AM v AF (Return Order: Dubai)

1. This is the final hearing of three applications: 1.1. A C100 application made by the father on 31.7.25 in the Newcastle Upon Tyne Family Court seeking a “lives with” Child Arrangements Order and a Prohibited Steps Order that the mother should not remove the children from the UK. This was filed with a C1A form, which did not raised any abuse or safeguarding issues, but asserted that the children were at risk of being abducted, alleging that “[M] has retained the children in Dubai without my consent and seeks to remove them from the UK and take them to Dubai on [8.8.25]”, and “The children have been unlawfully retained in Dubai without my consent since August 2024”; 1.2. A C100 application made by the mother on 2.8.25 in the Newcastle Upon Tyne Family Court seeking a “lives with” Child Arrangements Order confirming that the children live with her, a Prohibited Steps Order preventing the children’s removal from her care, and a Specific Issue Order “on the matter of abduction by father and return to the UAE”. This application was also filed with a C1A form, again raising no abuse or safeguarding issues, but asserting that F “shows signs that he will not return the children to me despite a previous agreement as well as a letter sent by my lawyer. Return tickets have been booked since April 2025”. In the C1A form the mother also asserted that the children were not habitually resident in the UK, but in Dubai; 1.3. A C66 application made by the mother on 6.8.25 in the High Court for a Return Order under the court’s inherent jurisdiction, to Dubai in respect of both children. After the mother issued the C66 application, all applications were allocated to be heard together, in the High Court. Whilst not first in time, the mother’s C66 application was designated the lead application.

2. This final hearing was listed with a time estimate of 2 days on 3-4 February 2026. The father attended in person, with his Counsel. The mother attended by video-link from Dubai; her Counsel was present in court.

3. Both Counsel presented their cases with care and professionalism. Their written and oral advocacy was of a high standard, and they both provided significant assistance to the court in considering this case. Overview of the issues

4. The key issues underlying this litigation are whether the children should live in Dubai or England, and the English court’s jurisdiction to resolve this question.

5. The mother wishes to continue living and working in Dubai with the children; the father does not want to return to live there, but wishes for the children to live in NE England with him (sharing care with the mother if she returns).

6. The parties agree in principle that they should share the care of the children in the future, albeit if they are living in different continents, the time the children would spend with the parent who does not live with them day-to-day will necessarily be limited (not least by the parties’ relatively limited finances and that they both work full-time). There are some details which are not agreed, in particular whose financial responsibility it should be to pay for the cost of the children’s flights if the parents are not living in the same country, and how their school holidays should be divided. Background

7. The father is aged 40 and the mother is aged

39. The father is a British citizen, and lives in the NE of England. The mother is a French citizen. She moved to England in 2009, and trained as a teacher from 2011-12. The parties met in 2016, and began cohabiting soon after in the father’s property in NE England. Later the father’s property was sold and they bought a home together. They had two children, before marrying in May 2023.

8. The parties’ children are C (aged 7 years) and D (aged 5 years). Both parties have parental responsibility. Both children are British citizens and have British passports. Although they are also French nationals, through their mother, she has not yet applied for them to have French passports.

9. The parties agree that, when the children were little, the father did not work but stayed at home to look after them. This was a joint decision made partly for the benefit of the children, and partly for financial reasons, to support the mother’s career as a teacher and because the father’s income from work would not have been sufficient to cover childcare costs.

10. After a holiday to Dubai in April 2022, they decided to explore moving to that country. The mother applied for teaching jobs and was offered a job with a good school in Dubai in February 2023, which she accepted. The job came with visas for the family, medical insurance, rent-free accommodation, 100% discount on school fees for the children and the cost of one flight for the mother and children to her “home jurisdiction” (which was elected as France). The mother’s salary was also tax-free in Dubai.

11. Before leaving, they put their home on the market for sale. They had considered renting it out, but decided to sell it. Completion of sale took place in December 2023, after they had moved to Dubai. All the furniture was either sold with the house, or given away/disposed of. They took all their personal possessions to Dubai when they moved. The father retained the house sale proceeds (although the extent of any proceeds and how they were spent was not an issue before the court).

12. By agreement they moved to Dubai in August 2023, and the mother started her teaching job. C immediately started at the same school. The terms of the father’s visa meant that he could not work, and he stayed at home to look after D. It took the parties a while to settle in Dubai (including a period in February 2024 when the mother was looking into teaching jobs back in NE England), and their marriage also hit difficulties. The marriage ended in August 2024, with the father flying to England on 1 September 2024 at the mother’s request. The mother and children remained in Dubai, where D had just started at the same school as C, and where the mother continues to work. The mother obtained a divorce in Dubai in November 2024 (although the father alleges that he was not given notice, this was not an issue before me, nor has the father taken any steps to challenge the divorce in Dubai).

13. Since then, the father has lived with his mother in her home in NE England, where he has obtained full-time work. He also has a new partner. Primarily due to limited funds and logistical issues, he has not returned to Dubai to spend time with the children there. The mother has twice brought the children to England to spend time with the father: in July/August 2025 and at Christmas 2025. When in Dubai, the children have video calls with their father about three times a week.

14. The father was clear in his written and oral evidence that, after their separation, he wanted the mother and children to return to England, so that he could continue to spend time with the children and share in their care. The mother did not agree, and the children continued living with the mother in Dubai. The mother did not bring the children to England to see their father at Christmas 2024, but instead took them to see her family in France. She accepts now that they should also have seen their father. There was then an agreement for the father to fly to Dubai to see the children at Easter 2025, and many logistical messages were exchanged between the parents, but in the end the father did not go. The summer 2025 holiday was therefore the first time the children saw their father after he had left in September 2024.

