggest that they raised this point themselves. 25. I agree with the appellant that before the FTT could have decided that the full cost of the report could not be recovered because it had not been shown that instructing a new contractor was reasonable it FTT ought to have given the applicants an opportunity to respond to that point. And the appellant has shown that if it had been asked to respond to the point it would have had a perfectly good explanation (which the respondents have not sought to challenge in the appeal). 26. Accordingly I set aside the FTT’s decision at its paragraph 25. That leaves intact the FTT’s acceptance at paragraph 23 that it was reasonable for the appellant to incur this cost. The amount payable in respect of the Assessed Risk report 27. Despite that, the cost of the Assessed Risk report is payable by the respondents only to the extent that it was reasonably incurred. There is no appeal from the FTT’s decision that the report was of very poor quality and that the amount payable by the respondents should be reduced accordingly: “26. Lastly, the Assessed Risk report is a very poor quality document. The surveyor seems to have sent up a drone to obtain an aerial photograph of the block, but the report identifies the wrong block on the estate! There are numerous other defects. At page 154 of the bundle (the report itself does not trouble itself with page numbering), it states that in the event of fire tenants should “stay put” in their flat. It is within the Tribunal’s knowledge that this is not usually the advice for a small converted block with three flats. In the event of fire, the tenants should evacuate if there is a safe escape route. Indeed the reference to a Stay Put policy is directly contradicted in the same paragraph by a detailed procedure on evacuation of the premises when the address of the property is given as Greycoat House, raising a concern about this report having been a cut and paste exercise. . Figure 1 in the report purports to be a diagram of the masonry, but this appears to be wholly speculative. 27. We would not have allowed anything close to £6,480 if the other matters outlined had not meant that the tenants bore no liability for these invoices.” 28. The Tribunal has invited the parties to make submissions about the amount that it would be reasonable for the respondents to pay (strictly: the extent to which the cost was reasonably incurred, bearing in mind its quality). The appellants in their grounds of appeal say that the value of the report is in its crystal clear conclusion that “the wooden panelling to the external wall at the rear of the property and the wooden decorative panelling on the balconies create a high risk to occupants and adjacent properties and must be removed and replaced with non-combustible materials within 12 months.” The respondents have not suggested that that is incorrect. 29. The respondents have detailed a number of problems with the report, as well as asserting that its conclusion was in any event obvious. They argue that no VAT should be payable since the company that charged it has been dissolved and therefore cannot have a VAT number; they also point out that the company had been dissolved before the date of the invoice. I think those points go nowhere in light of the explanation the appellant has given that it in fact dealt with Mr Taylor (paragraph 18 above). 30. The respondents suggest that the cost of the Celador report at £1,500 might be a benchmark for the cost of a competently prepared report. They ask that if the Tribunal finds that anything is payable for the report it should require numerous amendments, including confirmation that it was prepared in accordance with the relevant British Standard, and that lower cost mitigations have been considered. 31. The Tribunal does not have the power to require the report to be amended. The appellant acted reasonably in obtaining the report, and even if its conclusions were obvious it was important for the appellant to have the report to justify remedial action. The FTT found that it was of very poor quality. Doing the best that I can with that assessment, and without finding any further facts, I substitute the Tribunal’s decision that the cost was reasonably incurred to the extent of £1,250 including VAT. Conclusion 32. The appeal succeeds on grounds 1, 2 and 3. A cost of £1,250, including VAT, was reasonably incurred by the appellant on the Assessed Risk report and can be recovered in the service charge for 2023-24. Judge Elizabeth Cooke 2 March 2025 Right of appeal  Any party has a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal on any point of law arising from this decision.  The right of appeal may be exercised only with permission. An application for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal must be sent or delivered to the Tribunal so that it is received within 1 month after the date on which this decision is sent to the parties (unless an application for costs is made within 14 days of the decision being sent to the parties, in which case an application for permission to appeal must be made within 1 month of the date on which the Tribunal’s decision on costs is sent to the parties).  An application for permission to appeal must identify the decision of the Tribunal to which it relates, identify the alleged error or errors of law in the decision, and state the result the party making the application is seeking.  If the Tribunal refuses permission to appeal a further application may then be made to the Court of Appeal for permission.


Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).

A propos de cette decision

Décisions similaires

Royaume-Uni

First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber) – Information Rights

Fiscal EN

Beacon Counselling Trust v The Information Commissioner & Anor

Introduction to the Appeal 1. On 23 May 2024, the Appellant submitted a request (“the Request”) to the Leeds and York Partnership NHS Foundation Trust (“the Trust”) for copies of correspondence making reference to the Appellant, which had been sent to or from a named person at the Trust from 1 February 2023 to the date of the Request. 2....

Royaume-Uni

High Court (Chancery Division)

Fiscal EN

Kalaivani Jaipal Kirishani v George Major

Sir Anthony Mann : Introduction 1. This is an appeal from an order of HHJ Gerald sitting in the County Court at Central London dated 23rd December 2024 in which he dismissed two of three claims made by Ms Kirishana as claimant against her former cohabitee Mr Major. The claims were for a contribution to household and other domestic expenses,...

Royaume-Uni

High Court (Insolvency and Companies List)

Commercial EN

Joanna Rich v JDDR Capital Limited

ICC JUDGE AGNELLO KC: Introduction 1. This is the judgment in relation to an application to set aside a statutory demand against Mrs Joanna Rich (Mrs Rich) and a petition against Mr Clive Rich (Mr Rich) relating to the same debt claimed under a personal guarantee provided by them in relation to a loan granted to LawBit Limited (Lawbit). Mr...

Analyse stratégique offerte

Envoyez vos pièces. Recevez une stratégie.

Transmettez-nous les pièces de votre dossier. Maître Hassan KOHEN vous répond personnellement sous 24 heures avec une première analyse stratégique de votre situation.

  • Première analyse offerte et sans engagement
  • Réponse personnelle de l'avocat sous 24 heures
  • 100 % confidentiel, secret professionnel garanti
  • Jusqu'à 1 Go de pièces, dossiers et sous-dossiers acceptés

Cliquez ou glissez vos fichiers ici
Tous formats acceptes (PDF, Word, images, etc.)

Envoi en cours...

Vos donnees sont utilisees uniquement pour traiter votre demande. Politique de confidentialite.