15. The parties agreed the dates of the summer holiday trip in mediation, including for the children to spend C’s birthday with the father The trip was from 18.7.25 until 7.8.25. The mother booked return flights from Dubai in April 2025, pursuant to their agreement. All of the children’s and mother’s possessions remained in their apartment in Dubai, save for what they needed for the holiday. In England, the children stayed with the father in his mother’s home, and the mother flew to France to spend time with her family. It was during this visit, while the mother was in France, that the father issued his C100 application, without prior warning, to retain the children in England. The children’s and mother’s flight home was booked on 8.8.25, in good time for the mother to start work for the new school year, and the children to return to their school, but they were unable to take this flight because of the court proceedings which the father initiated. Procedural Background

16. The father’s C100 application, and the mother’s responsive C100 application both came before DDJ Gamble in the Newcastle Upon Tyne Family Court for an urgent case management hearing on 6.8.25. The father was represented by solicitors and Counsel; the mother was a litigant in person.

17. The court considered that it had jurisdiction to make substantive orders on the basis that “this is a case of urgency and the court is taking necessary measures of protection in respect of the children who are present in England and Wales”. The order recites that the jurisdiction of the English court to make decisions on the welfare of the children was in dispute, and that the mother intended to apply for an order under the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction for the children to be returned to the UAE.

18. The case was listed for a further hearing before a Circuit Judge in Newcastle (sitting as a DHCJ) on 18.8.25 allowing 2 hours “which will be to determine the issue of jurisdiction of the Family Court of England and Wales”. Pending that hearing, a Prohibited Steps Order was made ordering both parents not to remove the children from England and Wales, the mother was ordered to hand the children’s passports to the father’s solicitors, and the parties were to file/exchange skeleton arguments on jurisdiction by 14.8.25. The parents agreed the dates/times that the children were to spend with their mother until the 18.8.25 hearing. The court also encouraged the parties to try to reach an agreement, and “if possible to avoid protracted and expensive litigation”.

19. The mother’s C66 application under the inherent jurisdiction is dated 6.8.25 and was issued on 8.8.25, the day after the father should have returned the children to the mother, so that they could fly back to Dubai, and so the date on which his care of them was no longer agreed and he had – on the mother’s case – wrongfully retained them.

20. A hearing took place before Mr Justice Garrido on 13.8.25, at which the mother was represented by Ms Maria Scotland (as during this final hearing), instructed on a direct access basis. The father did not have notice of the hearing and did not attend. The application was adjourned and relisted on 15.8.25, so that the father could be served with the order and notice of hearing.

21. For the hearing on 15.8.25, both parties attended by CVP from NE England. Their Counsel attended in person, being helpfully the same Counsel as at this final hearing. In terms of the substantive decisions and orders made that day: 21.1. The court made an “interim return order” expressly “Without prejudice to either party’s position on jurisdiction or welfare”. The children were to be returned to the UAE, on a flight with the mother leaving on 19.8.25; 21.2. The father’s solicitors were to return the children’s passports to the mother; 21.3. The mother gave undertakings to return the children to England if ordered to do so by the court, and to obtain a “mirror order” in Dubai by 22.8.25 (although the mother was unable to do this as it is apparently not possible to obtain an interim order in Dubai, but only a final order); 21.4. The mother was ordered to make the children available to spend time with the father for indirect contact not less than 3 times a week, and for direct contact during the children’s holidays, at October half-term with the father to travel to Dubai (which he did not do), and Christmas 2025 with the mother to bring the children to England (which she did); 21.5. As a protective measure, the mother was ordered to pay £5,000 to the father’s solicitor, to be held in case she breached her undertaking to return the children to the jurisdiction, and in that event, the money was to be “transferred to the father to enable him to secure compliance with the court’s order”; 21.6. The C100 applications were transferred from Newcastle to the High Court, and consolidated with the C66 inherent jurisdiction application. The 18.8.25 hearing in Newcastle was vacated, and a CMH listed on 21.10.25 in the High Court; 21.7. Permission was granted for the parties to instruct an expert on the Law relating to children/legal remedies in Dubai, with a report by 19.9.25; 21.8. The parties were ordered to exchange statements dealing with habitual residence, child arrangements and proposals for future child arrangements, and skeleton arguments addressing the court’s jurisdiction to make orders regarding the children’s welfare, before the 21.10.25 hearing; 21.9. Provision was made for the CAFCASS High Court Team to consider “whether it is necessary to prepare a report addressing the children’s wishes and feelings or otherwise represent the children’s interests” (no report was prepared, and no-one suggested that the children should be represented); 21.10. In a schedule to the order, the mother indicated that she was “willing to agree a planned move of the children from the [UAE] to…England and Wales or another Hague Convention country (including France or Germany) by September 2027”, and that in advance of any planned move, she agreed to the father having shared time with the children in all school holidays, and video calls at least three times a week; 21.11. The parties agreed to mediate the issue of the children’s future living arrangements using the services of reunite or another mediation service.

22. The children returned to Dubai with their mother on 19.8.25, the mother having paid extra to change their flight dates. The mother returned to her teaching job, and the children returned to their school.

23. The parties did approach Reunite for mediation, but were told that this was not a suitable case. They did not engage in other mediation.

24. At the CMH on 21.10.25, the time for the father to file/serve his skeleton argument on jurisdiction was extended to 4.11.25 (with the mother to file a response, if so advised). Questions could be asked of the UAE expert, and if either party sought the expert’s attendance, an application was to be filed at least 21 days before the final hearing (neither party made an application). The interim child arrangements were continued, with specific dates agreed for Christmas holiday contact with the father in England (15-30.12.25). The mother’s £5,000 bond was transferred to the father’s new solicitors, where the money remains. This final hearing was listed on 3-4.2.26 (2 days).

25. The father had managed to obtain legal aid representation, although there were some issues with the extension of legal aid funding following the 21.10.25 hearing, which was only resolved on the Friday before this hearing started on a Tuesday. Counsel had been retained, but was only formally instructed on the Monday. Counsel’s position statement was lodged shortly before the start of the hearing, together with what was effectively another witness statement by the father, which I read. There was no skeleton argument on jurisdiction, so these arguments were dealt with orally.

26. The mother has been privately funding her representation. She has a Dubai lawyer, and has instructed English Counsel on a direct access basis. Due to these proceedings, the mother has built up significant debt. She owes €12,000 (c.£10.4k) to her mother (who took out a personal loan to provide these funds), AED 45,000 (c.£9k) to a teaching colleague and friend in Dubai, and has taken an advance on her own salary of AED 17,500 (c.£3.5k) which she has to pay off monthly. Her total debt (at current exchange rates) is c.£23,000. I note that the mother is a teacher and has no savings, and her net income (albeit tax-free) is not very high (c.£3.5k/month). There is no doubt that this litigation has placed her under significant financial pressure, and repaying the debts she now has will take some years. The father does not pay any child maintenance, although he is working, and so all of the children’s costs fall to the mother. Written and oral evidence

27. I was provided with a bundle of 312 pages, which I read carefully. This included: 27.1. All the court applications and orders; 27.2. The mother’s skeleton argument on jurisdiction and position statement (the father’s position statement was provided separately); 27.3. Two witness statements from each party (with exhibits) (a third statement from the father was provided separately); 27.4. An expert report from Mr Byron James on Dubai law (a further report was provided separately); 27.5. The children’s latest school reports.

28. During the hearing, I heard relatively short oral evidence from both parties, focussed on the issues of home country, habitual residence and future child arrangements.

29. There are no child protection issues raised by either party, and limited factual issues. The outcome of this case does not rely on the parties’ credibility, and neither party has alleged that the other is being deliberately untruthful or misleading.

30. In oral evidence, they both came across as genuine and thoughtful people, who very much love their children. They were both trying to assist the court, while presenting the case from their own perspectives. The father is upset that the children are not living with him in NE England, and regrets the move to Dubai. He wants to resume a full-time role in the children’s lives, and not live far away from them. The mother feels that she has done what she can to maintain the children’s relationship with their father, despite the distance, and has found the litigation stressful, alongside a busy full-time teaching job and the care of the children. She believes the children are thriving in Dubai, at their school and with their friends and activities, and that they should continue to live there with her.

31. On one key issue, the parents have different views: 31.1. The father asserts that the move to Dubai was intended to be “temporary”, and that the time the children have spent there since August 2023 is also temporary in nature (based on the mother’s job), and that this means that they have never become habitually resident there, and Dubai is not their home country; 31.2. The mother argues that their intentions in moving to Dubai were “open-ended”, and that they considered the move to be “permanent”, hence selling their home in this country as part of the move. She believes that Dubai is now – and was last summer when the applications were issued – their home country, and that she and the children were habitually resident in Dubai on the dates of the applications. Legal framework

32. A lengthy authorities bundle was provided to me (389 pages) and the father’s Counsel, Ms Ferguson, provided an additional authority in preparation for closing. I have read the authorities carefully, but will not refer to all of them in this Judgment.

33. Pursuant to s.2(1)(a) of the Family Law Act 1986, jurisdiction for the parties’ C100 children applications (for CAO, PSO and SIO) depends whether or not the children were habitually resident in England and Wales. The relevant date for assessing habitual residence is the date when the application(/s) were issued: 31.7.25 for the father’s C100 application and 2.8.25 for the mother’s C100 application.

34. The test for habitual residence is a simple one: “the place which reflects some degree of integration by the child in a social and family environment”.

35. Habitual residence is a question of fact. The court is focussed on the situation of the child, albeit that for younger children the “social and family environment” would normally be shared with the parent on whom they are dependent. Parental intentions in moving from one country to another may play a part in the question of habitual residence. However, a child’s habitual residence can also be changed by one parent, without the consent of the other parent; whether a parent has consented may affect the quality of the integration, but is not a bar to habitual residence changing. The Court should carefully take into account facts relevant to the children’s old and new lives, in considering whether they retain their previous habitual residence or have acquired a new habitual residence.

36. Even if the children were not habitually resident in England and Wales when the applications were issued, the High Court is able to exercise its inherent jurisdiction in this case to make a Return Order, if it considers it in the children’s best interests to do so, because the children were present in this jurisdiction when the application was issued; the children are also British nationals.

37. Although the children were returned to Dubai by Mr Justice Garrido under an “interim return order”, this was expressly “without prejudice to either party’s position on jurisdiction and welfare”, and I agree with Ms Ferguson for the father that I should approach the inherent jurisdiction application based on the position on 8.8.25 when the application was issued, and the children were present here, and not look at the case from the perspective of the children having been back in Dubai for the last 6 months. The delay in final resolution of this application is due to court listing, and should not prejudice either party in their arguments.

38. In considering whether to make a return order under the court’s inherent jurisdiction, the court should assess which is the children’s “home country”, to return to. In the House of Lords decision in Re J (A Child) (Custody Rights: Jurisdiction) [2005] 3 WLR 14, Baroness Hale of Richmond stated at §32-40 (selected passages below):

32. The most one can say…is that the judge may find it convenient to start from the proposition that it is likely to be better for a child to return to his home country for any disputes about his future to be decided there…

33. One important variable…is the degree of connection of the child with each country. This is not to apply what has become the technical concept of habitual residence, but to ask in a common sense way with which country the child has the closer connection. What is his “home” country? Factors such as his nationality, where he has lived for most of his life, his first language, his race or ethnicity, his religion, his culture and his education will all come into this.

34. Another closely related factor will be the length of time he has spent in each country. Uprooting a child from one environment and bringing him to a completely unfamiliar one, especially if this has been done clandestinely, may well not be in his best interests…

37. Like everything else, the extent to which it is relevant that the legal system of the other country is different from our own depends upon the facts of the particular case. It would be wrong to say that the future of every child who is within the jurisdiction of our courts should be decided according to a conception of child welfare which exactly corresponds to that which is current here. In a world which values difference, one culture is not inevitably to be preferred to another. Indeed, we do not have any fixed concept of what will be in the best interests of the individual child…

38. Hence our law does not start from any a priori assumptions about what is best for any individual child. It looks at the child and weighs a number of factors in the balance, now set out in the well-known “check-list” in section 1(3) of the Children Act…

39. … If there is a genuine issue between the parents as to whether it is in the best interests of the child to live in this country or elsewhere, it must be relevant whether that issue is capable of being tried in the courts of the country to which he is to be returned…

40. The effect of the decision upon the child’s primary carer must also be relevant, although again not decisive…

39. I also note the recent decision of the Court of Appeal in Re O (Summary Return: Non-Convention Country) [2025] EWCA Civ 660, including §54-56 of the leading Judgment of Mr Justice Cobb:

54. An application for a summary return of a child to a non-Hague Convention country under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court is to be determined simply and straightforwardly by what is in the child's best interests (Re J at [18], [25], [28], [29] and [32]).  On an application of this kind, a judge must undertake:  "…a swift, realistic and unsentimental assessment of the best interests of the child, leading, in proper cases, to the prompt return of the child to his or her own country, but not the sacrifice of the child's welfare to some other principle of law". Ormrod LJ in Re R (Minors) (Wardship: Jurisdiction) (1981) 2 FLR 416, at

425. The requirement for the Judge to undertake this "swift and unsentimental decision", rooted firmly in welfare, was reinforced by Baroness Hale in her speech in Re J at [31] and [41].

55. In determining a non-Convention summary return application, there is no 'warrant' to apply the principles of the 1980 Hague Convention, either directly or by analogy (Re J at [22], [31] and [33]). While 'habitual residence' is a key jurisdictional component of the 1980 Hague Convention (see, inter alia, Articles 3, 4, 5, 8, 13 ibid.), and 'wrongful removal' part of the lexicon of the 1980 Hague Convention (see, inter alia, Article 1, 3, 7, and 12), Baroness Hale could not have been clearer in Re J that it would not be right to introduce such "technicalities" of concept and language into a non-Hague Convention summary return application.

56. Re J provides the definitive statement of the law in this area…

40. In considering an application for a return order under the inherent jurisdiction, the court has to consider whether the order is the children’s best interests, carrying out a careful welfare analysis. The UAE is not a signatory to the 1980 or 1996 Hague Conventions, and so the concepts and principles within those Conventions do not apply. The decision should be made on a summary basis, and must focus on the children’s welfare. Although the welfare checklist in s.1(3) of the Children Act 1989 does not have to be used in exercising the inherent jurisdiction, it is a helpful framework for consideration of factors relevant to welfare and the children’s best interests.

41. The court can, if appropriate, attach “conditions” to return orders under the inherent jurisdiction (see e.g. Re A & B (Children: Return Order: UAE) [2022] EWHC 2120 (Fam), a decision of Mr Justice Poole, particularly §30). Expert evidence

42. The court has received expert evidence on the Law of the UAE, as it applies to Dubai, from Mr Byron James, instructed jointly by the parties. Mr James has provided two reports, dated 15.9.25 and 3.12.25. There was some confusion at the hearing as to why there were two reports, and also about whether questions which Counsel for the father had drafted to send to the expert were in fact sent. However, the written reports set out the legal position in Dubai with clarity, and neither party considered it necessary to cross-examine Mr James, so he did not give oral evidence.

43. Mr James was instructed to advise on four key questions: 43.1. The process by which an order of the High Court may be secured or replicated in Dubai, whether through direct enforcement, recognition, attestation, or the creation of a “mirror order”, and to set out the legal limits within which the Dubai courts operate when asked to give effect to a foreign judgment; 43.2. The procedural pathway that would govern a child custody dispute in Dubai if the English court were to decline jurisdiction, including the preliminary reconciliation procedures, the filing and service of proceedings, the nature of hearings, and the role of experts or social enquiry officers; 43.3. The substantive legal test applied in Dubai in determining custody and child arrangements for non-Muslim expatriate families, with particular attention to the statutory presumption of joint custody introduced by Federal Decree Law No. 41 of 2022 and subsequently incorporated into Federal Decree Law No. 41 of 2024, and the judicial discretion to depart from that presumption whenever the child’s best interests so require; and 43.4. The availability of legal representation in Dubai, the linguistic environment in which cases are conducted, and whether any form of state-funded or subsidised assistance exists for litigants unable to bear the cost of legal services.

44. The reports are lengthy, and this Judgment will just summarise the key elements relating to the four issues above: 44.1. The legal regime governing child custody for non-Muslim expatriates in the UAE has undergone significant statutory reform in recent years. The new civil personal status regime establishes a modern, ostensibly secular model for the adjudication of family disputes involving non-Muslim parties. There is now a default legal arrangement of “joint custody” for non-Muslim families. Article 10(1) of Federal Decree Law no.41 of 2022 provides that “custody of children is a right of both the father and the mother, jointly and equally, after divorce, without discrimination between them”. Article 10(4) makes explicit that the best interests of the child remain paramount, declaring that “the court shall have discretionary power to decide a particular course of action in the best interest of the child”. The judge has a wide discretion to evaluate the welfare of the child in the circumstances of each case. Under the 2024 Decree Law, the presumption of joint custody lasts until the child reaches age

18. The court may withdraw custody from a parent who poses a risk to the child’s safety, stability or moral welfare. No order may be made which contravenes Emirati public order. The court will scrutinise written agreements between the parents, to ensure that they are consistent with the child’s welfare. 44.2. There is no formal juridical status for “mirror orders” in Dubai, of foreign orders. The operative force of an order depends entirely on its domestication through domestic legal mechanisms. Any English order would therefore have to become a new and independent order in the Dubai court, to acquire authority in Dubai. 44.3. There are two pathways through which an English order may be domesticated. The first pathway (described as “by far the more straightforward”) is the consensual route by which parties jointly present the terms of the English order to the Dubai court as a parental agreement. The Family Guidance Committee may endorse the agreement provided that its contents do not infringe any aspect of Emirati public order or morality. If satisfied, the Committee will refer the matter to a Judge who may ratify the agreement as a judgment of the Personal Status Court. The effect of ratification turns an unenforceable foreign order into a domestic judgment capable of enforcement before the Execution Court. 44.4. The second pathway is called “attestation”. Thisis judicial rather than consensual, and proceeds through the mechanism of recognition and enforcement. Article 222 of Federal Decree Law no.41 of 2022 provides that decisions issued by foreign courts “shall be ordered to be enforced under the same conditions decided in the law of the country where the decision was issued”, provided that certain statutory conditions are met. These conditions include that the foreign court must have had proper jurisdiction, that the parties were summoned to court and represented, that the decision was final according to the law of the foreign court which makes it, and that enforcement in the UAE would not contradict “public order or morals”. When dealing with an attestation application relating to child arrangements, the court will not simply adopt the foreign order, but will undertake its own welfare analysis by reference to the child’s best interests. If the terms of the foreign order are congruent with the statutory presumption of joint custody, or otherwise reflect an outcome the Dubai court might reach, the court may issue a domestic order aligning with that outcome. However if the foreign order appeared inconsistent with the child’s welfare (eg by allocating custody to a parent considered “unsafe, unstable or morally unsuitable”), the court may refuse recognition or modify the substantive terms. 44.5. Once a domestic judgment is made by the Dubai Personal Status Court (whether on a consensual application, or by attestation), it is fully enforceable through the Execution Court which has extensive powers, including imposition of fines, attachment of earnings and assets, travel bans and referring a parent to criminal proceedings. 44.6. If the English court declined jurisdiction and made no order, the determination of custody, residence and broader parental responsibility would fall to the Dubai Personal Status Court, which would conduct a welfare enquiry. The process is “neither adversarial in the common-law sense nor inquisitorial in the continental sense, but a curated sequence of judicially supervised steps through which the parties’ claims, evidence and legal submissions are reduced to a written record upon which the judge ultimately rules”. When the proceedings commence, there is an obligatory referral to the Family Guidance Committee which has a conciliatory function, seeking to reach an agreed custodial arrangement. In the UAE there is a public policy emphasis on amicable settlement between family members. Structured meetings are held, normally in Arabic (with interpretation where necessary), to explore the parents’ positions. If agreement is reached, it is reduced to writing and sent to a Judge for ratification, after which it acquires the status of a judicial order. 44.7. If no agreement is reached, the Committee issues a formal certificate of non-conciliation, after which a parent may file a statement of claim before the Personal Status Court, which then deals with the claim. The process is almost entirely documentary, with oral advocacy playing a limited role. Hearings are short and administrative in nature. Oral evidence is rarely taken, but witness statements, medical and school reports and written submissions are made. The accuracy, coherence and completeness of the written record is therefore key. The court may order interim protective measures, and may appoint family specialists or social workers to conduct a social enquiry. The court may also speak to older children, usually from adolescence, if appropriate. Once the judge is satisfied that the matter is ready for determination, the proceedings are closed for judgment, and a written judgment is provided in Arabic. Appeals lie to the Court of Appeal, and (on points of law) to the Court of Cassation. The process from opening the Family Guidance file to issuing a first instance judgment may take several months. 44.8. The litigation process is conducted in Arabic. All pleadings, written submissions and documents must be drafted in, or translated into, Arabic by a certified legal translator. Hearings are conducted in Arabic (provision can be made for interpretation). According to Mr James, “The linguistic architecture of the court thus renders effective participation by an unrepresented, non-Arabic-speaking parent extremely difficult in practice”. Rights of audience are restricted to Emirati lawyers or advocates jointly registered under specific local regimes. 44.9. There is no comprehensive legal aid scheme, nor any mechanism equivalent to legal services orders or cost-funding directions. However there is a restricted legal aid programme, administered through the legal assistance office, which can provide advice (and exceptionally representation) to litigants unable to afford legal services. Access to this programme is discretionary, means-tested, and “more commonly extended to UAE nationals or long-term residents in demonstrable financial hardship”. There are some law firms which offer pro bono schemes for deserving cases and some NGOs offer legal clinics, but this support tends to be episodic rather than ongoing.

45. Mr James also considers how the Dubai court would deal with the current case, were it to be contested in the Dubai court, rather than resolved consensually (in circumstances where there are no allegations of harmful treatment by either parent of the children, or any other issues which would conflict with UAE considerations of public order): 45.1. If Dubai were regarded as the children’s place of habitual residence (or the English court otherwise declines jurisdiction), the Dubai court would test the parents’ proposals against the statutory presumption of joint custody. 45.2. The Dubai court would not treat any prior act of retention or non-retention as determinative. Dubai is not a party to the Hague Convention and judges therefore do not apply Convention concepts, but instead focus on the children’s welfare and the presumption of joint custody. 45.3. The court would look at the children’s lived reality: where they are schooled, by whom they are cared for on a day-to-day basis, and the stability and coherence of their domestic arrangements. 45.4. The Dubai court’s welfare enquiry would attach considerable importance to continuity in education, familiarity of environment and the preservation of daily routines. Disrupting a child’s established pattern of life, particularly for a child of school age, requires a compelling justification grounded in demonstrable welfare concerns. The mother’s ability to provide a stable and structured home in Dubai, coupled with the children’s integration into their Dubai school, would be regarded as weighty indicia of welfare. 45.5. If the court was satisfied (on the father’s case) that the move to Dubai was of a provisional character, it would look at the children’s welfare, and ask whether their best interests are better served by re-establishing them in the environment they had known in Dubai, or relocating them permanently to England. 45.6. In making that assessment, the Dubai court would consider the practical realities of each parent’s capacity to provide care (a settled home, employment etc.). 45.7. If the mother were assigned primary residential care based on stability and continuity in Dubai, the father’s relationship with the children would be preserved by extensive contact, including holiday residence and regular communication. The Dubai court would recognise “the importance of maintaining a meaningful paternal bond”. 45.8. Dubai court judgments are fully enforceable by a range of enforcement measures. The measures are intended to “uphold the child’s right to maintain relationships with both parents”. Habitual residence – facts and findings

46. There is no question that the children were habitually resident in England in August 2023, when they flew to Dubai: 46.1. The children were both born in England and are British citizens; although they also have French nationality, they have never lived in France; 46.2. They had lived in England for the whole of their lives until August 2023; 46.3. Their parents owned a home in NE England; 46.4. The father’s family all or mostly live in NE England; 46.5. The mother had worked in NE England as a teacher for several years, having left France in 2009; 46.6. They parents had local friends and a support network; 46.7. C had attended nursery for one year, and then completed her Reception year at a local school. (D was not yet of school age.)

47. Other than one holiday in April 2022, the parties had not spent time in Dubai or elsewhere in the UAE, and had no family or work connections there. The mother had one or two teaching friends who had moved to Dubai; the father had no connections there. They are not UAE citizens, and their immigration status depended on the mother’s job. The family moved as part of an “adventure” (according to the father).

48. I do not agree with the mother that their move was intended to be “permanent”. They had no family or proper support network in Dubai. Their immigration status, accommodation and income were dependent on her job, which was a school she had never taught at before. The children and father had never lived outside England, and did not know if they would settle and be happy in Dubai. However, I also do not agree with the father that it was always intended to be “temporary”, and that they agreed to move only on a “time limited basis” for a maximum of 2 years. If this was the case, I do not believe that they would have sold their home in England and all their furniture, and moved all their other possessions to Dubai.

49. The father points to the mother’s job offer being for 2 years, but this was extendable (and was extended by her in February 2025, when the time came for renewal of her contract and her and the children’s visas). A more realistic description, in my judgment, was that their move was “open-ended”. They hoped that it would work out, and that they would remain for an undefined period. Had things not worked out, they would have left Dubai and moved elsewhere. This may or may not have been back to England. The mother is French, and could have worked in International Schools across Europe. The children were entitled to French passports, and the father could presumably have lived in Europe, based on the mother’s French citizenship.

50. I do not agree that the children acquired a new habitual residence as soon as the family moved to Dubai. Instead it took them a while to settle. Initially their accommodation was not in a very good area, and was quite far from the school. The daily logistics were complicated. The mother and C left home very early, to get to school in time. The father remained at home with D, and was not always happy. They did not have many friends, or social integration. By February 2024, there are WhatsApp messages evidencing that the mother was looking for teaching jobs back in NE England. However, my task is not to assess habitual residence in August 2023 or February 2024, but in July/August 2025 when the court applications were issued.

51. In my judgment, by July/August 2025, the mother and children had acquired habitual residence in Dubai: 51.1. Their accommodation issues were resolved by the school providing a new 3 bed apartment, in a block with many other teachers and children from the same school, in April 2024. The apartment block was only a short distance from the school, significantly easing the logistical issues; 51.2. As part of their WhatsApp discussions in July 2024 about their marital problems, and the father’s dissatisfaction with life in Dubai, the father stated “I may want to go home next year I just don’t like it”. By mid-August 2024 the mother was trying to persuade him not to give up, and to remain in Dubai (“It will work out. I promise”). There is no suggestion in these messages that they would all return to England immediately or in the short-term; 51.3. When the marriage problems became unresolvable by late August 2024, the father returned to England (he says, at the mother’s insistence), but the children and mother remained living in Dubai; 51.4. Following the father’s return to England, the mother was the children’s primary carer; 51.5. The mother extended her work contract in February 2025 for another 2 years, being the normal contractual extension (aligning with the renewal process for UAE visas, which last 2 years), and can keep extending her contract as she wishes in the coming years. She has been promoted at the school, enjoys her work and is doing well; 51.6. Both children were settled in the same school, C since August 2023 and D since August 2024. According to their school reports they are happy and doing well; 51.7. Both mother and children had made many friends in Dubai, particularly through the school, but this does not diminish their social integration in their own community; 51.8. Although the father argues that the mother’s and children’s UAE immigration status, accommodation and friendship network are based around the mother’s job, which could end and is therefore in that sense temporary, in my judgment that does not prevent the mother and children from becoming habitually resident in Dubai, if they were settled and integrated over a sufficient period of time, which by July 2025 they had become. It could otherwise be the case that no expatriate families could become habitually resident in the country in which they are living and working, which cannot be right.

52. The children had spent very little time in England since leaving in August 2023, they had no home in England, and no school places. Since the father’s return, he has been staying temporarily with his mother, while he resolves his longer-term accommodation. In my judgment it is unrealistic for the father to argue that the children were still habitually resident in this country by July 2025.

53. On the basis that the children were not habitually resident in England and Wales on the relevant dates (31.7.25 / 2.8.25), I do not have jurisdiction to make substantive orders under the Children Act 1989, and will therefore dismiss both the father’s and the mother’s C100 applications. Return order – inherent jurisdiction

54. Although the children have been living in Dubai since the “interim return order” made by Mr Justice Garrido on 15.8.25, this was expressly “Without prejudice to either party’s position on jurisdiction or welfare”,and the mother undertook to return the children to England if ordered to do so. The issue of whether there should be a substantive Return Order to Dubai, thus remains live.

55. I therefore need to consider whether Dubai was the children’s “home country” on 8.8.25 (when the inherent jurisdiction application was issued), and if so, to consider whether it is in the children’s best interests to be “returned” there – in practice to continue living there – or for the court to refuse make a Return Order, which would have the practical effect that the children would have to be brought back to England by the mother, in compliance with her undertaking.

56. The father’s strong preference is that the mother and children return to NE England, where he is living and working, so he can resume his role as primary or joint carer of the children. If the mother does not wish to leave her job in Dubai, he is happy to take over the children’s day-to-day care in this country, and in the short-term suggests that he and the children would all live in his mother’s house, and local primary school places would be found for the children. Although he accepts that a move in the middle of the school year would be disruptive to the children, he wants them back in England by the summer 2026.

57. The father’s approach focussed understandably on his own role in the children’s lives, and the difficulty of him spending sufficient time with them when they are living in Dubai. However, it does not take into account the impact on the mother, were she to be required to move to NE England where she now has no home, no job, no family network of her own (being divorced from the father), and few friends. The mother also has significant debt from funding these proceedings, and no savings.

58. As part of discussions over a planned return in the longer-term to England or another European/Hague Convention country by 2027 (as the mother indicated in the schedule to Mr Justice Garrido’s 15.8.25 order), the mother stated at the outset of this final hearing that she now cannot commit to leave Dubai by 2027, because she owes so much money to her employer, her colleague and her mother, and needs to remain in Dubai with her higher tax-free income (and free accommodation), so that she can gradually pay off her debts. After some discussions between Counsel, the father offered to pay 50% of the mother’s debts if she would agree to return to England this summer, although it was unclear where this money would come from (and the father had previously complained that he could not fly to Dubai to spend time with the children, because he did not have enough money). This would still leave the mother in substantial debt, and without accommodation in this country.

59. In the end, no agreement was reached, and I therefore need to consider the mother’s application for a Return Order under the inherent jurisdiction on its merits. Home country – facts and findings

60. The first aspect which the court must consider is whether Dubai was the children’s “home country” in August 2025, and thus whether it would be appropriate to make a Return Order to Dubai.

61. The court is required to consider “the degree of connection of the child with each country” (per Baroness Hale in Re J). “This is not to apply what has become the technical concept of habitual residence, but to ask in a common sense way with which country the child has the closer connection. What is his “home” country? Factors such as his nationality, where he has lived for most of his life, his first language, his race or ethnicity, his religion, his culture and his education will all come into this.”

62. In this case, there are factors pointing both ways: 62.1. The children were born in England and are British nationals (and also French nationals); 62.2. They speak English (and some French, but almost no Arabic, although they are learning this at school in Dubai); 62.3. I am not aware of their religion, which does not feature at all in the evidence; 62.4. Culturally they were fully integrated in England until August 2023, but they have become settled in the cultural life of Dubai since moving there; 62.5. C attended school in England for 1 year for Reception, but since August 2023 has attended school in Dubai; 62.6. D did not attend school in England, and has only attended school in Dubai; 62.7. C was aged 5 when the family moved to Dubai and is now 7½, so she has spent 1/3rd of her life in Dubai; 62.8. D was only 2½ when the family moved, and has spent half of her life in Dubai; given her age on leaving, it is likely that she has little or no memory of her prior life in England; 62.9. They now have a settled home in Dubai (rented by the mother’s employer), but no home of their own in England.

63. Overall, I believe that that by 8.8.25, the children’s “home country” had become Dubai, where they were settled in their lives and school, with their mother, who by then had been their primary carer for nearly a year. Best interests / welfare analysis

64. In considering whether or not to make a Return Order to Dubai, I need to consider whether this is in the children’s best interests, taking their welfare as my paramount consideration. I will use the welfare checklist in s.1(3) Children Act 1989 as a helpful framework to structure this analysis.

65. (a) The ascertainable wishes and feelings of the children concerned (considered in the light of their age and understanding) No CAFCASS report was prepared in this case, and I therefore have no independent evidence of the children’s wishes and feelings. It is the father’s case that C has expressed a wish to return to live in England, and to spend much more time with her father. It is the mother’s case that the children are happy and thriving in Dubai, and want to remain there, at their school and with their friends, continuing their settled life in Dubai. I imagine both of these are true. D was too young to remember her life in England, but C was older when they left and so will have more memories of her prior life. I am sure both children miss their father, who was their primary carer when they were little, while their mother was at work during the week. However, the children also seem happy and settled in Dubai. Their school reports are very good, and I have seen many photographs of their life in Dubai. Given their ages, and the lack of independent evidence of their wishes and feelings, this is not an aspect which will significantly impact on the outcome either way.

66. (b) Their physical, emotional and educational needs Both parents are able to meet the children’s physical and emotional needs. Currently the children’s educational needs are met in Dubai, where they attend a very good private school. Fairly, the mother accepted that they could also receive a good education in England, at a state primary school. However, there would inevitably be disruption caused to the children’s education, by moving schools from Dubai to England.

67. (c) The likely effect on them of any change in their circumstances The children have been living in Dubai since August 2023, where they are settled in their lives, schools and with their friends. Their mother has a settled job, and they are thriving in her care. Moving to NE England would be a significant change. There is also much uncertainty about what their lives in NE England would look like, now that their parents have divorced. The father is living temporarily with his mother, and says that there are enough bedrooms for the children also to live there, but the children have never lived with their paternal grandmother before (except for holiday visits). Longer-term, the father plans to have his own accommodation although the timeframe is unclear, and he may live with his partner, who the children do not know well. He now works full-time and so would not be available to the children in the way he was when they were little, or while he was in Dubai. It is also unclear how or whether the mother could re-establish a life in the NE England. She would have to find a job, a home, and a new support network. She has no family in England, and no savings as a financial safety net (instead, substantial debt). The children’s settled life and schooling in Dubai would end. All this change would significantly impact on the children.

68. (d) Their age, sex, background and any characteristics of theirs which the court considers relevant The children are two girls, aged 5 and 7½, of British and French nationality. There are no other relevant characteristics of which I am aware.

69. (e) Any harm which they have suffered or are at risk of suffering This is not a case where the children have suffered harm in the care of either of their parents.

70. (f) How capable each of their parents is of meeting their needs Both parents are capable of looking after the children, and meeting their day-to-day needs. At different stages over the children’s lives, each has been the children’s primary carer, and both parents have a strong bond with both children.

71. A further factor I need to consider is whether the father would be able to challenge the children’s residence in Dubai through the Dubai courts, if I were to make a Return Order – and if he decided to do so. I also need to consider whether the father is able to ensure that he remains an important part of the children’s lives, if they are not to live near him in NE England.

72. It is clear from the expert evidence of Mr Byron James that the parties can lodge with the Dubai court an agreement that they have joint custody of the children, making provision for agreed time that the children should spend with their father, and also indirect contact. If done by consent, it is very likely that the Dubai court will make a judgment in these terms, which would then be fully enforceable in Dubai. I bear in mind that the father is not an Arabic speaker, and so would realistically need to obtain the assistance of a Dubai lawyer to enforce such an order for which he would have to pay, but the father works full-time, and believed that he could swiftly raise several thousands of pounds by borrowing from family, to assist the mother to pay off her debts.

73. Having carefully considered the mother’s evidence, both written and oral, I believe that she does understand the significant importance of the children maintaining a close relationship with their father. She facilitates indirect contact three times a week, and agrees to continue to do so. The father has not visited Dubai since he left on 1.9.24, but the mother encouraged him to do this, including in Spring 2025 (when she delayed her own family making plans to visit, while the father was deciding whether he would go) and in October 2025 (agreed in the 15.8.25 order, but the father did not go). The mother has twice taken the children to England to spend time with their father, at her own expense (and using the annual flights she receives from her employer), in the summer 2025 and over Christmas 2025. She accepted that she should also have prioritised taking the children to see their father at Christmas 2024, rather than only visiting her family in France.

74. The mother agrees that the parties should obtain by consent a joint custody order in Dubai, but wished for this to be at their joint expense, given the level of her debt. She agrees that the children should spend at least half of all holidays with the father (in particular, she offered more than equal time in the summer holidays, if the father wishes and is able to take this up). She agrees to pay for one of their flights to England (using her flight allowance), and said she would do what she can to contribute financially to another flight each year. She encouraged the father to fly to see the children in Dubai, including in term-time so that he can have some involvement in their school lives. She agrees to continue facilitating video contact, at least three times a week.

75. The father pointed to his limited financial means, and full-time job with only four weeks of holiday a year, as a bar to him spending time with the children in Dubai, but hopefully over time he will be able to save enough money to visit them there, particularly at non-peak times of the year when flights will be less expensive. I am also satisfied that the mother will ensure that the children spend time in England with their father, particularly in the long summer holidays and during the Christmas holidays.

76. Overall, and taking into account the children’s welfare in the broadest sense, I am satisfied that it is their best interests for the court to make a Return Order under the inherent jurisdiction, to Dubai. Conclusion: Orders and conditions

77. I have therefore decided to make the following orders: 77.1. Both parties’ applications under the Children Act 1989 for CAO, SIO and PSO are dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 77.2. Pursuant to the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction, there should be a Return Order for the children to Dubai, subject to the following conditions: 77.2.1. The parties shall cooperate forthwith to agree and lodge a consent application with the Dubai court, providing for joint custody of the children, at their joint expense; 77.2.2. The children will live with their mother in Dubai, while she remains resident there and while the father lives in England; 77.2.3. The father should spend at least 50% of the long school holidays with the children, with the summer holiday and Christmas holiday to be in England, and the Easter holiday in Dubai (if the father can afford to go). The father must notify the mother not less than 3 months in advance, if he does not intend to take up the Dubai Easter holiday contact; 77.2.4. Christmas Day should alternate between the parents, each year; 77.2.5. The mother should fund the costs of the children’s summer holiday flights to England (using her employment flight allowance); 77.2.6. The parents should contribute equally to the cost of the children’s Christmas holiday flights to England; 77.2.7. The Christmas and summer holiday dates should be agreed not less than 6 months in advance, so that flights can be booked in good time. In default of agreement on dates, these holidays will be divided in half, and the parties will alternate each year whether they have the first half or the second half (but ensuring that the mother is able to be back in Dubai with the children in good time for pre-term preparations in August); 77.2.8. The children should have indirect contact with the father not less than three times a week while they are in Dubai, on days/times to be agreed. 77.3. Permission is granted to the parties to disclose the written material in these proceedings, including this Judgment and the final order, for the purpose of any court proceedings in the UAE. 77.4. The father’s solicitors should forthwith release the £5,000 held by them (pursuant to the 15.8.25 order), to the mother. 77.5. The mother is released from the undertakings she gave to Mr Justice Garrido on 15.8.25, to return the children to England and Wales, and to obtain an interim “mirror order” in Dubai. 77.6. No order as to costs save for the necessary assessment of the father’s legally aided costs.

78. I would be grateful if Counsel could draw up a final order for the court’s approval. 6 March 2026